Political Risk as a Determinant of Southern European FDI in Neighboring Developing Countries

This study analyzes foreign direct investment flows from southern European countries to one of two nearby developing regions: north African countries and new European Union member states in central and eastern Europe. As expected, good economic perspectives, human capital, and development of infrastructures attract greater investment flows. However, greater levels of political risk, measured through scales of political discretion, corruption, and economic freedom, do also attract higher inflows. Despite the fact that one might expect global flows to fall as a consequence of political risk, those from the countries in the sample increase, because they come from firms that are searching for a market niche where they can take advantage of their political capabilities.     

How Country and Safety-Net Characteristics Affect Bank Risk-Shifting

Risk-shifting occurs when creditors or guarantors are exposed to loss without receiving adequate compensation. This paper seeks to measure and compare how well authorities in 56 countries controlled bank risk shifting during the 1990s. Although significant risk-shifting occurs on average, substantial variation exists in the effectiveness of risk control across countries. We find that the tendency for explicit deposit insurance to exacerbate risk shifting is tempered by incorporating loss-control features such as risk-sensitive premiums, coverage limits, and coinsurance. Introducing explicit deposit insurance has had adverse effects in environments that are low in political and economic freedom and high in corruption.     

基于入门费的腐败行为与金融制度研究

从世界范围内看,高腐败发生率客观存在是不争的事实。下级官员为获得有利可图的职位,而向上级官员缴纳入门费。而入门费的筹集方式的选择,作为腐败过程的一个重要环节,涉及到金融制度问题。金融制度与腐败收益率及其在不同相关利益群体之间的利益分割存在紧密联系。金融机构的存在以及审查监督的有效性,因为可以改变公共部门的租金分配,而可以降低腐败水平。     

Corporate social responsibility and corruption risk: A global perspective

This paper extends our knowledge on corporate corruption risk by examining whether and to what extent corporate social responsibility (CSR) affects firm-level corruption risk. Using a cross-country sample of major multinational firms, we find that firm-level CSR mitigates corruption risk. On closer examination, we find that the relationship between CSR and corruption risk is mediated by country-level variables such as institutional quality, protection of minority shareholders’ rights, stock market development and freedom of the press. Further, we find that in emerging countries, CSR mitigates corruption risk only when the country-level institutional quality is high and citizens enjoy press freedom. Our findings suggest that both formal institutions and the quality of civil society influence the effect of CSR on corruption risk. Our results remain robust to controls for endogeneity and potential sample selection bias.     

The relationship between corporate governance and foreign ownership of the banks in developing countries

The aim of this paper is to determine the effect of corporate governance on foreign ownership of the banks. Within this context, annual data of 65 developing countries for the periods between 2004 and 2013 was analyzed. In addition to this situation, 7 explanatory variables were used in this study in order to achieve this objective. As a result of the analysis, it was identified that there is a strong relationship between operations of foreign banks and governance levels of the countries. In this regard, it was determined that the factors of corruption, political stability, rule of law and flexibility in legal regulations affect foreign bank operations. Moreover, it was also analyzed that foreign bank operations are stronger in the countries that have low poverty, high political stability and efficient legal infrastructure. On the other hand, it was defined that strict legal regulation affects foreign bank operations negatively which shows that foreign banks prefer to enter into the countries that have flexible legal regulations. This study gives essential information to developing countries about the factors that affect the decisions of foreign banks in order to enter into a developing country. Therefore, by considering the results of this study, the authorities of these countries can have a chance to take necessary actions so as to attract foreign banks.     

Political connections,media monitoring and long-term loans

We analyze data on Chinese non-state-listed firms and find that it is easier for firms with political connections to obtain long-term loans with extended debt maturities than it is for firms without political connections. Our investigation indicates that this phenomenon is significantly less common with increased media monitoring. Houston et al.(2011) find strong evidence that the state ownership of media is associated with higher levels of bank corruption in China, but our study shows that, to a certain extent, media monitoring can curb corruption.     

Corporate environmental disclosure and political connection in regulatory and leadership changes: The case of China

With a rapid increase of corporate environmental disclosure in developing countries, more attention is drawn to the extent to which this increase is influenced by corporate political connection. This paper focuses on China, a country experiencing increasing tensions between fast economic growth and heavy environmental pollution, complicated by high levels of political connections. A more important context in China is a historical leadership change entangled with significant regulatory reform to tackle corruption in 2013–14. Using hand-collected data from heavily polluting companies in 2012 and 2015 respectively, this study finds that there is a positive association between political connections of corporate chairmen and environmental disclosure levels in 2015 but not in 2012, suggesting that corporate disclosure behaviour has become more politically motivated after the regulatory and leadership change. There has been a significant improvement in environmental disclosure quality and this improvement is prominent in firms with politically connected chairmen. Although the regulatory change to eliminate corruption has led to substantial reductions in political connections of CEOs and senior executives, change associated with corporate chairmen is marginal. These results imply that the improvement of environmental disclosure is related more to the greater political intervention enabled by the leadership shift and power consolidation during the anti-corruption campaign than to the regulatory change to reduce political shield.     

Institutional quality,economic freedom and stock market volatility in the MENA region

How can a government help secure low-cost equity financing? This study offers an answer that a government can secure sustainable economic progress when policies of economic freedom are well institutionalized in a way that results in low equity volatility, thus low-cost equity financing. This study examines the quantitative and empirical associations between elements of Economic Freedom Index (being treated in this study as a proxy for institutional quality) and stock market volatility. The authors classify the institutional quality into three levels: high, medium and low. The data cover the years 1996–2014 for the MENA countries. The statistical tests include fixed and random effects, linearity versus non-linearity. The results show that stock market volatility can be mitigated and reduced when economic freedom is associated with an effective enforcement of law and efficient regulations. Nevertheless, the high freedom from corruption results in active equity trading which is associated with high volatility that leads in turn to high cost of equity financing. The study contributes to the literature in terms of offering practical insights on the pillars of economic freedom that policymakers must improve in order to mitigate or reduce equity volatility, therefore cost of equity financing.     

Differences between Politically Connected and Nonconnected Firms: A Cross-Country Analysis

Evidence from firms in 47 countries shows that companies with political connections have higher leverage and higher market shares, but they underperform compared to nonconnected companies on an accounting basis. Differences between connected and unconnected firms are more pronounced when political links are stronger. Differences also vary depending on the level of corruption and the degree of economic development in individual countries.     

Financial freedom and bank efficiency: Evidence from the European Union

This paper investigates the dynamics between the financial freedom counterparts of the economic freedom index drawn from the Heritage Foundation database and bank efficiency levels. We rely on a large sample of commercial banks operating in the 27 European Union member states over the 2000s. After estimating bank-specific efficiency scores using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), we develop a truncated regression model combined with bootstrapped confidence intervals to test our main hypotheses. Results suggest that the higher the degree of an economy’s financial freedom, the higher the benefits for banks in terms of cost advantages and overall efficiency. Our results also show that the effects of financial freedom on bank efficiency tend to be more pronounced in countries with freer political systems in which governments formulate and implement sound policies and higher quality governance.     

Corruption and stock market development: Developing vs. developed economies

This paper looks at the impact of corruption on stock market development, emphasizing the difference between developing and developed economies and the role corruption may play in preventing firms from listing. Guided by a theoretical model that explains why corruption’s impact on stock market development may differ, we use a sample of 87 economies worldwide over the period 1995–2017 to test for that difference. For the full sample we find no evidence that corruption has a significant effect on stock market development, but this changes when we split the sample into two groups: high-income and low-income countries. For the subsample of poorer (developing) countries, the corruption-stock market development relationship remains insignificant or weak. For the subsample of high-income (developed) countries, however, we find a significant relationship between lower levels of corruption and stock market capitalization as a share of gross domestic product. Our results further indicate that higher levels of income and investment reduce the impact of that relationship. Our results are robust to alternative estimation specifications and confirm the importance of macroeconomic fundamentals (i.e., income, investment, domestic credit, and macroeconomic stability) for the development of stock markets. In particular, those fundamentals seem more important for developing economies before reduced corruption will have as much (if any) of an impact.     

Does economic freedom fosters banks’ performance? Panel evidence from Malaysia

The present paper provides new empirical evidence on the impact of economic freedom on banks’ performance. The empirical analysis is confined to the Malaysian banking sector during the period of 1999–2007. We find that overall economic freedom and business freedom exerts positive impacts, implying that higher (lower) freedom on the activities that banks can undertake and entrepreneurs to start businesses increases (reduces) banks’ profitability. The empirical findings seem to suggest that corruption has a corrosive impact on Malaysian banks’ profitability. Interestingly, the impact of monetary freedom is negative, demonstrating the importance of government intervention in determining the profitability of banks operating in the Malaysian banking sector.     

Institutions and Deposit Insurance: Empirical Evidence

Do banks’ responses to changes in deposit insurance vary across countries even if the countries have comparable institutions? If so, by how much? Using data on the financial performance of large banks in 15 financially and economically developed countries, we find that where deposit insurance has an effect, it is large and varies depending on the level of economic freedom, rule of law and corruption in the bank’s home country. As in prior papers, we show that during stable economic periods, increases in deposit insurance are associated with higher bank risk, both problem loans and leverage. In most, but not all, cases stronger institutions temper these effects. The institutions’ effects are substantial. For example, average changes in the rule of law double the impact of a change in deposit insurance on bank leverage. We contribute to the substantial literature in this area by showing that the institutional effects are significant even across a set of countries with comparable institutions; by conducting a careful calibration of the economic significance of the effects; by providing evidence that during stable periods changes in deposit insurance only affect bank risk and not other measures of performance; and finally by showing that the effects of both deposit insurance and institutions vary across stable and crisis economic periods. The stable period results are consistent with the moral hazard effects of deposit insurance, while the crisis period results are consistent with endogeneity concerns that poor bank performance could drive changes in regulations.     

Economic policy uncertainty,institutional environments,and corporate cash holdings

We investigate the effect of economic policy uncertainty (EPU) on corporate cash holdings using a large sample of international firms. EPU intensifies concerns of investors on managerial self-dealing and political extraction. Consequently, the potential cost of cash holdings (i.e., expropriation) outweighs its benefit (i.e., precautionary motives), and the optimal amount of cash holdings decreases. We find supportive evidence that firms hold less cash when EPU is high. We further show that the market discounts excess cash holdings under high policy uncertainty, but this negative effect is mitigated by stronger investor protection, better freedom of press, and better government quality.     

Corruption and valuation of multinational corporations

This paper examines the relationship between U.S. MNCs' valuation and corruption in countries where the MNCs' foreign subsidiaries are located. We uncover that country-level corruption has a multi-dimensional impact on MNCs' valuation. We find that the impact of intangibles is less pronounced for MNCs operating primarily in corrupt countries, consistent with the view that the lack of property rights protection and information asymmetry problems are more prevalent in corrupt environments. We also find that the expansion of a MNC network dominated by corrupt countries negatively affects MNCs' valuation, suggesting that investors may recognize it as an additional risk. However, more importantly, we find that geographic diversification in corrupt countries significantly increases firm value if the MNC has high levels of intangibles such as technological know-how and marketing expertise. Assuming that transactions costs in corrupt countries are higher, our findings are consistent with the notion that the advantages from internalizing the cross-border transfer of intangibles are greater in the presence of corruption. Our findings remain unchanged when we account for endogeneity at the country-and firm-level, when we use alternative corruption measures, and when we re-estimate models by omitting MNCs with operations in locations with big “negative” shocks during the sample period. Moreover, we show that firms with expertise in dealing with corruption enjoy greater benefits from internalization.     

Bank privatization in developing and developed countries: Cross-sectional evidence on the impact of economic and political factors

We examine how political, institutional, and economic factors are related to a country’s decision to privatize state-owned banks. Using a panel of 101 countries from 1982 to 2000, we find that political factors significantly affect the likelihood of bank privatization only in developing countries. Specifically, in non-OECD countries, bank privatization is more likely the more accountable the government is to its people. In contrast, none of our political variables affects the bank privatization decision in developed countries. Economic factors (such as the quality of the nation’s banking sector) are significant determinants of bank privatization in both OECD and non-OECD nations.     

Press freedom,externally-generated transparency,and stock price informativeness: International evidence

This paper examines the impact of press freedom on stock price informativeness in a sample of firms from 50 countries. We find a significant relation between more press freedom and lower stock price synchronicity. Our results suggest that the freedom of the press can enhance the information environment of stock markets.     

The injustice of inequality

In many countries, the operation of legal, political and regulatory institutions is subverted by the wealthy and the politically powerful for their own benefit. This subversion takes the form of corruption, intimidation, and other forms of influence. We present a model of such institutional subversion—focusing specifically on courts—and of the effects of inequality in economic and political resources on the magnitude of subversion. We then use the model to analyze the consequences of institutional subversion for the law and order environment in the country, as well as for capital accumulation and growth. We illustrate the model with historical evidence from Gilded Age United States and the transition economies of the 1990s. We also present some cross-country evidence consistent with the basic prediction of the model.     

Too close for comfort? Geographic propinquity to political power and stock returns

We show that firm headquarters’ geographic proximity to political power centers (state capitals) is associated with higher abnormal returns. Consistent with the notion that this effect is rooted in social network links, we find it is more pronounced in communities with high levels of sociability and political values’ homophily, and that it dissipates when firms move their headquarters to another state. Finally, in line with the view that investors perceive such networks to be associated with political risk, we find that this effect is particularly strong when there are substantial levels of corruption, dependency on government spending, and politicians’ turnover.     

Is there a bright side to government banks? Evidence from the global financial crisis

Using a sample of banks from 56 countries, this paper investigates the lending behavior of government banks during the crisis of 2008, and its association with bank performance and the economy. Contrary to the traditional wisdom, we find that government banks can play a beneficial role under certain circumstances. Government banks have higher loan growth rates than private banks during the crisis. In countries with low corruption, the increased lending by government banks is associated with better bank performance and more favorable GDP and employment growth in the crisis period. In contrast, the results for countries with high corruption are more consistent with the political view: the increased lending by government banks is associated with underperformance relative to private banks, and creates no beneficial effects on either GDP growth or employment.