Thorstein Veblen as Evolutionary Feminist Economist of the Progressive Era

Abstract

Just prior to the turn of the twentieth century, Thorstein Veblen advanced an evolutionary approach to feminist economics. A host of scholars considered in this inquiry are noted to have endorsed and also furthered his tradition. What distinguishes Veblen’s evolutionary approach to feminist economics is that he emphasizes that the roots of private property can be related to women being taken captive through warfare during the Age of Savagery. Instincts affecting behavior are viewed as relative constants, but which take on an evolutionary character when considered against what Veblen defines as four stages of social and economic development.     

习俗元制度的演化机制:一个演化经济学的视角

演化经济学为我们分析制度演化提供了新的视角,演化经济学关于制度的演化机制主要有遗传机制(复制机制)、变异机制(新奇创生机制)、选择机制和适应性学习机制等.习俗就是最基本的元制度之一,作为一种基本的元制度,是市场经济运行的基础,从演化经济学的视角来看,习俗元制度的演化机制至少有:遗传机制(复制机制)、变异机制(新奇创生机制)、选择机制和适用性学习机制.     

The Rate of Change in Evolutionary Systems and Evolutionary Economic Modeling

Evolutionary economics seeks to model socio-economic reality as an evolutionary system. This powerful approach entails the implication of the continuous loss of information through the evolutionary process. The implication corresponds to evolutionary biology, although the systems in evolutionary economics are different from those in evolutionary biology. The issue of the loss of information has not been extensively studied in economics. Many open questions remain: Which knowledge is lost under what circumstances? Can loss of information be harmful to the socio-economic system as a whole in the presence of runaway dynamics caused by, for example, network externalities? How can the development of knowledge in economic systems be studied? The present article examines these questions and more.     

The Vested Interests and the Evolving Moral Economy of the Common People

The British historian Edward P. Thompson ([1971, 1991] 1993 Thompson, Edward P. “The Moral Economy Reviewed.” In Customs in Common, by Edward P. Thompson, pp. 259-351. New York, NY: Penguin Books, [1991] 1993. [Google Scholar]) developed the concept of “moral economy” to analyze the food riot in eighteenthcentury England. I aim to elaborate on the concept of moral economy of the common people by combining Thompson’s insights with those developed by Veblenian institutional economists. I highlight the commonalities between Thompsonian history and Veblenian economics in terms of both questions addressed and methodological principles endorsed. Finally, I emphasize the complementarities between these two bodies of work, and suggest some ways to exploit them in order to better understand the evolution of the moral economy of the common people over time.     

Evolution-Based Approaches in Economics and Evolutionary Loss of Information

Evolutionary economics provides a self-organizing, stabilizing mechanism without relying on mechanic equilibria. However, there are substantial differences between the genetic evolutionary biology and the evolution of institutions, firms, routines, or strategies in economics. Most importantly, there is no genetic codification and no sexual reproduction in economic evolution, and the involved agents can interfere consciously and purposefully. This entails a general lack of fixation and a quick loss of information through a Muller’s ratchet-like mechanism. The present contribution discusses the analogy of evolution in biology and economics, and considers potential problems resulting in evolutionary models in economics.     

演化经济学的方法和主题特征及其演变——一种以另类教规理论为例的解释

以赖纳特和张夏准等人为代表的另类教规理论是演化经济学的新兴流派之一,文章在对演化经济学的历史比较与回溯、异质性与分类、时空特定性、能动性与结构等方法与主题特征进行阐述的同时,以另类教规理论为样本,对其主要观点、政策主张和分析方法进行剖析,以探讨演化经济学的发展。     

Joseph Schumpeter and Thorstein Veblen on technological determinism,individualism and institutions

This article investigates Joseph Schumpeter's affinities with Thorstein Veblen with respect to technological change and determinism, the future of capitalism, individualism and institutions. From a methodological point of view, a common point in their analysis is their anti-teleological view regarding economics as a discipline. Also, in the Schumpeterian system, technology is the cornerstone of economic evolution and appears as the making of new combinations. In the Veblenian theoretical framework, the bearer of change is to be found, inter alia, in technology, just like in Schumpeter's works, although not without differences. They also share the opinion that technology revolutionises capitalism and has serious implications for its future as a system. Furthermore, regarding individualism, in his work Schumpeter stresses the importance of the social milieu on individual action, a fact which bears strong resemblance to the Veblenian notion of evolution as ‘depersonalized evolution’. In this sense, Schumpeter is very close to Veblen, although Schumpeter's approach could be classified in what is called institutionalist individualism, whereas Veblen could be classified as holist. Undoubtedly, the role of institutions is of great importance in both Schumpeter and Veblen. Ιnstitutions in the Schumpeterian schema play a central role closely related to the future of capitalism. Institutional and non-institutional factors enter into complex forms of interaction just like in Veblen's approach. There, institutions are part of the social milieu and their underlying framework, much wider than mere economic and social. Of course, the theoretical analyses of Schumpeter and Veblen are not devoid of differences springing mainly from their methodological approach such as the role of the individual in the capitalist process which is probably the most significant difference regarding the importance attributed to it in Schumpeter's early works. Also, the way technical change appears constitutes another difference. However, his views are quite close to Veblen's. After all, Schumpeter began to write in a social, political, theoretical and ideological environment at a time when evolutionary ideas dominated social thought.     

演化经济学的本体论假设及其实践指导价值

经济学的哲学基础不仅限定了更为具体的经济理论的构造,而且对实际的经济活动也产生了直接的影响。为了使演化经济学动态的、有机的、系统的和开放的世界观具体化,借助正面启示法进一步推动经济演化理论的发展,并在哲学与经济学之间进行富有成效的对话,文章较为系统地论述了演化经济学的六大本体论假设,并说明了这种本体论假设对宏微观经济学体系的建构、我国经济体制改革、创新型国家建设以及脉络主义经济政策均具有实践指导价值。     

Economists on Darwin's theory of social evolution and human behaviour

Abstract

This article analyses Darwin's image among economists with a specific focus on his theory of social evolution as presented in the Descent of Man (1871). We propose an analysis of the way and context in which economists refer to Darwin, mention his name and quote his writings. It then appears that Darwin is most of the time viewed as a biologist only, who never developed his own theory of social evolution. He is thus quoted as a biologist who either borrowed concepts from economists who developed a theory of social evolution, or laid the basis for biological theory of social evolution developed by others, Spencer, in particular. It is only recently that eventually the twofold dimensions—biological and social—of Darwin's general theory of evolution are considered together by bioeconomists.     

The Narrow and Broad Approaches to Evolutionary Modeling in Economics

Some models in evolutionary economics rely on direct analogies to genetic evolution, assuming a population of firms with routines, technologies, and strategies on which forces of diversity generation and selection act. This narrow conception can build upon previous findings from evolutionary biology. Broader concepts of evolution allow many or just one adaptive entity, instead of necessarily requiring a population. Thus, an institution or a society can also be understood as an evolutionary entity. Both the narrow and broad approaches have been extensively used in the literature, albeit in different literature traditions. I provide an overview of the conception and development of both approaches to evolutionary modeling, and argue that a generalization is needed to realize the full potential of evolutionary modeling.     

J.A. Schumpeter and T.B. Veblen on economic evolution: the dichotomy between statics and dynamics

At present, the discussion on the dichotomy between statics and dynamics is resolved by concentrating on its mathematical meaning. Yet, a simple formalisation masks the underlying methodological discussion. Overcoming this limitation, the paper discusses Schumpeter's and Veblen's viewpoint on dynamic economic systems as systems generating change from within. It contributes to an understanding on their ideas of how economics could become an evolutionary science and on their contributions to elaborate an evolutionary economics. It confronts Schumpeter's with Veblen's perspective on evolutionary economics and provides insight into their evolutionary economic theorising by discussing their ideas on the evolution of capitalism.     

超越契约理论--演化论视角的企业理论研究

企业的契约理论围绕交易成本概念解释了企业的存在、边界和内部组织,但严重忽视了企业的技术和生产功能,演化经济学的企业理论通过研究企业内知识的产生、传播和利用过程,以及组织与个人的交互学习,不仅重新解释了企业的存在、边界和内部组织问题,还研究了契约理论未触及的企业异质性、竞争优势和企业家等问题.     

绿色供应链演化博弈的政府激励机制研究

绿色供应链管理是一种旨在促进社会和企业可持续发展的管理方式,它通过企业之间的紧密合作而达到系统环境的最优化。在市场机制下,较高的生产成本会延缓甚至阻碍企业发展绿色供应链的进程,此时政府的有效介入则可使这一过程顺利进行。本文以线性需求函数的产品差异化模型作为研究基础,运用演化博弈论针对政府激励机制对制造商生产策略演化行为的积极作用进行了深入研究。     

我国融资租赁行业风险的阶段性特征——来自不完全合同与演化博弈的理论解释

本文通过不完全合同与演化博弈理论对我国融资租赁业发展过程中的波动以及当前的不稳定状态进行了解释。研究表明,从长期看,我国融资租赁业发展中的剧烈波动源于参与方的不断变动;而从短期看,现阶段我国融资租赁业的不稳定源于竞争结构与交易方式的不合理。因此在政策层面上,统一监管与出台《融资租赁法》成为当务之急。     

经济金融化行为的政治经济学分析--一个演化博弈框架

自2008年美国金融危机发生以来,经济金融化成为国内外学界关注的焦点。文章从政治经济学的角度指出了金融化的本质在于资本积累演变为资本脱离剩余价值的生产与交换而通过金融系统实现增殖的过程,进而通过构建一个包含异质性主体的非对称演化博弈模型,揭示了非金融主体与金融主体之间从普通经济关系到金融关系的动态演变过程及其作用机制。研究表明：(1)经济主体之间的动态关系演变表现为非金融企业主要通过金融活动获取利润,金融企业则关注中间业务和表外业务并将普通家庭纳入其体系使之成为新的利润源泉,而普通家庭则被迫接受强势经济主体的二次分利,这些关系的变化将导致一国经济的金融化乃至金融危机。(2)经济发展状态取决于金融主体与非金融主体之间的相互关系,其中,非金融主体行为起主导性作用。在既定假设下,当非金融主体仅通过其资源保护行为影响金融主体的分利技术时,既可以促使一国经济走向新的稳定状态也可促使其走向崩溃;当非金融主体通过其资源保护行为和分利技术影响金融主体的分利技术时,经济可以实现演化稳定状态。(3)经济主体的金融化行为有三个层面的影响：一是经济主体的金融化行为促进经济主体自身在短期内实现高额资本积累;二是金融主体的分利行为与非金融主体的生产行为经常呈现对立的经济关系并容易被激化;三是没有政府介入的自由市场必然导致矛盾激化而陷入危机。因此,深入理解经济金融化问题的本质及其对经济的影响机制,对当前中国的经济转型和金融改革都具有重要意义。     

环境管制与企业竞争力的演化经济学解释--对传统观点与修正学派的批判

环境管制与企业竞争力的关系近年来成为各界争论的焦点。传统观点认为环境管制降低企业竞争力，修正学派则认为环境管制有利于企业创新，使企业受益于“创新补偿”和“先动优势”，从而有利于企业竞争力。本文从演化经济学的有限理性、多样化、随机因素和时间等基本假设出发，认为以组织能力为核心的动态演化观点有利于更好地理解和分析环境管制与企业竞争力的关系。     

The origin of utility: Sexual selection and conspicuous consumption

This paper proposes an explanation for the universal human desire for increasing consumption and the associated propensity to trade survival opportunity off conspicuous consumption. I argue that this desire was moulded in evolutionary times by a mechanism known to biologists as sexual selection, whereby an observable trait – conspicuous consumption in this case – is used by members of one sex to signal their unobservable characteristics valuable to members of the opposite sex. It then shows that the standard economics problem of utility maximisation is formally equivalent to the standard biology problem of the maximisation of individual fitness, the ability to pass genes to future generations, and thus establishes a rigorous theoretical foundation for including conspicuous consumption in the utility function.     

德商与领导德行力开发

德商和德行力是当前领导力开发研究的热点问题之一。本文在相关文献研究的基础上．详细介绍了德商定义、德商对智商和情商的导向作用,说明了如何将德商分解成领导德行力,并提出了领导德行力开发的几点建议。     

The evolutionary firm and Cournot's Dilemma

Recently, competence/capability has been introduced as a rivaland as a complement to the idea of transaction-costs as thefoundation for a modern theory of the firm. However, while thecompetence-based approach may be inspired by evolutionary economics,it does not, in its current form, provide an evolutionary theoryof the firm. To transform this competence-based approach intoan evolutionary theory, the connection between the firm andVeblen's concept of social knowledge is more fully developed.Once established, the evolutionary theory of the firm is utilisedto bypass Marshall's reconciliation problem and solve Cournot'sDilemma.     

Toward an experimental foundation for benefit-cost analysis

Empirical results from experimental economics and neuroscience have uncovered regularities in human behavior that may provide a base for new approaches to welfare theory and economic policy. These empirical findings do not challenge basic economic concepts but they do imply that our assumptions about “rational behavior”, “opportunity cost”, and “social welfare” should be revised using sound scientific evidence and methods. This research has the potential to make benefit-cost analysis more reflective of how people value gains and losses, and more responsive to considerations of environmental and social responsibility.