Macroprudential policy in the EU: A political economy perspective

In response to the lessons of the global financial crisis, macroprudential policy is now firmly established as a financial policy area to prevent excessive risk taking in the financial sector and mitigate its effects on the real economy. However, macroprudential policy is facing several challenges relating to its political sensitivity and institutional context. These include political and interest group resistance, weaknesses in the governance framework, and limited institutional memory among policy makers. This article seeks to contribute to the contextual understanding of macroprudential policy by exploring how factors relating to these challenges influence policy in the EU. More specifically, it develops and empirically tests a number of hypotheses on how wider institutional and structural factors influence the actual use of macroprudential measures across Europe. The findings yield considerable support for theoretical predictions that institutions and contexts matter - Political pressure and interest group resistance tend to influence the intensity of macroprudential policy stances. Weaker policy stances characterise countries where banking systems depend on domestic banks, whereas the opposite holds for financial systems with significant market shares of other financial intermediaries. Results on institutional arrangements show that governance arrangements on relating to transparency influence policy stances. The results also indicate that policy makers' inertia is best counteracted by appointing a single macroprudential authority. The results differ somewhat depending on whether countries are based in the Euro zone or not. This suggests that policy frameworks that are multi-layered and complex pose tricky conundrums on how to ensure sufficient institutional autonomy, policy capacity and discretion among macroprudential authorities. This also has implications on other policy areas macroprudential policy, such as microprudential policy, crisis management and fiscal policy.     

宏观审慎监管框架下的央行职能研究

本次金融危机凸显了加强宏观审慎监管的必要性.目前,国际社会对宏观审慎监管的重要性展开了广泛探讨,各国监管当局也在实践中逐步推进宏观审慎监管.本文剖析了宏观审慎监管框架的三个重要核心部分,即宏观审慎政策目标、政策治理范围和操作工具,进而探讨宏观审慎政策与货币政策的关系及其对中央银行履职带来的挑战.研究发现,宏观审慎政策与货币政策之间的相互作用,决定了两者必须协调使用,因此中央银行应该在宏观审慎监管中发挥主要作用,确保货币政策和宏观审慎政策的一致性,避免监管摩擦和监管真空.在我国加强宏观审慎监管的实践中,由于人民银行承担着防范和化解系统性金融风险,维护金融稳定的职责,同时具备牵头建立金融监管协调机制的法定职能和监管银行间市场、外汇市场和支付体系的法定职权,从而决定了人民银行在宏观审慎监管中必然发挥主要作用.     

宏观审慎政策的角色

本文基于宏观审慎目标、理论动因和风险传播渠道,探讨了是否应该追加全局性资本金以平抑经济周期。全局性资本金追加要求可以一刀切或者区别对待,区别对待的方法有利于更好地掌控风险,但必须慎重考量区别对待的适度水平,可通过一系列定量和定性指标来调校全局性资本金追加标准;宏观审慎决策需要一定的相机抉择,但必须对其施加相应的约束以保障政策的透明度、责任性和前瞻性,建议制定完备的责任约束机制,从而形成"有约束的相机抉择"的宏观审慎机制;一国宏观审慎制度需要得到国际合作与配合才能充分地发挥效力。     

货币政策与宏观审慎政策的协调

本文在梳理学术文献和国际经验基础上,讨论了货币政策与宏观审慎政策之间的潜在冲突和协调机制。国际文献的初步结论是,为了同时实现价格稳定和金融稳定目标,大部分情况下需要货币政策与宏观审慎政策反向操作(由于政策的替代性),但有时也需要两者同向操作(由于政策的互补性),最优政策组合取决于宏观冲击的类别和风险的来源。本文认为,选择最优组合是一个复杂的理论和实证问题,除了冲击类别和风险来源外,不同的金融体制和经济周期阶段也会影响选择结果。因此,货币政策当局与宏观审慎当局之间需要建立有效的协调机制,并加强对货币政策和宏观审慎政策“溢出效应”的分析能力。基于上述理论,针对我国“双支柱”决策的现状和问题提出如下改革建议:一是从法律上明确中央银行的金融稳定职责。二是建立在同一框架内分析货币政策与宏观审慎政策的方法和工具。三是将金融监管部门的主要宏观审慎政策决策权集中至中央银行。四是建立货币政策与宏观审慎政策的协调流程与机制。     

宏观审慎政策的国际协调问题研究--基于我国的DSGE模拟分析

本文在两国模型的DSGE框架下引入宏观审慎政策监管机制,把金融摩擦、国际资本流动和宏观审慎政策纳入同一个一般均衡分析框架。通过国际贸易和国际资本流动机制,考察宏观审慎政策的国际影响机制。基于我国的模拟分析结果表明,第一,对于我国来说,宏观审慎政策的国际合作不仅能够有效地应对国内经济冲击,也有助于抵御外部经济冲击。第二,我国推动构建国际宏观审慎政策长效合作机制,有助于积极应对国际资本流动,促进我国资本市场进一步开放。第三,我国宏观审慎政策存在国际溢出效应,但是对其他国家的影响并不明显。     

Effects of Monetary and Macroprudential Policies—Evidence from Four Inflation Targeting Economies

We examine the effects of monetary and macroprudential policies in the Asia‐Pacific region, where many inflation targeting economies have adopted macroprudential policies in order to safeguard financial stability. Using structural panel vector autoregressions that identify both monetary and macroprudential policy actions, we show that tighter macroprudential policies used to contain credit growth also have a significant negative impact on macroeconomic aggregates such as real GDP and the price level. The similar effects of monetary and macroprudential policies may suggest a complementary use of the two policies at normal times. However, they could also create challenges for policymakers, especially during times when low inflation coincides with buoyant credit growth.     

宏观审慎政策与货币政策目标协调研究

宏观审慎政策与货币政策之间的关系是当前理论研究的前沿,国内外对于宏观审慎政策与货币政策目标之间的关系、协调研究还很少.本文在回顾国内外研究的基础上,对宏观审慎政策与货币政策目标进行了比较,比较了两者目标的共同点、不同点,并分析了宏观审慎政策与货币政策目标协调的必要性:两者目标联系紧密、互相影响、具有互补性、需要关注潜在冲突,最后基于前述研究的基础上提出了对策建议.     

M‐PRESS‐CreditRisk: Microprudential and Macroprudential Capital Requirements for Credit Risk under Systemic Stress

M‐PRESS‐CreditRisk is a novel stress testing approach that can help authorities gauge banks' capital adequacy related to credit risk. For the first time, it combines the assessment of microprudential capital requirements under Pillars 1 and 2 and macroprudential buffers in a unified, coherent framework. Its core element is an advanced credit portfolio model—SystemicCreditRisk—built upon a rich, nonlinear dependence structure for correlated bank portfolios. The model is applied to a sample of 12 systemically important German banking groups and delivers measures for systemic credit risk and the banks' contributions to it in both baseline and stress scenarios.     

当前全球中央银行研究的若干重点问题

国际金融危机以来,世界经济形势发生了复杂而深远的变化,一些影响长期化的新现象、新问题、新概念不断涌现。作为全球重要的宏观经济研究力量,各国中央银行纷纷着手对后危机时代的新理念、新规律展开深入研究,并努力进行政策性的探索。本文重点讨论当前全球中央银行比较关注的三大问题:一是负利率政策的逻辑与效果;二是全球稳定币的宏观政策挑战;三是气候变化导致的宏观金融风险。现有宏观理论研究存在的不足及政策实践面临的新问题,对研究工作者而言,既是重大挑战,也是难得的历史性机遇。应立足中国国情,放眼全球百年变局,密切跟踪极具未来性的热点问题和理论前沿并将其科学应用于我国高质量发展时代的政策实践。     

对货币政策和宏观审慎政策双支柱调控框架内在逻辑的思考

本轮国际金融危机以来,金融稳定在中央银行政策目标中的重要性再次得到强化。随着具有顺周期波动特征的金融市场和金融资产规模显著增大,金融管理政策需要更加关注金融稳定和系统性风险问题,货币稳定和金融稳定“双目标”的重要性凸显出来。政策目标的变化相应要求优化和完善政策工具箱,需要健全宏观审慎政策框架作为应对系统性风险的工具,并与货币政策相互配合,形成由货币政策和宏观审慎政策“双支柱”支撑起“双目标”的基本框架,共同维护好货币稳定和金融稳定。在此框架中,货币政策和宏观审慎政策都不可或缺,须相互补充,形成合力,产生“一加一大于二”的政策效应增进效果。健全货币政策和宏观审慎政策双支柱调控框架,有利于把经济周期和金融周期更好地结合起来,把维护经济稳定与促进金融稳定更好地结合起来。下一阶段应进一步健全宏观审慎政策框架,并完善货币政策和宏观审慎政策协调配合的体制机制。     

Optimal macroprudential policy and rational bubbles

We provide a microfounded framework for the welfare analysis of macroprudential policy within a model of rational bubbles. For this, we posit an overlapping generation model where productivity and credit supply are subject to random shocks. We find that when real interest rates are lower than the rate of growth, credit financed bubbles may be welfare improving because of their role as a buffer in channeling excessive credit supply and inefficient investment at the firms’ level, but their sudden price decrease may cause a systemic crisis. Therefore, a well designed macroprudential policy plays a key role in improving efficiency while preserving financial stability. Our theoretical framework allows us to compare the efficiency of alternative macroprudential policies. Contrarily to conventional wisdom, we show that macroprudential policy (i) may be efficient even in the absence of systemic risk, (ii) has to be contingent on productivity shocks and (iii) must be contingent upon the level of real interest rates.     

Optimal Macroprudential Policies and House Prices in Korea

This article investigates the impacts of the macroprudential policy of limitation on credit growth in housing market on Korean economy to find empirical and theoretical implications. Empirical results based on VAR models show that macroprudential policies like LTV and DTI in Korea have significant and persistent effect on real household credit and real house price. This article further addresses implications of optimal macroprudential and monetary policy in Korea by employing a standard DSGE model. The results suggest that the time-varying macroprudential policy responding to the borrower’s debt to income ratio is most effective in stabilizing household debt among the macroprudential policy rules considered, but produces a moderate downturn of the economy.     

Banking systemic vulnerabilities: A tail-risk dynamic CIMDO approach

This study proposes a novel framework which combines marginal probabilities of default estimated from a structural credit risk model with the consistent information multivariate density optimization (CIMDO) methodology and the generalized dynamic factor model (GDFM) supplemented by a dynamic t-copula. The framework models banks’ default dependence explicitly and captures the time-varying non-linearities and feedback effects typical of financial markets. It measures banking systemic credit risk in the three forms categorized by the European Central Bank: (1) credit risk common to all banks; (2) credit risk in the banking system conditional on distress on a specific bank or combinations of banks; and (3) the buildup of banking system vulnerabilities over time which may unravel disorderly. In addition, the estimates of the common components of the banking sector short-term and conditional forward default measures contain early warning features, and the identification of their drivers is useful for macroprudential policy. Finally, the framework produces robust out-of-sample forecasts of the banking systemic credit risk measures. This paper advances the agenda of making macroprudential policy operational.     

My Reflections on the FPC's Strategy

I review the workings of the United Kingdom's Financial Policy Committee to illustrate the challenges of implementing macroprudential policy. I describe the committee's remit, explain my views on the channels of financial instability that the committee tries to mitigate, describe the tools the committee has its disposal and outline the principles it uses in deploying these tools. I conclude by offering some of the lessons I have learned in serving on the committee and highlighting a few challenges for macroprudential policymakers.     

Jointly Optimal Regulation of Bank Capital and Liquidity

In an economy with financial frictions, banks endogenously choose excessive leverage and maturity mismatch in equilibrium, as they fail to internalize the risk of socially wasteful fire sales. Macroprudential regulators can achieve efficiency with simple linear constraints, which require less information than Pigouvian taxes. The liquidity coverage and net stable funding ratios of Basel III can implement efficiency. Additional microprudential regulation of leverage is required when bank failures are socially costly. Micro‐ and macroprudential rules are imperfect substitutes. Optimally, macroprudential policy reacts to systematic risk and credit conditions over the cycle, while microprudential policy reacts to systematic and idiosyncratic risk.     

中国金融周期与横向关联:时空双维度相结合视角

宏观审慎政策关注各金融子市场在时间维度上的金融周期和空间维度上的横向关联。本文结合时间维度与空间维度视角,使用股票市场、货币市场、房地产市场以及信贷市场的数据,测算2001—2019年中国金融周期和横向关联的波动特征、作用关系与频域叠加机理。研究结果表明:时间维度金融周期与空间维度横向关联的波动趋势具有一致性。我国金融周期长度约为10.33年,横向关联波动周期的长度约为10.58年。从作用关系上看,首先,我国房地产周期达到波峰后,会对股票市场和信贷市场产生较强的溢出效应。随后,股市周期达到波峰后,会向房地产市场和信贷市场产生较强的溢出效应。最后,我国信贷市场接受股票市场和房地产市场溢出后,信贷周期会逐渐达到波峰。从频域叠加机理的角度看,我国金融子市场间横向关联的波动主要由中低频波段驱动,中低频波段横向关联的持续期在2个月以上。     

宏观审慎与货币政策双支柱框架研究——基于系统性风险视角

本轮国际金融危机之后,建立“宏观审慎政策专门盯住金融稳定目标,货币政策主要关注经济稳定目标”的双支柱成为国际社会的普遍共识。本文基于系统性风险视角,深入剖析系统性风险的累积和实现机制,从时间和空间两个维度梳理宏观审慎政策实现金融稳定的有效性,以及货币政策对系统性风险造成的潜在溢出性。目前从系统性风险的时间维度探讨双支柱政策的研究已较为丰富,可以总结为宏观审慎政策的“逆周期调节”机制和货币政策的“资本缺口”机制。从系统性风险的空间维度探讨双支柱政策的研究,也即对双支柱政策如何作用和改变金融机构内部关联网络的研究正成为研究热点。本文从政策工具和影响机制上对空间维度双支柱政策进行了系统梳理。基于以上分析,本文对双支柱政策的制定提出如下建议:时间维度宏观审慎政策要关注并消除货币政策对时间维度系统性风险的溢出性,同时要加强空间维度宏观审慎政策工具的创新力度。     

Macroprudential measures and developments in bank funding costs

In this paper, we study how the use of macroprudential policy instruments is associated with bank funding costs. To accomplish this, we develop several macroprudential indices based on policy objectives and include different macroeconomic and bank-level variables, while we also separately analyse the cost of debt and overall cost of funding. Our analysis relies on bank-level data in 43 European countries for the period between 2000 and 2017, and a macroprudential policy dataset based on an IMF survey. The results show the activation of macroprudential policies is chiefly related with lower bank funding costs, with this association being stronger for developed countries than emerging ones. The results also reveal positive links with certain macroprudential measures to bank cost of funding, offering further insight into the repercussions of calibrating and selecting macroprudential tools.     

Dynamical macroprudential stress testing using network theory

The increasing frequency and scope of financial crises have made global financial stability one of the major concerns of economic policy and decision makers. This has led to the understanding that financial and banking supervision has to be thought of as a systemic task, focusing on the interdependent relations among the institutions. Using network theory, we develop a dynamic model that uses a bipartite network of banks and their assets to analyze the system’s sensitivity to external shocks in individual asset classes and to evaluate the presence of features underlying the system that could lead to contagion. As a case study, we apply the model to stress test the Venezuelan banking system from 1998 to 2013. The introduced model was able to capture monthly changes in the structure of the system and the sensitivity of bank portfolios to different external shock scenarios and to identify systemic vulnerabilities and their time evolution. The model provides new tools for policy makers and supervision agencies to use for macroprudential dynamical stress testing.     

A macroprudential approach to address liquidity risk with the loan-to-deposit ratio

This paper maps the empirical features of the loan-to-deposit (LTD) ratio with an eye on using it in macroprudential policy to mitigate liquidity risk. We examine the LTD trends and cycles of 11 euro area countries by filtering methods and analyse the interaction between loans and deposits. We propose macroprudential policy to prevent an unsustainable level of the LTD ratio and policy measures to counter destabilizing cyclical developments.