Rationalizability, Strong Rationality, and Expectational Stability

We examine the connection between two stability concepts of rational expectations equilibria: expectational stability, based on the convergence of iterations of expectations, and strong rationality, based on uniqueness of the rationalizable solutions of an associated game with restrictions on beliefs. To compare the concepts we embed a standard expectations model in a game-theoretic framework. It is shown that the two stability concepts coincide when agents are homogeneous. For the general case of heterogeneous agents we show that expectational stability is a necessary condition for strong rationality and we provide a sufficient condition for the latter. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C62.     

Planning and coordination of economic policy in market economies

The purpose of the paper is to analyze the experience of capitalist countries in implementing national economic planning. Planning procedures are examined in order to ascertain whether plans have succeeded in coordinating economic policy. Five operational criteria are formulated that must be satisfied by planning procedures if policy coordination is to be achieved. The planning experience of four capitalist countries, France, Japan, The Netherlands, and Sweden, is then evaluated in the light of the five operational criteria. The conclusion is that planning has been far from successful in coordinating policy.     

增长与稳定的冲突及协调机制--对美国贸易赤字的另一种解释

一、关于美国贸易赤字的流行观点及其缺陷 近几年来,随着美国贸易赤字的进一步积累和90年代高增长周期的结束,越来越多的学者开始关注美国的贸易赤字问题.到目前为止,有三种主要的分析视角:第一种,关注外部均衡问题,主要是国际贸易层面的分析,把美国贸易赤字的根源归为汇率和汇率制度方面的因素;第二种,关注内部均衡问题,从美国的居民储蓄和财政赤字等因素出发,分析贸易赤字的根源;第三种,关注全球经济增长的联系,认为外围国家所采取的特定经济增长模式以及这种增长模式对美国的依赖性,是导致美国贸易赤字的主要原因.基于不同的分析视角,相关研究也针对美国贸易赤字的影响和可持续性提出了不同的看法.总体而言,基于前两种分析视角的主流观点认为美国的贸易赤字已经高到不可维持的程度,为了恢复全球经济的平衡,美元必须大幅贬值,美国必须提高国民储蓄率.基于第三种分析视角的研究一般认为,美国的贸易赤字不仅是可以持续的,而且是经济全球化背景下各国经济相互依存的必然结果;美元币值调整不仅不能从根本上解决全球经济失衡问题,而且可能增加金融危机的风险;美国贸易赤字和全球性经济失衡的调整依赖于全球经济增长模式的调整.     

国际经济政策协调的难题与对策

文章对国际经济政策协调存在的障碍和效果不佳原因进行经济学分析的同时,总结二战以来国际社会进行国际经济政策协调的经验与成果,为寻找克服国际经济政策协调困难提供理论和政策支持。     

Multilateral institutions for international economic policy coordination: bargaining vs voting

We study a world economy where worldwide policy coordination is essential to optimally stabilize unfavorable common supply shocks. We develop a two-stage game to investigate how to implement the first-best response to these shocks via a multilateral institution, whose board of directors is composed of a representative per each member country. In a first stage, national governments nominate their representatives on the board. In a second stage, the board collectively chooses stabilization policies. We compare the relative merits of two collective choice mechanisms – bargaining and majority voting – in avoiding manipulation of the cooperative agreement through the strategic nomination of national representatives.     

城市老人实际支持网和期望支持网分析

目前老年人实际支持网和期望支持者网之间有较大差异,实际支持网比较有限,期望支持网络比较广泛,独生子女老人表现最为突出。各种社会支持网络中,家庭成员尤其是配偶实际发挥重要作用,未来预期上也占很大比例。但养老支持中女儿和儿媳实际支持供给不足,对她们期望较高。正式社会支持网在支持中作用非常有限,期望也不高。     

A simple economic theory of skill accumulation and schooling decisions

We propose a model of schooling that can account for the observed heterogeneity in workers' productivity and educational attainment. Identical unskilled agents can get a degree at a cost, but becoming skilled entails an additional unobservable effort cost. Individual labor can then be used as an input in pairwise production matches. Two factors affect students' desire to build human capital: degrees imperfectly signal productivity, and contract imperfections generate holdup problems. Multiple stationary equilibria exist, some of which are market failures characterized by a largely educated workforce of low average skill. Policy implications are explored.     

两大部类协调性:量化测算——基于我国现实经济活动的视角

两大部类协调发展是社会再生产正常进行的条件,也是构建和谐社会的基础.本文在对当前经济活动中的两大部类进行深入认识的基础上,对1992-2006年两大部类的规模及其构成进行了测算,并利用测算结果对现实中两大部类的协调性进行了分析.     

Making development simple. The genetic deterministic hypothesis for economic development

This paper discusses the dangers inherent in attempting to simplify something as complex as development. It does this by exploring the Lynn and Vanhanen theory of deterministic development which asserts that varying levels of economic development seen between countries can be explained by differences in ‘national intelligence’ (national IQ). Assuming that intelligence is genetically determined, and as different races have been shown to have different IQ, then they argue that economic development (measured as GDP/capita) is largely a function of race and interventions to address imbalances can only have a limited impact. The paper presents the Lynne and Vanhanen case and critically discusses the data and analyses (linear regression) upon which it is based. It also extends the cause–effect basis of Lynne and Vanhanen's theory for economic development into human development by using the Human Development Index (HDI). It is argued that while there is nothing mathematically incorrect with their calculations, there are concerns over the data they employ. Even more fundamentally it is argued that statistically significant correlations between the various components of the HDI and national IQ can occur via a host of cause–effect pathways, and hence the genetic determinism theory is far from proven. The paper ends by discussing the dangers involved in the use of over-simplistic measures of development as a means of exploring cause–effect relationships. While the creators of development indices such as the HDI have good intentions, simplistic indices can encourage simplistic explanations of under-development.     

Concatenate coordination and mutual coordination

We tell of the evolving meaning of the term coordination as used by economists. The paper is based on systematic electronic searches (on “coord,” etc.) of major works and leading journals. The term coordination first emerged in professional economics around 1880, to describe the directed productive concatenation of factors or activities within a firm. Also, transportation economists used the term to describe the concatenation of routes and trips of a transportation system. These usages represent what we term concatenate coordination. The next major development came in the 1930s from several LSE economists (Hayek, Plant, Hutt, and Coase), who extended that concept beyond the eye of any actual coordinator. That is, they wrote of the concatenate coordination of a system of polycentric or spontaneous activities. These various applications of concatenate coordination prevailed until the next major development, namely, Thomas Schelling and game models. Here coordination referred to a mutual meshing of actions. Game theorists developed crisp ideas of coordination games (like “battle of the sexes”), coordination equilibria, convention, and path dependence. This “coordination” was not a refashioning, but rather a distinct concept, one we distinguish as mutual coordination. As game models became more familiar to economists, it was mutual coordination that economists increasingly had in mind when they spoke of “coordination.” Economists switched, so to speak, to a new semantic equilibrium. Now, mutual coordination overshadows the older notion of concatenate coordination. The two senses of coordination are conceptually distinct and correspond neatly to the two dictionary definitions of the verb to coordinate. Both are crucial to economics. We suggest that distinguishing between the two senses can help to clarify “coordination” talk. Also, compared to talk of “efficiency” and “optimality,” concatenate coordination allows for a richer, more humanistic, and more openly aesthetic discussion of social affairs. The narrative is backed up by Excel worksheets that report on systematic content searches of the writings of economics using the worldwide web and, using JSTOR, of Quarterly Journal of Economics, Economic Journal, Journal of Political Economy, American Economic Review, and Economica.     

Forecasting nonlinear economic time series: A simple test to accompany the nearest neighbor approach

This paper is based on a recent nonparametric forecasting approach by Sugihara, Grenfell and May (1990) to improve the short term prediction of nonlinear chaotic processes. The idea underlying their forecasting algorithm is as follows: For a nonlinear low-dimensional process, a state space reconstruction of the observed time series exhibits spatial correlation, which can be exploited to improveshort term forecasts by means of locally linear approximations. Still, the important question of evaluating the forecast perfomance is very much an open one, if the researcher is confronted with data that are additionally disturbed by stochastic noise. To account for this problem, a simple nonparametric test to accompany the algorithm is suggested here. To demonstrate its practical use, the methodology is applied to observed price series from commodity markets. It can be shown that the short term predictability of the best fitting linear model can be improved upon significantly by this method.     

Modeling regulatory behavior: The economic theory of regulation versus alternative theories and simple rules of thumb

Empirical tests of the economic theory of regulation have typically consisted of estimation of a model of some observed regulatory decision, with various interest group variables incorporated as exogenous determinants of that decision. Statistical significance of the coefficients of these interest group variables is then taken as empirical support for this theory. Here, a different approach is adopted. We specify seven alternative models based upon: (1) the economic theory of regulation, (2) alternative theories of regulatory behavior, and (3) simple rules of thumb. Model selection tests are then performed. Our findings reveal that the economic theory of regulation consistently outperforms the alternative models.     

The auctioneerless economics of Axel Leijonhufvud: the 'dark forces of time and ignorance' and the coordination of economic activity

Leijonhufvud focuses his analysis on the coordination of economicactivities. In a world tossed and torn by ever new episodesof instability, macroeconomic theory must finally admit andproperly analyse the limits of collective and individual rationality.Starting from the system's coordination, Leijonhufvud underlinesthe crucial role of information, learning and institutions.Coming to individual choice, he unremittingly rejects unboundedrationality. Methodologically, however, his use of general equilibriumas a benchmark seems to have conditioned his analysis. In bringingto light the ‘dark forces of time and ignorance’,Leijonhufvud himself seems to have fallen under the influenceof the siren represented by general equilibrium theory.     

Puzzles in the economic institutions of capitalism: production coordination, contracting and work organisation in the Irish linen trade, 1750-1850

Pre-Famine Ireland is a byword for market failure and path dependence.Production of flax yarn and linen cloth was highly regulatedand coordinated by the market rather than by firms. Contemporarypolitical economists suggested that these institutional featuresprovided evidence of organisational inefficiency. The historicalevidence suggests that they were a rational response to transactionand production costs. The Irish case provides a test of thehypotheses that firms emerge to reduce the cost of market transactions.It suggests that institutions other than the firm can modifytransaction costs, coordination of production can affect bothtransaction and production costs, and that agents choose betweenmarket and firm coordination given technology and factor prices.Finally, centralisation of production was driven by technology.     

Beyond clusters: Crafting contexts for innovation

The Review of Austrian Economics - Innovation requires cooperation among multiple actors spread across different organizations in order to fund, research, develop, scale-up and bring new products...     

Credible assignments in coordination games

This paper uses the experimental method to examine an arbiter's ability to determine the outcome of two-person coordination games. All of the arbiter's assignments in the experiments were strict equilibrium points, but some assignments violated payoff-dominance or symmetry. An assignment that corresponds to the game's outcome is a credible assignment. The experiments test the hypothesis that an assignment to a strict equilibrium is a credible assignment. Our subjects did not find the individual rationality and mutual consistency of an equilibrium assignment to be sufficient reason for implementing the assignment when doing so conflicts with payoff-dominance or symmetry.     

Behavioral spillovers in coordination games

Motivated by problems of coordination failure observed in weak-link games, we experimentally investigate behavioral spillovers for minimum- and median-effort coordination games. Subjects play these coordination games simultaneously and sequentially. The results show that successful coordination on the Pareto optimal equilibrium in the median game influences behavior in the minimum game when the games are played sequentially. Moreover, this positive, Pareto-improving spillover is present even when group composition changes across games, although the effect is not as strong. We also find that the precedent for uncooperative behavior in the minimum game does not influence play in the median game. These findings suggest guidelines for increasing cooperative behavior within organizations.     

Dynamic coordination games

Summary Gains from coordination provide incentives for delay. In this paper, the extent of delay is studied in a dynamic,N-person, coordination game. There is no social gain from delay, so an equilibrium with delay is always inefficient. For fixedN, there is no coordination failure when the period length is short: all equilibrium outcomes converge to the Pareto efficient outcome as the period length converges to zero. On the other hand, holding period length fixed, there exist equilibria in which delay is proportional toN, for arbitrarily large values ofN. In addition, it can be shown that the possibility of delay depends on the timing of strategic complementarities. However, under certain conditions, delay is shown to be a robust phenomenon, in the sense that well-behaved equilibria exhibit infinite delay forN sufficiently large.This paper grew out of discussions with Christophe Chamley. While writing it I benefited from discussions with Ken Binmore, Russell Cooper, Bob Rosenthal and Michael Manove. Joe Farrell, Drew Fudenberg, Martin Hellwig and Sawoong Kang made very useful comments on an earlier version that led to substantial improvements. Helpful comments were also made by seminar participants at the London School of Economics, the SUNY at Stoney Brook, the NBER Summer Institute, Northwestern University, and the University of Chicago. I would like to thank Nick Yannelis and an anonymous referee for their editorial advice. Financial support for this research was provided by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. SES 9196061.