Trade policy under the GATT/WTO: empirical evidence of the equal treatment rule

Abstract. A fundamental difference between multilateral trade agreements like the GATT and WTO and a preferential agreement is the multilateral agreements’ inclusion of a most‐favoured‐nation principle. Though MFN requires that members implement policies that provide equal treatment to all GATT/WTO countries, how far do members actually follow the MFN principle when so required? We empirically investigate a sample of GATT/WTO trade disputes and the effect of successful dispute settlement negotiations on the disputed product trade of third country exporters to the defendant country. We document evidence of trade liberalization consistent with defendant countries successfully applying the equal treatment rule. JEL classification F13     

The MFN clause,welfare, and multilateral cooperation between countries of unequal size

This paper analyzes MFN in a “competing exporters” model of trade between three countries with unequal endowments and shows that MFN yields higher aggregate welfare than tariff discrimination even as it makes low income countries worse off. Furthermore, in a repeated game of tariff cooperation, multilateral free trade is easier to sustain under MFN punishments relative to discriminatory ones. This conclusion holds even when tariff discrimination takes the form of bilateral trade agreements. Overall, the analysis shows that from the viewpoint of low income countries, MFN and multilateral tariff cooperation are complementary in nature.     

Developing-Country Benefits from MFN Relative to Regional/Bilateral Trade Arrangements

Using a general‐equilibrium model of world trade, this paper evaluates the benefits of most‐favored‐nation (MFN) treatment to developing countries in multilateral relative to bilateral or regional trade agreements, from three sources. First, developing countries may be able to free‐ride on bilateral tariff concessions exchanged between larger countries in MFN‐based GATT/WTO rounds. Second, MFN benefits developing countries by restricting discriminatory retaliatory actions by other countries, evaluated here by a non‐ cooperative Nash tariff game. Finally, MFN changes threat points in bargaining and hence affects the bargaining solution of multilateral MFN‐based trade negotiation compared to a bilateral/regional arrangement. The authors find that the benefits to developing countries are small in the first case as the tariff rates are already low, and the benefits are small in the second case as the optimal tariffs under unconstrained retaliation are not very asymmetric. Benefits from the third case are large as large countries can extract large side‐payments if they bargain bilaterally.     

GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF CHINA's WTO ACCESSION

Abstract.  This paper studies the determination of split of total surplus among the negotiating parties (member countries and the acceding country) in a WTO accession negotiation using a sequential bargaining model. In particular, we are interested in the effect of the most-favored-nation (MFN) principle on the negotiation outcome. The MFN principle says that any tariff reduction offered by the applicant for accession has to be automatically granted to all existing members. The model suggests that it is quite plausible that China's share of surplus is more when MFN is in place.     

Reconciling the WTO Effects on Trade at the Extensive and Intensive Margins

Empirical studies examining the impact of World Trade Organization (WTO) membership have produced disparate results. These studies, however, have focused on total aggregate trade flows. In this paper, we utilize disaggregated product level data to examine the impact of WTO membership on the product level extensive and intensive margin of imports. Utilizing the Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimation that allows for heteroskedasticity in trade data and accounting for several estimation issues, we do not find a positive impact on either margins between WTO member country-pairs. Once we examine asymmetries in trade flows across countries based on their level of development, we find that developing WTO members experience an increase in the extensive margin from industrial member countries. Additionally, the industrial WTO members also experience an increase in the extensive margin from developing WTO members. Results suggest that WTO facilitates the North–South trade relationship, which has been largely absent in trade literature.     

Do external interventions work? The case of trade reform conditions in IMF supported programs

Trade reform conditions are common in IMF supported programs. Of the 99 countries that had IMF programs during 1993-2003, 77 had trade reform conditions in their programs. Since the WTO has not been found especially effective in promoting trade openness for most developing countries, it is of great interest to see if the IMF has been more effective as it combines carrots and sticks not available to the WTO. Yet, the effectiveness of these trade conditions has not been systematically studied. Using a unique dataset, this paper provides such an assessment. It finds that trade conditions are indeed associated with an increase in trade openness on average, but the effect comes mostly from countries that can be characterized by a high degree of “willingness to reform.”     

The role of the most favored nation principle of the GATT/WTO in the New Trade model

I study the impact of the most favored nation (MFN) principle of the GATT/WTO on bilateral trade agreements in the New Trade model. The paper offers four main predictions. First, a bilateral trade agreement without external tariff adjustments hurts the outside country, while a bilateral trade agreement under MFN benefits the outside country. Second, the MFN principle may cause a free‐rider problem. Third, a Pareto‐improving bilateral trade agreement under MFN does not exist if initial tariffs and the elasticity of substitution are sufficiently low. This suggests that the MFN principle may prevent bilateral trade agreements in the future when tariffs are already low and that the definition of “like products” in the MFN rule is welfare improving only if it covers only goods that are closely substituted. Fourth, in the future when tariffs are low, multilateral negotiations and preferential trade areas will become more desirable. Using a calibrated 10‐region 33‐industry model, I show that around 30% of bilateral trade agreements that would be agreed upon in the absence of the MFN rule could not be agreed upon if the MFN rule is imposed.     

Trade Wars and the World Trade Organization: Causes,Consequences, and Change

The rise in trade tensions and launch of a trade war by the USA is in part a result of World Trade Organization (WTO) working practices that have impeded the ability to use the organization to address the underlying sources of conflict through dialogue, analysis, and rule‐making. Open plurilateral agreements between the major protagonists offer an avenue for revitalizing the ability of the WTO to resolve trade conflicts. More generally, reform of WTO working practices is needed for the organization to be more effective in providing a platform for members to cooperate on trade policy matters.     

INTERNATIONAL TRADE BARGAINING AND THE MOST-FAVORED-NATION CLAUSE*

This paper advances a model of multilateral trade negotiations to analyze the effects of the most-favored-nation clause (MFN) on international trade agreements. Negotiations are modeled in a three player, non-cooperative, dynamic bargaining framework that admits the possibility of both bilateral and multilateral agreements. The central result is that bargaining in the presence of MFN results in Pareto efficient, mutually advantageous, multilateral trade agreements. The free-rider problem commonly attributed to the presence of MFN does not arise, and, under a condition of symmetry, each country receives equal gains (or reciprocity) from the agreement. In the absence of MFN, many of these properties may not hold. Examples are given in which at most two of the three countries benefit from agreement. These results suggest that many of the criticisms levied against the MFN clause are misplaced; moreover, attempts to replace unconditional MFN with conditional MFN may sacrifice many of the long-held values of the GATT.     

贸易救济措施中贸易双方公共利益问题研究

金融危机的席卷,加剧了国际贸易之间的贸易摩擦。而反倾销、反补贴、保障措施作为世界贸易组织(WorldTrade-Organization,简称WTO)允许各成员国采取的保护国内产业的三种贸易救济措施手段被许多成员国视为救命稻草,动辄实施贸易救济措施,贸易救济措施遭到了滥用,沦为了贸易保护主义的工具。为了遏制贸易救济措施的滥用,WTO各成员国纷纷呼吁要实施公共利益原则,一些国家已经将公共利益原则纳入了法律体系。但是,目前各国对于如何界定贸易救济措施中的公共利益还没有统一的认识,公共利益原则的实施也缺乏统一的标准,在实践中没有发挥出应有的积极作用。     

The impact of cultural exceptions: audiovisual services trade and trade policy

Audiovisual services such as music and movies in digital formats have gained substantial importance over the last decade, while remaining one of the sectors with the lowest number of commitments by WTO members. Based on a novel data set, this article analyses the role of trade restrictions on audiovisual services in a gravity model. We find that countries with WTO commitments trade more audiovisual services, while both exports and imports are lower for countries which impose policies to curb inflows of foreign cultural services.     

Do state trading exporters distort trade?

In this paper, we analyse the trade-distorting effects of state trading enterprises (STEs) which exist in some exporting countries. Because of these potential effects, several countries have raised the issue of state enterprises in the Doha Round negotiations in the WTO. The belief is that STEs in certain developed countries have trade effects which are equivalent to an export subsidy. STEs also exist in developing countries, though since the aim of government policy may differ from the developed country case, the trade distortion may be equivalent to an export tax. We present a theoretical model that is sufficiently general to allow us to consider the case of exporting STEs in developed and developing economies. The model is calibrated with data on two examples of STEs, one typical of an STE in a developed country, the other typical of an STE in a developing economy. In each case, we allow for differences in the nature of the STE's pay-off function. The overall conclusion is that STEs do distort trade and the trade distortion effect is potentially significant.     

Hub‐and‐spoke free trade areas: theory and evidence from Israel

Abstract We study how the sequential formation of free trade areas affects trade flows between member countries. In a three‐country, three‐good model of comparative advantage if two countries have an FTA, and both sign a similar agreement with the third, trade between the two decreases. However, if only one of them signs an additional FTA, a hub‐ and‐spoke pattern arises, and trade between the initial members increases. Israel’s experience lends strong support to our model: trade between Israel and the EU, subject to an FTA since 1975, increased by an additional 29% after the introduction of the US‐Israel FTA in 1985.     

Exchanging market access at the outsiders' expense: the case of customs unions

Abstract.  Under a customs union, countries can exchange preferential market access by coordinating external tariffs to shift profits from excluded countries. I show that the exporting rents resulting from this coordination can offset trade diversion losses produced by the union, even if its members are relatively small in world markets. Such gains come, however, at the expense of excluded countries. I show that small countries can use customs unions also to foster multilateral cooperation, by increasing the incentives of excluded countries to support global free trade.     

Beyond Dutch disease

How does the deterioration of rule of law in Russia in recent years affect its ability to move away from an export pattern dominated by natural resources? We investigate this question using three datasets for Russia's bilateral trade relations for goods, services and investment at disaggregated level with its partner countries over the world. Our empirical analysis shows that the deterioration of the rule of law in Russia since 2003 has affected the long‐run trade performance of Russia in sophisticated and technology‐intensive manufactured goods, as well as its inward investments with advanced economies. It is precisely this type of trade that Russia should nurture to diversify away from hydrocarbons export dependence. Our statistical analysis also shows that Russia remains to a large extent an outlier within the multilateral trading system. It exports disproportionately less to partner countries which are or had become members of the WTO over our period of analysis. Russia's trade appears to have been negatively affected by the accession of these countries to the WTO. Russia itself finally acceded to the WTO in July 2012 amidst signs of a modest improvement of its rule‐of‐law indicators.     

Does WTO accession matter for the dynamics of foreign direct investment and trade?

The aim of this article is to study the impacts of World Trade Organization accession on the dynamics of foreign direct investment (FDI) and trade in Vietnam. In order to do this, we employ an augmented gravity model and use a panel data set covering bilateral trade and FDI between Vietnam and its 17 most important partner countries, over the period 1990–2008. Firstly, we find that WTO accession has a significantly positive effect both on Vietnam’s imports and on inward FDI. Secondly, even though we find no evidence to demonstrate convincingly that WTO accession influences Vietnam’s exports, this accession seems to indirectly encourage Vietnam’s exports through the FDI channel due to a strong connection between these two.     

Steel safeguards and the welfare of U.S. steel firms and downstream consumers of steel: a shareholder wealth perspective

Abstract.  This paper analyses the steel safeguards applied during 2001–3. Results reveal that for shareholders of U.S. steel companies safeguards generated positive 'abnormal' returns of approximately 6%. The cancellation of the safeguards resulted in wealth gains of about 5%. Steel shareholders experienced negative abnormal returns of −5% in response to the WTO ruling that the U.S. had violated WTO law. Our results are consistent with the neoclassical view that producers gain at the expense of consumers. Also, findings indicate that downstream-consuming firms that diversify production in NAFTA countries avert some trade policy risk associated with higher steel costs caused by safeguard protection.     

Heterogeneous trade agreements,WTO membership and international trade: an analysis using matching econometrics

This article explores the heterogeneous effects of trade agreements (TAs) and World Trade Organization (WTO) membership on the volume of international trade. We extend Baier and Bergstrand’s (2009a) application of matching econometrics by distinguishing between different types of TAs and WTO participation and account for the endogenous nature of trade policy. For a panel data set covering 1960–2005 and 187 countries, we find that the treatment effect on international trade systematically varies with the type of TA and WTO membership.     

Measuring China’s trade liberalization: A generalized measure of trade restrictiveness index

Neither simple average nor import-weighted average tariff indexes are ideal measures of tariff barriers. In this paper, we propose a generalized trade restrictiveness index (GTRI) that extends Feenstra’s (1995) tariff restrictiveness index (TRI) by relaxing the crucial assumption of a small open economy. We show that the GTRI can be measured using import tariffs, import shares, and the corresponding import and foreign export elasticities. We then apply the GTRI to examine how trade restrictiveness has evolved in China from 1997 to 2008, the period in which China entered the WTO. The GTRI indicates a higher level of protection than simple and import-weighted averages, but lower than the TRI. We further show a negative correlation between tariffs and product export supply elasticity, indicating that strategic trade policy was being pursued prior to China’s WTO accession. Finally, we calculate the welfare loss and terms-of-trade gain due to tariff protection. The overall tariff pass-through increases from around 28% to almost 47% because of the WTO.     

Trade creating free trade areas and the undermining of multilateralism

This paper indicates that the consequences of regional trade agreements for the world trade system may be deceiving—an arrangement's apparent virtue may constitute the source of its drawback. In a model where governments have political, as well as economic, motivations, I show that a free trade area induces its members to reduce protection against the non-members, and to do so sufficiently deeply to generate overall trade creation. Trade creation amplifies the excluded countries’ access to the integrating markets, but also reduces their extra gains from multilateral liberalization. Thus, trade creation can reverse the support of the excluded countries to liberalization on a multilateral basis. This is more likely to happen when governments outside the free trade area are more responsive to special interests.