Strategic Corporate Social Responsibility Activities and Corporate Governance in Imperfectly Competitive Markets

We investigate the incentives of firms' owners to commit voluntarily to corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities in an oligopolistic market. The socially responsible attributes attached to products are considered as credence goods, with consumers forming expectations about their existence and level. We show that hiring an ‘individually’ socially responsible CEO and delegating to him the CSR effort and market decisions acts as a commitment device for the firm's owners and credibly signals to consumers that the firm will undertake the ‘missioned’ CSR activities. We also find that CSR activities are welfare enhancing for consumers and firms and thus, they should be encouraged. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A Positive Theory of Moral Management, Social Pressure, and Corporate Social Performance

This paper provides a theory of firm behavior motivated by moral duty, self-interest, and social pressure. A morally managed and a self-interested firm compete in a market in which their corporate social performance (CSP) provides product differentiation. Some citizens have altruistic or warm glow preferences for products with associated CSP, personal giving to social causes, holding shares in firms providing CSP, and contributing to social pressure to increase CSP. Social pressure is delivered by an activist NGO funded by voluntary contributions by citizens. The model characterizes an equilibrium in the product market, the capital market, and the market for social pressure. The equilibrium establishes a price for CSP and for activist-induced social pressure. The theory provides predictions of the market values of firms, the prices of products, firm profits, target selection, contributions to the activist, and the amount of CSP supplied. For example, if citizens do not distinguish between morally motivated CSP and CSP induced by social pressure, the activist is more likely to target the softer, morally motivated firm. Higher quality activists are better funded, target self-interested firms, and obtain greater corporate social performance. Lower quality activists target morally managed firms.     

Which institutional investors matter for firm survival and performance?

Using data that spans three decades, we assess the diverse roles of institutional investors in impacting survival and performance of chronically underperforming firms and contrast the results for consistently overperforming firms. We find material differences in investor roles and investment returns between these samples. Differentiating among institutional types, controlling for prior performance and attrition bias provides insights unattainable by examining aggregated holdings. For underperformers, results are negative for activist pension funds and long-term institutions, positive for activist hedge funds and short-term institutions, and mixed for institutional blockholders.     

Activism for Corporate Responsibility: Conceptualizing Private Regulation Opportunity Structures

In this article, we examine how private regulatory initiatives (PRIs) – which define standards for corporate responsibility (CR) issues and sometimes monitor their application by firms – create opportunities and constraints for activist groups aiming to push firms towards more stringent CR activities. Drawing on social movement theory, we conceptualize how private regulation opportunity structures affect such CR‐based activist groups' targets and tactics at both the firm and field levels. At the field level, we argue that both radical and reformative activist groups direct most of their time and resources towards PRIs with comparatively more stringent standards. At the firm level, while radical activist groups are likely to target firms participating in more stringent PRIs, reformative activist groups target firms participating in less stringent PRIs, or those that do not participate in PRIs at all. When facing unfavourable opportunity structures, CR‐based activist groups tend either to advocate the creation of new PRIs or to shift their activities to pressure other focal points. This article contributes to moving beyond extant literature's emphasis of PRIs as settlements of contentious firm–activist interactions towards also viewing them as starting points for activist groups aiming to push firms towards a more substantive CR engagement.     

Strategic Activism and Nonmarket Strategy

Activist NGOs have increasingly foregone public politics and turned to private politics to change the practices of firms and industries. This paper focuses on private politics, activist strategies, and nonmarket strategies of targets. A formal theory of an encounter between an activist organization and a target is presented to examine strategies for lessening the chance of being a target and for addressing an activist challenge once it has occurred. The encounter between the activist and the target is viewed as competition. At the heart of that competition is an activist campaign, which is represented by a demand, a promised reward if the target meets the demand, and a threat of harm if the target rejects the demand. The model incorporates target selection by the activist, proactive measures and reputation building by a potential target to reduce the likelihood of being selected as a target, fighting a campaign, and credible commitment.     

Private Environmental Activism and the Selection and Response of Firm Targets

Environmental activists are increasingly resorting to private strategies such as boycotts and protests focused on changing individual firms' behavior. In this paper, we examine activists' use of such "private politics" to engender firm compliance with activist objectives. We begin by developing a simple theoretical model of an activist campaign from which we develop a set of empirical hypotheses based on a set of observable features of firms. We test our hypotheses using a unique dataset of environmental activist campaigns against firms in the United States from 1988 to 2003. This paper fills an important need in the literature as one of the first empirical attempts to examine the private political strategies of activists and has important implications for the burgeoning literatures on industry self-regulation and the nonmarket strategies of firms.     

Asymmetric information as a barrier to knowledge spillovers in expert markets

This paper investigates barriers to effective knowledge spillovers for markets in which the product can be characterized as a credence good, i.e. its complexity impedes the evaluation of quality by customers both ex-ante and ex-post. We focus on the German market for energy efficiency consultants, as an emerging and subsidized sector in which the service offered has strong credence good properties. Based upon in-depth interviews with stakeholders, we analyze the determinants and barriers to knowledge spillovers. We find that the incentive to foster spillovers to increase suppliers’ knowledge is limited by the difficult commercialization of additional capabilities. The implementation of a public certification scheme has failed to increase the sectoral knowledge spillovers. By contrast, the participation in formal knowledge networks has been more effective in prompting companies to foster knowledge spillovers, which has also led to a higher degree of specialization. We conclude that access to certification schemes should be further restricted to increase market transparency and private networks should be supported to achieve the aim of increasing knowledge spillovers.     

Peer effect on dividends and return comovement

This study investigates the stock return comovement of dividend-paying and nonpaying firms induced by peer effects of dividend payout policies. We consider peer effect as a channel that links a firm’s dividend initiation to firms that did not change dividend status. Dividend initiation attracts investors to the industry and puts pressure on peer firms to change their dividend policy, which leads to return comovement between nonpaying peers and paying firms. Using matched peer firms that resemble dividend initiators, we find that return comovement can be induced through an indirect channel without changes in style or category. Excess return comovement for firms without dividends is observed with dividend payers of the market and their industries through peer influence.     

Corporate risk management and asymmetric information

We discuss the effect of information on corporate risk management decisions when the information is asymmetric between the insider and the market. We suggest an explanation for previous contradiction between existing theories and empirical findings, which state that fewer small firms choose to hedge. We consider two different scenarios of information revelation to the market, and find hedging cost is not the main reason preventing firms from hedging. Rather asymmetric information plays the decisive role in a firm's risk management policy. One of the empirical implications we find is that cash flows with high variances may discourage firms from hedging even when they face high financial distress costs.     

Advertising Media Planning,Optimal Pricing,and Welfare

This paper analyzes optimal media planning strategies in a pricing‐advertising competition model where firms can use mass and specialized advertising. We find that although targeted advertising avoids the wasting of ads, firms might find it optimal to mix specialized advertising with the mass media. We also show that the characteristics of the specialized media available crucially affect the outcome of price competition between firms, which can range from a full fragmentation of the market into local monopolies to lower average prices (compared to the case where firms had only mass advertising available). Regarding welfare, we prove that although the use of specialized advertising can lower consumer surplus and drive a fragment of consumers out of the market, this advertising technology is welfare‐improving, and can be Pareto superior.     

An analysis of firm and market volatility

In this paper, using time series data for the period 2 January 1998 to 31 December 2008 for 560 firms listed on the NYSE, we examine whether firm volatility is related to market volatility. The main contribution of this paper is that we develop an analytical framework motivating the firm-market volatility relationship. We present three new findings on volatility. First, we discover significant evidence of common volatility; for 12 out of 14 sectors, market volatility has a statistically significant effect on firm volatility for at least 50 percent of firms. Second, we discover significant evidence of size effects: for small-sized firms, there is weak evidence of commonality in volatility, while for large-sized firms there is high evidence (for as much as 75 percent of firms) of commonality in volatility. Third, we find that market volatility predicts firm volatility for firms belonging to five of the 14 sectors.     

Corporate sustainability and financial performance: Collective reputation as moderator of the relationship between environmental performance and firm market value

Markets value superior corporate sustainability performance in part because investors use a firm's environmental performance as a signal of desirable but difficult-to-observe attributes, such as the firm's integrity capacity. Yet a signaling conflict can arise when a firm belongs to an organizational form that has a collective reputation for being unethical. In such circumstances, the firm's environmental performance may no longer credibly signal its underlying integrity capacity, leading markets to adjust downward the value they would otherwise place on the firm's environmental performance. Using longitudinal data on South Korean firms, we find that improvements in firm environmental performance lead to smaller increases in market values for firms belonging to a poorly reputed organizational form. However, firms can partially recover lost value by adopting firm features that reduce the signaling conflict, thereby restoring the notion of corporate sustainability performance driving firm market values.     

Short‐Term Expectations in Listed Firms: The Effects Of Different Owner Types

We report empirical evidence in line with the disciplining role of different institutional and other owner types in reducing managerial myopia. Using data from a large Nordic survey, we find that companies, to a reasonably high degree, feel that external pressure for a good result in the short‐term generates conflict with the company's long‐term goals. We test for the effect of different ownership types and find that especially in firms with a large and non‐transitory activist or fund as an owner, the perceived pressure for short‐term actions is reduced. In addition, we observe a negative association between firm profitability and short‐term pressure, and we find that younger managers feel significantly more pressure. Firms subject to greater pressure engage in more actions to accommodate that pressure. Again, the impact of a large activist owner is especially beneficial because such firms significantly less often undertake actions that have the potential to destroy value, such as deprioritizing their long‐term investments or R&D.     

Why do firms cross-list? International evidence from the US market

Using a modified international asset-pricing model we find strong evidence that publicly quoted firms cross-list when exhibiting strong performance in their domestic market and wish to take advantage of this situation. After cross-listing, this advantage disappears. Our sample consists of daily data for 1165 firms from 47 countries that have cross-listed on the US equity markets over the period 1976–2007. Within the context of this model we provide tests of the validity of the main hypotheses of capital market segmentation and investor protection, which provide explanations for equity cross-listing and investigate whether the nature of the market (regulated or unregulated) and the accompanying legal framework (common or civil law) can account for the impact of cross-listing on returns. Supporting the segmentation hypothesis, we report a decrease in local market risk after cross-listing. However, we find that the magnitude of such a decrease is diminishing over time as international markets become more integrated. On the other hand, we do not find any change in the global market risk after cross-listing, except for firms that cross-listed between 2001 and 2007, where their exposure to international market risk decreases. Furthermore, we find no evidence to support the investor protection hypothesis.     

Evolutionary competition in a mixed market with socially concerned firms

In this paper we study an oligopoly market where profit-maximizing firms and socially concerned firms compete in quantities. Confronting remarks by Milton Friedman and Gary Becker, we are using an evolutionary setting to investigate the endogenous choice of the proper objective of business firms and the influence of product differentiation on the long run survival of firms which pursue non-profit motives. We find that firms which consider a combination of profit and consumer welfare can indeed have larger market shares and profits than their profit-maximizing rivals. One insight is that it might pay off for shareholders to consider stakeholder welfare, but that the level of social concern should not be too high. Based on a strategy׳s profitability, we consider asynchronous evolutionary updating with firms selecting Nash quantities or choosing best replies to the expected market quantity. Here we observe that the consumers׳ willingness to pay a price premium for products is crucial for the long run survival of socially concerned firms. Depending on the degrees of product differentiation and social concern, long run outcomes consist either of both types of firms or only one type of firm. If the firms׳ propensity to switch between a social or a profit-maximizing strategy is sufficiently large, steady states are unstable and even complicated dynamics can occur.     

Fostering green product innovation through green entrepreneurial orientation: The roles of employee green creativity,green role identity,and organizational transactive memory system

Developing new green products is critical to an organization's achievement of sustainable goals as well as competitive advantage. This study aims to unravel the mechanisms through which organizations with green entrepreneurial orientation (green EO) can foster green product innovation. The dataset for testing these mechanisms was garnered from employees and managers who worked in manufacturing firms based in an Asia-Pacific market. Through a multilevel analysis of the data, the study revealed the positive nexus between organizational green EO and green product innovation. The results of the study further lent credence to employee green creativity as a mediation path for such a relationship. Furthermore, employee green role identity and organizational transactive memory system were found to fortify the linkage between green EO and employee green creativity. These results suggest to organizations how to optimally translate their green entrepreneurial strategy into new green products that met customer preferences and societal expectations.     

Reputation and Corporate Social Responsibility Aberrations,Trends, and Hypocrisy: Reactions to Firm Choices in the Stock Option Backdating Scandal

Drawing on strategic corporate social responsibility (CSR) and reputation theory, this paper examines the market reaction to firm disclosures of involvement in the US stock option backdating scandal. We examine how a firm's prior signals regarding ethical behaviour and values, as demonstrated through CSR initiatives, may both ameliorate and exacerbate market reactions. CSR initiatives may buffer a firm against general wrong‐doing but expose it to greater scrutiny and sanction for related wrong‐doing. Our results show that firms with enhanced overall reputations for CSR are partially buffered from scandal revelations. However, we find that when firms possess an enhanced reputation for CSR associated with corporate governance, violations pertaining specifically to governance are viewed as hypocritical and more harshly sanctioned. We also find lower and negative market reactions for firms that delay but self‐disclose their involvement in the scandal. The study extends the emergent, related literatures on strategic CSR and reputation management, and documents dynamics in the relationship between corporate social and financial performance.     

Endogenous vertical structure and trade policy in an import-competing market

We examine the endogenous determination of a vertical market in an import-competing market with import tariff. We show that if firms commit to vertical organization before the government's commitment to trade policy, the home and foreign firms choose vertical separation and vertical integration, respectively, at equilibrium under Bertrand competition. Under Cournot competition, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium entails both firms separating their retailers. Comparing profits between Bertrand competition to Cournot competition, we find that upstream manufacturer's profit can be higher under Bertrand competition with integration than under Cournot competition with separation when comparing foreign upstream manufacturer's profit.     

Firm performance and the political economy of corporate governance: survey evidence for Bulgaria,Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia

Using survey data for 220 traditional manufacturing firms over 7 years of transition and 4 Central Eastern Europe (CEE) countries, we find firms that produced for the EU market under planning consistently outperform those that produced for the CMEA market. Within the previously CMEA market, the best firms were selected to outside privatisation and outperformed insider/state owned firms. Outside privatisation was resisted in EU oriented firms and ownership was found to have no effect on performance. Path dependent demand shocks and political constraints on the sequencing of state firms to private ownership determine the relationship between firm performance and ownership structure during transition.     

Global Engagement and Returns Volatility

This paper finds that a greater reliance on foreign market sales increases the volatility of firms’ stock returns, using high‐frequency data for publicly listed Japanese manufacturing firms over the period 2000–10. The two margins of global engagement we consider, namely, exports and sales via foreign affiliates (horizontal foreign direct investment), have both a positive and economically significant effect on firm‐level volatility. We find, however, that increasing the intensity of sales through foreign affiliates has a stronger effect on volatility than a similar change in export intensity. We also uncover evidence consistent with the notion that firms’ need to use external finance to cover the substantial costs involved in reaching foreign consumers can be an important channel through which firms’ participation in international markets increases their exposure to economic uncertainty.