Oligopoly equilibria in electricity contract markets

This paper examines the implications of forward contracting on oligopoly environments by extending the model of Allaz and Vila to an environment with multiple firms and increasing marginal cost. Estimates of key parameters of this model are taken from existing electricity markets to predict the market impact of one round of public contracting, such as those seen in auctions for retail provision and resource procurement. The results imply that, when forward contracts are present, the importance of supplier concentration is greatly magnified relative to other determinants unilateral market power such as demand elasticity.      

Price discovery in restructured electricity markets

We empirically investigate the degree of integration that existed prior to the cost increases that caused emergency conditions in the Western Systems Coordinating Council (WSCC), particularly California, during the summer of 2000. Evidence from Granger causality tests and common features analysis over the period from December 1994 to September 1999 indicates a moderate degree of integration among these markets. However, price effects throughout the region were often only unidirectional, did not exhibit the characteristics of perfect substitutability, and were significantly influenced by institutional changes in the California market. Most importantly, our research suggests that these markets were not as highly integrated as earlier research had indicated.     

Contracting for the second best in dysfunctional electricity markets

Power pools constitute a set of sometimes complex institutional arrangements for efficiency-enhancing coordination among power systems. In many developing countries, where such institutional arrangements can’t be established over the short term, there still can be scope for voluntary electricity-sharing agreements among power systems. Using a particular type of efficient risk-sharing model with no commitment we demonstrate that second-best coordination improvements can be achieved with low to moderate risks of participants leaving the agreement. In the absence of an impartial market operator who can observe production fluctuations in connected power systems, establishing quasi-markets for trading excess electricity helps to achieve some cooperation in mutually beneficial electricity sharing.     

Incentive effects of paying demand response in wholesale electricity markets

Recently issued U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission regulations require comparable treatment of demand reduction and generation in the wholesale electric market so that they are compensated at the same market clearing price. The new regulations measure demand reduction as a reduction from a “customer baseline,” a historically based estimate of the expected consumption. In this paper, we study the incentive effects on the efficiency of the demand response regulation using a static equilibrium model and a dynamic extension of the model. Our analysis provides three main results. Firstly, our analysis shows that the demand reduction payment will induce consumers to (1) inflate the customer baseline by increasing consumption above the already excessive level during normal peak periods and (2) exaggerate demand reduction by decreasing consumption beyond the efficient level during a demand response event. This result persists when applied to alternative baseline designs in a dynamic model. Secondly, we study alternative policy remedies to restore the efficiency of demand response regulation and introduce a new approach to define the customer baseline as a fixed proportion of an aggregate baseline. In particular, the aggregate baseline approach can significantly weaken or eliminate the incentive to inflate the baseline. Finally, we illustrate that if the baseline inflation problem is solved and demand and supply functions are linear, the current policy can produce a net social welfare gain. However, the welfare improvement requires that demand reduction be paid only when the wholesale price is at least twice the fixed retail rate. This argues that the policy should include a sufficiently high threshold price below which demand response is not dispatched.     

Exchange rate dynamics in integrated markets

This paper intends to formalize the behavior of exchange rate dynamics in integrated markets. The decomposition of the exchange rate behavior in different time frequencies suggests that both stochastic and fundamental processes as well as exogenous random shocks are present in the determination of the nominal exchange rate dynamics in integrated countries. A stochastic process within a potential well captures all the elements observed in the data. In addition, the mathematical solutions shed some light on the relationship between the stochastic process and the drift found in the literature. Finally, this model provides an alternative to the Standard Target Zone Stochastic Model thus far used to analyze the exchange rate dynamics in integrated markets.     

Forward discount dynamics in integrated markets

This paper models the excess return or forward discount (premium) dynamics in integrated markets. Its decomposition at different time frequencies suggests that both stochastic and fundamental processes, as well as exogenous random shocks, are relevant for the determination of the forward discount (premium) over time. A stochastic process within a time-dependent parabolic well appears to capture the empirical findings of the literature and provides the means for the derivation of the equilibrium pricing formula for the forward discount. The mathematical solution that determines the relationship between the stochastic process and the trend allows for an interpretation of the reasons why, in some cases, expectational error appears to be correlated with the forward discount (premium) but not with the forward risk premium. Finally, estimations of the forward discount are carried out using the proposed model, which seems to support the data well.     

Noisy chaotic dynamics in commodity markets

The nonlinear testing and modeling of economic and financial time series has increased substantially in recent years, enabling us to better understand market and price behavior, risk and the formation of expectations. Such tests have also been applied to commodity market behavior, providing evidence of heteroskedasticity, chaos, long memory, cyclicity, etc. The present evaluation of futures price behavior confirms that the resulting price movements can be random, suggesting noisy chaotic behavior. Prices could thus follow a mean process that is dynamic chaotic, coupled with a variance that follows a GARCH process. Our conclusion is that models of this type could be constructed to assist in forecasting prices in the short run but not over long run time periods.First version received: June 2001/Final version received: March 2003     

Locational-based coupling of electricity markets: benefits from coordinating unit commitment and balancing markets

We estimate the benefits of electricity locational marginal pricing (LMP) that arise from better coordination of day-ahead commitment decisions and real-time balancing markets in adjacent power markets when there is significant uncertainty in demand and wind forecasts. To do so, we formulate a series of stochastic models for committing and then dispatching electric generators subject to transmission limits. In the unit commitment stage, the models optimise day-ahead generation schedules under either the full set of network constraints or a simplified net transfer capacity (NTC) constraint, where the latter represents the present approach for limiting forward electricity trade in Europe. A subsequent redispatch model then creates feasible real-time schedules. Benefits of LMP arise from decreases in expected start-up and variable generation costs resulting from consistent consideration of the full set of network constraints both day-ahead and in real time. Meanwhile, coordinating adjacent balancing markets provides benefits because intermarket flows can be adjusted in real-time in response to changing conditions. To quantify these benefits, we analyse a stylised four-node network, examining the effects of varying system characteristics on the magnitude of the locational-based unit commitment benefits and the benefits of intermarket balancing. We conclude that both categories of benefits are situation dependent, such that small parameter changes can lead to large changes in expected benefits. Although both can amount to a significant percentage of operating costs, we find that the benefits of coordinating balancing markets generally exceed unit commitment benefits.     

Investment coordination in network industries: the case of electricity grid and electricity generation

Liberalization of network industries frequently separates the network from the other parts of the industry. This is important in particular for the electricity industry where private firms invest into generation facilities, while network investments usually are controlled by regulators. We discuss two regulatory regimes. First, the regulator can only decide on the network extension. Second, she can additionally use a “capacity market” with payments contingent on private generation investment. For the first case, we find that even absent asymmetric information, a lack of regulatory commitment can cause inefficiently high or inefficiently low investments. For the second case, we develop a standard handicap auction which implements the first best under asymmetric information if there are no shadow costs of public funds. With shadow costs, no simple mechanism can implement the second best outcome.     

Information and transparency in wholesale electricity markets: evidence from Alberta

We examine the role of information transparency in Alberta’s wholesale electricity market. Using data on firms’ bidding behavior, we analyze whether firms utilize information revealed in near real-time through the Historical Trading Report (HTR), which is released 10 min after each hour and contains a complete (de-identified) list of every firms’ bids into the wholesale market from the previous hour. We demonstrate that firms are often able to identify the offers of specific rivals by offer patterns adopted by those firms. For one of these firms, these patterns are associated with higher offer prices. This is consistent with allegations by Alberta’s Market Surveillance Administrator that firms may be utilizing unique bidding patterns to reveal their identities to their rivals to elevate market prices. We show that certain firms respond to rival offer changes with a lag consistent with responding to information revealed through the HTR, and that they respond differently to different firms, suggesting that they are able to infer identification.     

Pricing and capacity provision in electricity markets: an experimental study

The creation of adequate investment incentives has been of great concern in the restructuring of the electricity sector. However, to achieve this, regulators have applied different market designs across countries and regions. In this paper we employ laboratory methods to explore the relationship between market design, capacity provision and pricing in electricity markets. Subjects act as firms, choosing their generation capacity and competing in uniform price auction markets. We compare three regulatory designs: (1) a baseline price cap system that restricts scarcity rents, (2) a price spike regime that effectively lifts these restrictions, and (3) a capacity market that directly rewards the provision of capacity. Restricting price spikes leads to underinvestment. In line with the regulatory intention both alternative designs lead to sufficient investment albeit at the cost of higher energy prices during peak periods and substantial capacity payments in the capacity market regime. To some extent these results confirm theoretical expectations. However, we also find lower than predicted spot market prices as sellers compete relatively intensely in capacities and prices, and the capacity markets are less competitive than predicted.     

Proactive planning and valuation of transmission investments in restructured electricity markets

Traditional methods of evaluating transmission expansions focus on the social impact of the investments based on the current generation stock which may include firm generation expansion plans. In this paper, we evaluate the social welfare implications of transmission investments based on equilibrium models characterizing the competitive interaction among generation firms whose decisions in generation capacity investments and production are affected by both the transmission investments and the congestion management protocols of the transmission system operator. Our analysis shows that both the magnitude of the welfare gains associated with transmission investments and the location of the best transmission expansions may change when the generation expansion response is taken into consideration. We illustrate our results using a 30-bus network example. An erratum to this article can be found at     

Nonlinear dynamics in CEE stock markets indices

We investigate the existence of nonlinearities in the dynamics of the returns of stock markets indices from CEE economies. We use several types of nonlinear tests. We discuss the implications of the results with respect to the efficient market hypothesis.     

How to allocate forward contracts: The case of electricity markets

Several regulatory authorities worldwide have imposed forward contract commitments on electricity producers as a way to mitigate their market power. In this paper we analyze the impact of such commitments on equilibrium outcomes in a model that reflects important institutional and structural features of electricity markets. We show that, when firms are asymmetric, the distribution of contracts among firms matters. In the case of a single dominant firm, the regulator can be confident that allocating contracts to that firm will be pro-competitive. However, when asymmetries are less extreme, certain contract allocations might yield anti-competitive outcomes by eliminating more competitive equilibria. Our analysis thus suggests that forward contracts should be allocated so as to (virtually) reduce asymmetries across firms.     

Investment coordinates in the context of housing and stock markets nexus

This study examines the causal relationship between Chinese housing market (HM) and stock market (SM), using the bootstrap Granger full-sample causality test and subsample rolling-window estimation test. The results show that stock price (SP) has both positive and negative impacts on housing price (HP) in several sub-periods, and HP has the same effects on SP. The substitution effect drives their adverse consequences. Meanwhile, the positive effect indicates that SP has a wealth effect on HP, and HP has a credit-price effect on SP. Results provide information to Chinese financial institutions and individual investors for constructing investment portfolios within these asset markets.     

Spatial price dynamics and integration in russian food markets

In general, vocational education does not lead to higher wages. However, in some countries, labor markets are characterized by employment growth and skill shortages. In these, vocational schooling has produced higher wages and returns on investment than general education. Using 1998 Egyptian household survey, the study adds evidence to the debate on relative benefits of vocational education and of general education at the secondary level. The findings suggest that providing general education to the workforce followed by on-the-job training would provide the most benefit.