Diversification and ownership concentration

If controlling shareholders can divert profits, equity ownership is more concentrated the higher the stock returns correlation. A higher returns correlation reduces the benefits of diversification, giving rise to both a higher investment by the controlling shareholder in the asset that he controls and a lower investment by the non-controlling shareholders. The empirical analysis supports the predictions of the model: equity ownership is more concentrated in countries where the stock returns correlation is higher; moreover the intensity of the relationship between the stock returns correlation and ownership concentration is amplified by poor investor protection.     

Die Abgrenzung beitragsbezogener Pensionspläne aus Sicht des Asset-Liability-Managements

As a first step towards establishing models for the asset liability management (ALM) of contribution based pension plans of German pension funds it is important to characterize the essential properties of such plans. It is shown that it is not appropriate to assume an equivalence between such plans and a ?Beitragszusage mit Mindestleistung” (contribution based pension plan with investment guarantee). Although the plans under consideration grant the participation in the asset returns generated by the pension fund, they also guarantee a benefit level. This shows clearly that it is impossible to apply traditional ALM models for defined contribution plans — which in general provide no minimum benefit guarantee — to German pension funds without substantial alterations.     

The effects of ownership structure on dividend policy: Evidence from seasoned equity offerings (SEOs)

This paper examines the effects of ownership structure on dividend policy, specifically the role of controlling shareholders in shaping dividend policy in a sample of firms that pay dividends and issue new equity simultaneously. The results show that managers in weakly governed firms are more likely to initiate customized dividends to meet outside large shareholders' needs while simultaneously using costly external capital to finance new investment projects. This paper contributes to the existing literature on agency problems by explaining why firms engage in this suboptimal dividend policy: it allows large shareholders to extract private benefits.     

Pension plan solvency and extreme market movements: a regime switching approach

We develop and test a new approach to assess defined benefit (DB) pension plan solvency risk in the presence of extreme market movements. Our method captures both the ‘fat-tailed’ nature of asset returns and their correlation with discount rate changes. We show that the standard assumption of constant discount rates leads to dramatic underestimation of future projections of pension plan solvency risk. Failing to incorporate leptokurtosis into asset returns also leads to downward biased estimates of risk, but this is less pronounced than the time-varying discount rate effect. Further modifying the model to capture the correlation between asset returns and the discount rate provides additional improvements in the projection of future pension plan solvency. This reduces the perceived future risk of underfunding because of the negative correlation between interest rate changes and asset returns. These results have important implications for those with responsibility for balancing risk against expected return when seeking to improve the current poor funding positions of DB pension schemes.     

Rehabilitating the role of active management for pension funds

Pension fund returns can be decomposed into different sources, including market movements, asset allocation policy, and active portfolio management. We use a unique database covering the asset allocations of US defined-benefit pension funds for the period 1990–2008, and we test the role of each factor in explaining their returns. Our results shed new light on pension funds’ sources of performance. While the previous literature emphasized that policy allocation accounts for the bulk of returns, leaving little room for active management, we show that taking explicit account of market movement can change the results significantly. Although active management plays a minor role in global asset allocation, its role is predominant in explaining returns to individual asset classes, whether traditional or alternative. This paper rehabilitates the contribution of active management as a source of performance for pension funds, at least at the asset class level.     

Housing Price Dynamics in Time and Space: Predictability,Liquidity and Investor Returns

It is widely accepted that aggregate housing prices are predictable, but that excess returns to investors are precluded by the transactions costs of buying and selling property. We examine this issue using a unique data set—all private condominium transactions in Singapore during an eleven-year period. We model directly the price discovery process for individual dwellings. Our empirical results clearly reject a random walk in prices, supporting mean reversion in housing prices and diffusion of innovations over space. We find that, when house prices and aggregate returns are computed from models that erroneously assume a random walk and spatial independence, they are strongly autocorrelated. However, when they are calculated from the appropriate model, predictability in prices and in investment returns is completely absent. We show that this is due to the illiquid nature of housing transactions. We also conduct extensive simulations, over different time horizons and with different investment rules, testing whether better information on housing price dynamics leads to superior investment performance.     

The Cross Section of Expected Real Estate Returns: Insights from Investment-Based Asset Pricing

Motivated by investment-based asset pricing, we show that two firm fundamentals, investment and profitability, have substantial predictive power for REIT returns. The return predictability of investment and profitability is not subsumed by conventional models and can be useful for understanding the cross section of expected REIT returns. To illustrate, we construct an investment-based factor model for REITs that consists of a market factor, an investment factor, and a profitability factor. The investment-based model outperforms conventional models in capturing well-known cross-sectional patterns in REIT returns. Our findings suggest that incorporating investment-based asset pricing can be a promising direction for future real estate finance research.     

国企“混改”与企业金融资产配置

本文利用2010～2017年中国沪深A股非金融类上市公司面板数据,考察了国企“混改”对企业金融资产配置的影响,并重点分析了国企“混改”过程中企业金融资产配置的动机。结果显示,非国有股东参股促进了国有企业的金融资产投资。机制检验发现,非国有股东参股通过治理效应路径和融资约束路径共同影响了国有企业的金融资产配置行为,具体表现为非国有股东参股带来的监督治理效应和融资约束强化效应均增强了国有企业配置金融资产的预防性储蓄动机,进而促使国有企业增加金融资产投资。上述研究结果表明,非国有股东参股推动的国有企业金融资产投资并非出于短期利益追逐,而是为了平滑企业投资进行的预防性储蓄。本文研究对于如何通过深化混合所有制改革引导企业“脱虚向实”有一定的借鉴意义。     

Solutions to the Asset Allocation Problem by Informed Respondents: The Significance of the Size-of-Bet and the 1/N Heuristic

Asset allocation is a classic topic in the theory of finance and a crucial issue for investment policy. Noted for its significance in driving pension fund performance, it is also an issue that individual investors consider when designing their investment portfolios. In theory, Markowitz and those following in his wake have an optimal solution. In practice, however, we show that when asked to allocate their own money to a set of asset classes (from relatively low risk to high risk) in an experimental situation, most of our informed respondents would vary their investment strategies according to the size-of-bet (the money value of assets to be invested). We also show that most participants in the study adopted one of three solutions to the posed problem only one of which could be thought consistent with Benartzi and Thaler's 1/ n  heuristic. Since respondent solutions do not seem to be explained by formal education, professional qualifications, or training, it is suggested that solutions to the asset allocation problem are a product of strategies that mix intuitive responses to the initial tranche of money with theoretical cum practical shared conventions. Solutions to the asset allocation puzzle suggest that the size-of-bet could be a significant consideration for many informed investors. In conclusion, suggestions are made about taking forward closer scrutiny of these experimental results.     

Institutional investors and stock returns volatility: Empirical evidence from a natural experiment

In this paper, we provide empirical evidence on the impact of institutional investors on stock market returns dynamics. The Polish pension system reform in 1999 and the associated increase in institutional ownership due to the investment activities of pension funds are used as a unique institutional characteristic. Performing a Markov-switching-GARCH analysis we find empirical evidence that the increase of institutional ownership has temporarily changed the volatility structure of aggregate stock returns. The results are interpretable in favor of a stabilizing effect on index stock returns induced by institutional investors.     

Investor sophistication and risk taking

Using investment policy data of 857 Dutch pension funds during 1999–2006, we develop three indicators of investor sophistication. The indicators show that pension funds’ strategic portfolio choices are often based on coarse and less sophisticated approaches. First, most pension funds round strategic asset allocations to the nearest multiple of 5%, similar to age heaping in demographic and historical studies. Second, many pension funds invest little or nothing in alternative, more complex asset classes, resulting in limited asset diversification. Third, many pension funds favor regional investments and as such do not fully employ the opportunities of international risk diversification. Our indicators are correlated with pension fund size, in line with the expectation that smaller pension funds are generally less sophisticated than large pension funds. Using the indicators for investor sophistication, we show that less sophisticated pension funds tend to opt for investment strategies with less risk.     

Political and Regulatory Risk in Water Utilities: Beta Sensitivity in the United Kingdom

UK utilities are generally regulated by the periodic setting of a price cap (the RPI-X mechanism). To establish these caps, regulators must determine what returns are appropriate on the capital employed by utilities. This paper addresses the issue of the level of risk inherent in investment in the equity of regulated water utilities in the UK. It uses the techniques of the Kalman Filter to estimate daily betas for the major utilities in the period from privatisation to mid-1999. The paper demonstrates that water utilities' risk is time-variant. It demonstrates, also, that there have been significant political and regulatory influences in the systematic risk faced by water utility shareholders. It finds beta to display little evidence of cyclical variation across the regulatory review cycle. The paper also confirms that significant excess returns have been generated over the history of the privatised water sector and suggests that over-estimation of systematic risk faced by investors in the sector may imply further excess returns in the next regulatory review period.     

Pension Policy and the Value of Corporate‐Level Investment

We examine how pension policy affects the value of corporate‐level investment to the firm and its various claimants using Monte Carlo simulation. Shareholders lose the greatest amount of project value to the pension plan when it is undiversified across asset classes. Improved funding levels mandated by the provisions of the Pension Protection Act of 2006 generally reduce those wealth transfers. Thus, mitigation of the overhang effect joins the reduction of financial distress costs as a motivation for holding both stocks and bonds in the pension fund.     

Shareholder composition,share turnover,and returns in volatile markets: The case of international REITs

The shareholder composition of listed property companies has changed from the fragmented, retail ownership, to more concentrated, institutional ownership over the past decade. In this paper, we first document significant variation in the composition of the shareholder base across the world's five largest listed property markets. We then examine the relation between the composition of the shareholder base and stock market performance and share turnover during the turbulent trading days of 2008 and 2009. By directly relating the shareholder base of firms to excess returns and turnover on these volatile days, we are able to isolate the importance of shareholder composition during periods when trading behavior is most likely to vary across different types of shareholders. We find that both large block holdings and high levels of institutional ownership decrease trading volumes and moderate stock returns; however, the effects largely occur when stock prices move sharply downward. Moreover, these effects are strongest when ownership concentration and institutional ownership exceed 25 percent. We also find that the disaggregation of institutional investors into distinct categories (banks, pension funds, advisors, etc.) increases our understanding of stock trading and share price dynamics of listed property companies.     

Large Shareholders,the Board of Directors and the Allocation of Cash Proceeds from Corporate Asset Sell‐offs

Recent finance literature suggests that managers of divesting firms may retain cash proceeds from corporate asset sell‐offs in order to pursue their own objectives, and, therefore, shareholders' gains due to these deals are linked to a distribution of proceeds to shareholders or to debtholders. We add to this literature by examining the role of various corporate governance mechanisms in the context of the allocation of sell‐off proceeds. Specifically, we examine the impact of directors' share‐ownership and stock options, board composition and external large shareholdings on (1) shareholders' abnormal returns around asset sell‐off announcements, and (2) managers' decision to either retain or distribute (to shareholders or to debtholders) sell‐off proceeds. We find that non‐executive directors' and CEO's share‐ownership and stock options are related to shareholders' gains from sell‐offs for firms that retain proceeds. However, corporate governance mechanisms are not significantly related to shareholders' gains for firms that distribute sell‐off proceeds. Furthermore, we find that the likelihood of a distribution of proceeds, relative to the retention decision, is increasing in large institutional shareholdings, executive and non‐executive directors' share‐ownership and non‐executive representation in the board.     

Who incentivizes the mutual fund manager,new or old shareholders?

This study tests whether mutual fund shareholders continue to trade in response to fund returns after they make their initial investment in fund shares. It decomposes the relationship between fund returns and shareholder flow in a large, proprietary panel of all shareholder transactions in one midsize no-load mutual fund family. Results show that both new and old shareholders buy shares during periods of good returns; however, shareholder outflow is essentially unrelated to fund returns. This lack of a return-sell relationship is not driven by locked-in pension assets, shareholders’ ignorance of ongoing fund returns, or embedded capital gains. However, there is evidence that exchanges between equity funds in the family are related more strongly to returns of the destination fund than to returns of the origination fund. This may indicate that flow between equity mutual funds is driven by shareholders buying new funds rather than selling old funds. Supermarket shareholders are smart insofar as they exchange into funds that subsequently outperform their prior funds during their individual holding periods.     

企业金融资产配置与融资约束的缓解机制:基于流动性管理的分析

企业进行金融资产配置,一方面能够为企业提供流动性,缓解融资约束;另一方面也因投机动机而占用企业流动性资源,加剧融资约束,对实体投资造成挤压。这是形成企业金融化的"投资挤出效应"和"蓄水池效应"两种现象并存的内在机制。为衡量这种内在机制,本文使用2007—2018年我国上市公司样本,对金融资产配置的流动性管理效应展开分析。结果显示:非金融企业的金融收益会推动超额现金的持有,通过超额现金的中介效应引致了融资约束程度的缓解;而企业持有金融资产行为则产生相反的效应。进一步研究发现,在典型的公司治理机制中,无论是外部股东的投票机制,还是来自内部的代理成本与高管持股机制,都在一定程度上推动了金融资产配置产生的流动性效应。     

Do institutional investors destabilize stock prices? evidence from an emerging market

In this paper, we provide empirical evidence on the impact of institutional investors on stock market returns dynamics in Poland. The Polish pension system reform in 1999 and the associated increase in institutional ownership due to the investment activities of pension funds are used as a unique institutional characteristic. We find robust empirical evidence that the increase of institutional ownership has changed the autocorrelation and volatility structure of aggregate stock returns. However, the findings do not support the hypothesis that institutional investors have destabilized stock prices. The results are interpretable in favor of a stabilizing effect on index stock returns induced by institutional trading.     

The investment opportunity set,director ownership,and corporate policies: evidence from an emerging market

This paper provides evidence of the association between a firm's investment opportunity set (IOS), director ownership, and corporate policy choices. Using a sample of growth and non-growth firms in an emerging Asian market, we find that the IOS theory has significant explanatory power in the financing, dividend, executive compensation, and leasing aspects of corporate policies. Growth firms have lower debt-to-equity ratios and dividend yields, pay higher cash compensation and bonus amounts to their top executives, and finance a higher proportion of their asset acquisitions through operating leases. We also find that director ownership moderates and counteracts the association between IOS and corporate policies. Our results are consistent with contracting theory predictions that high director ownership mitigates the need for incentive or bonus compensation plans in growth firms.     

Excess Volatility and UK Investment Trusts

Abstract:   The issue of whether or not asset prices are more volatile than the underlying fundamentals is an empirical question with implications for market efficiency. Recent research suggests that the volatility of closed end fund returns in the USA is significantly higher than the returns on assets held by the funds. This has been attributed to noise trading as closed‐end fund shares are predominantly held by individual investors. This study demonstrates that UK investment trust returns exhibit similar excess volatility in spite of the prevalence of institutional investors. However, big investment trusts in terms of market capitalisation show greater excess volatility than small trusts. Although most of the excess volatility appears to be idiosyncratic, investor sentiment index is the most important variable associated with residual returns.