Does it matter who pays for bond ratings? Historical evidence

We test whether Standard and Poor's (S&P) assigns higher bond ratings after it switches from investor-pay to issuer-pay fees in 1974. Using Moody's rating for the same bond as a benchmark, we find that when S&P charges investors and Moody's charges issuers, S&P's ratings are lower than Moody's. Once S&P adopts issuer-pay, its ratings increase and no longer differ from Moody's. More importantly, S&P only assigns higher ratings for bonds that are subject to greater conflicts of interest, measured by higher expected rating fees or lower credit quality. These findings suggest that the issuer-pay model leads to higher ratings.     

Rating shopping and rating inflation in Israel

Firms may exploit the option of choosing among different rating agencies in order to pick the highest rating offered. This possibility, known as rating shopping, is relatively limited on the US corporate bond market because the two main rating agencies (S&P and Moody's) rate virtually all large bond issuers. In this study, we use the data on corporate bond ratings assigned by two Israeli rating agencies affiliated with S&P and Moody's during the period 2004–2012. We show that while one agency (Midroog) systematically assigned higher ratings, the ratings of the other agency (S&P-Maalot) were inflated due to rating shopping. However, despite the many features that encourage rating inflation, the resulting distortion was relatively small (one notch). This may be a fair price for maintaining a competitive rating industry.     

The sovereign-bank rating channel and rating agencies' downgrades during the European debt crisis

We investigate the rating channel for the transmission of changes in sovereign risk to the banking sector, analysing data from Moody's, S&P and Fitch before and during the European debt crisis. Sovereign rating downgrades and negative watch signals have strong effects on bank rating downgrades in the crisis period. The impact is stronger for multiple-notch sovereign rating downgrades, and more pronounced in PIIGS countries. Secondly, we investigate rating agencies' competition in the banking sector during the same periods, finding significant differences in rating policies across the agencies. S&P credit actions tend to be the more independent ones, while Moody's appears to be more cautious, although it is by far the most likely to assign multiple-notch downgrades. In the pre-crisis period, we find no evidence that bank rating actions are linked to sovereign rating signals (nor vice versa) nor to prior bank rating changes by a competing agency.     

Information effect of entry into credit ratings market: The case of insurers' ratings

The paper analyzes the effect of competition between credit rating agencies (CRAs) on the information content of ratings. We show that a monopolistic CRA pools sellers into multiple rating classes and has partial market coverage. This provides an opportunity for market entry. The entrant designs a rating scale distinct from that of the incumbent. It targets higher-than-average companies in each rating grade of the incumbent's rating scale and employs more stringent rating standards. We use Standard and Poor's (S&P) entry into the market for insurance ratings previously covered by a monopolist, A.M. Best, to empirically test the impact of entry on the information content of ratings. The empirical analysis reveals that S&P required higher standards to assign a rating similar to the one assigned by A.M. Best and that higher-than-average quality insurers in each rating category of A.M. Best chose to receive a second rating from S&P.     

Reputations and credit ratings: Evidence from commercial mortgage-backed securities

How do changes in a rating agency's reputation affect the ratings market? We study the dynamics of credit ratings after Standard & Poor's (S&P) was shut out of a large segment of the commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) ratings market following a procedural mistake. Exploiting the fact that most CMBS have ratings from multiple agencies, we show that S&P subsequently eased its standards compared to other raters. This coincided with a partial recovery in the number of deals S&P was hired to rate. Our findings suggest that an agency can regain market share after suffering reputational damage by issuing optimistic ratings.     

Can investor-paid credit rating agencies improve the information quality of issuer-paid rating agencies?

This paper examines how the information quality of ratings from an issuer-paid rating agency (Standard and Poor's) responds to the entry of an investor-paid rating agency, the Egan-Jones Rating Company (EJR). By comparing S&P's ratings quality before and after EJR initiates coverage of each firm, I find a significant improvement in S&P's ratings quality following EJR's coverage initiation. S&P's ratings become more responsive to credit risk and its rating changes incorporate higher information content. These results differ from the existing literature documenting a deterioration in the incumbents' ratings quality following the entry of a third issuer-paid agency. I further show that the issuer-paid agency seems to improve the ratings quality because EJR's coverage has elevated its reputational concerns.     

The information content of three credit ratings: the case of European residential mortgage-backed securities

We assess the information content of three credit ratings for tranches of newly issued European residential mortgage-backed securities. We find that tranches rated by three credit rating agencies where the rating by Standard & Poor's (S&P's) Ratings Service or Fitch is inferior to Moody's lead to higher funding costs and reflects what we refer to as rating risk. Our results suggest that market participants do not view credit ratings by Fitch and S&P's as redundant despite the fact that both employ the same rating approach.     

Sovereign rating actions and the implied volatility of stock index options

This paper examines the interaction between the equity index option market and sovereign credit ratings. S&P and Moody's signals exhibit strong impact on option-implied volatility while Fitch's influence is less significant. Moody's downgrades reduce the market uncertainty over the rated countries' equity markets. Strong causal relationships are found between movements in the option-implied volatility and all credit signals released by S&P and Fitch, but only actual rating changes by Moody's, implying differences in rating agencies' policies. The presence of additional ratings tends to reduce market uncertainty. The findings highlight the importance of rating information in the price discovery process and offer policy implications.     

Does the Dodd-Frank Act reduce the conflict of interests of credit rating agencies?

I compare issuer-paid ratings, represented by Standard & Poor's (S&P) to investor-paid ratings, represented by Egan-Jones Ratings Company (EJR), after the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act. My results show that S&P ratings are lower than EJR ratings in the post-Dodd-Frank period, especially for firms able to generate revenue to credit rating agencies (CRAs); i.e., firms with a large bond issuance, larger firms, and low-performing firms. Further, I find evidence of a greater accuracy of S&P ratings relative to EJR ratings in the post-Act period as shown by the lower probability of large credit rating changes and rating reversals. Finally, I show that issuer-paid ratings are more concerned about providing timely ratings in the post-Dodd-Frank period, thus protecting their reputation as leading information providers, than investor-paid ratings. My results are robust to a wide battery of robustness tests.     

Moody's and S&P Ratings: Are They Equivalent? Conservative Ratings and Split Rated Bond Yields

We examine the relative impact of Moody's and S&P ratings on bond yields and find that at issuance, yields on split rated bonds with superior Moody's ratings are about 8 basis points lower than yields on split rated bonds with superior S&P ratings. This suggests that investors differentiate between the two ratings and assign more weight to the ratings from Moody’s, the more conservative rating agency. Moody's becomes more conservative after 1998 and the impact of a superior Moody's rating becomes stronger. Furthermore, the differential impact of the two ratings is more pronounced for the more opaque Rule 144A issues.     

The adjustment of credit ratings in advance of defaults

This paper assesses biases in credit ratings and lead–lag relationships for near-to-default issuers with multiple ratings by Moody’s and S&P. Based on defaults from 1997 to 2004, we find evidence that Moody’s seems to adjust its ratings to increasing default risk in a timelier manner than S&P. Second, credit ratings by the two US-based agencies are not subject to any home preference. Third, given a downgrade (upgrade) by the first rating agency, subsequent downgrades (upgrades) by the second rating agency are of greater magnitude in the short term. Fourth, harsher rating changes by one agency are followed by harsher rating changes in the same direction by the second agency. Fifth, rating changes by the second rating agency are significantly more likely after downgrades than after upgrades by the first rating agency. Additionally, we find evidence for serial correlation in rating changes up to 90 days subsequent to the rating change of interest after controlling for rating changes by the second rating agency.     

Sovereign credit ratings during the COVID-19 pandemic

Using 603 sovereign rating actions by the three leading global rating agencies between January 2020 and March 2021, this paper shows that the severity of sovereign ratings actions is not directly affected by the intensity of the COVID-19 health crisis (proxied by case and mortality rates) but through a mechanism of its negative economic repercussions such as the economic outlook of a country and governments' response to the health crisis. Contrary to expectations, credit rating agencies pursued mostly a business-as-usual approach and reviewed sovereign ratings when they were due for regulatory purposes rather than in response to the rapid developments of the pandemic. Despite their limited reaction to the ongoing pandemic, sovereign rating news from S&P and Moody's still conveyed price-relevant information to the bond markets.     

Did going public impair Moody׳s credit ratings?

We investigate a prominent allegation in congressional hearings that Moody?s loosened its rating standards to chase revenue after it went public in 2000. Consistent with this allegation, Moody?s ratings for both corporate bonds and structured finance products are significantly more favorable to issuers, relative to S&P?s, after Moody?s IPO. Moreover, Moody?s ratings are more favorable for clients subject to greater conflict of interest. There is little evidence that Moody?s higher ratings, post-IPO, are more informative, measured as expected default frequencies (EDFs) or as the probability of default. Our findings inform the debate on whether financial gatekeepers should be publicly traded.     

Vergleich zweier Modelle zur Bewertung der Kapitalausstattung deutscher Lebensversicherungsunternehmen

The result of the comparison between the capital adequacy model published by the rating agency Standard & Poor’s (S&P) and the supervisory model of the German Insurance Association (GDV) points up the both models aim at measuring the German life insurers’ capital adequacy. The capital adequacy model is part of the Insurer Financial Strength Rating analyzing the financial security of insurance companies. The supervisory model is part of the recommandations by the GDV to reform the insurance control within the Solvency II project. Furthermore, the research includes the GDV’s proposal for the Solvency II standard model following the supervisory model as recommandation to the Solvency II project. The risk based capital computation’s analysis shows that the S&P model is more comprehensive on the assets and the supervisory model is more comprehensive on the liabilities. In addition, S&P differentiates in his model in a more quantitative way, the GDV in a more qualitative way. The standard model balances out the supervisory model’s lower number of quantitative differentiating factors.     

Mergers in the bond rating industry: does rating provider matter?

I examine whether investors favour bond ratings from established global agencies by analyzing the market response to Standard and Poor’s (S&P) acquisition of the Canadian Bond Rating Service (CBRS). As a result of the acquisition, CBRS ratings were completely eliminated and replaced with ratings from S&P. While little reaction was apparent for bonds, the stocks of firms with CBRS ratings responded positively to the acquisition announcement. Small firms and those with little institutional ownership experienced the greatest benefit. The findings suggest that ratings from S&P may increase the exposure of foreign firms to international investors.     

Measuring Sovereign Risk: Are CDS Spreads Better than Sovereign Credit Ratings?

Using data for 54 countries over a 12‐year period, we find that the variation in average sovereign ratings in a given year can be explained by average credit default swap (CDS) spreads over the previous three years. In a horse race between CDS spreads and sovereign ratings, we find that CDS spread changes can predict sovereign events, while rating changes cannot. The predictability of CDS spreads is greater when there is disagreement between Moody's and the S&P for a country's rating.     

THE INFORMATIONAL CONTENT OF BOND RATINGS

This paper explores the risk structure of interest rates. The focus is on whether yields on industrial bonds indicate that market participants base their evaluations of a bond issue's default risk on agency ratings or on publicly available financial statistics. Using a non-linear least squares procedure, the yield-to-maturity is related to Moody's rating, Standard and Poor's (S&P) rating, and accounting measures of creditworthiness such as coverage and leverage. Market yields are found to be significantly correlated with both the ratings and a set of readily available financial accounting statistics. These results indicate (1) that market participants base their evaluations of an issue's creditworthiness on more than the agencies' ratings and (2) that the ratings bring some information to the market above and beyond that contained in the set of accounting variables. The paper also asks whether the market views Moody's and Standard and Poor's ratings as equally reliable measures of risk or whether the market attaches more weight to one agency's ratings than the other. Finally, the hypothesis that the market pays more attention to the accounting measures and less to the ratings if the rating has not been reviewed recently is tested.     

Differences of opinion in sovereign credit signals during the European crisis

Motivated by the European debt crisis and the new European Union regulatory regime for the credit rating industry, we analyse differences of opinion in sovereign credit signals and their influence on European stock markets. Rating disagreements have a significant connection with subsequent negative credit actions by each agency. However, links among Moody’s/Fitch actions and their rating disagreements with other agencies have weakened in the post-regulation period. We also find that only S&P’s negative credit signals affect the own-country stock market and spill over to other European markets, but this is concentrated in the pre-regulation period. Stronger stock market reactions occur when S&P has already assigned a lower rating than Moody’s/Fitch prior to taking a further negative action.     

Market Segmentation Effects in Corporate Credit Rating Changes: The Case of Emerging Markets

We examine stock market reactions to corporate credit rating changes in 26 emerging market countries included in the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) Emerging Market Index. We hypothesize and test the notion that emerging market firms in the American Depository Receipts (ADRs) markets are more likely to purchase ratings from the Big Two (Moody’s and S&P), and that they react more strongly to the announcements of corporate rating changes by Moody’s or S&P than to those of raters in local markets. We compare the effect of credit rating changes of the Big Two in two emerging stock markets: local markets (local currencies) and ADR markets (U.S. dollars). We find significant price reactions in the ADR markets, and insignificant reactions in local markets, and conclude that there is capital market segmentation in ADR markets for credit rating changes of emerging market firms. We find evidence that investors react more strongly in the ADR markets than local markets because they require higher costs of capital for firms cross-listed both in the ADR markets and local markets due to greater expected bankruptcy costs and foreign exchange risks of those firms. We also report that stock markets react significantly, not only to rating downgrades, but also to upgrades in the ADR markets.

Does the disclosure of unsolicited sovereign rating status affect bank ratings?

This paper integrates three themes on regulation, unsolicited credit ratings, and the sovereign-bank rating ceiling. We reveal an unintended consequence of the EU rating agency disclosure rules upon rating changes, using data for S&P-rated banks in 42 countries between 2006 and 2013. The disclosure of sovereign rating solicitation status for 13 countries in February 2011 has an adverse effect on the ratings of intermediaries operating in these countries. Conversion to unsolicited sovereign rating status transmits risk to banks via the rating channel. The results suggest that banks bear a penalty if their host sovereign does not solicit its ratings.