Conditional correlations in the returns on oil companies stock prices and their determinants

The identification of the forces that drive stock returns and the dynamics of their associated volatilities is a major concern in empirical economics and finance. This analysis is extremely important for determining optimal hedging strategies. This paper investigates the stock prices’ returns and their financial risk factors for several integrated oil companies, namely Bp (BP), Chevron-Texaco (CVX), Eni (ENI), Exxon-Mobil (XOM), Royal Dutch (RD) and Total-Fina Elf (TFE). We measure the actual co-risk in stock returns and their determinants “within” and “between” the different oil companies, using multivariate cointegration techniques in modelling the conditional mean, as well as multivariate GARCH models for the conditional variances. The distinguishing features of this paper are: (i) focus on the determinants of the market value of each company using the cointegrated VAR/VECM methodology; (ii) specification of the conditional variances of VECM residuals with the Constant Conditional Correlation (CCC) multivariate GARCH model of Bollerslev [(1990) Review of Economics and Statistics 72:498–505] and the Dynamic Conditional Correlation (DCC) multivariate GARCH model of Engle [(2002) Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 20:339–350]; (iii) discussion of the performance of optimal hedge ratios calculated with the DCC estimates. The “within” and “between” DCC indicate time-varying interdependence between stock return volatilities and their determinants. Moreover, DCC models are shown to produce more accurate hedging strategies.     

Tax-induced Dissimilarities Between Domestic and Foreign Mutual Funds in Italy

Using data from Italy over the period 1998–2002, this study investigates whether tax effects can account for differences in return patterns between domestic and foreign mutual funds, and if this dissimilarity translates into performance. The paper presents evidence that much of the difference between domestic and foreign funds is explained by the different tax systems. The asymmetry between the two groups, due to the fact that domestic funds are obliged to pay taxes on a daily basis while foreign funds are taxed when capital gains are collected, also affects performance. We prove that comparing pre-tax returns, Italian funds are virtually indistinguishable from their foreign counterparts in terms of risk-adjusted returns, while when comparing after-tax returns, foreign funds outperform.     

Budget share and optimal commodity taxes without computation

This paper shows for the linear expenditure system that the optimal tax rates increase across commodities in the ratio of the respective budget shares of the rich to those of the poor—i.e., the more luxurious good has a higher tax. These budget shares can be calculated either at pre-tax or post-tax price levels, thus can be expressed directly in terms of the basic parameters of the linear expenditure system.     

Redistributive taxation,wealth distribution,and economic growth

This paper examines the relationship between wealth distribution and economic growth in an endogenous growth model with heterogeneous households and redistributive taxation. In this paper, we incorporate an endogenous determination of redistributive policy into the model, focusing on the relation between pre- and post-tax inequality. Endogenous redistributive policy affects wealth distribution and economic growth. Therefore, the relation between post-tax inequality and economic growth is different from that between pre-tax inequality and economic growth. Results show that there exists a negative correlation between pre-tax inequality and economic growth, whereas there exists an inverted-U relationship between post-tax inequality and economic growth in a voting equilibrium.     

Endogenous structural change and crisis in a multiple time-scales growth model

The slow and endogenous twist of economic macro-structure makes up an important evolutionary feature of capitalist economies, and may be at the root of structural crisis. In this line, a Goodwinian growth model with increasing returns and profit-sharing that tries to picture a simple scenario of the seventies crisis is considered. It is shown that the exhaustion of the Kaldor-Verdoorn “productivity law” can entail, in a nonlinear framework, a “catastrophic” bifurcation from a “high” to a “low” growth path. Slow/fast dynamical systems then allow one to formalize a multiple time-scales dynamics where the growth path is shaped by the structural framework in which it takes place, but has also a long -un feedback. Structural change and crisis appear as long term and endogenous outcomes.     

Environmental tax policy in a model of growth cycles

Summary. The purpose of this paper is to consider environmental taxation which would control emissions of firms in a model of growth cycles. In the model presented below, the economy may experience two phases of growth and environmental quality: “the no-innovation growth regime” and “the innovation-led growth regime”. Aggregate capital and environmental quality remain constant in the no-innovation growth regime, while they perpetually increase in the innovation-led growth regime. The paper shows that the tax plays a key role in determining whether the economy stably converges to one of the two regimes or fluctuates permanently between them. It also shows that there is a critical level of the tax and that the economy obtains higher growth rates of capital and environmental quality by raising (or reducing) the tax if the initial tax is below (or above) the critical level. Received: April 2, 2001; revised version: March 21, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" This research reported here was conducted within the research project “Project on Intergenerational Equity” at Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. I am deeply grateful to an anonymous referee for his or her insightful comments, which greatly improved the paper. I also thank Hiroshi Honda, Yasuo Maeda, Yuji Nakayama, and participants in workshops at Hitotsubashi University, Kyoto University, Nagoya University, Osaka University, University of Tsukuba, Yokohama National University, and University of Tokyo for their valuable comments and suggestions. Any remaining errors are mine.     

Tax compliance and obedience to authority at home and in the lab: A new experimental approach

In most experimental studies of tax evasion, participants are instructed that they may report any amount of income from zero up to the amount they actually earned or received. This amounts to an invitation to gamble. In contrast, real-world tax authorities unambiguously demand compliance. We develop two new settings for conducting tax experiments. Both involve an explicit demand for compliance. Thus, we can determine whether knowing that the experimental authority would regard evasion as wrongful disobedience will influence compliance decisions. We demonstrate that simply telling people that they are required to pay a “participation fee” analogous to a tax produces remarkably high compliance rates and less sensitivity to changes in economic variables than in the earlier experimental literature using invitation-to-gamble language. This suggests that many people pay taxes despite the financial attraction of non-compliance because they are strongly inclined towards obeying authority. Furthermore, we show that giving participants a week to make their reporting decisions at home without an authority figure physically present overcomes the inclination to obey for some people, significantly lowering compliance rates. However, the majority still complies, even after the audit rate falls from 25% to 1%, which would make non-compliance extremely attractive if it were viewed only as a simple matter of risk and expected return. Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at . JEL Classification C91, H26     

The Arrow-Debreu model: How math can hide a fatal conceptual error

I argue that math, like love, can cover a multitude of sins, and I use the neoclassical object of adoration, the Arrow-Debreu model, as the case in point. It is commonplace that the Arrow-Debreu (AD) model of general equilibrium does not describe the real world, but it is equally commonplace to accept it as representing the pure logic of the competitive capitalist economy in an idealized world free of transactions costs. I show that the AD model fails even as an idealized model; it actually mistakes the logic of pure capitalism. Unlike McKenzie’s model of idealized general equilibrium under constant returns to scale, Arrow and Debreu claim to have shown the existence of competitive equilibrium under decreasing returns to scale and positive pure profits. The AD model (again unlike the McKinzie model) needs to assign the profits to individuals and this is done using the notion of “ownership of the production set.” But this notion suffers from a fatal ambiguity. If Arrow and Debreu interpret it to mean “ownership of a corporation” then a simple argument in the form “labor can hire capital or capital can hire labor” defeats the alleged necessity of assigning residual claimancy to the corporation. A given corporation may or may not end up exploiting a set of production opportunities (represented by a production set) depending on whether it hires in labor and undertakes production or hires out its capital to others (all by assumption at the parametrically given prices). In the latter case, residual claimancy is elsewhere. There is no such property right as “ownership of a production set” in a private property market economy. The legal party which purchases or already owns all the inputs used up in production has the defensible legal claim on the outputs: there is no need to also “purchase the production set.” At any set of prices that allow positive pure profits, anyone in the idealized AD model could bid up the price of the inputs and thus try to reap a smaller but still positive profit. Therefore,pace Arrow and Debreu, there could be no equilibrium with positive pure profits. In the Appendix, the property rights fallacy that afflicts the AD model is shown to also afflict orthodox capital theory and corporate finance theory. World Bank The findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the author and should not be attributed in any manner to the World Bank, to its affiliated organizations or to the members of its Board of Directors or the countries they represent.     

Income distribution and redistribution through taxation: An international comparison

Income tax progressivity is studied with Generalized Entropy measures of inequality. Luxembourg Income Study data sets for nine countries are used for international comparison and analysis. progressivity indices are generated by using the Generalized Entropy family as well as Atkinson measures. We further our understanding by examining pre-tax and post-tax measures of inequality based respectively on gross and disposable household incomes. The decomposition property is shown to be desirable for enhancing our knowledge of income inequality and the redistributive effect of income taxes. Thus decomposition based on family size and number of earners is conducted. We learn that countries vary in their emphasis regarding redistributive effects of income taxes.     

Individual heterogeneity in the returns to schooling: instrumental variables quantile regression using twins data

Considerable effort has been exercised in estimating mean returns to education while carefully considering biases arising from unmeasured ability and measurement error. Recent work has investigated whether there are variations from the “mean” return to education across the population with mixed results. We use an instrumental variables estimator for quantile regression on a sample of twins to estimate an entire family of returns to education at different quantiles of the conditional distribution of wages while addressing simultaneity and measurement error biases. We test whether there is individual heterogeneity in returns to education and find that: more able individuals obtain more schooling perhaps due to lower marginal costs and/or higher marginal benefits of schooling and that higher ability individuals (those further to the right in the conditional distribution of wages) have higher returns to schooling consistent with a non-trivial interaction between schooling and unobserved abilities in the generation of earnings. The estimated returns are never lower than 9 percent and can be as high as 13 percent at the top of the conditional distribution of wages but they vary significantly only along the lower to middle quantiles. Our findings may have meaningful implications for the design of educational policies.     

A Reinterpretation of the CIE Projections of the Long-Run Economic Effects of Immigration*

The 1988 Committee to Advise on Australia's Immigration Policies uses ORANI projections of increasing GDP per head as indicators of the economic benefits of immigration. We show that the projections imply that immigration reduces incumbents' pre-tax real incomes, leaving their post-tax incomes unchanged The rise in GDP per head is due to immigrants' relatively high participation rates. We argue that distributional information is important in assessing the effects of immigration.     

Peaks or tails – What distinguishes financial data?

We argue against the view that it is mostly the peaks of the empirical densities of stock returns (and of other risky returns as well) that set such data aside from “normal” variables. We show that peaks depend on sample size and on the way returns are standardized, and that for given data sets of stock returns, both higher peaks and lower peaks than in a standard normal case can be obtained. First version received: March 1998/Final version received: April 2000     

The political economy of constitutional restraints

Constitutions are multidimensional objects with non-trivial implications on the structure of the political environment and, therefore, on the policy outcomes. This paper models constitutions as sets of “restraints” on the authority’s choice freedom (absolute and democracy restraints). We argue that even if both kinds of restraints seem to be serving the same purpose (increase social welfare), “democracy restraints” prolong the “life” of a constitution while “absolute restraints” not. We moreover use the proposed way of modelling constitutions in order to explain the dominance of intermediate (in terms of tightness of “democracy restraints”) constitutions in the real world.     

On measuring violations of the progressive principle in income tax systems

Kakwani and Lambert (Eur J Polit Econ 14(2):369–380, 1998) state three axioms which should be respected by an equitable tax system. Using the Atkinson–Plotnick–Kakwani re-ranking indexes of taxes, tax rates, and post-tax incomes, calculated with respect to the ranking of pre-tax income distribution, they then propose a measurement system to evaluate the negative influences that axiom violations exert on the redistributive effect of taxes. In this paper, we reconsider the way Kakwani and Lambert measure violations of their second axiom, which concerns the re-ranking of tax rates. We construct a non-negative index which is strictly faithful to Kakwani and Lambert’s commands; we show that the Authors’ measure does not exactly fit the statements made in their second axiom. Both Kakwani and Lambert’s original measurement system and the modified one are then applied to Italian personal income tax in 2008. According to the modified measurement system, the average tax rate seems to play a smaller role than that suggested by the results gained using Kakwani and Lambert’s original methodology.     

What is the Best Distribution for Pollution Abatement Efforts? Information for Optimizing the WFD Programs of Measures

The Water Framework Directive (WFD) has mobilized economic theory in order to encourage E.U. Member States to reach desirable environmental water pollution levels by conciliating economic and ecological interests. For this purpose, a stringent standard (“good status”) has been set. Nevertheless, it will be possible to relax this standard if it appears that total abatement costs required for reaching this “good status” exceed expected environmental benefits. This ambitious policy updates the issue of the abatement costs and environmental benefits assessment. Concerning the costs, a full discrimination of the abatement effort minimizes the total cost when the impact of polluters changes spatially, while a uniform effort can reach a pollution target in flexible ways. In this case, the increase of the degree of discrimination of the abatement effort is required only if it generates significant positive economies. Our theoretical and empirical results have shown that the discrimination advantage becomes insignificant for either very demanding or very little demanding ecological standards and varies according to the polluters’ profile. In the case of “intermediate” standards, efficiency gains become negligible with a restricted number of effort “levels”.     

Global environment and dynamic games of environmental policy in an international duopoly

This paper examines a differential game model of international pollution control in which polluting oligopolists compete in a third country market. Two alternative policy instruments (emission taxes and command-and-control regulations) are considered. A tougher emission policy in the home country enhances the foreign firm’s competitiveness because of the static “rent-shifting” effect. The foreign country also enjoys a future improvement of the global environmental quality by “free riding” on the home country’s emission reduction effort. Because of these strategic effects, the levels of environmental policy determined in the noncooperative policy game are distorted away from the socially optimal level. Moreover, the emission tax game produces a more distortionary outcome than that in the command-and-control game; it generates more pollution and lower welfare.      

Social Change versus Transition: The Political Economy of Institutions and Transitional Economies

The “transition” process in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (EEFSU) was one of the most dramatic non-marginal adjustments in economic systems ever experienced. During the transition process, elements of centrally administered socialism and embryonic market relations co-existed. This made traditional economic theory irrelevant. The purpose of this paper is to discover policy concerns and outcomes that orthodox “transition” literature ignores. Stanfield’s contribution to the economic literature, a cultural-holistic approach of radical institutionalism, makes it possible to understand the “transition” process from a new and more enlightened perspective. Stanfield provides a better understanding of the complexities involved, since the nature of change in the EEFSU is social and ever-lasting, not an end-state in the form of “transition”. Students of transition and of international development would benefit from this novel approach, which dismisses “transition” and substitutes “social change”, as the proper designation and manifestation of what actually took place in EEFSU.     

Tax policy,capital use,and investment incentives

In this paper, we investigate the effect of a corporate income tax on the utilization and maintenance of capital and on the demand for capital stock and services. We find that a tax that allows interest deductions is distortionary unless allowable depreciation depends on the firm's utilization and maintenance decisions. Also, we show that the usual demand equation for capital stock is misspecified if capital utilization is not a technological constant.     

Tax progressivity, income distribution and tax non-compliance

This article examines the determinants of tax non-compliance when we recognise the existence of an imperfectly competitive “tax advice” industry supplying schemes which help taxpayers reduce their tax liability. We apply a traditional industrial organisation framework to model the behaviour of this industry. This tells us that an important factor determining the equilibrium price and hence, the level of non-compliance, is the convexity of the demand schedule. We show that in this context, this convexity is affected by the distribution of pre-tax income, the progressivity of the tax-schedule and the way in which monitoring and penalties vary with income. It is shown that lower pre-tax income inequality as well as a less progressive tax code may cause more tax minimisation activities. Therefore, the frequently advocated policy of reducing the highest tax rate may fail as a policy directed at improving tax discipline. One way of offsetting the possible harm to tax compliance from a less progressive tax could be an adjustment of the penalty and monitoring functions.     

Is there a Laffer curve between aggregate output and public sector employment?

This paper develops a model of the relationship between public sector employment, total output and aggregate real demand in market prices, where public employment has a positive productivity effect on private output. Public employment crowds out private employment and output because its increase induces higher wages and taxes. The valuation of government output is also taken into account. While public employment affects total output and aggregate real demand in an a priori ambiguous way, numerical simulations suggest that the relationship may be nonlinear; positive, when public sector is “small” and negative, when it is “large”. Using the annual data from 22 OECD countries over the period 1960–1996 and estimating and testing for threshold models and more commonly used specifications with multiplicative interaction terms give support to this nonlinearity hypothesis between public employment and private sector output. First version received: October 1996/Final version received: April 2000