Post-Keynesian Economic Policies: The Case of Sweden

This paper attempts to present the basic features that would define a model of behavior suited to an institutional and post-Keynesian approach. To facilitate explanation, human behavior is divided into three phases: motivation, cognition and reasoning and decision-making. Motivation appears as a process directed toward the satisfaction of a complex structure of various needs and wants. The role of emotions and the social and cognitive aspects of motivation are recognized. Moreover, it is also recognized that human beings have limited cognitive and rational capacities, and it is accepted that they are potentially creative. Partly as a consequence of that, cognition becomes a social act and knowledge of reality is subject to fundamental uncertainty. Finally, human rationality (or intelligence) is associated with a search for good solutions, and it includes elements of procedural rationality, creativity and emotional rationality. The role of habits and institutions in all these phases is stressed.     

制度经济学三大流派的比较与评析

20世纪二三十年代之后,西方经济学在经济理论上陷入持久的危机。制度经济学派就是在批判传统的主流经济学——新古典主义的基础上发展起来的。制度经济学按其类型一般分为以凡勃仑、康芒斯为代表的早期制度经济学,以加尔布雷斯、缪尔达尔为代表的后制度经济学和以科斯、诺斯为代表的新制度经济学。它们分别代表了三种制度观和三种研究思路与方法,各有其合理性和局限性。目前,国内经济学界往往热衷于新制度经济学的研究与介绍,而对于另外两大制度学派的研究却甚为冷清。只知晓其中一种而忽视其他,很难说就掌握了制度理论的精髓。只有了解制度学派的全貌,并对它们进行比较和鉴别,才能更为深入地了解制度经济学学说,才有可能形成较为客观的认识与判断。     

马克思主义与制度经济学

新制度经济学是对古典制度经济学的复归,而马克思的政治经济学则是古典制度经济学的集大成者.从古典制度经济学到新制度经济学的发展,体现了经济学演进历史的内在逻辑性.但是,马克思制度经济学与新制度经济学存在着根本分歧:前者以揭示经济制度的本质为目的;后者以为市场经济运行服务为目的.这种根本分歧的存在,决定了我们不应将二者的理论基点和研究方法混为一谈.     

Economic Reforms in Socialist Economics: A Comment on Petr

Abstract:

The pre-WWII approaches to trade unions were mainly based on the theoretical and methodological viewpoints of early institutional economics. Trade unions were conceived of as politico-economic organizations whose members were motivated by relative comparisons, and also were concerned with issues of equity and justice. In the post-war period, there was a major theoretical and methodological shift toward the idea of unions as optimizing economic units with well-defined objective functions, which are optimized subject to purely economic constraints. This conceptual transformation took place mainly through the Dunlop -Ross debate, in which John Dunlop conceived of unions as analogous to business firms, as opposed to Arthur Ross’s institutional and political approach. However, after decades of analytical developments, the current state of trade union theory has not produced very impressive theoretical results. We trace the historical development of the economic analysis of trade unions from a methodological perspective. We also examine the methodological reasons for the dominance of Dunlop’s approach, and the current state of – and the contemporary criticism toward – the established theory. Furthermore, we discuss the contemporary efforts to build a more comprehensive approach to trade union theory and trade union objectives, also incorporating Ross’s institutional and political insights.     

Similarities and Dissimilarities between Original Institutional Economics and New Institutional Economics

Original Institutional Economics and New Institutional Economics display several similarities. However, differences in methodology and normative stance are too big to reconcile both approaches. Both approaches may keep each other sharp.     

Property and Economic Power as Issues in Institutional Economics

In the first part of this two-part paper, I presented an "irenic" reconciliation of the three apparently contradictory definitions of "institution" within original institutional economics (OIE), employing the methodology of critical institutionalism. The critical institutionalist reconciliation of these definitions conceptualizes institutions as an emergent process by which the internal and necessary relations of social structure as collective action, mediated through agency, results in the control, expansion, and liberation of the individual action of social actors in transactions. In short, an institution is the emergent process of social structure actualized in transactions (social action). Institutions, therefore, not only have a structural existence, but also an actual existence as they are the process of the emergence of the actual (in transactions) from the structural. Institutions are multi-level processes and cannot be reduced to structures, actions, behaviors, or patterns of behaviors. In this part, I demonstrate the significance of this reconciliation in two areas. The first is its ability to further differentiate the institutional definition of economics as "the science of social provisioning" from the mainstream definition of economics as "a relationship between ends and scarce means" by decomposing the institutional definition into its productive and distributive processes. The second is its usefulness in modeling the interaction of non-economic social institutions with economic institutions at varying levels of detail. I also introduce critical institutional analysis, and use as a method, for model-building and use it to build models of communal, feudal, and industrial capitalist economies.     

Towards a History of American Institutional Economics

This paper focuses on a number of issues that have arisen in my efforts to deal with the history of American institutional economics in the interwar period. The specific issues addressed here are (1) the choice of time frame; (2) the definition of institutionalism in terms of its commonly held ideas; (3) the treatment of the network of personal contacts that make up the institutional movement; (4) the treatment of certain institutional and cross-disciplinary connections and supports; and (5) the variety of reasons lying behind the relative decline in the position of institutional economics after World War II. Each of these issues is discussed in light of historical material and examples and with a view to detailing the specific challenges and possible solutions involved.     

The Legal-Economic Nexus from the Perspective of New Institutional Economists and Original Institutional Economists

There are two institutional economics approaches to law and economics. New institutional economists prescribe that arbitrators foster efficiency in setting economic disputes and original institutional economists focus on creating reasonable values – that is, balancing efficiency and justice. Disequilibrium between desired efficiency and perceived fairness triggers agency and is a source of coevolution of law and economics.     

The Circular Economy and Institutional Economics: Compatibility and Complementarity

The notion of a circular economy (CE) developed out of the work of Kenneth Boulding and others concerned about Earth’s limited resources and its capacity for regeneration. The concept has recently become the heart of an economic perspective influencing governments, companies, and researchers. Core topics examined by those researchers include resource use, economic value, and systems thinking. The CE literature and the tradition of institutional economics (IE) have important elements of compatibility and complementarity which we examine in this article. There are also opportunities for collaboration between CE and IE.     

A Critical Review of the Rationale Approach to the Microfoundation of Post-Keynesian Theory

While modeling macroeconomic interactions, post-Keynesians propose rationales to verbally motivate the choice of behavioral equations. This informal approach to microfoundation results in inconsistencies and fuzzy arguments. The rationales for different behavioral rules are mutually inconsistent, require strong and nontransparent assumptions, or refer to highly endogenous variables that are not part of the model. The postulated behavioral rules are invariant to endogenous changes in the microenvironment, whereas the rationales imply that they adjust endogenously. The prevailing assumption of purely backward-looking expectations is neither theoretically nor empirically satisfying. The article concludes that revisiting the issue of microfoundation within the post-Keynesian framework may be a rewarding line of research. Furthermore, post-Keynesians should be open to various microfoundations as long as models feature the core of post-Keynesian theory—the principle of effective demand.     

从制度经济学视角看人民币汇率改革

汇率改革是一种多目标的制度安排,各利益主体在利益上既存在着一致性,又存在着矛盾性.实施混合性制度变革,将有利于最大限度地减少全社会在利益上的损失和汇率改革阻力,也有利于制度均衡的产生和改革的最终实现.     

新制度主义经济学与城市经营

近年来“经营城市”运作模式在我国取得一定成效的同时,也出现了一些偏差或负面效应。本文以新制度主义经济学为出发点,分析城市的本质是一种制度,因此,提出用“经营-管治”一体化制度安排来确保“经营城市”的健康发展。     

Towards a non-Darwinian Theory of Institutional Change

The paper emphasizes two flaws in mainstream economics: the failure to understand actual human behavior in many real contexts and the failure to take account of transaction costs. By emphasizing the role of knowledge, institutions, transaction costs and path dependence, new institutional economics has provided a powerful answer to these shortcomings. Nevertheless, a number of questions remain open. In particular, path dependence is far from being a continuous process. Its dynamics and its irregularities are by and large unexplained. Hence, a strong need for a convincing evolutionary theory of environmental change. This article does not deny the validity of the Darwinian view applied to the theory of the firm and of competition in a free-market economy. The paper, however, maintains that the natural-selection process that characterizes the Darwinian approach is ill suited to describe economic evolutionary processes. It is shown that a combination of functional analysis and natural selection may indeed be a better solution, for it solves some of the puzzles raised by public choice theory without violating the fundamental tenets of the new institutional economics approach. Still, although this combined view may well explain why the institutional features are retained by the system, it does not clarify why they are introduced in the first place. A third possibility is put forward in the second part of the paper, where a new evolutionary theory is suggested. Within this framework, agents are assumed to behave according to their preferences within the existing rules of the game. At the same time, new ideas and sometimes new ideologies may influence their behavioral patterns. The combination between needs and ideologies generates environmental change, especially if so-called ideological entrepreneurs are able to transform latent and shared beliefs into an institutional project and enforce it.     

Limits of the New Institutional Economics Approach to African Development

In the last two decades, there has been a marked shift in the research on Sub-Saharan Africa from standard neoclassical analysis to new institutional economics (NIE). The increasing emphasis on NIE is reflected in a wide range of works by international financial institutions and scholars. However, the NIE approach retains fundamental limitations due to its narrow interpretation of institutions, its over-reliance on analysis of transactions costs and property rights, and its ahistorical attachment to markets and private sector firms as major engines of development. Furthermore, NIE typically fails to look “inside institutions” to identify the complex cultural factors that shape the interests and behaviors of the members of institutions. This paper engages in a critique of NIE analysis of Sub-Saharan Africa’s economic development, and suggests the need for a nuanced analysis of property rights and culture, along with development programs to address inequality and poverty and to foster state-led development.     

An Institutional Explanation for Economists’ Theoretical and Methodological Choices

Scientific research in general and economics research in particular is a social act. More specifically, schools of economic thought as well as associations, research groups and conferences are expressions of social organizations within the realm of economics. Historically, studies investigating the methodologies used in economics have focused on the strengths of these social organizations. This study aims to analyze the key roles played by individuals within social organizations in building and reinforcing economics and, in turn, their influence on these individuals. To achieve this goal, we use an institutionalist approach in a broad sense. We show how economics as an academic environment can be presented as an institutional entanglement and how an institutionalist approach can enhance an understanding of why economists adopt a particular theoretical and methodological perspective. It is argued that habits, observations and cognitive abilities should be seriously considered to understand the logic and decision making of economic researchers. We discuss also the importance of forming groups in the process of institutionalizing elements relevant to an economic researcher’s logic and decision making and present an interpretation of mainstream economics in terms of the analytical approach of our study.     

The 2016 Veblen-Commons Award Recipient: Daniel W. Bromley: Institutional Economics

Institutional economics remains impaired by a lack of agreement as to the meaning of the concept “institution.” At the practical level, this conceptual muddle prevents progress in the crucial task of helping problematic states in Africa, parts of South Asia, and the Middle East. Thousands of refugees seeking to enter Europe are a reminder of the tragic consequences of dysfunctional states. Standard international development programs — emphasizing economic growth and fighting poverty — are counter-productive because they fail to address the underlying institutional incoherence in fragile states. They are flawed because they focus on symptoms rather than reasons. A focus on the reasons for current dysfunctional states would bring attention to the defective institutional architecture — legal relations — that prevents the emergence of economic coherence where dysfunction now reigns. We must help countries craft economic institutions that will improve livelihoods. But conceptual coherence about institutions must first emerge from the academy.     

价值现象学视野中的新制度经济学

新制度经济学突破了新古典经济学的范式,引入了交易费用分析范式。运用价值现象学的方法可以对新制度经济学的理论基础进行分析,新制度经济学由于忽视交易费用赖以存在的条件,所以在研究过程中经常会颠倒事物之间的因果关系,这与新制度经济学的社会心理基础有关。怨恨构造了现代社会的精神气质,新制度经济学与这种精神气质是一致的。新制度经济学对制度起源及变迁的关注都与怨恨所造成的价值假象密切相关。     

两种制度经济学范式中的意识形态理论:分歧与根源

作为制度经济学的两种范式,新制度经济学和马克思经济学的意识形态理论在意识形态的本质和功能、意识形态的根源与变迁、意识形态与制度变迁的关系等方面存在着明显的分歧.整体来看,马克思的分析框架迄今仍是最有说服力的.这些分歧的根源是方法论:新制度经济学的方法论是制度个体主义和建构理性主义,马克思的制度经济学的方法论是制度整体主义与制度个体主义的统一、演进理性主义与建构理性主义的统一.     

西方经济学与马克思主义经济学关于生产理论的比较——一个方法论的视角

西方经济学与马克思主义经济学的生产理论研究方法上存在三个方面本质区别:西方经济学的生产理论是以"经济人"假设为出发点,把劳动者仅仅作为生产要素研究;而马克思主义经济学的生产理论是以"历史的、现实的人"为出发点,把劳动者既看作生产要素,又作为生产主体来研究.西方经济学的生产理论只研究生产一般,因而使用价值(即效用)范畴是其研究的核心;而马克思主义经济学则不仅研究生产一般,更注重研究生产的具体社会形式,因而把价值范畴作为研究的核心.西方经济学用个体主义方法,把生产理论仅仅置于微观领域来研究,致使其理论体系在微观与宏观上形成脱节;而马克思主义经济学则运用唯物辩证法,在宏观和微观的有机联系中研究资本主义的生产和再生产问题.     

Institutional Economics as Theory of Policy Change: Impact of Past Policy Failures on Present Policy

Social scientists have developed several theories for understanding or evaluating policy change over time. Since all costs or benefits are not internalized owing to positive transaction costs, policymaking is always implemented under cost underestimation conditions and, therefore, is imperfect. I call this trait policy failure in this article. Furthermore, I show that a new framework combining the social costs approach and the legal/economic approach in institutional economics is suitable and can be applied to evaluating how past policy failures affect present policy, providing as an example the Fukushima nuclear disaster in Japan.