共查询到10条相似文献,搜索用时 0 毫秒
1.
以往的公司治理研究并没有考虑银行业的特殊性,因此对银行的治理问题不能简单地套用以往的研究结论。本文在充分考虑银行业治理的特殊性基础上,通过建立模型实证考察独立董事在银行中的运行效率。研究证实,由于银行股权制衡能力比较强,独立董事的监督职能被弱化,但是银行独立董事由于其专业背景以及广泛的社会关系,能够提高董事会决策效率,促进银行业绩的提升。研究还发现,独立董事的作用是有滞后性的。当期的独立董事能够明显地促进银行下一期的绩效。独立董事制度在国内上市银行中具有效率,能够促进银行的进一步发展。 相似文献
2.
以往的公司治理研究并没有考虑银行业的特殊性,因此对银行的治理问题不能简单地套用以往的研究结论.本文在充分考虑银行业治理的特殊性基础上,通过建立模型实证考察独立董事在银行中的运行效率.研究证实,由于银行股权制衡能力比较强,独立董事的监督职能被弱化,但是银行独立董事由于其专业背景以及广泛的社会关系,能够提高董事会决策效率,促进银行业绩的提升.研究还发现,独立董事的作用是有滞后性的.当期的独立董事能够明显地促进银行下一期的绩效.独立董事制度在国内上市银行中具有效率,能够促进银行的进一步发展. 相似文献
3.
中国上市银行独立董事制度创新研究 总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3
本文分析了商业银行公司治理的特殊性和独立董事制度的外生性,认为可以由银监会代表中小股东和存款人组成上市银行独立董事管理委员会,向上市银行推选一名独立董事,从而为中小股东和存款人的利益诉求提供通道,与银行绩效挂钩的独立董事薪酬制度将会进一步突出股东一债权人代理问题,建立银行业独立董事市场可以发挥声誉机制在有效约束独立董事和调动独立董事积极性等方面的作用。认定独立董事责任需要引入尽职免责制度。为了保障内部监督协调有效,需要重新安排独立董事与监事会的职责。 相似文献
4.
M. M. Fonseka Omar Al Farooque R. L. Theja N. Rajapakse Gao-Liang Tian 《新兴市场金融与贸易》2018,54(9):2053-2077
This study examines the influence of directors who are politically connected and/or have boardroom interlocking on private equity placements (PEPs) in Chinese listed firms. We document that interlocked directors can significantly influence the propensity to apply for PEPs and approval of PEPs and reduce the cost of PEPs while providing greater access to proceeds from PEPs through lowering information asymmetry and information cost. Although politically connected directors have a significant role in the approval of PEPs, they are more likely to reduce the monitoring effects and increase agency problems, which lead to increased cost of PEPs and reduced proceeds from PEPs. The results also reveal that political connection diminishes the benefits of interlocking directors for firms having directors with both interlocking and political ties. 相似文献
5.
Dr Martin Bugeja Raymond Da Silva Rosa Andrew Lee 《Journal of Business Finance & Accounting》2009,36(1-2):185-209
Abstract: This study examines factors that explain the turnover and board seats held by target firm directors post-takeover. Following successful takeovers the proportion of the board replaced is lower when the target has better performance. In failed takeovers, executive directors have lower turnover and the rate of turnover is reduced after a hostile takeover. Inconsistent with ex-post settling-up, actions that advance target shareholder wealth during the takeover does not assist a director obtain an increase in future board seats. Confirming a reputation effect, directors with multiple directorships have a lower rate of turnover and a higher increase in future board seats. 相似文献
6.
Separation of Ownership from Control and Acquiring Firm Performance: The Case of Family Ownership in Canada 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Abstract: This study investigates the relationship between ownership structure and acquiring firm performance. A large proportion of Canadian public companies have controlling shareholders (families) that often exercise control over voting rights while holding a small fraction of the cash flow rights. This is achieved through the concurrent use of dual class voting shares and stock pyramids. Many suggest that these ownership structures involve larger agency costs than those imposed by dispersed ownership structures and that they distort corporate decisions with respect to investment choices such as acquisitions. We find that average acquiring firm announcement period abnormal returns for our sample of 327 Canadian transactions are positive over the 1998–2002 period. Cash deals, acquisitions of unlisted targets and cross‐border deals have a positive impact on value creation. Governance mechanisms (outside block‐holders, unrelated directors and small board size) also have a positive influence on the acquiring firm performance. Further, the positive abnormal returns are greater for family firms. We do not find that separation of ownership and control has a negative impact on performance. These results suggest that, contrary to other jurisdictions offering poor minority shareholder protection or poor corporate governance, separation of control and ownership is not viewed as leading to value destroying mergers and acquisitions, i.e., market participants do not perceive families as using M&A to obtain private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders. We do find a non‐monotonic relationship between ownership level and acquiring firm abnormal returns. Ownership of a majority of the cash flow rights has a negative impact on announcement returns. This is consistent with the view that large shareholders may undertake less risky projects as their wealth invested in the firm increases. 相似文献
7.
以2007~2009年我国深沪A股上市公司为研究样本,引入中介变量的研究方法,检验并揭示内部控制对股权结构影响盈余质量的中介传导作用。结果发现:第一大股东持股比例越高,内部控制水平越低,盈余质量水平越低;股权制衡能力越高,内部控制水平越高,更利于提高企业的盈余质量;机构投资者持股比例越高,企业的内部控制水平越高,但盈余质量越低。总体看,内部控制对股权结构与盈余质量具有传导效应,但是显著性存在差异,对股权结构中的第一大股东持股比例、机构投资者持股比例与盈余质量的中介传导效应要显著高于对股权制衡能力与盈余质量的中介传导效应。 相似文献
8.
We investigate the investment‐cash flow sensitivity of a large sample of the UK listed firms and confirm that investment is strongly cash flow‐sensitive. Is this sensitivity a result of agency problems when managers with high discretion overinvest, or of asymmetric information when managers owning equity are underinvesting if the market (erroneously) demands too high a risk premium? We find that investment‐cash flow sensitivity results mainly from the agency costs of free cash flow. The magnitude of the relationship depends on insider ownership in a non‐monotonic way. Furthermore, we obtain that outside blockholders, such as financial institutions, the government, and industrial firms (only at high control levels), reduce the cash flow sensitivity of investment via effective monitoring. Finally, financial institutions appear to play a role in mitigating informational asymmetries between firms and capital markets. We corroborate our findings by performing additional tests based on the stochastic efficient frontier approach and power indices. 相似文献
9.
以2003~2009年沪深两市仅发行了A股的上市公司为样本,使用高频交易数据构造相对有效价差和相对报价价差以衡量股票流动性,同时采用价差分解的方法构造逆向选择指标以衡量信息不对称程度,对这一问题进行了考察。研究结果表明:两权分离度越高,则股票流动性越低,信息不对称程度越高;和国有企业相比,这一关系在民营企业中表现得更加的明显。 相似文献
10.
近年银信合作监管政策的变化、效果及挑战 总被引:4,自引:1,他引:4
本文简要回顾了自2008年以来我国银信合作监管政策的变化过程.分析了引起政策变化的原因和监管效果。在肯定2010年监管政策效果显著的基础上,指出银信合作监管尚存在执行不到位,政策不公平、不合理等问题。对未来我国银信合作监管政策的制定,文章指出需要注意银信合作政策变化所引发的蝴蝶效应,注意跨业金融产品的监管、银信合作产品中的投资者保护、监管政策的市场指导性以及监管政策合法性等方面的挑战。 相似文献