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1.
Hutton A 《Harvard business review》2001,79(5):125-32, 166
Managers fail to communicate effectively with Wall Street for all sorts of reasons. But neglecting the investment community--particularly the analysts whose opinions shape the market and whose recommendations often make or break a company's share price--can knock the most carefully conceived and brilliantly executed strategy off course. The companies that struggle the most with providing good information to analysts are those in rapidly evolving industries, where the gap between traditional performance metrics and economic realities is at its widest. In these industries, a company's strategy and the variables that govern its performance can change radically in a short time. What's more, the metrics used to report performance often fail to capture the drivers of value in today's information economy. Few accounting measures are helpful when it comes to assessing the intangible assets--knowledge, skilled employees, and so forth--on which many of today's fastest-growing companies build their strategies. According to Amy Hutton, an associate professor at Harvard Business School, there are four basic rules for clear communications with Wall Street. First, make sure that your company's financial reporting reflects your strategy as closely as possible. Second, popularize the nonfinancial metrics that best predict--and flatter--the performance of your businesses. Third, appoint managers with recognized credibility to your strategic operations. Finally, cultivate the market experts who cover the industries in which you seek to compete. Hutton shows how AOL successfully followed these rules as it significantly changed its strategic direction and competitive arena.  相似文献   

2.
Coming up short on nonfinancial performance measurement   总被引:4,自引:0,他引:4  
Companies in increasing numbers are measuring customer loyalty, employee satisfaction, and other nonfinancial areas of performance that they believe affect profitability. But they've failed to relate these measures to their strategic goals or establish a connection between activities undertaken and financial outcomes achieved. Failure to make such connections has led many companies to misdirect their investments and reward ineffective managers. Extensive field research now shows that businesses make some common mistakes when choosing, analyzing, and acting on their nonfinancial measures. Among these mistakes: They set the wrong performance targets because they focus too much on short-term financial results, and they use metrics that lack strong statistical validity and reliability. As a result, the companies can't demonstrate that improvements in nonfinancial measures actually affect their financial results. The authors lay out a series of steps that will allow companies to realize the genuine promise of nonfinancial performance measures. First, develop a model that proposes a causal relationship between the chosen nonfinancial drivers of strategic success and specific outcomes. Next, take careful inventory of all the data within your company. Then use established statistical methods for validating the assumed relationships and continue to test the model as market conditions evolve. Finally, base action plans on analysis of your findings, and determine whether those plans and their investments actually produce the desired results. Nonfinancial measures will offer little guidance unless you use a process for choosing and analyzing them that relies on sophisticated quantitative and qualitative inquiries into the factors actually contributing to economic results.  相似文献   

3.
There is a disconnect in most companies between strategy formulation and strategy execution. On average, 95% of a company's employees are unaware of, or do not understand, its strategy. If employees are unaware of the strategy, they surely cannot help the organization implement it effectively. It doesn't have to be like this. For the past 15 years, the authors have studied companies that achieved performance breakthroughs by adopting the Balanced Scorecard and its associated tools to help them better communicate strategy to their employees and to guide and monitor the execution of that strategy. Some companies, of course, have achieved better, longer-lasting improvements than others. The organizations that have managed to sustain their strategic focus have typically established a new corporate-level unit to oversee all activities related to strategy: an office of strategy management (OS M). The OSM, in effect, acts as the CEO's chief of staff. It coordinates an array of tasks: communicating corporate strategy; ensuring that enterprise-level plans are translated into the plans of the various units and departments; executing strategic initiatives to deliver on the grand design; aligning employees' plans for competency development with strategic objectives; and testing and adapting the strategy to stay abreast of the competition. The OSM does not do all the work, but it facilitates the processes so that strategy is executed in an integrated fashion across the enterprise. Although the companies that Kaplan and Norton studied use the Balanced Scorecard as the framework for their strategy management systems, the authors say the lessons of the OSM are applicable even to companies that do not use it.  相似文献   

4.
Charting your company's future   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
Few companies have a clear strategic vision. The problem, say the authors, stems from the strategic-planning process itself, which usually involves preparing a large document, culled from a mishmash of data provided by people with conflicting agendas. That kind of process almost guarantees an unfocused strategy. Instead, companies should design the strategic-planning process by drawing a picture: a strategy canvas. A strategy canvas shows the strategic profile of your industry by depicting the various factors that affect competition. And it shows the strategic profiles of your current and potential competitors as well as your own company's strategic profile--how it invests in the factors of competition and how it might in the future. The basic component of a strategy canvas--the value curve--is a tool the authors created in their consulting work and have written about in previous HBR articles. This article introduces a four-step process for actually drawing and discussing a strategy canvas. Readers will learn how one European financial services company used this process to create a distinct and easily communicable strategy. The process begins with a visual awakening. Managers compare their business's value curve with competitors' to discover where their strategy needs to change. In the next step--visual exploration--managers do field research on customers and alternative products. At the visual strategy fair, the third step, managers draw new strategic profiles based on field observations and get feedback from customers and peers about these new proposals. Once the best strategy is created from that feedback, it's time for the last step--visual communication. Executives distribute "before" and "after" strategic profiles to the whole company, and only projects that will help move the company closer to the "after" profile are supported.  相似文献   

5.
Business model (BM) and strategy disclosures could provide investors with relevant information. This study offers a platform for future research on BM and strategy disclosure and is the first to analyse the change in BM and strategy disclosures after the introduction of an integrated reporting (IR) requirement, to propose a framework for disclosure quality analyses, and to analyse how companies disclose the relationship between their BM and strategy. The findings show that BMs and strategy were not disclosed before the requirement to publish an integrated report in South Africa, but were disclosed thereafter. By 2014, companies used diagrams, flow charts, and informative narratives of business plans and value chains. Companies now disclose their strategic goals more transparently, but still do not link these goals to BMs, key performance indicators, risks or opportunities. The findings provide insight into disclosures that improved since the IR requirement and matters that are still not fully disclosed, which would be of interest to regulators tasked with investor protection.  相似文献   

6.
Hughes J  Weiss J 《Harvard business review》2007,85(11):122-6, 128, 130-1 passim
Corporate alliances are growing in number--by about 25% a year--and account for up to a third of revenues and value at many companies. Yet some 60% to 70% of them fail. What is going wrong? Because alliances involve interdependence between companies that may be competitors and may also have vastly different operating styles and cultures, they demand more care and handling than other business arrangements, say Hughes and Weiss, management consultants at Vantage Partners. The authors have developed five principles--based on their two decades of work with alliances -to complement the conventional advice on alliance management: (1) Focus less on defining the business plan and more on how you and your partner will work together. (2) Develop metrics pegged not only to alliance goals but also to performance in working toward them. (3) Instead of trying to eliminate differences, leverage them to create value. (4) Go beyond formal systems and structures to enable and encourage collaborative behavior. (5) Be as diligent in managing your internal stakeholders as you are in managing the relationship with your partner. Companies that have adopted these principles have radically improved their alliance success rate. Schering-Plough, for example, engages in a systematic "alliance relationship launch": four to six weeks of meetings at which the partners explore potential challenges, examine key differences and develop shared protocols for managing them, and establish mechanisms for day-to-day decision making. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida measures the quality of alliance progress through regular surveys of both its own staff and its partners'. These companies have learned that the conventional advice is not so much wrong as incomplete. The five simple rules can help fill in the blanks.  相似文献   

7.
From the experience of a cross-section of Fortune "500" companies and top nonindustrials, these authors develop a profile of the newer types of health plans and benefits designed to cut health care costs. After examining the various plans, their funding, and their results, however, the authors conclude that another form of health insurance, more like other kinds of insurance policies that cover only catastrophic events, is the most promising from all points of view. In a second article, Regina Herzlinger will examine corporate efforts to reshape the system of supplying health care.  相似文献   

8.
Strategy as ecology   总被引:41,自引:0,他引:41  
Microsoft's and Wal-Mart's preeminence in modern business has been attributed to any number of factors--from the vision and drive of their founders to the companies' aggressive competitive practices. But the authors maintain that the success realized by these two very different companies is due only partly to the organizations themselves; a bigger factor is the success of the networks of companies with which Microsoft and Wal-Mart do business. Most companies today inhabit ecosystems--loose networks of suppliers, distributors, and outsourcers; makers of related products or services; providers of relevant technology; and other organizations that affect, and are affected by, the creation and delivery of a company's own offering. Despite being increasingly central to modern business, ecosystems are still poorly understood and even more poorly managed. The analogy between business networks and biological ecosystems can aid this understanding by vividly highlighting certain pivotal concepts. The moves that a company makes will, to varying degrees, affect the health of its business network, which in turn will ultimately affect the organization's performance--for ill as well as for good. Because a company, like an individual species in a biological ecosystem, ultimately shares its fate with the network as a whole, smart firms pursue strategies that will benefit everyone. So how can you promote the health and the stability of your own ecosystem, determine your place in it, and develop a strategy to match your role, thereby helping to ensure your company's well-being? It depends on your role--current and potential--within the network. Is your company a niche player, a keystone, or a dominator? The answer to this question may be different for different parts of your business. It may also change as your ecosystem changes. Knowing what to do requires understanding the ecosystem and your organization's role in it.  相似文献   

9.
Strategy as revolution   总被引:17,自引:0,他引:17  
How often does the strategic-planning process start with senior executives asking what the rest of the organization can teach them about the future? Not often enough, argues Gary Hamel. In many companies, strategy making is an elitist procedure and ?strategy? consists of nothing more than following the industry's rules. But more and more companies, intent on overturning the industrial order, are rewriting those rules. What can industry incumbents do? Either surrender the future to revolutionary challengers or revolutionize the way their companies create strategy. What is needed is not a tweak to the traditional strategic-planning process, Hamel says, but a new philosophical foundation: strategy is revolution. Hamel offers ten principles to help a company think about the challenge of creating truly revolutionary strategies. Perhaps the most fundamental principle is that so-called strategic planning doesn't produce true strategic innovation. The traditional planning process is little more than a rote procedure in which deeply held assumptions and industry conventions are reinforced rather than challenged. Such a process harnesses only a tiny proportion of an organization's creative potential. If there is to be any hope of industry revolution, senior managers must give up their monopoly on the creation of strategy. They must embrace a truly democratic process that can give voice to the revolutionaries that exist in every company. If senior managers are unwilling to do this, employees must become strategy activists. The opportunities for industry revolution are mostly unexplored. One thing is certain: if you don't let the revolutionaries challenge you from within, they will eventually challenge you from without--in the marketplace.  相似文献   

10.
Ready DA 《Harvard business review》2004,82(12):92-100, 149
Few leaders excel at both the unit and enterprise levels. More than ever, though, corporations need people capable of running business units, functions, or regions and focusing on broader company goals. It's up to organizations to develop leaders who can manage the inherent tensions between unit and enterprise priorities. Take the example of RBC Financial Group, one of the largest, most profitable companies in Canada. In the mid-1990's, RBC revamped its competitive strategy in a couple of ways. After the government announced that the Big Six banks in Canada could neither merge with nor acquire one another, RBC decided to grow through cross-border acquisitions. Additionally, because customers were starting to seek bundled products and services, RBC reached across its traditional stand-alone businesses to offer integrated solutions. These changes in strategy didn't elicit immediate companywide support. Instinctively, employees reacted against what would amount to a delicate balancing act: They would have to lift their focus out of their silos while continuing to meet unit goals. However, by communicating extensively with staff members, cross-fertilizing talent across unit boundaries, and targeting rewards to shape performance, RBC was able to cultivate rising leaders with the unit expertise and the enterprise vision to help the company fulfill its new aims. Growing such well-rounded leaders takes sustained effort because unit-enterprise tensions are quite real. Three common conditions reinforce these tensions. First, most organizational structures foster silo thinking and unimaginative career paths. Second, most companies lack venues for airing and resolving conflicts that arise when there are competing priorities. Third, many have misguided reward systems that pit unit performance against enterprise considerations. Such long-established patterns of organizational behavior are tough to break. Fortunately, as RBC discovered, people can be trained to think and work differently.  相似文献   

11.
How valuable is word of mouth?   总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2  
Kumar V  Petersen JA  Leone RP 《Harvard business review》2007,85(10):139-44, 146, 166
The customers who buy the most from you are probably not your best marketers. What's more, your best marketers may be worth far more to your company than your most enthusiastic consumers. Those are the conclusions of professors Kumar and Petersen at the University of Connecticut and professor Leone at Ohio State University, who analyzed thousands of customers in research focused on a telecommunications company and a financial services firm. In this article, the authors present a straightforward tool that can be used to calculate both customer lifetime value (CLV), the worth of your customers' purchases, and customer referral value (CRV), the value of their referrals. Knowing both enables you to segment your customers into four constituent parts: those that buy a lot but are poor marketers (which they term Affluents); those that don't buy much but are very strong salespeople for your firm (Advocates); those that do both well (Champions); and those that do neither well (Misers). In a series of one-year experiments, the authors demonstrated the effectiveness of this segmentation approach. Offering purchasing incentives to Advocates, referral incentives to Affluents, and both to Misers, they were able to move significant proportions of all three into the Champions category. Both companies reaped returns on their marketing investments greater than 12-fold--more than double the normal marketing ROI for their industries. The power of this tool is its ability to help marketers decide where to focus their efforts. Rather than waste funds encouraging big spenders to spend slightly more while overlooking the power of customer evangelists who don't buy enough to seem important, you can reap much higher rewards by nudging big spenders to make referrals and urging enthusiastic proponents of your wares to buy a bit more.  相似文献   

12.
A 2004 McKinsey survey of more than 30 companies reveals that at least 70% of them have major alliances that are underperforming and in need of restructuring. Moreover, JVs that broaden or otherwise adjust their scope have a 79% success rate, versus 33% for ventures that remain essentially unchanged. Yet most firms don't routinely evaluate the need to overhaul their alliances or intervene to correct performance problems. That means corporations are missing huge opportunities: By revamping just one large alliance, a company can generate 100 million dololars to 300 million dollars in extra income a year. Here's how to unlock more value from alliances: (1) Launch the process. Don't wait until your venture is in the middle of a crisis; regularly scan your major alliances to determine which need restructuring. Once you've targeted one, designate a restructuring team and find a senior sponsor to push the process along. Then delineate the scope of the team's work. (2) Diagnose performance. Evaluate the venture on the following performance dimensions: ownership and financials, strategy, operations, governance, and organization and talent. Identify the root causes of the venture's problems, not just the symptoms, and estimate how much each problem is costing the company. (3) Generate restructuring options. Based on the diagnosis, decide whether to fix, grow, or exit the alliance. Assuming the answer is fix or grow, determine whether fundamental or incremental changes are needed, using the five performance dimensions above as a framework. Then assemble three or four packages of restructuring options, test them with shareholders, and gain parents' approval. (4) Execute the changes. Embark on a widespread and consistent communication effort, building support among executives in the JV and the parent companies. So the process stays on track, assign accountability to certain groups or individuals.  相似文献   

13.
This article summarizes the findings of research the author has conducted over the past seven years that aims to answer a number of questions about institutional investors: Are there significant differences among institutional investors in time horizon and other trading practices that would enable such investors to be classified into types on the basis of their observable behavior? Assuming the answer to the first is yes, do corporate managers respond differently to the pressures created by different types of investors– and, by implication, are certain kinds of investors more desirable from corporate management's point of view? What kinds of companies tend to attract each type of investor, and how does a company's disclosure policy affect that process? The author's approach identifies three categories of institutional investors: (1) “transient” institutions, which exhibit high portfolio turnover and own small stakes in portfolio companies; (2) “dedicated” holders, which provide stable ownership and take large positions in individual firms; and (3) “quasi‐indexers,” which also trade infrequently but own small stakes (similar to an index strategy). As might be expected, the disproportionate presence of transient institutions in a company's investor base appears to intensify pressure for short‐term performance while also resulting in excess volatility in the stock price. Also not surprising, transient investors are attracted to companies with investor relations activities geared toward forward‐looking information and “news events,” like management earnings forecasts, that constitute trading opportunities for such investors. By contrast, quasi‐indexers and dedicated institutions are largely insensitive to shortterm performance and their presence is associated with lower stock price volatility. The research also suggests that companies that focus their disclosure activities on historical information as opposed to earnings forecasts tend to attract quasi‐indexers instead of transient investors. In sum, the author's research suggests that changes in disclosure practices have the potential to shift the composition of a firm's investor base away from transient investors and toward more patient capital. By removing some of the external pressures for short‐term performance, such a shift could encourage managers to establish a culture based on long‐run value maximization.  相似文献   

14.
Everybody loves the stories of heroes like Martin Luther King, Jr., Mother Teresa, and Gandhi. But the heroic model of moral leadership usually doesn't work in the corporate world. Modesty and restraint are largely responsible for the achievements of the most effective moral leaders in business. The author, a specialist in business ethics, says the quiet leaders he has studied follow four basic rules in meeting ethical challenges and making decisions. The rules constitute an important resource for executives who want to encourage the development of such leaders among their middle managers. The first rule is "Put things off till tomorrow." The passage of time allows turbulent waters to calm and lets leaders' moral instincts emerge. "Pick your battles" means that quiet leaders don't waste political capital on fights they can't win; they save it for occasions when they really want to fight. "Bend the rules, don't break them" sounds easier than it is--bending the rules in order to resolve a complicated situation requires imagination, discipline, restraint, flexibility, and entrepreneurship. The fourth rule, "Find a compromise," reflects the author's finding that quiet leaders try not to see situations as polarized tests of ethical principles. These individuals work hard to craft compromises that are "good enough"--responsible and workable enough--to satisfy themselves, their companies, and their customers. The vast majority of difficult problems are solved through the consistent striving of people working far from the limelight. Their quiet approach to leadership doesn't inspire, thrill, or provide story lines for uplifting TV shows. But the unglamorous efforts of quiet leaders make a tremendous difference every day in the corporate world.  相似文献   

15.
The innovation value chain   总被引:17,自引:0,他引:17  
The challenges of coming up with fresh ideas and realizing profits from them are different for every company. One firm may excel at finding good ideas but may have weak systems for bringing them to market. Another organization may have a terrific process for funding and rolling out new products and services but a shortage of concepts to develop. In this article, Hansen and Birkinshaw caution executives against using the latest and greatest innovation approaches and tools without understanding the unique deficiencies in their companies' innovation systems. They offer a framework for evaluating innovation performance: the innovation value chain. It comprises the three main phases of innovation (idea generation, conversion, and diffusion) as well as the critical activities performed during those phases (looking for ideas inside your unit; looking for them in other units; looking for them externally; selecting ideas; funding them; and promoting and spreading ideas companywide). Using this framework, managers get an end-to-end view of their innovation efforts. They can pinpoint their weakest links and tailor innovation best practices appropriately to strengthen those links. Companies typically succumb to one of three broad "weakest-link" scenarios. They are idea poor, conversion poor, or diffusion poor. The article looks at the ways smart companies - including Intuit, P&G, Sara Lee, Shell, and Siemens- modify the best innovation practices and apply them to address those organizations' individual needs and flaws. The authors warn that adopting the chain-based view of innovation requires new measures of what can be delivered by each link in the chain. The approach also entails new roles for employees "external scouts" and "internal evangelists," for example. Indeed, in their search for new hires, companies should seek out those candidates who can help address particular weaknesses in the innovation value chain.  相似文献   

16.
In an article published in this journal two years ago titled "Just Say No to Wall Street," Harvard's Michael Jensen and The Monitor Group's CEO Joseph Fuller urged companies to put an end to what they called the "earnings guidance game." Instead of earnings forecasts, Jensen and Fuller recommended that companies provide investors with information about their strategic goals and value drivers, and about the risks associated with carrying out those goals and management's plans to manage those risks.
In this roundtable, a group of corporate executives, equity analysts, and academics explore the possibility that companies can increase their values by resisting the temptation to "manage" earnings, committing to expanded disclosure, and engaging investors in a more strategic dialogue. By establishing such a dialogue, companies may be able to break out of the current "bad equilibrium" in which markets distrust managers and managers distrust markets.  相似文献   

17.
杨青  吉赟  王亚男 《金融研究》2019,465(3):168-188
本文搜集了2006-2016年中国201个地级市高铁开通的情况,并匹配了A股1,244家上市公司的面板数据,利用双重差分(DID)模型,研究了高铁开通对证券分析师盈余预测的影响。研究结果显示:高铁通车之后,分析师盈余预测的精准度显著提升,分歧度和乐观度显著下降。进一步考察高铁发挥作用的内在机制,发现高铁开通显著增加了对沿线公司进行实地调研的分析师数量及人均调研次数。高铁开通对分析师盈余预测的影响存在异质性,影响主要体现在信息处理成本较低的企业、公司治理水平较好的企业以及分析师面临买方压力较小的企业中。动态地来看,高铁开通对分析师盈余预测的影响主要体现在通车两年以后。此外,在利用工具变量法、控制飞机出行以减少内生性问题之后,上述结论仍稳健。这说明高铁的开通改善了资本市场的信息环境,使得分析师能够更好地扮演信息中介的角色。文章较早研究了高铁开通对分析师盈余预测的影响,揭示了高铁在金融市场的信息传导效应。  相似文献   

18.
Having trouble with your strategy? Then map it   总被引:19,自引:0,他引:19  
If you were a military general on the march, you'd want your troops to have plenty of maps--detailed information about the mission they were on, the roads they would travel, the campaigns they would undertake, and the weapons at their disposal. The same holds true in business: a workforce needs clear and detailed information to execute a business strategy successfully. Until now, there haven't been many tools that can communicate both an organization's strategy and the processes and systems needed to implement that strategy. But authors Robert Kaplan and David Norton, cocreators of the balanced scorecard, have adapted that seminal tool to create strategy maps. Strategy maps let an organization describe and illustrate--in clear and general language--its objectives, initiatives, targets markets, performance measures, and the links between all the pieces of its strategy. Employees get a visual representation of how their jobs are tied to the company's overall goals, while managers get a clearer understanding of their strategies and a means to detect and correct any flaws in those plans. Using Mobil North American Marketing and Refining Company as an example, Kaplan and Norton walk through the creation of a strategy map and its four distinct regions--financial, customer, internal process, and learning and growth--which correspond to the four perspectives of the balanced scorecard. The authors show step by step how the Mobil division used the map to transform itself from a centrally controlled manufacturer of commodity products to a decentralized, customer-driven organization.  相似文献   

19.
Lead for loyalty.   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
The greater the loyalty a company engenders among its customers, employees, suppliers, and shareholders, the greater the profits it reaps. Frederick Reichheld, a director emeritus of Bain & Company, offers advice on improving loyalty that is based on more than a decade of research. Primarily, he says, outstanding loyalty is the direct result of the decisions and practices of committed top executives with personal integrity. The "loyalty leader" companies--those with the most impressive loyalty credentials--are a diverse group, ranging from Vanguard and Northwestern Mutual to Chick-fil-A, Harley-Davidson, Intuit, and Enterprise Rent-A-Car. But beneath their surface variations lie six strikingly similar relationship strategies: 1. Preach what you practice. Executives must preach the importance of loyalty in clear, precise, powerful terms. 2. Play to win-win. It's not enough that your competitors lose; your partners must win. There's a clear connection, for instance, between a company's treatment of its employees and its attitude toward customers. 3. Be picky. A truly humble company knows it can satisfy only certain customers, and it goes all out to keep them happy. Careful selection of employees also plays an important role. 4. Keep it simple. Great leaders understand that they must simplify rules for decision making. 5. Reward the right results. Many companies reward employees who grab short-term profits and short-change those who build long-term value and customer loyalty. 6. Listen hard, talk straight. Long-term relationships require honest, two-way communication and learning. Exemplary leaders break through the cynicism of the times by showing they believe that an organization thrives when its partners and customers do.  相似文献   

20.
Do investments in your employees actually affect workforce performance? Who are your top performers? How can you empower and motivate other employees to excel? Leading-edge companies such as Google, Best Buy, Procter & Gamble, and Sysco use sophisticated data-collection technology and analysis to answer these questions, leveraging a range of analytics to improve the way they attract and retain talent, connect their employee data to business performance, differentiate themselves from competitors, and more. The authors present the six key ways in which companies track, analyze, and use data about their people-ranging from a simple baseline of metrics to monitor the organization's overall health to custom modeling for predicting future head count depending on various "what if" scenarios. They go on to show that companies competing on talent analytics manage data and technology at an enterprise level, support what analytical leaders do, choose realistic targets for analysis, and hire analysts with strong interpersonal skills as well as broad expertise.  相似文献   

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