Ambiguous events and maxmin expected utility

We study the properties associated to various definitions of ambiguity [L.G. Epstein, J. Zhang, Subjective probabilities on subjectively unambiguous events, Econometrica 69 (2001) 265-306; P. Ghirardato et al., Differentiating ambiguity and ambiguity attitude, J. Econ. Theory 118 (2004) 133-173; K. Nehring, Capacities and probabilistic beliefs: a precarious coexistence, Math. Soc. Sci. 38 (1999) 197-213; J. Zhang, Subjective, ambiguity, expected utility and Choquet expected utility, Econ. Theory 20 (2002) 159-181] in the context of Maximin Expected Utility (MEU). We show that each definition of unambiguous events produces certain restrictions on the set of priors, and completely characterize each definition in terms of the properties it imposes on the MEU functional. We apply our results to two open problems. First, in the context of MEU, we show the existence of a fundamental incompatibility between the axiom of “Small unambiguous event continuity” (Epstein and Zhang, 2001) and the notions of unambiguous event due to Zhang (2002) and Epstein and Zhang (2001). Second, we show that, in the context of MEU, the classes of unambiguous events according to either Zhang (2002) or Epstein and Zhang (2001) are always λ-systems. Finally, we reconsider the various definitions in light of our findings, and identify some new objects (Z-filters and EZ-filters) corresponding to properties which, while neglected in the current literature, seem relevant to us.     

A SMOOTH AMBIGUITY MODEL OF THE COMPETITIVE FIRM

This paper examines the optimal production decision of the competitive firm under price uncertainty when the firm's preferences exhibit smooth ambiguity aversion. Ambiguity is modeled by a second‐order probability distribution that captures the firm's uncertainty about which of the subjective beliefs govern the price risk. Ambiguity preferences are modeled by the (second‐order) expectation of a concave transformation of the (first‐order) expected utility of profit conditional on each plausible subjective distribution of the price risk. Within this framework, we derive necessary and sufficient conditions under which the ambiguity‐averse firm optimally produces less in response either to the introduction of ambiguity or to greater ambiguity aversion when ambiguity prevails. In the case that the price risk is binary, we show that ambiguity and greater ambiguity aversion always adversely affect the firm's production decision.     

Efficient allocations under ambiguity

Important implications of the expected utility hypothesis and risk aversion are that if agents have the same probability belief, then consumption plans in every efficient allocation of resources under uncertainty are comonotone with the aggregate endowment, and if their beliefs are concordant, then the consumption plans are measurable with respect to the aggregate endowment. We study these two properties of efficient allocations for models of preferences that exhibit ambiguity aversion using the concept of conditional beliefs, which we introduce in this paper. We provide characterizations of such conditional beliefs for the standard models of preferences used in applications.     

Information,trade and common knowledge

In any voluntary trading process, if agents have rational expectations, then it is common knowledge among them that the equilibrium trade is feasible and individually rational. This condition is used to show that when risk-averse traders begin at a Pareto optimal allocation (relative to their prior beliefs) and then receive private information (which disturbs the marginal conditions), they can still never agree to any non-null trade. On markets, information is revealed by price changes. An equilibrium with fully revealing price changes always exists, and even at other equilibria the information revealed by price changes “swamps” each trader's private information.     

On the second optimality theorem of welfare economics

To what extent does the second optimality theorem of welfare economics (every Pareto optimal allocation can be repesented as a Walras equilibrium allocation) remain valid when preferences are allowed to be locally satiated? It is always valid for an exchange economy, and is valid for a production economy if there is a consumer who is not locally satiated, but not in general for a production economy where all consumers are locally satiated. A generalized equilibrium is defined, which includes the Walras equilibrium as a special case. Every Pareto optimum can be represented as a generalized equilibrium allocation. Furthermore, every Pareto optimal utility distribution can be realized by a Walras equilibrium allocation.     

Half empty, half full and why we can agree to disagree forever

Aumann [Aumann R., 1976. Agreeing to disagree. Annals of Statisitics 4, 1236–1239] derives his famous we cannot agree to disagree result under the assumption that people are expected utility (=EU) decision makers. Motivated by empirical evidence against EU theory, we study the possibility of agreeing to disagree within the framework of Choquet expected utility (=CEU) theory which generalizes EU theory by allowing for ambiguous beliefs. As our first main contribution, we show that people may well agree to disagree if their Bayesian updating of ambiguous beliefs is psychologically biased in our sense. Remarkably, this finding holds regardless of whether people with identical priors apply the same psychologically biased Bayesian update rule or not. As our second main contribution, we develop a formal model of Bayesian learning under ambiguity. As a key feature of our approach the posterior subjective beliefs do, in general, not converge to “true” probabilities which is in line with psychological evidence against converging learning behavior. This finding thus formally establishes that CEU decision makers may even agree to disagree in the long-run despite the fact that they always received the same information.     

Differentiating ambiguity and ambiguity attitude

The objective of this paper is to show how ambiguity, and a decision maker (DM)'s response to it, can be modelled formally in the context of a general decision model. We introduce a relation derived from the DM's preferences, called “unambiguous preference”, and show that it can be represented by a set of probabilities. We provide such set with a simple differential characterization, and argue that it is a behavioral representation of the “ambiguity” that the DM may perceive. Given such revealed ambiguity, we provide a representation of ambiguity attitudes. We also characterize axiomatically a special case of our decision model, the “α-maxmin” expected utility model.     

Regular Distributive Efficiency and the Distributive Liberal Social Contract

We consider abstract social systems of private property, made of n individuals endowed with nonpaternalistic interdependent preferences, who interact through exchanges on competitive markets and Pareto‐improving lump‐sum transfers. The transfers follow from a distributive liberal social contract defined as a redistribution of initial endowments such that the resulting market equilibrium allocation is both: (i) a distributive optimum (i.e., is Pareto‐efficient relative to individual interdependent preferences) and (ii) unanimously weakly preferred to the initial market equilibrium. We elicit minimal conditions for meaningful social contract redistribution in this setup, namely, the weighted sums of individual interdependent utility functions, built from arbitrary positive weights, have suitable properties of nonsatiation and inequality aversion; individuals have diverging views on redistribution, in some suitable sense, at (inclusive) distributive optima; and the initial market equilibrium is not a distributive optimum. We show that the relative interior of the set of social contract allocations is then a simply connected smooth manifold of dimension n ? 1. We also show that the distributive liberal social contract rules out transfer paradoxes in Arrow–Debreu social systems. We show, finally, that the liberal social contract yields a norm of collective action for the optimal provision of any pure public good.     

Ambiguity Made Precise: A Comparative Foundation

The theory of subjective expected utility has been recently extended to allow ambiguity to matter for choice. We propose a notion of absolute ambiguity aversion by building on a notion of comparative ambiguity aversion. We characterize it for a preference model which encompasses some of the most popular models in the literature. We next build on these ideas to provide a definition of unambiguous act and event and show the characterization of the latter. As an illustration, we consider the classical Ellsberg 3-color urn problem and find that the notions developed in the paper provide intuitive answers. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: D81.     

Information, trade and incomplete markets

The no-trade result of Milgrom and Stokey, J Econ Theory 26:17–27 (1982), states that if rational traders begin with an ex-ante Pareto optimal allocation then the arrival of information cannot generate trade. This paper allows traders to trade before and after the arrival of information. If there are enough securities to hedge against all payoff relevant risk, then the preinformation-arrival allocation is Pareto optimal and information arrival has no effect. This no-retrade result is the competitive analog of the no-trade result of (1982). However, information generically generates trade when markets are state-contingent incomplete.We thank seminar participants at Cambridge, Carnegie Mellon,Cornell, Essex, London, Maastricht, USC, and York and participants at the 2003 SITE, the 2003 SAET and the Fall 2002 Cornell–Penn State Macro Conference. We also thank Karl Shell and a referee for this journal for useful comments     

Experimental evidence on personality traits and preferences

Using an experiment, we test the relation between personality traits and revealed risk and ambiguity preferences, and we consider the effects of personality traits prevalence in a group on the decision making of each group member. In the experiment, subjects reveal their risk and ambiguity preferences through lottery choices. They then participate in an unstructured group chat. Afterwards, they are given the chance to revise their initial lottery choices. Results show that personality traits affect ambiguity but not risk preferences before the chat. Specifically, agreeableness is negatively related to ambiguity aversion. We also show that the probability of changing decisions after the chat is affected by the individual's personality traits but not by the traits of the other group members. The latter only affects the direction and the degree of the change.     

Scientific Ambiguity and Climate Policy

Economic evaluation of climate policy traditionally treats uncertainty by appealing to expected utility theory. Yet our knowledge of the impacts of climate policy may not be of sufficient quality to be described by unique probabilistic beliefs. In such circumstances, it has been argued that the axioms of expected utility theory may not be the correct standard of rationality. By contrast, several axiomatic frameworks have recently been proposed that account for ambiguous knowledge. In this paper, we apply static and dynamic versions of a smooth ambiguity model to climate mitigation policy. We obtain a general result on the comparative statics of optimal abatement and ambiguity aversion, and then extend our analysis to a more realistic, dynamic setting, where we introduce scientific ambiguity into the well-known DICE model of the climate-economy system. For policy-relevant exogenous mitigation policies, we show that the value of emissions abatement increases as ambiguity aversion increases, and that this ‘ambiguity premium’ can in some plausible cases be very large. In these cases the effect of ambiguity aversion on welfare is comparable to that of other much studied welfare parameters. Thus ambiguity aversion may be an important neglected aspect of climate change economics, and seems likely to provide another argument for strong abatement policy.     

DEALING WITH UNCERTAINTY: ROBUST RULES IN MONETARY POLICY

We argue that in seeking to insure against model uncertainty, monetary policy makers are often ready to trade ex post performance for greater certainty in the outcome. They thus look for rules that although not optimal ex post, have certain properties that qualify them as robust. We apply first, Gul's approach of ‘disappointment’ aversion to describe policy makers' aversion to uncertainty and then define the properties the notion of ‘robustness’ entails. With these two tools we then link the desirability of such robust rules to the degree of policy makers' aversion to uncertainty. We thus show that provided such robust rules exist, a larger degree of disappointment aversion leads to a greater emphasis on robustness in policy implementation.     

Ambiguity Without a State Space

Many decisions involve both imprecise probabilities and intractable states of the world. Objective expected utility assumes unambiguous probabilities; subjective expected utility assumes a completely specified state space. This paper analyses a third domain of preference: sets of consequential lotteries. Using this domain, we develop a theory of objective ambiguity without explicit reference to any state space. We characterize a representation that integrates a non-linear transformation of first-order expected utility with respect to a second-order measure. The concavity of the transformation and the weighting of the measure capture ambiguity aversion. We propose a definition for comparative ambiguity aversion.     

Kindness,confusion, or … ambiguity?

Other-regarding preferences or decision errors are the main explanations put forward to justify contributions exceeding the non-cooperative optimum in VCM games. An alternative rationale relies on ambiguity aversion. Ambiguity aversion increases the perceived marginal benefit of own contributions, which in equilibrium will exceed the Nash level. We present a series of experiments testing this hypothesis. To control for other-regarding preferences, we run a two-player game in which a human player plays with a virtual agent. Players are assigned either to a risky setting (known probabilities of opponent’s choices) or to an ambiguity setting (probabilities of opponent’s contribution are vague). Results show that ambiguity affects contributions. However, attitude to ambiguity appears to be affected by the location of the aggregate Nash optimum inside the decision space.     

When curiosity kills the profits: An experimental examination

Economic theory predicts that in a first-price auction with equal and observable valuations, bidders earn zero profits. Theory also predicts that if valuations are not common knowledge, then since it is weakly dominated to bid your valuation, bidders will bid less and earn positive profits. Hence, rational players in an auction game should prefer less public information. We are perhaps more used to seeing these results in the equivalent Bertrand setting. In our experimental auction, we find that individuals without information on each other's valuations earn more profits than those with common knowledge. However, given a choice between the two sets of rules, approximately half the individuals preferred to have the public information. We discuss possible explanations, including showing that there is a correlation between ambiguity aversion and a preference for having more information in the auction.     

Social Learning from Private Experiences: The Dynamics of the Selection Problem

I analyse social interactions that stem from the successive endeavours of new cohorts of heterogeneous decision makers to learn from the experiences of past cohorts. A dynamic process of information accumulation and decision making occurs as the members of each cohort observe the experiences of earlier ones, and then make choices that yield experiences observable by future cohorts. Decision makers face the selection problem as they seek to learn from observation of past actions and outcomes, while not observing the counterfactual outcomes that would have occurred had other actions been chosen. Assuming that all cohorts face the same outcome distributions, I show that social learning is a process of sequential reduction in ambiguity. The specific nature of this process, and its terminal state, depend critically on how decision makers make choices under ambiguity. I use the problem of learning about innovations to illustrate.     

Bilateral trade in a monetized pure exchange economy

A model is constructed having n traders and m commodities, one of which is money and must be used in every trade. Exchange rates are flexible. If bilateral exchange takes place whenever utility increasing trade is possible, the allocation matrix converges to the Pareto locus.     

Beneficial altruism

We investigate the question of whether or not it is possible that every allocation that does not involve unilateral transfers of some of the always desired goods, without receiving anything in return, can be Pareto dominated by an allocation that involves such transfers.     

Digital technologies,knowledge spillovers,innovation policies,and economic growth in a creative region

We theoretically study the impact of two innovation policies on economic growth in a region that is creative in the sense of Richard Florida and that uses digital technologies to produce a final consumption good. The use of these digital technologies in our creative region gives rise to incomplete knowledge spillovers. Our analysis generates three salient findings. First, we characterize the balanced growth path (BGP) equilibrium. Second, we solve the social planner's problem, describe the Pareto optimal allocation of resources, and then compare the Pareto optimal allocation with the BGP equilibrium allocation. Finally, we study the impacts that a research subsidy and a particular patent policy have on economic growth in our creative region and then we relate our findings to the incompleteness of the above-mentioned knowledge spillovers.