Tariff wars in the Ricardian Model with a continuum of goods

This paper describes strategic tariff choices within the Ricardian framework of Dornbusch, Fischer, and Samuelson (1977) using CES preferences. The optimum tariff schedule is uniform across goods and inversely related to the import demand elasticity of the other country. In the Nash equilibrium of tariffs, larger economies apply higher tariff rates. Productivity adjusted relative size (≈ GDP ratio) is a sufficient statistic for absolute productivity advantage and the size of the labor force. Both countries apply higher tariff rates if specialization gains from comparative advantage are high and transportation cost is low. A sufficiently large economy prefers the inefficient Nash equilibrium in tariffs over free trade due to its quasi-monopolistic power on world markets. The required threshold size is increasing in comparative advantage and decreasing in transportation cost. I discuss the implications of the static Nash-equilibrium analysis for the sustainability and structure of trade agreements.     

Trade-diverting free trade agreements,external tariffs,and feasibility

There has been a proliferation of preferential trade agreements within the last two decades. This paper analyzes the effects of free trade agreements (FTAs) on external tariffs in small economies where protection decisions are made politically. Our model determines tariff rates endogenously instead of assuming they are fixed during or after the formation of FTAs as commonly done in the literature. We show that when an FTA is established, the tariff rates that apply to non-members essentially decline. More importantly, we investigate the interaction between endogenous tariff determination and the feasibility of an FTA. We find that the expectation of tariff reductions under endogenous tariffs could make an otherwise feasible FTA if tariffs were fixed become infeasible. However, if domestic import-competing sectors are relatively smaller and the government places a significant weight on political contributions relative to social welfare, an FTA with endogenous tariffs may be more likely to be feasible than an FTA assumed to fix external tariffs.     

The economics of taxes with equivalent effects to tariffs

Developing countries are faced with the issue of tariff replacement at an early stage of their development, due to their increased commitments through Free Trade Arrangements with developed countries. As tariff replacement through VAT, or more sophisticated tools such as income tax, is neither practically nor economically desirable in these economies, this paper investigates the effects of an alternative replacement tax that only affects categories of goods not produced locally. This tax, denominated tax with equivalent effects to tariffs (TEET), is indeed a consumption tax as it concerns all goods, whether imported or potentially produced in the country. Based on a simple diagrammatic approach, the study shows that this tool tends to generate more welfare than tariffs if final prices of goods are left unchanged. It shows that a government can continue to maintain its revenues and increase the welfare of consumers through this fiscal replacement. Additionally, the political and economic reserves associated with this tool are discussed. The TEET are therefore useful mainly for small and non-diversified economies. It also remains that the use of this tool is, in practice, conditioned by the level of tolerance of developed countries, which tend to prohibit it in bilateral agreements with developing countries.     

Exporting out of poverty: Provincial poverty in Vietnam and U.S. market access

Can a developing country reduce poverty by gaining increased market access to a large, rich country? The 2001 U.S.–Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA) provides an excellent opportunity to examine this question as, unlike other bilateral trade agreements, the U.S. tariff cuts were not influenced by Vietnamese industries. Using variation in the structure of the labor force across provinces prior to the trade agreement, I construct provincial measures of U.S. tariffs. To address concerns over confounding trends between changes in provincial poverty and changes in provincial tariffs I follow two approaches: controlling for trends based on observable initial conditions and differencing away time invariant trends using pre-BTA data. I find that provinces that were more exposed to the U.S. tariff cuts experienced faster decreases in poverty between 2002 and 2004. Additionally, I document that the movement of workers across provinces is limited in scale, particularly for those with low levels of education. Finally, I show that the most exposed provinces experienced faster wage growth for workers with low levels of education, but not for highly educated workers.     

Preference Erosion,Government Revenues and Non‐tariff Trade Barriers

Developing countries benefiting from developed country unilateral trade preferences fear that Doha Round tariff cuts will erode the value of those preferences. That these programmes confer significant benefits, however, is not clear. Studies indicate that the impact of preference erosion would be minimal for most developing countries. But for a small subset of middle‐income and least‐developed countries, concern may be warranted. WTO members, should address affected countries’ concerns, perhaps by tailoring WTO tariff negotiations to lessen adjustment pressures and providing development assistance. Developing countries also are anxious that lower tariffs will reduce government revenues. Dependence on tariff revenue is diminishing and trade liberalisation need not result in lower total tax revenues or even lower customs revenues. Much depends on a country's current tariff and trade regime, its tax structure and its overall economic structure. At some point, a country does need to broaden its tax base and look to other revenue sources to offset declining tariff revenues. Tax reform, therefore, complements trade reform. A third area of developing country concern is non‐tariff barriers (NTBs), which may limit market access even after tariffs are reduced. Despite prior WTO work in this area, NTBs remain a thorny issue for all WTO members.     

Escaping a protectionist rut: Policy mechanisms for trade reform in a democracy

This paper analyzes the dynamics of trade policy reform under democracy. In an overlapping generations model, heterogeneous agents may acquire skills when young thereby determining the skill composition of their cohort. Current and anticipated trade policies influence education decisions and thus voters' trade policy preferences. We show that there may exist two political steady states: one protectionist and one liberal. Transition from the former to the latter can be achieved by government announcements, temporary educational subsidies, or tariff liberalization by trading partners, but generally not by transfer payments to adversely affected workers. We find additionally that reform is politically feasible only if the proposed liberalization is sufficiently large, suggesting that radical reform may be necessary for escaping a protectionist political rut.     

Free trade agreements in a small,open country: The case of Norway

Negotiating free trade agreements (FTAs) has been a high political priority for Norway. Today, it has agreements with 41 countries outside the European Union (EU)/the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), resulting in one of the world's most extensive FTA networks. FTAs cover about 10% of Norway's trade—a share likely to increase in the future. These agreements eliminate tariffs on a substantial number of traded products and have gradually become more comprehensive, covering an expanding range of non‐tariff areas. Hence, they may have trade‐promoting effects beyond tariff reductions as such. On the other hand, the non‐tariff provisions often do not go further than what has already been dealt with in other international agreements or practised domestically, so their overall effect may be limited.     

Do credible domestic institutions promote credible international agreements?

We examine the relationship between international policy coordination and domestic policy reputation when both are self-sustaining. We show that domestic policy commitment does not necessarily facilitate international cooperation; rather, efficient policies may be most easily sustained when governments are unable to pre-commit to policy domestically. Moreover, the lack of domestic commitment is more likely to facilitate international cooperation the larger the international spillovers of domestic policies are.     

Trade Policy Flexibilities and Turkey: Tariffs,Anti‐dumping,Safeguards and WTO Dispute Settlement

The commitment to lower import tariffs and to maintain tariffs at low levels entails political‐economic trade‐offs. Empirical work examining the relationship between such commitments and the ‘flexibilities’ that policymakers exercise to get around them is still relatively nascent, especially for emerging economies. This paper provides a rich, empirically based assessment of ways that Turkey exercised trade policy flexibilities during the global economic crisis of 2008–11. First, and despite multilateral and customs union commitments that might limit changes to its applied tariffs, Turkey exercised flexibilities during 2008–11 by making changes to both its applied MFN and preferential tariffs that could affect nearly 9 per cent of its manufacturing imports. Second, Turkey's cumulative application of temporary trade barrier (TTB) policies – that is, anti‐dumping, safeguards and countervailing duties – is estimated to impact an additional 4–6 per cent of Turkey's manufacturing imports by 2011. Other surprising results include Turkey's lengthy extensions to the duration of previously imposed anti‐dumping and safeguards beyond expected removal dates, conversion of product coverage from one TTB policy to another, extensive coverage of upstream and downstream segments of important industries and potential deepening of discriminatory preferences already inherent in existing preferential trade agreements.     

Foreign influence and welfare

How do foreign interests influence policy? How are trade policies and the viability of trade agreements affected? What are the welfare implications of such foreign influence? In this paper we develop a model of foreign influence and apply it to the study of optimal tariffs. In a two-country voting model of electoral competition, we allow the incumbent party in each country to take costly actions that probabilistically affect the electoral outcome in the other country. We show that policies end up maximizing a weighted sum of domestic and foreign welfare. Using this formulation we show that foreign influence increases aggregate world welfare when there are no other means of alleviating the externalities that arise from cross-border effects of policies. In contrast, when countries can engage in international agreements, foreign influence can prove harmful as powerful countries may refuse to offer concessions. We also show that power imbalances are particularly detrimental to cooperation when they are positively correlated with economic size.     

Protective Excise Taxation

In a small open economy composed of unionised international Cournot-Nash duopolies, a self-interested government has unilateral incentives to set higher specific domestic excise duties under the destination principle when the typical foreign firm is dominant and the import-competing sector is small. Excise taxes may emerge in political equilibrium when domestic firms and unions lobby for protection and the government is unable to use alternative protective policies because of international agreements. In so far as the government is prepared to exchange tax revenues for political contributions, under some conditions the excise tax rate will be higher than the one chosen without lobbying.     

Endogenous trade policy and lobby formation: an application to the free-rider problem

This paper develops a model in which tariffs are determined through bargaining between a utility maximizing policy maker and an industry lobby. Individual firms only contribute to the lobbying effort if it is in their own self-interest so that both trade policies and lobby formation are endogenous. By introducing bargaining between the industry and the government, the paper provides microfoundations for the tariff-formation function approach taken by many authors in the political economy literature. Applied to the free-rider problem, the model identifies general conditions under which increasing the number of firms in an industry makes cooperation between them more difficult.     

External tariffs under a free-trade area

How do free-trade areas affect the tariffs that member countries impose against non-members? There is no consensus in the literature regarding this important question. In this study, we use a political-economy model of endogenous protection to show that if individual preferences exhibit loss aversion or if the government's objective is characterized by diminishing marginal political support, a free-trade area can lead member countries to increase their external tariffs and thus act as a stumbling block to unilateral liberalization. We also argue that the stumbling block result is more likely to arise under loss aversion than under diminishing marginal political support and confirm this using a simulation. Finally, we show that the stumbling block effect can also take place under multilateral liberalization. Our results highlight a new type of mechanism through which preferential trade agreements may affect external tariffs.     

Non-tariff barriers are a manageable problem

With the advancing general dismantiement of tariffs, it became progressively more obvious that, apart from import duties, there are a number of other obstacles for a free flow of international trade. There are numerous rules, regulations, and restrictive practices imposed and operated by government departments and semi-official bodies which exert a more or less strong influence on the volume, the directions, and the composition of foreign trade. Such measures designed to channel trade into desired directions are collectively known as non-tariff barriers (NTBs).     

How to Balance the Outcomes of the Economic Partnership Agreements for Sub‐Saharan African Economies?

Since 2002, the Sub‐Saharan African countries ( except South Africa which already has a free‐trade agreement with the EU ) have embarked on free‐trade agreement negotiations with the European Union. These arrangements will replace the Cotonou scheme, which requires these countries to eliminate their tariffs on ‘substantially’ all their European imports. Based on a general equilibrium analysis, this study estimates the potential effects of these agreements by considering different levels of reciprocity in the commitments of the Sub‐Saharan African countries. It shows that the ‘standard’ EU proposal, whereby Sub‐Saharan African countries would cut tariffs on 80 per cent of their European imports, would not be enough to balance the outcome of the Economic Partnership Agreements. As a result of the asymmetries between European and African protections and supply‐side capacities, African countries could experience a balance of trade deficit of USD 1.8 billion associated with a 0.1 per cent decrease in GDP. This proposal, which also induces an industrial restructuring to the benefit of the agro‐processing industries, will create a significant fiscal burden. A lesser level of commitment could largely mitigate these unfavourable results; by reciprocating tariff eliminations on only 60 per cent of their European imports, African countries would reduce the trade imbalance and fiscal losses induced by these agreements by 21 and 51 per cent respectively.     

Location decision of heterogeneous multinational firms

We examine how multinational firms with heterogeneous total factor productivity (TFP) self-select into different host countries. Both aggregate- and firm-level estimates suggest that more productive French firms are more likely than their less efficient competitors to invest in relatively tough host countries. Countries with a smaller market potential, higher fixed costs of investment or lower import tariffs tend to have higher cutoff productivities and attract a greater proportion of productive multinationals. This self-selection mechanism remains largely robust when we control for unobserved firm and country heterogeneity and address potential TFP endogeneity.     

The impact of trade liberalization on productivity: Evidence from India's formal and informal manufacturing sectors

Despite a large literature investigating the impacts of trade on firm productivity, there is almost no evidence on how small firms react to trade liberalization. Using a unique dataset of firm-level surveys that are representative of the entire Indian manufacturing industry, I show that India's unilateral reduction in final goods tariffs increased the average productivity of small, informal firms, which account for 80% of Indian manufacturing employment but have been excluded from previous studies. In contrast, the increase in productivity among larger, formal firms was driven primarily by the concurrent reduction in input tariffs. By examining the effect of the tariff liberalization on the distributions of productivity and firm size, I find evidence consistent with the exit of the smallest, least productive firms from the informal sector. In addition, I find that although the decline in final goods tariffs did not significantly impact average formal sector productivity, it did increase productivity among the top quantiles of the distribution.     

Politics of free trade areas: tariffs versus quotas

In this paper we compare and contrast the political viability of bilateral Free Trade Area (FTA) Agreements in the presence of tariffs and quotas. Assuming that the government maximizes a weighted sum of welfare and producer profits, we show that the political viability of FTAs varies according to whether trade restrictions take the form of tariffs or quotas. A key result is that whereas an FTA is unambiguously rejected by one of the countries under a tariff, it may be endorsed by both trading partners under a voluntary export quota or import quota that provides equal protection as the tariff.     

International trade agreements between countries of asymmetric size

This paper analyzes how changes in the structure and environment of trade agreements between a small and a large country affect the efficient frontier of those self-enforcing agreements and hence, negotiation outcomes. Using the autarky punishment instead of the interior Nash punishment may provide the small country with greater bargaining power. Negotiating direct transfers under free trade instead of reciprocal tariff reductions improves the worst possible negotiation outcome for the small country. The existence of irreversible investment may strengthen (weaken) the small country’s bargaining power under the interior Nash (autarky) punishment scheme.     

Tariff Liberalisation and Increased Administrative Protection: Is There a Quid Pro Quo?

Theoretical models and intuition suggest that the amount of non‐traditional protection such as anti‐dumping duties will increase as more traditional forms such as tariffs are lowered under multilateral trade agreements. This paper is the first empirical study of the role of tariff liberalisation in the spread of anti‐dumping. Through both correlations and regression approaches we analyse the relationship between tariff concessions made during the Uruguay Round trade negotiations and the filing of anti‐dumping petitions, with particular interest in whether multilateral trade reductions have spurred the recent growth in new users of anti‐dumping policies. We find that, at least for developing economies, tariff reductions agreed to under the Uruguay Round not only increased the likelihood of a country using anti‐dumping protection but also the total number of anti‐dumping petitions filed by countries.