Inflation targeting,credibility, and non-linear Taylor rules

In this paper we systematically evaluate how central banks respond to deviations from the inflation target. We present a stylized New Keynesian model in which agents' inflation expectations are sensitive to deviations from the inflation target. To (re-) establish credibility, monetary policy under discretion sets higher interest rates today if average inflation exceeded the target in the past. Moreover, the central bank responds non-linearly to past inflation gaps. This is reflected in an additional term in the central bank's instrument rule, which we refer to as the ”credibility loss.” Augmenting a standard Taylor (1993) rule with the latter term, we provide empirical evidence for the interest rate response for a sample of five inflation targeting (IT) economies. We find, first, that past deviations from IT feed back into the reaction function and that this influence is economically meaningful. Deterioration in credibility (ceteris paribus) forces central bankers to undertake larger interest rate steps. Second, we detect an asymmetric reaction to positive and negative credibility losses, with the latter dominating the former.     

基于前瞻性泰勒规则对中国通货膨胀目标值估计的实证研究

基于状态空间形式的前瞻性泰勒规则,采用卡尔曼滤波估计方法对中国1992～2008年动态通货膨胀目标值进行估计,结果显示中国的通货膨胀预期目标值较实际水平平滑,1998年之后的通货膨胀目标估计值能够较准确反映中国这一时期真实通货膨胀率预期值;中国历年通货膨胀和产出水平的变化随着利率的变化而顺向变动。结论提示今后中国货币政策可采取把灵活而又规范的通货膨胀目标制与泰勒规则结合的操作框架。     

Flexible inflation targets,forex interventions and exchange rate volatility in emerging countries

Emerging economies with inflation targets (IT) face a dilemma between fulfilling the theoretical conditions of “strict IT”, which imply a fully flexible exchange rate, or applying a “flexible IT”, which entails a de facto managed-floating exchange rate with foreign exchange (forex) interventions to moderate exchange rate volatility. Using a panel data model for 37 countries we find that, although IT lead to higher exchange rate instability than alternative regimes, forex interventions in some IT countries have been more effective to lower volatility than in non-IT countries, which may justify the use of “flexible IT” by policymakers.     

The Advantage of Flexible Targeting Rules

This paper investigates the consequences of debt stabilization for inflation targeting. If the fiscal authority holds constant the real value of debt at maturity under strict inflation targeting, the equilibrium dynamics are indeterminate for a wide range of parameters and steady‐state fiscal stances. “Flexible” targeting rules that include a concern for stabilization of the output gap can restore determinacy of the equilibrium. Flexible inflation targeting appears to be more robust than flexible debt targeting to alternative parameterizations. The fiscal authority can prevent indeterminacy under strict targeting rules by committing to hold constant debt net of interest rate spending.     

Following the leader? The relevance of the Fed funds rate for inflation targeting countries

In a New-Keynesian model for a small open economy, we derive a CPI inflation-based Taylor rule that implements the flexible price allocation. We conclude that, in this rule, the natural rate of interest should be linked to the foreign interest rate and to domestic productivity shocks. This rule ensures that the CPI real rate moves in order to induce movements in consumption that are coherent with the flexible price allocation. The empirical evidence shows that inflation-targeting central banks respond to movements in the Fed funds rate, besides reacting to expected CPI inflation and to the domestic output gap. This is true for developed and emerging economies. Furthermore, we find that in emerging countries the response to foreign variables is not different from zero, as suggested by theory, when domestic inflation, rather than CPI inflation, is introduced in the policy rule.     

劳动市场摩擦与机会主义货币政策

本文在存在劳动市场摩擦的DSGE模型框架下考察机会主义货币政策的合理性。研究发现,当经济中存在显著的工资粘性、雇佣成本和搜寻匹配摩擦时,实行灵活通胀目标的机会主义货币政策在社会福利效果上优于以稳定通胀和产出缺口为目标的标准泰勒规则,并接近无约束最优政策的福利效果。因此在这些条件下,机会主义货币政策是中央银行合理的政策选择。     

The Central Banker as a Risk Manager: Estimating the Federal Reserve's Preferences under Greenspan

We derive a natural generalization of the Taylor rule that links changes in the interest rate to the balance of the risks implied by the dual objective of sustainable economic growth and price stability. This monetary policy rule reconciles economic models of expected utility maximization with the risk management approach to central banking. Within this framework, we formally test and reject the standard assumption of quadratic and symmetric preferences in inflation and output that underlies the derivation of the Taylor rule. Our results suggest that Fed policy decisions under Greenspan were better described in terms of the Fed weighing upside and downside risks to their objectives rather than simply responding to the conditional mean of inflation and of the output gap.     

全球化、资产价格变动与中国货币政策反应——基于泰勒规则的扩展研究

在经济全球化、虚拟化的背景下对泰勒规则进行了扩展研究,分析了利率与汇率、利率与资产价格的相关影响机制;并采用静态模型和基于预期的动态模型对名义利率与通货膨胀水平、产出缺口、汇率、股票价格缺口以及房地产价格缺口之间的关系进行了检验。结果显示,考虑预期因素的动态模型能够达到稳定通货膨胀的作用,短期名义利率对于汇率和资产价格起到了符合经济意义的稳定作用。     

The Role of Money in Monetary Policy at the Lower Bound

In light of the current low-interest-rate environment, we reconsider the merits of strict money growth targeting (MGT) relative to conventional inflation targeting (IT) and to price level targeting (PLT). We evaluate these policies in terms of social welfare through the lens of a New Keynesian model and accounting for a zero lower bound (ZLB) constraint on the nominal interest rate. Although MGT makes monetary policy vulnerable to money demand shocks, MGT contributes to achieving price level stationarity and significantly reduces the incidence and severity of the ZLB relative to both IT and PLT. Furthermore, MGT lessens the need for fiscal expansions to supplement monetary policy in fighting recessions.     

经济转型时期中俄货币政策目标比较研究

本文回顾了中国和俄罗斯近年来执行货币政策的主要经历,并针对两国货币政策目标及其实施绩效进行了评价。结果发现,虽然中俄两国采取了相同的货币政策框架,但是却取得了不同的结果,中国的货币政策成功的控制了通胀,而俄罗斯的实际通胀率却始终高于其预先设定的目标。利用开放经济条件下的泰勒规则,我们进一步对中俄两国货币政策的目标进行了实证分析。结果表明,尽管中俄两国货币政策都采取了相同的反通胀的政策立场,但俄罗斯货币政策在稳定通胀的同时,还将稳定汇率作为了货币政策主要目标,这也是造成两国货币政策不同绩效的主要原因。我们认为,在当前人民币升值和通胀上升双重压力的背景下,我国货币政策的基本取向应该是坚持以反通胀为首要目标。     

Learnability and monetary policy: A global perspective

The recent literature on monetary policy design has emphasized the importance of equilibrium determinacy and learnability in the choice of policy rules. This paper contains an analysis of the learnability of the equilibrium in a class of simple, micro-founded models in which the policy authority uses a Taylor-type monetary policy rule. Unlike previous analyses, the model economy is not linearized about a steady state—instead, a global perspective is adopted. Globally, the nonlinear model economy can possess rational expectations equilibria other than the steady state consistent with the inflation target of the monetary authorities. These include a second, low inflation ‘liquidity trap’ steady state, periodic equilibria, and sunspot equilibria. The main results in the paper characterize the conditions under which these alternative equilibria maybe stable under adaptive learning, even when the policy rule obeys the Taylor principle. The stability of multiple equilibria is associated with policy rules which are forecast-based. An important finding is that backward-looking Taylor-type policy rules can guarantee that the unique learnable equilibrium is the steady state associated with the inflation target of the monetary authority.     

The Role of Inflation Target Adjustment in Stabilization Policy

How and under what circumstances can adjusting the inflation target serve as a stabilization-policy tool and contribute to welfare improvement? We answer these questions quantitatively with a standard New Keynesian model that includes cost-push-type shocks. Our proposed inflation target rule calls for the target to be adjusted in a persistent manner and in the opposite direction to the realization of a cost-push shock, which is essentially a makeup strategy. The inflation target rule, combined with a Taylor-type rule, significantly reduces inflation fluctuations originating from cost-push shocks and mitigates the stabilization trade-off, resulting in a similar level of welfare to that associated with the Ramsey optimal policy.     

Determinacy and expectational stability of equilibrium in a monetary sticky-price model with Taylor rule

Recent studies show that the Taylor rule possesses desirable properties in terms of generating determinacy and E-stability of rational expectations equilibria under sticky prices. This paper examines whether this policy rule retains these properties within a discrete-time money-in-utility-function model, employing three timings of money balances of the utility function that the existing literature contains: end-of-period timing and two types of cash-in-advance timing. This paper shows: (i) even a small degree of non-separability of the utility function between consumption and real balances causes the Taylor rule to be much more likely to induce indeterminacy or E-instability if this rule responds not only to inflation but also to output or the output gap; (ii) differences among the three timings strongly alter conditions for the Taylor rule to ensure both determinacy and E-stability.     

Nowcasting and the Taylor Rule

Actual federal funds rates in the U.S. have, at times, deviated from the recommendations of a simple Taylor rule. This paper proposes a “nowcasting” Taylor rule that preserves the form of the Taylor rule but encompasses realistic assumptions on information observable to policymakers. Because contemporaneous inflation rates and output gaps are not observable at the time policy is set, policymakers must form “nowcasts.” The optimal nowcast will depend, in part, on forecast uncertainty whenever policymakers have asymmetric costs to over‐ and underpredicting inflation and output. Empirical evidence shows that actual policy rates are consistent with those recommended by a nowcasting Taylor rule.     

Can central banks’ monetary policy be described by a linear (augmented) Taylor rule or by a nonlinear rule?

The original Taylor rule establishes a simple linear relation between the interest rate, inflation and the output gap. An important extension to this rule is the assumption of a forward-looking behaviour of central banks. Now they are assumed to target expected inflation and output gap instead of current values of these variables. Using a forward-looking monetary policy reaction function, this paper analyses whether central banks’ monetary policy can indeed be described by a linear Taylor rule or, instead, by a nonlinear rule. It also analyses whether that rule can be augmented with a financial conditions index containing information from some asset prices and financial variables. The results indicate that the monetary behaviour of the European Central Bank and Bank of England is best described by a nonlinear rule, but the behaviour of the Federal Reserve of the United States can be well described by a linear Taylor rule. Our evidence also suggests that only the European Central Bank is reacting to financial conditions.     

The Taylor Principle and Monetary Policy Approaching a Zero Bound on Nominal Rates: Quantile Regression Results for the United States and Japan

This paper offers a new approach that estimates the response of interest rates to inflation and the output gap at various points (quantiles) on the conditional distribution of interest rates. This offers an improvement on empirical estimates conducted only at the mean and also allows us to test the propositions that policy shows greater aggression to inflation in the reaction function in terms of a greater response coefficient as interest rates reach low levels, and increasing aggression as the lower bound is approached. We find support for the Taylor principle, a more aggressive response to inflation than under a Taylor rule, but no detectable evidence of increasing aggression as the zero lower bound is approached in the US and Japan.     

The Meta Taylor Rule

We characterize U.S. monetary policy within a generalized Taylor rule framework that accommodates uncertainties about the duration of policy regimes and the specification of the rule, in addition to the standard parameter and stochastic uncertainties inherent in traditional Taylor rule analysis. Our approach involves estimation and inference based on Taylor rules obtained through standard linear regression methods, but combined using Bayesian model averaging techniques. Employing data that were available in real time, the estimated version of the “meta” Taylor rule provides a flexible but compelling characterization of monetary policy in the United States over the last 40 years.     

Monetary Policy Rules in an Open Economy with Heuristics: Which Model Is Best?

The choices of policy targets and the formation of agents’ expectation have been critical issues for reconsidering monetary policy management since 2008. The purpose of this article is to evaluate macroeconomic stability in a New Keynesian open economy in which agents experience cognitive limitations. The (im)perfect credibility of various monetary policies (e.g., a Taylor-type rule, strict domestic inflation targeting, strict CPI inflation targeting, exchange rate peg) may lead agents to react according to their expectation rules, and then create various degrees of booms and busts in output and inflation. Therefore, relaxation of the rational expectation hypothesis has potential consequences for policy designs. Our simulations confirm that the business cycles induced by animal spirits are enhanced by strict inflation targeting. Furthermore, a Taylor-type (CPI or domestic inflation) rule or a credible exchange rate pegging system can improve social welfare and stability in an open economy.     

Optimism and auditor liability

There is strong evidence that individuals are optimistic in the sense that they underrate the probability of a negative event occurring. This paper provides a positive theoretical analysis of how auditor optimism affects their incentives to take care under two liability rules: strict liability and a negligence rule. Under strict liability, auditors are held liable when they cause damages to investors. Under a negligence rule, auditors are held liable when they cause damages and in addition, act negligently, that is, fail to meet the standard of due care specified in legal and professional rules. I find the following results. (1) If due care is sufficiently close to the efficient level, a negligence rule distorts auditors’ incentives less than strict liability. Under strict liability, optimism makes the auditor overestimate the chances of finding material mistakes and thus induces suboptimal care. (2) If due care is too strict, the auditor will not exert due care but the same level of suboptimal care under either liability rule. (3) With increasing optimism and in the absence of punitive damages, strict liability becomes less preferable to a precise negligence rule. This statement also holds for vaguely defined standards of due care if due care is sufficiently strict or if auditor optimism is sufficiently high. (4) Punitive damages counteract suboptimal incentives generated by auditor optimism, especially under strict liability.