Subsidizing low-skilled jobs in a dual labor market

We introduce a matching model that allows for classical and frictional unemployment. The labor market is dual featuring low-skilled and high-skilled workers and simple and complex jobs. Simple jobs pay a minimum wage, while wages in the complex jobs are determined by Nash bargaining. Opportunities for low-skilled workers are limited to simple jobs; while high-skilled unemployed can apply for both types of jobs, and thereby can accept to be downgraded. We analyze the outcomes of simple job subsidy policies assuming that government budget is balanced through taxes on occupied workers. We first give conditions for the existence and uniqueness of a steady-state equilibrium and we then analyze the effects of different fiscal instruments. We show that in this set-up, increasing simple job subsidies does not necessarily reduce low-skilled unemployment or unemployment spells. By introducing heterogeneous skills and possible downgrading of the high-skilled workers, we show that the effectiveness of such policies in reducing the classical unemployment is decreasing. In fact, any additional classical unemployed re-entering the job market is accompanied by an increasing number of high-skilled workers downgrading to low-skilled jobs. We calibrate the model on French labor market data. It is found that for five low-skilled workers leaving classical unemployment, two high-skilled workers are downgraded.     

Price versus quantity in a duopoly with network externalities under active and passive expectations

This study examines the endogenous choice of strategic contracts in a duopoly composed of firms that produce goods with network externalities with some sort of compatibility. We adopt two types of expectations—active and passive—as consumers' expectations for each firm's equilibrium market share. In addition, we take into account the managerial case and entrepreneurial case with and without separation between ownership and management, as firms' internal structures. We derive the properties in the Cournot competition and the Bertrand competition as the equilibrium market structures under both passive and active expectations under imperfectly compatibility of networks.     

Equilibrium search unemployment with explicit spatial frictions

Assuming that job search efficiency decreases with distance to jobs, workers' location in a city depends on spatial elements such as commuting costs and land prices and on labour elements such as wages and the matching technology. In the absence of moving costs, we show that there exists a unique equilibrium in which employed and unemployed workers are perfectly segregated but move at each employment transition. We investigate the interactions between the land and the labour market equilibrium and show under which condition they are interdependent. When relocation costs become positive, a new zone appears in which both the employed and the unemployed co-exist and are not mobile. We demonstrate that the size of this area goes continuously to zero when moving costs vanish. Finally, we endogeneize search effort, show that it negatively depends on distance to jobs and that long and short-term unemployed workers coexist and locate in different areas of the city.     

Can platform competition support market segmentation? Network externalities versus matching efficiency in equity crowdfunding markets

We investigate whether, in spite of the existence of cross‐market network externalities, platform competition can lead to segmentation of the two sides of the market served by the platforms. We address this question in the context of competition between two equity crowdfunding platforms that connect startups looking for capital with prospective investors. Given the heterogeneity in the populations of startups and investors in terms of the riskiness of the former population and the degree of risk aversion of the latter population, we investigate whether there exists an equilibrium where the two populations are segmented to ensure an improved match between them. We find that the segmenting equilibrium can arise only when compatibility in terms of their risk profiles is of high importance to both populations, and compatibility is significantly more important than the size of the network externality considered by startups. Segmentation is likely to improve the welfare of both populations when the basic benefit from any kind of match is relatively high.     

Social networks,employment and worker discouragement: Evidence from South Africa

Social networks are increasingly being recognized as having an important influence on labour market outcomes, since they facilitate the exchange of job related information. Access to information about job opportunities as well as perceptions about the buoyancy of the labour market depend critically on the social structures and the social networks to which labour market participants belong. In this paper, we examine the impact of information externalities generated through network membership on labour market status. Using Census data from South Africa, a country characterized by high levels of unemployment and worker discouragement, we adopt an econometric approach that aims to minimise the problems of omitted variable bias that have plagued many previous studies of the impact of social networks. Our results suggest that social networks may enhance employment probabilities by an additional 3–12%, and that failure to adequately control for omitted variables would lead to substantial over-estimates of the network co-efficient. In contrast, the impact of social networks on reducing worker discouragement is much smaller, at between 1 and 2%.     

Overeducation, regional labor markets, and spatial flexibility

For most workers, access to suitable employment is severely restricted by the fact that they look for jobs in the regional labor market rather than the global one. In this paper we analyze how macrolevel opportunities (regional market characteristics) and microlevel restrictions (the extent to which job searchers are restricted to the regional market) can help to explain the phenomenon of overeducation. We use a two-step procedure to control selective access to employment. The results show that the size of the labor market is an important factor in avoiding overeducation.     

The impact of the presence of biased managers as strategic commitment on endogenous market structures

We consider the endogenous selection of strategic contracts in an asymmetric duopoly with substitutable goods. The market includes a biased manager, in terms of the market size the manager expects, in a managerial duopoly with separation between ownership and management. In particular, we focus on how the types of managers selected by owners affect the equilibrium market structures. Furthermore, by considering that each manager's expectation of market size depends on their own type and the type of the rival manager, we examine a situation in which the owner is less certain of the type of manager.     

Migrant Networks and the Spread of Information

Diaspora networks provide information to future migrants, which affects their success in the host country. While the existing literature explains the effect of networks on the outcomes of migrants through the size of the migrant community, we show that the quality of the network is an equally important determinant. We argue that networks that are more integrated in the society of the host country can provide more accurate information to future migrants about job prospects. In a decision model with imperfect signalling, we show that migrants with access to a better network are more likely to make the right decision, that is, they migrate only if they gain. We test these predictions empirically using data on recent Mexican migrants to the United States. To instrument for the quality of networks, we exploit the settlement of immigrants who came during the Bracero program in the 1950s. The results are consistent with the model predictions, providing evidence that connections to a better integrated network lead to better outcomes after migration.     

Inferring Employer Search Behaviour from Wage Subsidy Participation

We introduce a novel way to infer employer search behaviour, through deadweight loss incidence in wage subsidy schemes. Using a data set on British firms participating in such schemes we can distinguish between intensive and extensive employer search. These data also allow us to separate the negative economies of scale effect from the positive monitoring effect of firm size on intensive search costs. Our findings further indicate that ‘hours worked’ and ‘supervisory tasks’ increase extensive search costs. Since intensive and extensive search behaviour affect the job find probability of the (long-term) unemployed, our conclusions have significant labour market policy relevance.     

Who Creates Stable Jobs? Evidence from Brazil

Recent research shows that start‐ups are important for job creation, but these firms are also inherently volatile. We use linked employer–employee data to examine the relative importance of firm age and firm size for job creation and destruction in Brazil. Firm age is a more important determinant of job creation in Brazil than firm size; young firms and start‐ups create a relatively high number of jobs. However, young firms are also more likely to exit the market and have higher levels of employment volatility. We, therefore, condition the job creation analysis on job stability. Young firms and large firms create relatively more stable jobs in Brazil.     

Semi-Nonparametric Estimation of an Equilibrium Search Model

We specify and estimate an equilibrium job search model with productivity differences across labour market segments. The model allows for two types of unemployment: frictional unemployment due to search frictions and structural unemployment due to wage floors. Wage floors exist because of high unemployment benefits or binding minimum wages. The productivity distribution is estimated semi-nonparametrically along the lines of Gallant-Nychka, using Hermite series approximation. We decompose the total unemployment rate and we examine the effects of changes in the minimum wage.     

Social networks and labor market transitions

We study the influence of social networks on labor market transitions. We develop the first model where social ties and job status coevolve through time. Our key assumption is that the probability of formation of a new tie is greater between two employed individuals than between an employed and an unemployed individual. We show that this assumption generally generates negative duration dependence of exit rates from unemployment. Our model has a number of novel testable implications. For instance, we show that a higher connectivity among unemployed individuals reduces duration dependence and that exit rates depend positively on the duration of the last job held by the unemployed worker.     

Cournot outcomes under Bertrand–Edgeworth competition with demand uncertainty

We provide new results for two-stage games in which firms make capacity investments when demand is uncertain, then, when demand is realized, compete in prices. We consider games with demand rationing schemes ranging from efficient to proportional rationing. In all cases, there is a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome coinciding with the outcome of the Cournot game with demand uncertainty if and only if (i) the fluctuation in absolute market size is small relative to the cost of capacity, or (ii) uncertainty is such that with high probability the market demand is very large and with the remaining probability the market demand is extremely small. Otherwise, equilibria involve mixed strategies. Further, we show under efficient rationing that condition (i) is sufficient for the unique equilibrium outcome to be an equilibrium outcome of the Cournot game with demand uncertainty.     

Sequential product positioning in the presence of an asymmetric network externality intensity

In this study, we analyze the sequential decisions on product positioning of two firms in the presence of network externalities. One commonly accepted phenomena in a market where a network externality arises is the first‐mover advantage, in which the first entrant into a market can earn a higher profit than later entrants. However, in some recent online services markets, we see that the second mover earns a higher profit than the first mover. This occurs because the second mover strengthens its variety of available functions and services markedly, thereby facilitating consumers' work and communication with its main product, which we call network externality intensity. Based on this observation, we analyze sequential positioning in Hotelling's framework by incorporating an asymmetric network externality intensity between firms. We show that unlike the results of previous related studies, both first‐ and second‐mover advantages can appear in the equilibrium depending on the relationship of the network externality intensity between firms; further, they do not change monotonically with the level of network externality intensity.     

Technology choice in an evolutionary oligopoly game

In this paper, we propose and analyze a two-stage oligopoly game in which firms first simultaneously choose production technologies and in the second stage simultaneously choose production quantities. After characterizing the Nash equilibrium of the game, we cast our static model in a dynamic setting exploring the stability properties of the market equilibrium in two different cases: (i) exogenously distributed technologies and Cournot adjustments and (ii) endogenously distributed technologies in an infinite population game with Cournot–Nash equilibrium outputs. The main aim of the paper is that of extending the results about Cournot oligopoly stability in an evolutionary setting of heterogeneous decreasing returns-to-scale technologies. We show how the interplay between production decisions and R&D decisions can generate endogenous market fluctuations leading to complex dynamic phenomena.     

Motivate and select: Relational contracts with persistent types

We develop a model of relational contracts with moral hazard and asymmetric persistent information about an employee's type. We find that the form of the optimal contract depends on the job characteristics and the distribution of employees' talent. Bonus contracts are more likely to be adopted in complex jobs and when high talent is not too common or too rare. Firms with “normal” jobs are more likely to adopt termination contracts. In labor market equilibrium, different contracts may be adopted by ex ante identical firms. Hence, we offer an explanation for the coexistence of different employment systems within the same industry.     

Precise computation of a competitive equilibrium of the discrete land market model

This paper provides a finite algorithm to compute a competitive equilibrium of the Alonso-type discrete land market model (known as bid-rent equilibrium) without assuming any condition on the spatial configuration such as monocentricity. The existence of the finite algorithm implies that the discrete land market model is sufficiently tractable for computer simulation analysis (sensitivity analysis) even if the spatial configuration is variable. Specifically, we can evaluate numerically the effects of new routes in a transportation network upon equilibrium rents and commuting mode.     

The Role of Information and Influence in Social Networks

A bstract .   This article examines two mechanisms through which social networks are related to job mobility: (1) access to diverse sources of information about job openings and (2) nonredundant sources of influence. Using data on job changing and social networks among television station managers, we assess the extent to which job information and influence variables mediate the relationship between social network structure and getting a better job. Results indicate that there is an association between job mobility and having nonredundant contacts, but our measures of the information and influence mechanisms are not significant mediators. We conclude by reexamining the network-resource model that forms the basis for much of the research on the relationship between social networks and job mobility.