HUMAN CAPITAL FORMATION AND TAX EVASION

A strictly risk‐averse individual with an exogenous gross income in period one can acquire human capital in the same period and evade taxes. Period‐two income rises with educational investments in period one and can also be hidden from tax authorities. It is shown that a greater tax deductibility of educational investments and higher individual ability induce a positive correlation between tax evasion and educational investments in period two, whereas the relationship in period one is ambiguous. These theoretical predictions can explain diverse empirical findings on the correlation between education and tax evasion.     

Fairness in tax compliance: A political competition model

This paper analyzes the political economy of income redistribution when voters are concerned about fairness in tax compliance. We consider a two‐stage model where there is a two‐party competition over the tax rate and over the intensity of the tax enforcement policy in the first stage, and voters decide about their level of tax compliance in the second stage. We find that if the concern about fairness in tax compliance is high enough, a liberal middle‐income majority of voters may block any income redistribution policy. Alternatively, we find an equilibrium in which the preferences of the median voter are ignored in favor of a coalition formed by a group of relatively poor voters and the richest voters. In this equilibrium income redistribution prevails with no tax enforcement.     

On the Optimal Taxation in a Growth Model of the Mixed Economy

Previous studies of second‐best taxation have shown that capital income shall not be taxed in the long run for some cases where individuals have infinite lives and a utility function of special form. The present paper improves upon this conclusion in two respects: first, the utility function may be of more general form, and second, zero capital income tax is required for the entire period, which does not depend on whether the individual's horizon is infinite or finite. Furthermore, we also show that the optimal tax rate on capital income should tend to zero in the long run if the first‐best optimum is attainable.     

Constrained Inefficiency and Optimal Taxation with Uninsurable Risks

When individuals' labor and capital income are subject to uninsurable idiosyncratic risks, should capital and labor be taxed, and if so how? In a two‐period general equilibrium model with production, we derive a decomposition formula of the welfare effects of these taxes into insurance and distribution effects. This allows us to determine how the sign of the optimal taxes on capital and labor depend on the nature of the shocks and the degree of heterogeneity among consumers' income, as well as on the way in which the tax revenue is used to provide lump‐sum transfers to consumers. When shocks affect primarily labor income and heterogeneity is small, the optimal tax on capital is positive. However, in other cases a negative tax on capital is welfare‐improving.     

REDISTRIBUTIVE POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT DEBT IN A BORROWING‐CONSTRAINED ECONOMY

We develop a two‐period, three‐class of income model where low‐income agents are borrowing constrained because of capital market imperfections, and where redistributive expenditure is financed by tax and government debt. When the degree of capital market imperfection is high, there is an ends‐against‐the‐middle equilibrium where the constrained low‐income and the unconstrained high‐income agents favour low levels of government debt and redistributive expenditure; these agents form a coalition against the middle. In this equilibrium, the levels of government debt and expenditure might be below the efficient levels, and the spread of income distribution results in a lower debt‐to‐GDP ratio.     

LIQUIDITY RISK AND CORPORATE HEDGING WITH FUTURES

This paper examines the hedging behaviour of a value‐maximizing firm that exists for two periods. The firm faces uncertain income and is subject to tax asymmetries with no loss‐offset provisions. The firm has access to unbiased futures contracts in each period for hedging purposes. We impose a liquidity constraint on the firm. Specifically, whenever the net interim loss due to its first‐period futures position exceeds a predetermined threshold level, the firm is forced to terminate its risk management program and, therefore, is prohibited from trading the futures contracts in the second period. We show that the liquidity‐constrained firm optimally adopts a full‐hedge via its second‐period futures position to minimize the extent of the income risk and an under‐hedge via its first‐period futures position to limit the degree of the liquidity risk.     

Tax Havens,Growth, and Welfare

This paper develops an endogenous growth model featuring tax havens, and uses it to examine how the existence of tax havens affects the economic growth rate and social welfare in high‐tax countries. We show that the presence of tax havens generates two conflicting channels in determining the growth effect. First, the public investment effect states that tax havens may erode tax revenues and in turn decrease the government's infrastructure expenditure, thereby reducing growth. Second, the tax planning effect of tax havens reduces marginal cost of capital and hence encourages capital accumulation so as to spur economic growth. The overall growth effect is ambiguous and is determined by the extent of these two effects. The welfare analysis shows that tax havens are more likely to be welfare‐enhancing if the government expenditure share in production is low, or the initial income tax rate is high. Moreover, the welfare‐maximizing income tax rate is lower than the growth‐maximizing income tax rate if tax havens are present.     

Income Taxation, Endogenous Factor Prices and Production Efficiency

In an analysis of a two‐type income tax model with endogenous wages, this paper shows that production efficiency is violated in the optimum with (i) non‐linear and (ii) linear income taxation if and only if a distortionary tax schedule is implemented. These findings complement earlier results of the literature. In passing, it is also shown that optima with non‐linear redistributive income taxation cannot be identified with the redistributive regime if the assumption of endogenous wages is taken seriously.     

Effect of the Tax System ON R&D Intensity,Growth, Wages and Consumption Share

We propose a general equilibrium knowledge‐driven (semi‐)endogenous‐growth model with horizontal R&D, which is extended to consider two types of labour, skilled and unskilled, and exogenous government expenditure, financed through taxes on financial assets and on labour income, to analyse the implications of the tax system on R&D intensity, economic growth, wage inequality and consumption share in the output. In particular, we show that: (i) taxes have negative influence in the consumption share, being higher the marginal effect of the labour‐income tax; (ii) for any given government expenditure share, an increase (a decrease) in financial‐assets tax decreases (increases) the labour‐income tax; (iii) only the financial‐assets tax affects negatively the R&D intensity and the skill‐premium; thus, to reduce the skill‐premium the financial‐assets tax must increase; (iv) ignoring the effect on wage inequality and on R&D intensity, taxes are substitutes.     

Conspicuous Leisure: Optimal Income Taxation When Both Relative Consumption and Relative Leisure Matter*

In previous studies on public policy under relative‐consumption concerns, leisure comparisons have been ignored. In this paper, we consider a two‐type optimal non‐linear income tax model, in which people care about both their relative consumption and their relative leisure. Increased consumption positionality typically implies higher marginal income tax rates for both ability types, whereas leisure positionality has an offsetting role. However, this offsetting role is not symmetric; concern about relative leisure implies a progressive income tax component (i.e., a component that is larger for the high‐ability type than for the low‐ability type). Leisure positionality does not modify the policy rule for public‐good provision.     

Optimal Nonlinear Income Taxation with Habit Formation

It has recently been shown that incorporating “keeping up with the Joneses” preferences into a prototypical two‐ability‐type optimal nonlinear income tax model leads to higher marginal tax rates for both types of agents. In particular, the high‐skill type faces a positive marginal tax rate, rather than zero as in the conventional case. In this paper, agents’ utility functions are postulated to exhibit “habit formation in consumption” such that the prototypical two‐ability‐type optimal nonlinear income tax model becomes a dynamic analytical framework. We show that if the government can commit to its future fiscal policy, the presence of consumption habits does not affect the standard results on optimal marginal tax rates. By contrast, if the government cannot precommit, the high‐skill type will face a negative marginal tax rate, while the low‐skill type’s marginal tax rate remains positive.     

企业行为约束下技术创新所得税激励政策效应研究

技术创新所得税激励政策效应的发挥不但取决于政策本身的制度设计,还取决于企业投资行为对税收政策的敏感性。技术创新所得税激励政策作为制度驱动,既受到企业自身行为的约束,又与企业内部研发驱动机制相互作用。在企业行为理论框架下,运用随机效应模型,以2009—2013年中国Ａ股上市公司数据为样本,对企业行为约束下中国技术创新所得税激励政策效应进行了理论分析和实证检验。结果发现,税收优惠政策形成的税收补贴通过转化为企业内部资源、降低研发投资风险,使得企业内部驱动机制对研发支出的积极作用增强;所得税激励政策本身并未对企业技术创新活动产生显著的激励作用。     

Identifying Laffer Bounds: A Sufficient‐Statistics Approach with an Application to Germany

We derive a simple sufficient‐statistics test for whether a nonlinear tax‐transfer system is second‐best Pareto efficient. If it is not, then it is beyond the top of the Laffer curve and there exists a tax cut that is self‐financing. The test depends on the income distribution, extensive and intensive labor supply elasticities, and income effect parameters. A tax‐transfer system is likely to be inefficient if marginal tax rates are quickly falling in income. We apply this test to the German tax‐transfer system, and we find that the structure of effective marginal tax rates is likely to be inefficient in the region where transfers are phased out.     

Distributional Effects of a Wealth Tax under Lifetime‐Dynastic Income Concepts*

Annual wealth tax is back on the policy agenda, but discussion of its effect is not well informed. When standard methodology is used and wealth‐tax burdens are measured against annual individual income, it is found that a large share of the tax burden falls on people with low incomes. In this study, we use rich Norwegian administrative data to discuss the distributional effects of wealth tax under several different income concepts, ultimately measuring income over the lifetime of family dynasties. When measured against lifetime income and lifetime income in dynasties, wealth tax is mostly borne by high‐income taxpayers and is seen as clearly redistributive.     

Optimal Taxation of Risky Human Capital*

In a two‐period life‐cycle model with ex ante homogeneous households, earnings risk, and a general earnings function, we derive the optimal linear labor tax rate and optimal linear education subsidies. The optimal income tax trades off social insurance against incentives to work. Education subsidies are not used for social insurance, but they are only targeted at offsetting the distortions of the labor tax and internalizing a fiscal externality. Both optimal education subsidies and tax rates increase if labor and education are more complementary, because education subsidies indirectly lower labor tax distortions by stimulating labor supply. Optimal education subsidies (taxes) also correct non‐tax distortions arising from missing insurance markets. Education subsidies internalize a positive (negative) fiscal externality if there is underinvestment (overinvestment) in education because of risk. Education policy unambiguously allows for more social insurance if education is a risky activity. However, if education hedges against labor‐market risk, optimal tax rates could be lower than in the case without education subsidies.     

The dual nature of public goods and congestion: the role of fiscal policy revisited

Abstract The role of fiscal policy is examined when public goods provide both productive and utility services. In the presence of congestion, the consumption tax is shown to be distortionary. Optimal fiscal policy involves using consumption‐based instruments in conjunction with the income tax. An income tax‐financed increase in government spending dominates both lump‐sum and consumption tax‐financing. Replacing the lump‐sum tax with an income tax to finance a given level of spending dominates introducing an equivalent consumption tax. These results contrast sharply with the literature, where the consumption tax is generally viewed as the least distortionary source of public finance.     

Dividend Taxes and Income Shifting

In this paper, we analyze whether a dividend tax cut for owner‐managers of closely held corporations encourages income shifting, income generation, or both. We use rich Swedish administrative micro data from 2000 to 2011 comprising detailed firm‐ and individual‐level information. We find robust evidence of extensive income shifting across tax bases in response to the 2006 Swedish dividend tax cut. Owner‐managers of closely held corporations reclassify earned income as dividend income but do not increase total income. The response is more pronounced for owner‐managers with tax incentives and with easier access to income shifting through a high ownership share.     

Optimal Redistributive Income Taxation and Efficiency Wages*

In this paper, we integrate efficiency wage setting with the theory of optimal redistributive income taxation. In doing so, we use a model with two skill types, where efficiency wage setting characterizes the labor market faced by the low‐skilled, whereas the high‐skilled face a conventional, competitive labor market. We show that the marginal income tax implemented for the high‐skilled is negative under plausible assumptions. The marginal income tax facing the low‐skilled can be either positive or negative, in general. An increase in unemployment benefits contributes to a relaxation of the binding self‐selection constraint, which makes this instrument particularly useful from the perspective of redistribution.     

GROWTH AND VARIABILITY OF SCHOOL DISTRICT INCOME TAX REVENUES: IS TAX BASE DIVERSIFICATION A GOOD IDEA FOR SCHOOL FINANCING?

School districts in Ohio have the option of diversifying their revenue base by adopting income taxes. Using a panel of Ohio school districts that adopted a local income tax from 1990 to 2008, we find that revenues are procyclical and fluctuate only mildly. The estimated short‐ and long‐run income elasticity of school district income tax revenues is 1.05 and 1.04, respectively. We also find that the school district tax base fully adjusts to its long‐run equilibrium within 2 years. Finally, we show that school district income tax adoption does not provide more stability to total school district tax revenues in the short or the long run. (JEL H71, H75)