Taxes, Financing Decisions, and Firm Value

We use cross-sectional regressions to study how a firm's value is related to dividends and debt. With a good control for profitability, the regressions can measure how the taxation of dividends and debt affects firm value. Simple tax hypotheses say that value is negatively related to dividends and positively related to debt. We find the opposite. We infer that dividends and debt convey information about profitability (expected net cash flows) missed by a wide range of control variables. This information about profitability obscures any tax effects of financing decisions.     

管理者特质、负债融资与企业价值

本文基于行为金融理论和高层梯队理论,选用2008-2013年我国A股上市公司数据作为研究样本,区分企业产权性质,实证检验了拥有不同特质的管理者对负债融资行为与企业价值的影响。研究结果显示:我国上市公司的负债融资可以降低企业代理成本,对企业价值有正面的治理效应;管理者为男性、教育水平越高、任期越短、有财务相关工作经历时,越容易出现过度自信,也更偏好使用负债融资,其中管理者性别、教育水平、工作经历更是可以显著提高负债融资对企业价值的提升作用。进一步区分产权性质后发现,和国有公司相比,非国有公司负债融资对企业价值的提升效果更好;非国有公司管理者教育水平、工作经历与负债融资的正相关更强,也更能显著提高负债融资对企业价值的提升作用。本研究不仅丰富了管理者特质和企业融资研究领域的文献和经验证据,而且也表明了在研究负债融资对企业价值的治理效应时,管理者特质和公司的产权性质是重要的考量因素。     

融资需求、融资约束与盈余管理

本文从企业融资视角,分为融资约束和融资需求研究了融资对于企业盈余管理的作用。通过对盈余管理行为的成本收益分析发现:虽然融资约束和融资需求在理论上都可能导致企业盈余管理行为的增加,但是由融资约束引发的盈余操控成本较大,从而在一定程度上对企业的盈余管理行为起抑制作用;而由融资需求引致的盈余管理行为同样会导致较高的操控成本,但是由于需求较大,相应的盈余管理所带来的效用水平也较高,其愿意承担更高的沉没成本,从而导致较多的盈余管理行为。这从理论上解释了融资对于盈余管理的双重作用问题。该结论在运用我国中小板企业2004-2012年的数据进行检验时成立。     

Hedging Affecting Firm Value via Financing and Investment: Evidence from Property Insurance Use

I provide evidence about the value effects of alternative risk management by examining corporate purchase of property insurance, a commonly used pure hedge of asset-loss risks. Using an insurance data set from China, I find that there is an inverted U-shape effect of the extent of property insurance use on firm value measured by several versions of Tobin's Q. Therefore, the use of property insurance, to a certain degree, has a positive effect on firm value; however, over insurance appears detrimental to firm value. Given that the inflection points occur at relatively high levels of the observed insurance spending, insurance use appears beneficial to the majority of my sample firms. The estimated average hedging premium is about 1.5%. I demonstrate that an avenue for insurance to create value in China is that it helps firms secure valuable new debt financing and enhance investment.     

Cross-Subsidies, External Financing Constraints, and the Contribution of the Internal Capital Market to Firm Value

We examine the link between the excess value of a diversifiedfirm and the value of its internal capital market. Subsidiesto small financially constrained segments with good relativeinvestment opportunities significantly increase excess value,while transfers of resources from segments with good relativeinvestment opportunities significantly decrease excess value.Of interest is that subsidies to small financially constrainedsegments with poor relative investment opportunities also significantlyincrease excess value. However, there is little evidence thatthis result depends on the diversity of a firm's investmentopportunities. We conclude that financing constraints drivethe relationship between the internal capital market and firmvalue.     

Diversification,Refocusing and Firm Value

At any point in time a firm faces three restructuring choices: diversify, refocus, or do nothing. This study analyses the causes and the consequences of these actions in a unified framework using the appropriate methodologies. Various factors, such as firm's characteristics and multinational nature, its industry's characteristics, its exchange and index inclusion, and divested (or acquired) segment(s)' industry conditions, are considered as the determinants of the diversifying and the refocusing decisions. The estimation results from the corresponding multinomial logit model suggest that refocusing occurs generally due to firm‐specific reasons, and diversification due to outside factors, such as industry and economic conditions. Added or dropped segment's industry profitability, its relationship to the core business of the firm, and its relatedness to the businesses of the conglomerate's other segments have a nontrivial effect on either decision. In a related analysis, the paper explicitly models and estimates the valuation consequences that are sustained by the firm after it undertakes a refocusing or a diversification action. To isolate the changes in firm's value that are due to these decisions only, a 2SLS estimation is used to control for endogeneity that arises because the factors that affect a firm's value are likely to have also induced the firm to make the corresponding decision. The novelty of my approach is in its inclusion of variables measuring the consequences due to both actions, the diversification and the refocusing, in the same valuation equation. Contrary to some earlier findings, I find no evidence of ‘diversification discount’ or ‘refocusing premium.’ The choice of this paper to analyse all corporate restructuring decisions in a unified framework yields valuable business insights into the reasons for undertaking such corporate events.     

Debt Financing,Corporate Financial Intermediaries and Firm Valuation

In this paper we consider the role of financial intermediaries in the valuation of firms and projects. We show that security prices should reflect both used and unused debt capacity if some corporations can act as financial intermediaries and can capture the tax benefits of debt capacity unused by the operating firm. We also provide some reasons why the value of the firm might be increased if the financing and operating risks of the firm are separated and financial intermediaries issue debt rather than the unit operating the asset.     

Spin-offs, Divestitures, and Conglomerate Investment

We examine whether spin-offs or divestitures cause improvementsin conglomerate investment efficiency. At issue are endogeneityof these restructuring decisions and correct measurement ofinvestment efficiency. Endogeneity is a problem because thefactors that induce firms to spin off or divest divisions mayalso improve investment efficiency; measurement error is a problembecause efficiency measures employ Tobin’s q as a noisyproxy for investment opportunities. We find important differencesbetween firms that divest or spin off and a control sample.After accounting for these differences and for measurement errorin q, we find no evidence of improvements in investment efficiency.(JEL G31, G34)     

SME Financing in Emerging Markets: Firm Characteristics,Banking Structure and Institutions

Using the World Bank Enterprise Survey indicator database, we investigate (1) how firm characteristics affect financing of small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs) in emerging markets; (2) how cross-country differences in the banking sector affect SME financing; and (3) how financing of SMEs is influenced by economic development and institutions. Our findings confirm that younger and smaller firms in nonmanufacturing sectors consistently face severe financing obstacles/constraints and rely heavily on internal financing. Moreover, the availability of credit information and the bank concentration ratio, as well as economic development and the institutional environment, can significantly affect SME financing, and access to external financing in particular.     

Investability and Firm Value

We study how investability, or openness to foreign equity investors, affects firm value in a sample of over 1,400 firms from 26 emerging markets. We find that, on average, investability is associated with a 9% valuation premium (as measured by Tobin's q). This significant valuation premium persists in firm‐fixed effects regressions, although the magnitude and robustness of the premium is somewhat lower. Analysis of the components of Tobin's q shows that firms that become investable experience significant increases in both market values and physical investment. These effects are strongest for firms that face country‐level or firm‐level financial constraints prior to becoming investable.     

Corporate Governance, Board Diversity, and Firm Value

This study examines the relationship between board diversity and firm value for Fortune 1000 firms. Board diversity is defined as the percentage of women, African Americans, Asians, and Hispanics on the board of directors. This research is important because it presents the first empirical evidence examining whether board diversity is associated with improved financial value. After controlling for size, industry, and other corporate governance measures, we find significant positive relationships between the fraction of women or minorities on the board and firm value. We also find that the proportion of women and minorities on boards increases with firm size and board size, but decreases as the number of insiders increases.     

Global Diversification, Industrial Diversification, and Firm Value

Using a sample of 44,288 firm–years between 1984 and 1997, we document an increase in the extent of global diversification over time. This trend does not reflect a substitution of global for industrial diversification. We also find that global diversification results in average valuation discounts of approximately the same magnitude as those for industrial diversification. Analysis of the changes in excess value associated with changes in diversification reveals that increases in global diversification reduce excess value, while reductions in global diversification increase excess value. These findings support the view that the costs of global diversification outweigh the benefits.     

Diversification,Organization, and Value of the Firm

Because corporate diversification coevolves with organizational structure, a discount for diversification, which is widely documented in the literature, can be caused by organizational structure rather than by the industrial scope of the firm. I examine this possibility based on a large sample of Japanese firms for which the legal (parent–subsidiary) structure of the organization is easily observable. I identify a significant discount for diversified firms with and without control over the organizational structure. I also find that firms with a legally segmented structure (e.g., holding companies) are deeply discounted. My results suggest that diversification and organization are both important determinants of firm value.     

企业负债率、研发投资强度与企业价值

选取2003—2010年沪深A股上市公司R＆D数据,研究R＆D投入与上市公司债务融资的相关性和R＆D投入与上市公司市场价值关联性。实证研究发现：企业的负债率越高,其研发投入越少,非国有控股上市公司所面临的债务融资约束更大;企业的研发投入对公司价值具有正向影响,并且这种影响会因企业负债水平的高低而不同。在模型中进一步加入RDI＊D负债水平交叉项后发现,相对于负债水平较低的企业,负债水平较高企业的研发投入对公司价值的正向影响是减弱的,对于非国有控股上市公司,这种减弱效应更为显著。     

Work Ethic, Employment Contracts, and Firm Value

We analyze how the work ethic of managers impacts a firm's employment contracts, riskiness, growth potential, and organizational structure. Flat contracts are optimal for diligent managers because they reduce risk-sharing costs, but they attract egoistic agents who shirk and unskilled agents who add no value. Stable, bureaucratic firms with low growth potential are more likely to gain value from managerial diligence. Firms that hire from a virtuous pool of agents are more conservative in their investments and have a horizontal corporate structure. Our theory also yields several testable implications that distinguish it from standard agency models.     

Divestitures,wealth effects and corporate governance

We analyse the market reaction to divestiture decisions and determine the impact of corporate governance practices. We find the market reaction is significant and can be determined using internal governance mechanisms. We evaluate the determinants of the decision to sell using a control sample of firms displaying characteristics often associated with divestitures indicating that these firms may face the same incentives to divest but elect not to restructure in this manner. Our results suggest that a combination of strong internal and external governance may force managers to act in a manner that is incompatible with their personal desires.     

反收购条款、并购概率与公司价值

本文选取A股民营上市公司2007～2011年的面板数据,对章程中设置反收购条款的影响进行了分析,实证结果表明反收购条款对并购的影响存在一个作用区间:当并购交易规模达到10%以上时,反收购条款能显著降低目标公司被并购的可能性,这时错列董事会条款将发挥主要的反收购作用;当交易规模低于10%时,反收购条款对并购概率没有显著影响,这时累积投票制能显著促进并购的发生。与国外的研究结果类似,反收购条款对目标公司价值具有显著的负向影响,反收购条款的主要作用表现为对管理层的保护。     

董事会内部联结、税收规避与企业价值

本文通过构建基于董事会成员相似特征形成的内部联结指数,考察了独立董事治理机制对于企业税收规避激进程度的影响及其对于企业价值的作用效果。研究发现,董事会内部联结显著正向影响企业税收规避程度,但是影响力度随着税收规避激进程度的提升而有所减弱。董事会内部联结对于企业避税活动的这种适度监管显著提升了企业价值。     

Disequilibrium Structures and Financing Decisions in the Firm

The business firm confronts interdependent decision problems in production, investment, and finance. Emphasis is here placed on the firm's decision criteria in disequilibrium situations or at infra-optimum structural planning and decision points. The operative cost of capital is shown to be 'the full marginal cost of relaxing the money capital availability constraint'. The popular 'weighted average cost of capital' is shown to be an 'equilibrium datum' which has operative significance only at optimum structural positions. It does not offer adequate guidance to financing and investment decisions in disequilibrium situations.     

Book Value,Residual Earnings,and Equilibrium Firm Value with Asymmetric Information

The residual income valuation model (RIM) by Ohlson (1995) and Feltham and Ohlson (1995) assumes that investors are risk-neutral with homogenous beliefs. Thus, the present value of expected dividends represents firm value. The purpose of the present study is to derive a RIM in a market setting of the Kyle (1985) type. Since traders are asymmetrically informed in the Kyle setting, firm value is no longer equivalent to the present value of the firm's expected dividends. In the present model, the informed investor observes a signal about the firm's profitability, which the market maker (who sets the price) is unable to observe. The market maker infers the informed investor's private signal based on the total order flow, which is an informative but noisy signal. The analysis identifies the equilibrium firm value as a linear function of current book value, current residual income, and the aggregate order flow.