Banks as lenders and shareholders: Evidence from Japan

This paper examines the effects of the main bank's equity–debt structure, (i.e., equity stakes and debt claims) on firm performance and financial policies in Japan over the period 1977–1987. Results show that firms with main bank equity stakes have lower performance than those without. However, among firms with main bank equity stakes, the equity–debt structure of claims has a positive effect on firm performance. The positive effect of the main bank's equity–debt structure is found to be greater in group-affiliated firms than in independent firms. The main bank maximizes its own interests by charging a higher interest rate when its equity stakes are relatively less than its debt claims and by prompting firms to pay more dividends when its equity stakes are relatively high.     

The role of bank lenders in firm leverage adjustments

In this article we examine the impact of bank loan characteristics on firm leverage adjustments, with a special focus on the conflicts of interest between shareholders and creditors. The results show that, on average, more bank loans slow down leverage adjustments. The subsample analysis reveals that bank loans slow down leverage adjustments in underlevered firms but speed up adjustments in overlevered firms. This finding suggests that bank lenders are able to limit their risk exposure in borrowers and protect their own rights. Further evidence indicates that the effect of bank loans is more notable during the global financial crisis and when a firm is financially constrained. Bank loan concentration and maturity have a significant impact on leverage adjustments as well.     

Changing banking relationships and client‐firm performance: Evidence from Japan for the 1990s

The extant literature generally suggests that the performance of client firms deteriorates if their distressed main bank reduces the supply of credit. However, this insight is only consistent with the notion that main banks have an information advantage over other banks to the extent that a client firm has trouble getting access to credit if the firm changes its main bank. This paper shows that Japanese firms did change their main banking relationship when their main banks become distressed in a period with financial shocks. Surprisingly, these firms did not suffer from loss of access to credit and actually their performance significantly improved after their change of main banks.     

银行业竞争、创新资源配置和企业创新产出——基于中国工业企业的经验证据

本文利用城市级商业银行分支机构数据,结合中国工业企业数据和企业专利数据,实证分析银行业竞争对中国企业创新产出的影响。研究发现,竞争性的银行业市场结构显著促进了企业创新产出,对非国有企业和中小企业尤为显著。进一步地,本文基于资源配置角度,从新进入企业和在位企业双重视角探讨银行业竞争影响企业创新产出的作用途径。检验发现,银行业竞争提高条件下,更多的高效率企业进入创新部门,更多的高效率在位企业增加创新投入,且上述影响在非国有企业和中小企业中更为明显。本文检验结果显示,银行业竞争能提高银行对高效率企业的信贷支持,优化企业之间创新资源配置,并通过引导高效率非国有企业和中小企业增加创新投入而推动整体层面的创新产出。本文拓展了银行业竞争对企业创新的微观影响研究,为制定基于创新驱动的金融发展政策提供新思路。     

Why Do Firms Switch Banks? Evidence from China

This article uses a sample of matched firms-banks data in China over the period 1999–2012 to determine the drivers of firms switching behavior from one bank relationship to another. The results show that the principal driver of a switching action is the credit needs of the firm. The binding force of the Communist Party in state-owned banks and enterprises would suggest that switching should be a rare phenomenon in Chinese commercial relations. But switching occurs. The findings support the extant literature that transparent firms are able to switch more readily than opaque firms. The results also suggest that banks that develop their fee income services are more effective in locking-in their borrowers and that firms tend to switch from state-owned banks to smaller non-state owned banks. However, in other areas switching does not conform with the mainstream explanations.     

银行价格竞争、融资约束与企业研发投资——基于“中介效应”模型的实证研究

近年来我国利率市场化改革积极推进,实体经济发展积极向创新驱动转型,一个亟须研究厘清的关键问题是,银行业竞争如何驱动企业创新活动？本文关注银行价格竞争对企业创新的影响,以2013—2018年沪深两市的上市企业为样本,采用“中介效应”因果分析模型,实证检验了银行价格竞争对企业研发投资的影响,并识别出以融资约束为中介渠道的作用机制。研究发现,银行价格竞争不仅会提高银行的风险容忍度,直接增加R&D投资的信贷供给意愿,而且还会通过降低贷款价格和增加贷款可得性来缓解企业整体的融资约束,间接促进企业创新活动。这一机制在解除贷款利率管制之后以及在民营企业层面体现得更加明显。本文的研究结果对于深化金融市场化改革、改善金融服务实体经济效果以及实施经济创新驱动发展战略,具有明确的政策启示。     

The determinants and valuation effects of classification choice on the statement of cash flows

In this paper we exploit the choice allowed by International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) regarding the presentation of interest payments on the cash flow statement to answer two related questions: First, whether the classification choice is explained by firm reporting incentives and second, whether it is value relevant. Using a UK sample, we find that firms reporting losses, with a greater proportion of their debt stemming from public sources, with CFO-based covenants and greater increases in leverage in the year of adoption are less likely to report interest payments in cash flows from operating activities (CFOA). Results also suggest that the incentive to meet or beat analyst CFO forecasts decreases, but strong corporate governance increases the probability of including interest payments in CFOA. Based on the assumption that the decision not to classify interest payments in CFOA captures lower disclosure quality or poor future expected performance, we posit that these firms should also exhibit lower valuations. Results obtained after correcting for self-selection bias confirm this assertion. We conclude that managers’ decision not to classify interest payments in CFOA is consistent with the opportunistic use of the choice allowed by IFRS.     

银行业竞争、融资约束与企业创新——中国工业企业的经验证据

本文将1998-2007年中国工业企业数据、专利申请数据与银监会公布的金融许可证数据相匹配,考察银行业竞争影响企业创新的内在机制。结果发现,竞争的加剧通过缓解企业面临的融资约束,从而提升其创新能力。在弱化内生性问题和一系列稳健性检验后,上述结果仍然稳健。进一步研究发现,外部融资依赖度较高的企业,中小、民营企业,以及位于市场化水平高和法治环境好的地区的企业,银行业竞争通过缓解融资约束促进其创新的效应更加明显。此外,本文还发现股份制银行和城商行的竞争能更好地推动企业创新。因此,建立健全多层次、多元化的金融体系,能有效缓解企业创新的融资困境,激发创新活力。     

Information Opacity,Credit Risk,and the Design of Loan Contracts for Private Firms

This paper examines the structure and cost of a large sample of bank loans to private firms. Compared to public firms, private firms are more informationally opaque and riskier. The results suggest that the design of a loan to a private firm is significantly different from that to a public firm. Bank loans to private firms are more likely to be by a sole lender, collateralized, and have sweep covenants than loans to public firms. The cost of borrowing is higher for a private firm than for a public firm, even after holding constant firm and loan characteristics.     

Bank power,block ownership,boards and financial distress likelihood: An investigation of Spanish listed firms

We investigate the effects of bank power, block ownership and board independence on the likelihood of financial distress. Using a matched sample design, we find that firms in which banks have power are more likely than their counterparts to enter financial distress. However, the bank power effects are moderated by block ownership and board independence. Specifically, on the one hand, financial distress due to bank power is lower for firms with greater ownership by pressure resistant blockholders and such blockholders appear to be the largest blockholder in the firm. The bank power effects are also lower in firms with greater outside directors and this appears to be primarily driven by proprietary directors than independent directors. On the other, we document evidence suggesting that the bank power effects are magnified for firms in which the board chair is a proprietary director aligned to non-financial blockholders or CEO/Chair, suggesting that banks might partly influence decisions via board chairs. Overall, the findings are consistent with bank power actions being detrimental to the firm, but the extent to which such actions harm the firm depends on the monitoring intentions of blockholders and/or board of directors. These findings have important implications for policymakers.     

所有权、产业政策指导与银行贷款利率

以上市公司披露的银行信贷数据为样本,实证分析产业政策指导对企业贷款利率的影响。结果表明:产业政策指导中的重点支持类企业和一般支持类企业往往获得了银行贷款的利率优惠,商业银行较好地落实了国家的产业政策;相比于民营企业,与政府有密切关系的国有企业获得了较低的贷款利率,商业银行的信贷决策表现出一定程度的所有权金融歧视。     

Trade credit use and bank loan access: an agency theory perspective

In this study we find that firms’ use of trade credit significantly facilitates their access to bank loans in the future, suggesting a complementary relationship. Such a relationship is more profound for firms with higher perceived agency costs, i.e., firms with opaque corporate information, firms located in regions with less developed external institutions, and firms at an early stage of existence. Firms switch from trade credit to bank loans as the main source of debt financing as they age. However, the process is slower for firms with a greater level of corporate information opacity and firms located in regions with weak external institutions.     

Corporate social responsibility,credit rating,and private debt contracting: new evidence from syndicated loan market

We examine the impact of corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities on loan spreads of syndicated bank loans, with a particular interest in how CSR and credit ratings are interrelated as a joint determinant of loan spreads. Focusing on private debt contracts, we show that both CSR strengths and concerns are related to their loan spreads. CSR strengths work to lower firm risk, hence reducing the loan spread, whereas CSR concerns increase firm risk, thus increasing the loan spread. Once we include detailed credit rating information in the models, however, CSR concerns lose significance, but CSR strengths remain significantly related to the loan spread. We also find that both CSR strengths and CSR concerns are related to loan spread for non-rated firms, but the CSR concern effect is stronger than the CSR strength effect for these firms. A further test shows that firm risk measured by stock return volatility plays as a direct channel through which a firm’s CSR activities affect loan spreads, whose result lends further support to our main results. Overall, our results provide strong evidence that CSR matters to the pricing of loan contracts beyond credit rating information and the results remain robust to the possible firm size effect and the endogeneity issues.     

Banking relationships and access to equity capital markets: Evidence from Japan’s main bank system

We study the role of banking relationships in IPO underwriting. When a firm in Japan goes public, it can engage an investment bank that is related through a common main bank, or can select an alternative investment bank. The main bank relationship can be an efficient way for the investment bank to acquire information generated by the main bank, but may give rise to conflicts of interest. We find that main bank relationships give small issuers increased access to equity capital markets, but that issuers of large IPOs often switch to non-related investment banks that are capable of managing large offerings. While investment banks seek to exploit bargaining power with related issuers, issuers respond to expected high issue cost by switching to non-related investment banks. The net result is that total issue costs through related and non-related investment banks are similar. With respect to aftermarket performance and use of proceeds, we find no evidence of conflict of interest or self-dealing for either the main bank or the investment bank.     

Distance, Lending Relationships, and Competition

We study the effect on loan conditions of geographical distance between firms, the lending bank, and all other banks in the vicinity. For our study, we employ detailed contract information from more than 15,000 bank loans to small firms comprising the entire loan portfolio of a large Belgian bank. We report the first comprehensive evidence on the occurrence of spatial price discrimination in bank lending. Loan rates decrease with the distance between the firm and the lending bank and increase with the distance between the firm and competing banks. Transportation costs cause the spatial price discrimination we observe.     

银行与企业交叉持股的理论与依据——基于国际比较的研究

本文通过文献回顾分析了世界主要国家银行与企业交叉持股的经济后果。从银行持有企业股份的角度而言,一方面银行持有企业股份能降低委托代理成本,另一方面银行同时作为股东和债权人会产生利益冲突。从企业持有银行股份的角度看,企业持股银行最直接的后果是关联贷款。但是,关联贷款既可能是掏空银行的手段,也可能是因为银行对企业股东更为了解,所以发放关联贷款。本文的结论表明,银行与企业交叉持股既有积极的一面,也要严密防范金融风险。本文的结论对于促进产融结合具有积极的意义。     

Evidence of a bank lending channel in the UK

Using balance sheet data for a panel of UK listed firms, we find evidence of a bank lending channel of monetary transmission. A higher interest rate induces more bank lending to listed companies, but this effect diminishes if monetary policy becomes tight enough to impose severe constraints on bank loan lending. The dynamic behaviour of bank debt versus non-bank debt shows that the lending channel works through cutting back loan supplies to small, bank-dependent firms while restricting the bank’s ability to provide financial assistance to other firms. We see cross-sectional differences between bank-dependent and non-bank-dependent listed companies, and between listed and non-listed companies: Both can contribute to the size effect of investment. Small firms bear most of the reductions in bank loan supplies, and since they do not have many alternatives to bank finance, they suffer more from monetary tightening than big firms. This is consistent with inventory behavior. Furthermore, we have found that big, non-bank-dependent firms can benefit more from the bank–firm relationship than small, bank-dependent firms.     

Bank discrimination, holding bank ownership, and economic consequences: Evidence from China

This paper finds that compared with Chinese state-owned firms, non-state-owned firms have a greater propensity to hold significant ownership in commercial banks. These results are consistent with the notion that because non-state-owned firms are more likely to suffer bank discrimination for political reasons, they tend to address their financing disadvantages by building economic bonds with banks. We also find that among non-state-owned firms, those that hold significant bank ownership have lower interest expenses, and are less likely to increase cash holdings but more likely to obtain short-term loans when the government monetary policy is tight. These results suggest that the firms building economic bonds with banks can enjoy benefits such as lower financial expenses and better lending terms during difficult times. Finally, we find that non-state-owned firms with significant bank ownership have better operating performance. Overall, we find that firms can reduce discrimination through holding bank ownership.     

Credit rationing and the relationship between family businesses and banks in Italy

We investigate whether family businesses (FBs) suffer stiffer credit rationing in the post-crisis Italian economy. FBs are, in fact, typically more opaque than other firms, possibly deterring bank lending to them. Moreover, regulatory changes may lead many banks to abandon relationship lending, weakening their ability to evaluate opaque firms. Using detailed firm data, our estimates reach nuanced conclusions. First, credit rationing is not more intense at FBs. However, it systematically intensifies if FBs engage in firm-bank arrangements less able to overcome information asymmetries either coupling with a main bank that uses transactional lending or diluting relationships across various banking partners.     

The Benefits of Relationship Banking: Evidence from Small Business Financing in Finland

Using unique small business credit-file data from a major Finnish bank, I analyze how relationship characteristics are associated with loan interest rates. Data includes the effective loan rate and variables that describe the duration and scope of relationship, collateralization, firm characteristics, bank’s internal risk rating, and loan characteristics. The results show that longer duration tends to lower the cost of credit and that a long-term bank/firm relationship is beneficial especially to high-risk firms. As the relationship matures, the loan premiums for high-risk firms decrease at higher rate than for low-risk firms.