Credit default swap spreads and variance risk premia

We find that the firm-level variance risk premium has a prominent explanatory power for credit spreads in the presence of market- and firm-level control variables established in the existing literature. Such predictability complements that of the leading state variable—the leverage ratio—and strengthens significantly with a lower firm credit rating, longer credit contract maturity, and model-free implied variance. We provide further evidence that (1) the variance risk premium has a cleaner systematic component than implied variance or expected variance, (2) the cross-section of firms’ variance risk premia capture systematic variance risk in a stronger way than firms’ equity returns in capturing market return risk, and (3) a structural model with stochastic volatility can reproduce the predictability pattern of variance risk premia for credit spreads.     

Arbitrage-free credit pricing using default probabilities and risk sensitivities

The relation between physical probabilities (rating) and risk-neutral probabilities (pricing) is derived in a large market with a quasi-factor structure. Factor sensitivities and default probabilities are obtainable for all kinds of credits on historical rating data. Since factor prices can be backed out from market data, the model allows the pricing of non-marketable credits and structured products thereof. The model explains various empirical observations: credit spreads of equally rated borrowers differ, spreads are wider than implied by expected losses, and expected returns on CDOs must be greater than their rating matched, single-obligor securities due to the inherent systematic risk.     

The use of credit default swaps by bond mutual funds: Liquidity provision and counterparty risk

Corporate bond mutual funds increased their selling of credit protection in the credit default swaps (CDS) market during the 2007–2008 financial crisis. This trading activity was primarily in multi-name CDS, greater among larger and established funds, and directed toward counterparty dealers in financial distress. Funds that sold credit protection during the crisis experienced greater credit market risk and superior post-crisis performance, consistent with higher expected returns from liquidity provision. Funds using Lehman Brothers as a counterparty experienced abnormal outflows and returns of –2% immediately following Lehman's bankruptcy, suggesting that funds’ opportunistic trading in CDS exposed investors to counterparty risk.     

Liquidity risk and expected corporate bond returns

This paper studies the pricing of liquidity risk in the cross section of corporate bonds for the period from January 1994 to March 2009. The average return on bonds with high sensitivities to aggregate liquidity exceeds that for bonds with low sensitivities by about 4% annually. The positive relation between expected corporate bond returns and liquidity beta is robust to the effects of default and term betas, liquidity level, and other bond characteristics, as well as to different model specifications, test methodologies, and a variety of liquidity measures. The results suggest that liquidity risk is an important determinant of expected corporate bond returns.     

Market conditions,default risk and credit spreads

This study empirically examines the impact of the interaction between market and default risk on corporate credit spreads. Using credit default swap (CDS) spreads, we find that average credit spreads decrease in GDP growth rate, but increase in GDP growth volatility and jump risk in the equity market. At the market level, investor sentiment is the most important determinant of credit spreads. At the firm level, credit spreads generally rise with cash flow volatility and beta, with the effect of cash flow beta varying with market conditions. We identify implied volatility as the most significant determinant of default risk among firm-level characteristics. Overall, a major portion of individual credit spreads is accounted for by firm-level determinants of default risk, while macroeconomic variables are directly responsible for a lesser portion.     

Distress risk premia in expected stock and bond returns

Prior studies find that shareholders’ strategic actions over debtholders are significant for stock prices but not for bond prices. I find that for firms with private and public debt, strategic default has no significant effect on distress risk premia in expected stock or bond returns, suggesting that the dispersion of bondholders greatly weakens the shareholder advantage effect. The shareholder advantage effect on stock prices is only significant for firms with only private debt and to some degree affected by the dispersion of stockholders and complexity in capital structure. Overall, renegotiation friction helps explain the cross-sectional implications of strategic default for stock and bond prices.     

International evidence on bond risk premia

This paper revisits the study of time-varying excess bond returns in international bond markets. Using newly available yield curve data from 10 different countries with independent monetary policy, I test the robustness of Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005). For most countries in my sample, I find more modest predictive power for forward rates than originally found by Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) for the US. Their single-factor model captures well the predictability in international data, and this factor also tends to have a tent-shape in most countries of my sample. CP factors are more idiosyncratic across countries than yields or forward rates. Finally, I show that the recent financial crisis has significantly affected the predictability of excess bond returns.     

The impact of credit rating announcements on credit default swap spreads

We document the ability of the credit default swap (CDS) market to anticipate favorable as well as unfavorable credit rating change (RC) announcements based on more extensive samples of credit rating events and CDS spreads than previous studies. We obtain four new results. In contrast to prior published studies, we find that corporate RC upgrades do have a significant impact on CDS spreads even though they are still not as well anticipated as downgrades. Second, CreditWatch (CW) and Outlook (OL) announcements, after controlling for prior credit rating events, lead to significant CARs at the time positive CW and OL credit rating events are announced. Third, we extend prior results by showing that changes in CDS spreads for non-investment-grade credits contain information useful for estimating the probability of negative credit rating events. Fourth, we find that the CDS spread impact of upgrades but not downgrades is magnified during recessions and that upgrades and downgrades also differ as to the impact of simultaneous CW/OL announcements, investment-grade/speculative-grade crossovers, current credit rating, market volatility, and industry effects.     

Varying risk premia in international bond markets

Cochrane and Piazzesi [Cochrane, J.H., Piazzesi, M., 2005. Bond risk premia. American Economic Review 95, 138–160] use forward rates to forecast future bond returns. We extend their approach by applying their model to international bond markets. Our results indicate that the unrestricted Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) model has a reasonable forecasting power for future bond returns. The restricted model, however, does not perform as well on an international level. Furthermore, we cannot confirm the systematic tent shape of the estimated parameters found by Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005). The forecasting models are used to implement various trading strategies. These strategies exhibit high information ratios when implemented in individual countries or on an international level and outperform alternative approaches. We introduce an alternative specification to forecast future bond returns and achieve superior risk-adjusted returns in our trading strategy. Bayesian model averaging is used to enhance the performance of the proposed trading strategy.     

The impact of central clearing on counterparty risk,liquidity, and trading: Evidence from the credit default swap market

This paper examines the impact of central clearing on the credit default swap (CDS) market using a sample of voluntarily cleared single-name contracts. Consistent with central clearing reducing counterparty risk, CDS spreads increase around the commencement of central clearing and are lower than settlement spreads published by the central clearinghouse. Furthermore, the relation between CDS spreads and dealer credit risk weakens after central clearing begins, suggesting a lowering of systemic risk. These findings are robust to controls for frictions in both CDS and bond markets. Finally, matched sample analysis reveals that the increased post-trade transparency following central clearing is associated with an improvement in liquidity and trading activity.     

Internal liquidity risk,financial bullwhip effects,and corporate bond yield spreads: Supply chain perspectives

This study explores internal liquidity risk (ILR) and financial bullwhip effects on corporate bond yield spreads along supply chain counterparties by employing American market data from year 1997 to 2008. This study finds that the ILRs of suppliers and customers positively affect a firm’s bond yield spreads and the effects of customers’ ILRs are greater. This research also finds a financial bullwhip effect that the ILR effect becomes greater upwardly along the supply chain counterparties. The results are robust when controlling for well-known spread determinant variables.     

Liquidity risk of corporate bond returns: conditional approach

We study the exposure of the US corporate bond returns to liquidity shocks of stocks and Treasury bonds over the period 1973–2007 in a regime-switching model. In one regime, liquidity shocks have mostly insignificant effects on bond prices, whereas in another regime, a rise in illiquidity produces significant but conflicting effects: Prices of investment-grade bonds rise while prices of speculative-grade (junk) bonds fall substantially (relative to the market). Relating the probability of these regimes to macroeconomic conditions we find that the second regime can be predicted by economic conditions that are characterized as “stress.” These effects, which are robust to controlling for other systematic risks (term and default), suggest the existence of time-varying liquidity risk of corporate bond returns conditional on episodes of flight to liquidity. Our model can predict the out-of-sample bond returns for the stress years 2008–2009. We find a similar pattern for stocks classified by high or low book-to-market ratio, where again, liquidity shocks play a special role in periods characterized by adverse economic conditions.     

Macro-finance VARs and bond risk premia: A caveat

At the turn of the century, US and euro area long-term bond yields experienced a remarkable decline and remained at historically low levels despite rising short-term rates (the so called “conundrum”). Estimating macro-finance VARs and no-arbitrage term structure models, many researchers find that the decline in long-term rates was primarily driven by an unprecedented reduction in risk premia. I show that this result might be an artefact of the class of models employed to study the phenomenon.     

The impact of European bank mergers on bidder default risk

We analyze the implications of European bank consolidation on the default risk of acquiring banks. For a sample of 134 bidding banks, we employ the Merton distance to default model to show that, on average, bank mergers are risk neutral. However, for relatively safe banks, mergers generate a significant increase in default risk. This result is particularly pronounced for cross-border and activity-diversifying deals as well as for deals completed under weak bank regulatory regimes. Also, large deals, which pose organizational and procedural hurdles, experience a merger-related increase in default risk. Our results cast doubt on the ability of bank merger activity to exert a risk-reducing and stabilizing effect on the European banking industry.     

The increasing default risk of US Treasury securities due to the financial crisis

This paper examines the impact of the current financial crisis on long-term US Treasury yields by testing the impact of a series of events from December 2007 to March 2009 on the spread between 10-year USD LIBOR swap and 10-year US Treasury (constant maturity) rates to measure risk associated with Treasuries. Controlling for the liquidity of the two markets, the default risk of the swap, and the net foreign purchases of Treasury securities, we find that 13 of the tested 20 events have significantly negative coefficients. We conclude that the lower spread is consistent with greater default risk for US Treasury securities.     

The delivery option in credit default swaps

Under standard assumptions the reduced-form credit risk model is not capable of accurately pricing the two fundamental credit risk instruments – bonds and credit default swaps (CDS) – simultaneously. Using a data set of euro-denominated corporate bonds and CDS our paper quantifies this mispricing by calibrating such a model to bond data, and subsequently using it to price CDS, resulting in model CDS spreads up to 50% lower on average than observed in the market. An extended model is presented which includes the delivery option implicit in CDS contracts emerging since a basket of bonds is deliverable in default. By using a constant recovery rate standard models assume equal recoveries for all bonds and hence zero value for the delivery option. Contradicting this common assumption, case studies of Chapter 11 filings presented in the paper show that corporate bonds do not necessarily trade at equal levels following default. Our extension models the implied expected recovery rate of the cheapest-to-deliver bond and, applied to data, largely eliminates the mispricing. Calibrated recovery values lie between 8% and 47% for different obligors, exhibiting strong variation among rating classes and industries. A cross-sectional analysis reveals that the implied recovery parameter depends on proxies for the delivery option, primarily the number of available bonds and bond pricing errors. No evidence is found for a direct influence of the bid-ask spread, notional amount, coupon, or rating used as proxies for bond market liquidity.     

Liquidity,default, taxes,and yields on municipal bonds

We examine the effects of liquidity, default and personal taxes on the relative yields of Treasuries and municipals using a generalized model with liquidity risk. The municipal yield model includes liquidity as a state factor. Using a unique transaction dataset, we estimate the liquidity risk of municipals and its effect on bond yields. Empirical evidence shows that municipal bond yields are strongly affected by all three factors. The effects of default and liquidity risk on municipal yields increase with maturity and credit risk. Liquidity premium accounts for about 9–13% of municipal yields for AAA bonds, 9–15% for AA/A bonds and 8–19% for BBB bonds. A substantial portion of the maturity spread between long- and short-maturity municipal bonds is attributed to the liquidity premium. Ignoring the liquidity risk effect thus results in a severe underestimation of municipal bond yields. Conditional on the effects of default and liquidity risk, we obtain implicit tax rates very close to the statutory tax rates of high-income individuals and institutional investors. Furthermore, these implicit income tax rates are quite stable across bonds of different maturities. Results show that including liquidity risk in the municipal bond pricing model helps explain the muni puzzle.     

Endogenizing exogenous default barrier models: The MM algorithm

In this paper, we propose a Maximization–Maximization (MM) algorithm for the assessment of hidden parameters in structural credit risk models. Step M1 updates the value, volatility, and expected return on the firm’s assets by maximizing the log-likelihood function for the time series of equity prices; Step M2 updates the default barrier by maximizing the equity holders’ participation in the firm’s asset value. The main contribution of the method lies in the M2 step, which allows for ‘endogenizing’ the default barrier in light of actual data on equity prices. Using a large international sample of companies, we demonstrate that theoretical credit spreads based on the MM algorithm offer the lowest CDS pricing errors when compared to other, traditional default barrier specifications: smooth-pasting condition value, maximum likelihood estimate, KMV’s default point, and nominal debt.     

Mergers increase default risk

We examine the impact of mergers on default risk. Despite the potential for asset diversification, we find that, on average, a merger increases the default risk of the acquiring firm. This result cannot solely be explained by the tendency for generally safe acquirers to purchase riskier targets or by the tendency of acquiring firms to increase leverage post-merger. Our evidence suggests that managerial motivations may play an important role. In particular, we find larger merger-related increases in risk at firms where CEOs have large option-based compensation, where recent stock performance is poor, and where idiosyncratic equity volatility is high. These results suggest that the increased default risk may arise from aggressive managerial actions affecting risk enough to outweigh the strong risk-reducing asset diversification expected from a typical merger.     

The role of time value in convertible bond call policy

Since the seminal work of Ingersoll (1977b) the optimal time in which a firm should redeem its outstanding convertible bonds has received large attention by the financial literature. Several studies have put forward a number of possible costs and benefits for a firm if it interrupts the life of its convertible bonds prior to their contractual maturity. However, in this paper we argue that the managerial decision to call back a convertible bond is mainly driven by a fundamental variable almost neglected up until now: the time value extraction from bondholders’ conversion option. Accordingly, we propose a measure for the effective convenience of calling—which we define as net time value advantage—and we show, using a survival analysis, that it is more effective than previously proposed measures in explaining the firms’ observed call policy.