上市公司并购绩效影响因素分析

近年来公司间的并购呈现突飞猛进的发展势头,并购理论也逐步得以发展,但对企业并购的绩效研究却存在不同的结论。本文尝试研究控股权性质、控股方式及距离这三个因素对企业并购后长短期绩效的影响,以找出影响上市公司并购绩效的因素。本文的实证结果表明:控股权为国有的企业长期绩效得以改善,而控股权为民营的企业短期绩效恶化,同时控股方式及区域因素也分别对企业的长期和短期绩效产生显著的影响。     

我国上市公司并购方式效应分析

并购可以增加企业的价值，优化社会资源的配置。但是，在我国上市公司的企业并购是否真的优化了资源配置，要结合中国市场的实际进行分析。本文以2001年我国上市公司（沪市）控股权发生转移的全部71家公司的并购为样本，以公司每股收益、主营业务收入、净利润和净资产收益率为指标，以2001年和2002年的数据为基础，分析并购效应通过实证分析形成结论：在我国上市公司并购中，采取横向并购的公司业绩较好，且在并购中占主导地位。     

1998年中国上市公司并购实践的效应分析

对上市公司的收购是中国股市近些年出现的新现象 ,本文以 1 998年深沪两市发生的全部 67家公司的并购为样本 ,以公司净资产收益率 (NROA)和主业利润率(CROA)为指标 ,将所有样本根据并购原因划分为 6类 ,以并购前 2年和并购后 3年的数据为基础 ,系统分析了并购的效应与得失。在此基础上 ,还讨论了国有企业与民营企业作为收购方的并购效应和并购的有偿转让与无偿划拨方式的不同结果。文章的结论是 :业绩较差的公司较愿出让控股权 ;多数并购是战略性的 ,获上市地位是主要的并购动力 ;并购后主业得到明显加强 ;市场化的战略性并购效果较好 ,有偿并购的效果也较好。     

不同跨国并购动因下的并购整合效果

跨国并购是企业成长壮大,迅速扩张的一种重要手段.2008年金融危机的发生,加快了我国企业并购的步伐,形成了我国第一次跨国并购的高潮.我国企业进行跨国并购主要是为了寻求资源、技术和市场,本文对这三种动因下的并购整合进行了分析,发现不同动因下企业的并购整合效果是不同的,资源和市场寻求型企业的跨国并购能够实现有效整合,提升企业绩效.而技术寻求型企业则不能进行有效的整合     

我国企业并购融资市场的缺陷及其对策

市场化企业并购是项耗资巨大的工程,并购融资市场是否完善在相当大程度上决定着并购的效率乃至是否成功。我国目前企业并购融资市场在一些方面存在着严重的缺陷,从而对市场化并购形成制约。文章提出一些政策建议,以拓宽企业并购融资渠道,健全并购融资市场,从而推动市场化并购的健康发展。     

市场分割与资源配置效率的损害——来自企业并购的证据

中国市场分割是否存在,进而是否损害资源配置效率?文章从企业并购的角度进行了研究.并购具有促进资源优化配置、改善企业公司治理、提高企业价值的功能,但是并购也意味着被并购企业控制权的转移,这会对被并购企业所在地的经济、就业产生重大影响,因而可能引致地方政府的干预.研究发现,由于地方保护主义的存在,企业进行异地并购困难重重,但随着市场化程度的提高,异地并购的障碍得到有效的缓解,这说明我国存在一定程度的市场分割,但是随着市场化进程的深入,市场分割状况得到改善.     

中外企业并购特点的比较分析

与国外企业并购的特点比较 ,在并购的推动力、并购动机、并购方式、并购程序、代价支付形式、并购的行业选择等方面 ,我国国内企业的并购有着不同的特点。要规范我国国内企业间的并购行为 ,促进外资参与我国国内企业并购 ,就必须在认识这些不同特点的基础上 ,从并购政策和并购管理方面加强对我国企业参与并购行为的合理引导。     

市场化改革与我国上市公司并购重组的关系研究

我国的上市公司在市场经济的运行中必然面临着一系列市场关系的处理问题,其中并购重组时市场化改革的问题尤为突出.文章对市场化改革与我国上市公司并购重组的发展现状进行阐述,由此分析了市场化改革与上市公司并购重组的关系,并提出了市场化改革进程中上市公司并购重组的相关政策建议.     

企业并购绩效研究述评

与欧美的市场相比,我国的并购虽然起步较慢,但近些年来,我国并购的交易事件不断提升.为了探究企业并购后的绩效,国内外学者从不同角度做了大量的研究,但研究至今没有统一的结论.本文对已有的关于企业并购绩效方面的研究做了综述,希望对我国并购绩效带来启示.     

后股权分置时期上市公司并购行为分析

上市公司并购活动的状况受股权制度的制约.我国股权分置改革是股权制度的根本性变革,它为上市公司并购活动市场化奠定了制度性基础,它也必然导致并购动因、并购方式及并购效应的重大变化.     

Rule of law, democracy, openness, and income

We estimate the interrelationships among economic institutions, political institutions, openness, and income levels, using identification through heteroskedasticity (IH). We split our cross‐national dataset into two sub‐samples: (i) colonies versus non‐colonies; and (ii) continents aligned on an East–West versus those aligned on a North–South axis. We exploit the difference in the structural variances in these two sub‐samples to gain identification. We find that democracy and the rule of law are both good for economic performance, but the latter has a much stronger impact on incomes. Openness (trade/GDP) has a negative impact on income levels and democracy, but a positive effect on rule of law. Higher income produces greater openness and better institutions, but these effects are not very strong. Rule of law and democracy tend to be mutually reinforcing.     

Inflation,money, interest rate,exchange rate,and casuality: the case of Egypt,Morocco, and Tunisia

This study provides further evidence of the inflationary efects of the rates of growth of money supply, gross domestic product, efective exchange rate, and imported inflation for Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia using quarterly data from 1964 to 1990. In addition, it examines the Granger causality between inflation and money supply as well as between inflation and the real exchange rate in the countries under consideration. Most of the results are consistent with extant theory and empirical evidence.     

The Complexities and Potential of Theorizing Gender,Caste, Race,and Class

Most economists have not yet grappled with the demands of intersectional scholarship, which recognizes the intertwined nature of gender, race, class, caste and other influences on the economic situation of individuals and groups. Among economists, feminist economists may have made the most progress and be best positioned to break further ground, though we can do better and much remains to be done. This article synthesizes the case for intersectional work, reviews the state of the economic literature, describes the contributions of the articles in this special issue of Feminist Economics on "gender, color, caste and class," and sketches directions for the future.     

Democracy,Rule of Law,Corruption Incentives,and Growth

We bridge the gap between the standard theory of growth and the mostly static theory of corruption. Some public investment can be diverted from its purpose by corrupt individuals. Voters determine the level of public investment subject to an incentive constraint equalizing the returns from productive and corrupt activities. We concentrate on two exogenous institutional parameters: the “technology of corruption” is the ease with which rent‐seekers can capture a proportion of public spending. The “concentration of political power” is the extent to which rent‐seekers have more political influence than other people. One theoretical prediction is that the effects of the two institutional parameters on income growth and equilibrium corruption are different according to the constraints that are binding at equilibrium. In particular, the effect of judicial quality on growth should be stronger when political power is concentrated. We estimate a system of equations where both corruption and income growth are determined simultaneously and show that income growth is more affected by our proxies for legal and political institutions in countries where political rights and judicial institutions, respectively, are limited.     

Quality of judicial institutions,crimes, misdemeanors,and dishonesty

We investigate the extent to which quality of judicial institutions has an impact on individuals’ propensity for criminal and dishonest behavior and on their views regarding the acceptability of dishonesty and law-breaking. We use micro data on residents of 25 European countries and employ alternative measures of judicial quality as perceived by the residents of these countries. As an instrument for judicial quality we employ the procedures with which prosecutors and judges are appointed to their posts in each country. As alternative instruments, we employ an index of de jure institutional quality as well as its components, which provide similar results. The findings show that an increase in the perception of the quality of judicial institutions, such as an improvement in judicial independence or the impartiality of the courts, has a deterrent effect on dishonest and criminal acts. A higher perceived quality of the judicial system also makes individuals less likely to find acceptable a variety of dishonest and illicit behaviors, suggesting that institutions help shape the beliefs of the society. We obtain the same results when we analyze the sample of immigrants, whose cultural attributes should be (more) related to their countries of origin, rather than their countries of residence, and thus should be arguably uncorrelated with the factors that can impact the instrument. We show that people’s beliefs in the importance of the family, in the fairness of others, and the importance of being rich are not impacted by judicial quality, suggesting that judicial quality is not a blanket representation of underlying cultural norms and beliefs in the society.     

Politics, Structure of Protection, and Welfare

Three issues in the political economy of protection are examined. The first, the endogenization of interest group formation, is addressed from the perspective of profitability instead of the difficulty caused by the free-rider problem. The second issue is the determinants of an interest group's political influence. Two sets of determinants—the characteristics of the interest group and the political economic environment faced by that group—are identified. The third is the circumstances under which the presence of more interest groups is socially preferable to fewer. Such circumstances are related to the parameters of the model.     

Recession,terms of trade,and immigrants

The current literature does not adequately analyze how economic crisis affects employment of immigrants in host countries. It is generally believed that immigrants lose jobs and return home during recession. We show that recession may instead help relatively unskilled immigrants when it leads to terms-of-trade improvement in the host country, and when the unskilled sector is protected by minimum wage regulations. We also derive the condition under which the income gap between natives and immigrants falls.     

Uncertainty, Insurance, and Division of Labor

This paper develops an equilibrium model to investigate the relationships between transaction uncertainties, risk aversion, insurance, specialization, per capita real income, and productivity progress. It is shown that transaction uncertainties can restrict the division of labor; the level of division of labor decreases with the degree of risk aversion; insurance will promote the equilibrium level of division of labor, per capita real income, and productivity.     

Savings, Volume of Trade, and Growth

This paper develops a two-country dynamic general equilibrium model with endogenous growth to analyze the effects of international trade on steady-stage growth. The two countries differ both in preferences and in technologies. It is shown first that both countries cannot simultaneously experience increases in consumption growth from trade. It is then shown that trade can increase output growth for both countries if the attitude towards saving matches the change in the terms of trade in each country. A country facing a decline (rise) in its output price grows faster if its intertemporal elasticity of substitution is sufficiently low (high).