The MFN clause,welfare, and multilateral cooperation between countries of unequal size

This paper analyzes MFN in a “competing exporters” model of trade between three countries with unequal endowments and shows that MFN yields higher aggregate welfare than tariff discrimination even as it makes low income countries worse off. Furthermore, in a repeated game of tariff cooperation, multilateral free trade is easier to sustain under MFN punishments relative to discriminatory ones. This conclusion holds even when tariff discrimination takes the form of bilateral trade agreements. Overall, the analysis shows that from the viewpoint of low income countries, MFN and multilateral tariff cooperation are complementary in nature.     

How reasonable are assumptions used in theoretical models? Computational evidence on the likelihood of trade pattern changes

Abstract .  In theoretical literature it is common to make the assumption that in a multi-country, multi-good world, the direction of trade (import and export by commodity) is predetermined and fixed for each good for each country. We consider a simple three-country, three-good, pure-exchange model with CES preferences. We compute free trade competitive equilibria, three-country non-cooperative Nash equilibria, and customs union equilibria for randomised parameterizations, and find that trade pattern changes between free trade and customs union equilibria in around 35% of cases.     

Neckties in the tropics: a model of international trade and cultural diversity

Abstract .  Some cultural goods are consumed socially and are characterized by the same consumption network externalities as languages. Also, producers of new cultural goods in any one country draw on the stock of ideas generated by previous cultural production in all countries. For such goods, costless trade and communication tend to lead to the dominance of one cultural style, increasing utility in the short run but reducing quality and welfare in the long run. Increasing protection while keeping communication costs low may stimulate production of cultural goods that are 'compatible' with the dominant style, adding little to the stock of usable ideas.     

Strategic competition and optimal parallel import policy

Abstract In a two‐country Hotelling type duopoly model of price competition, we show that parallel import (PI) policy can act as an instrument of strategic trade policy. The home firm’s profit is higher when it cannot price discriminate internationally if and only if the foreign market is sufficiently bigger than the domestic one. The key mechanism in the model is that the home firm’s incentive to keep its domestic price close to the optimal monopoly price affects its behavior during price competition abroad. We also analyze the welfare implications of PI policies and show that our key insights extend to quantity competition.     

On the trade-diversion effects of free trade agreements

Trade-diversion effects of free trade agreements (FTAs) have not been thoroughly examined empirically. Using a novel empirical approach, we confirm that FTAs divert trade away from non-member countries and even more so from internal trade (domestic sales) in member countries.     

Trade effects of monetary agreements: Evidence for OECD countries

This paper analyses the effects of monetary agreements on trade flows using a sample of 25 OECD countries over the period 1950-2004. We find that these agreements have boosted intra-bloc trade. This result especially applies to the case of the euro. More importantly, in contrast to regional trade agreements, all monetary agreements analysed show evidence of trade-creating effects with third countries. Finally, only the euro shows a symmetric impact for the trade-creating effect with non-members, that is, using the euro promotes both the Eurozone's exports and its imports to non-Eurozone markets to a similar extent.     

Exchanging market access at the outsiders' expense: the case of customs unions

Abstract.  Under a customs union, countries can exchange preferential market access by coordinating external tariffs to shift profits from excluded countries. I show that the exporting rents resulting from this coordination can offset trade diversion losses produced by the union, even if its members are relatively small in world markets. Such gains come, however, at the expense of excluded countries. I show that small countries can use customs unions also to foster multilateral cooperation, by increasing the incentives of excluded countries to support global free trade.     

Trade costs and productivity in services sectors

This paper provides the first evidence linking lower international trade costs with higher productivity in services sectors. On average, lowering trade costs by 10% is associated with a gain in total factor productivity of around 0.5%, which is an effect of similar magnitude to that for goods sectors.     

The role of importers and exporters in the determination of the U.S. tariff preferences granted to Latin America

This paper investigates the role played by domestic importers and foreign exporters in improving preferential access to the domestic market. To this end, the framework used in this paper extends the protection for sale analysis to explicitly model the role of domestic importers and foreign exporters in the determination of preferential trade treatment. The predictions of the model are tested using data on preferential trade between the United States and Latin American countries. The results suggest that Latin American exporters and US importers' lobbying efforts have a significant and important role in determining the extent of preferential access granted by the United States. More interestingly, these findings also show that U.S. importers capture a very substantial share of the rents generated by tariff preferences. These results therefore shed a pessimistic view on preferential trade schemes as a reliable source of gains for developing countries.     

Location of vertically linked industries: agglomeration versus comparative advantage

This paper analyses the effects of trade liberalisation on the location of manufacturing firms that are vertically linked and differ in factor intensities. I extend the new economic geography literature, by embedding a model with vertical linkages within a Heckscher-Ohlin framework. I show that lower trade costs can lead to an agglomeration of all upstream and downstream firms in one country, even when they differ in factor intensities. These industrial location patterns do not always lead to factor price convergence; and may result in an increase in returns to both factors in the country where the agglomeration locates.     

Trade creating free trade areas and the undermining of multilateralism

This paper indicates that the consequences of regional trade agreements for the world trade system may be deceiving—an arrangement's apparent virtue may constitute the source of its drawback. In a model where governments have political, as well as economic, motivations, I show that a free trade area induces its members to reduce protection against the non-members, and to do so sufficiently deeply to generate overall trade creation. Trade creation amplifies the excluded countries’ access to the integrating markets, but also reduces their extra gains from multilateral liberalization. Thus, trade creation can reverse the support of the excluded countries to liberalization on a multilateral basis. This is more likely to happen when governments outside the free trade area are more responsive to special interests.     

On tariff and quality innovation in a market with discrete preferences

In a market for a quality-differentiated good with heterogeneous set of consumers and a local firm facing competitive imports from abroad, we examine private and social incentives for quality innovation. For differential tariff regime, we show that both the private and social gains increase with the tariff protection for the low-quality segment of the domestic market for any given tariff on high-quality imports. But for some very high costs of innovation, the local firm may not undertake a socially desirable innovation. The pro-competitive effect, on the other hand, ensures that quality-distortion-at-the-bottom occurs only for very high levels of tariffs.     

Determinants of successful regional trade agreements

This paper investigates the determinants of the effectiveness of regional trade agreements (RTAs) in enhancing bilateral trade. Characteristics of both the country pair and other RTA members are found to significantly influence the trade creation effect of RTAs. However, North/North, North/South and South/South RTAs are found to have similar effects on trade.     

Endogenous trading bloc formation in a North-South global economy

Abstract .  The majority of the trading blocs to date are between similar countries, rather than between developed and developing countries. This paper provides a rationale for why trading blocs among similar countries may arise as an equilibrium phenomenon. It develops a model of an asymmetric world economy in which there are at least four countries. The countries are differentiated with respect to their market size and they choose their trading partners. In the coalition-proof Nash equilibrium, either there is global free trade or free trade areas are formed among similar countries.     

Industrial targeting in free trade areas with policy independence

Abstract.  We investigate the limits of a mechanism for free trade area (FTA) formation that simultaneously satisfies internal industrialization targets. For arbitrary targets, we find necessary and sufficient conditions that guarantee that the mechanism is efficient for member countries individually, even if other members do not implement the efficient policy. When the objective is conservative – designed to protect the level of industrialization previously achieved by the target industry – member countries are guaranteed gains from the efficient policy and their FTA participation. The analysis covers cases with transportation costs and explains why minimally restrictive rules of origin support efficiency and policy independence.     

Interregional Trade Linkages and the Commercial Role: The Spanish Case

The development of a national or regional economy depends on its own actions as much as on those of its commercial partners. Trade transmits economic events from one economy to another. The type and the degree of interdependence between territories—regions or countries—determines the consequences of external actions in a region. Multipliers translate the effects of a change in one variable on the others. Using an input–output scheme to express interregional commercial flows, some coefficients are developed to classify and identify the role that each region plays in interregional trade. An empirical application of the methodology on Spanish Comunidades Autonomas is presented. A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the Fifty-Eight International Atlantic Economic Conference, Chicago, October 7–10, 2004. The authors greatly appreciate the comments and suggestions from the participants at the meeting. The authors also wish to thank an anonymous referee and editor for their constructive suggestions and comments. This research was partially supported by the DGI project SEJ2004-07924/ECON.     

Skilled-unskilled wage inequality and unemployment: A general equilibrium analysis

The paper develops a static three sector competitive general equilibrium model of a small open economy in which skilled labor is mobile between a traded good sector and the non-traded good sector and unskilled labor is specific to another traded good sector. Capital is perfectly mobile among all these three sectors. We introduce involuntary unemployment equilibrium in both the labor markets and explain unemployment using efficiency wage hypothesis. We examine the effects of change in different factor endowments and prices of traded goods on the unemployment rates and on the skilled-unskilled relative wage. Also, we introduce Gini-Coefficient of wage income distribution as a measure of wage income inequality; and show that a comparative static effect may force the skilled-unskilled relative wage and the Gini-Coefficient of wage income distribution to move in opposite directions in the presence of unemployment.     

Modelling the world wool market: A hybrid approach

We present a model of the world wool market that merges two modelling traditions: the partial-equilibrium commodity-specific approach and the computable-general-equilibrium approach. The model captures the multistage nature of the wool production system, and the heterogeneous nature of raw wool, processed wool and wool garments. It also captures the important wool producing and consuming regions of the world. We illustrate the utility of the model by estimating the effects of tariff barriers on wool products using partial- and general-equilibrium solutions. We find that either solution generates similar wool industry results, whereas the macroeconomic effects differ significantly with the partial-equilibrium estimates significantly overestimating the benefits of the tariff changes.     

Further simulation evidence on the performance of the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimator

We extend the simulation results in Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006, The log of gravity, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 88, 641-658) by considering a novel data-generating process. Our results confirm that the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimator is generally well behaved, even when the proportion of zeros in the sample is very large.     

Trade policy in majoritarian systems: the case of the U.S.

Abstract We provide a theory of trade policy determination that incorporates the protectionist bias inherent in majoritarian systems, suggested by Grossman and Helpman (2005) . The prediction that emerges is that in majoritarian systems, the majority party favours industries located disproportionately in majority districts. We test this prediction using U.S. data on tariffs, Congressional campaign contributions, and industry location in districts represented by the majority party over the period 1989–97. We find evidence of a significant majority bias in trade policy: the benefit to being represented by the majority party appears at least as large in magnitude as the benefit to lobbying.