Organizing for solutions: Systems seller vs. systems integrator

This paper aims to examine how firms are organizing to provide integrated solutions: a business model for the supply of capital goods based on the provision of products and services as integrated solutions to individual customer's needs. The industrial marketing literature suggests that the origins of this business model can be traced back to early 1960s when firms adopted strategies and organizations for ‘systems selling’. The marketing literature helps us to identify two contrasting types of organizations: (1) the vertically-integrated systems seller that produces all the product and service components in a system; and (2) the systems integrator that coordinates integration of components supplied by external firms. The paper uses these two ideal types to analyse the strategies and organizations of five case study firms that have recently attempted to move into the provision of integrated solutions. It argues that there is no evidence to support the continuing dominance of the systems seller or a simple transition from systems selling to systems integration. A more complex pattern of organizational forms is emerging, combining elements of both systems selling (i.e. vertical integration into services) and systems integration.     

Subprime governance: Agency costs in vertically integrated banks and the 2008 mortgage crisis

Research summary: This study uses the 2008 mortgage crisis to demonstrate how the relationship between vertical integration and performance crucially depends on corporate governance. Prior research has argued that the vertical integration of mortgage origination and securitization aligned divisional incentives and improved lending quality. We show that vertical integration improved loan performance only in those firms with strong corporate governance and that this performance‐integration relationship strongly decreases and actually reverses as governance quality decreases. We interpret these findings as suggesting that the additional control afforded by vertical integration can, in the hands of poorly monitored managers, offset gains from aligned divisional incentives. These findings support the view that corporate governance influences the strategic outcomes of a firm, in our case, by influencing the effectiveness of boundary decisions. Managerial summary: One of the unanswered questions of the 2008 mortgage crisis is why some firms produced toxic mortgages and others did not. Many have argued that vertically integrated banks—banks that both originated and securitized mortgages—had incentives to monitor themselves and thereby avoid overaggressive lending and outright fraud. Yet many of the worst lenders, such as Washington Mutual and New Century Financial, were in fact integrated. This study shows that the behavior of these firms critically depended on their corporate governance. We find that poorly monitored executives used their additional control over the integrated businesses to issue low quality loans that supported short‐term growth. Our results suggest that governance is a crucial prerequisite for financial services, particularly for firms whose managers control multiple, interrelated businesses. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Vertical Integration and Efficiency: Ownership in the Swedish Sawmill Industry

This study investigates different types of vertically integrated ownership types inrelation to technical efficiency, in the Swedish sawmill industry. The theoreticalfindings connecting vertical integration and efficiency points in two directions:both in favour for non-integrated firms and in favour for fully integrated firms.In the study, significant differences between ownership types are not found. Onepossible interpretation of this result is that the integration advantages outweigh thepossible negative effects an integrated firms will have from maximising an integratedobjective function.     

Vertical equilibrium in a competitive input market

Imperfect competition, imperfect information, disequilibrium, and rationing all induce vertical integration in relatively straightforward ways. But can vertical integration arise when firms are competitive and markets clear rapidly? This paper demonstrates that a vertical equilibrium can be generated when the intermediate market is subject to external fluctuations and when there are economies of coordination for firms which avoid the market via integration. The vertical equilibrium is one in which some firms will be integrated while some will not, despite the fact that all firms are identical. Thus, one need not conclude that differential degrees of integration within industries are the result of differing circumstances among firms.     

Developing integrated solutions: The importance of relationships within the network

Firms that have traditionally focused on selling products, spare parts and services face difficulties with increasing competition and declining margins. They are therefore turning to new strategies where products and services are integrated into so-called integrated solutions. Research on the challenges this presents is sparse, but there is evidence that internal factors as well as external relationships play an important role. In this paper we investigate the relationships within the business network in order to uncover some of the complex issues related to integrated solutions, including how and to what extent these relationships facilitate or impede the development of integrated solutions. Two case studies of one more and one less successful initiative within the same firm are used to illustrate challenges and possible success factors for the development of integrated solutions in the capital goods industry.The paper identifies the following six factors as important when developing integrated solutions: the strength of the relationships between the different actors involved, the firm's position in the network, the firm's network horizon, the solution's impact on existing internal activities, the solution's impact on customers' core processes, and external determinants. It shows that inter- and intra-firm relationships can both enable and obstruct the development of integrated solutions. For the firms involved in the development of integrated solutions, it becomes crucial to manage this duality.     

Configuring the after-sales service supply chain: A multiple case study

After-sales service in firms manufacturing and selling durable goods has a strategic relevance in its potential contribution to company profitability, customer retention and product development. This paper addresses the configuration of the after-sales supply chain. Three configuration choices are analysed: The degree of vertical integration, the degree of centralisation, and the decoupling of activities (i.e. how activities are decomposed and separated organisationally). Exploratory case study research was performed over seven companies belonging to durable consumer goods industries. The empirical findings show that configuration choices vary, suggesting that no “one best way” exists. Moreover, many firms develop multiple configurations. Choices are influenced by drivers, including the attractiveness of the after-sales business, the strategic priorities, the characteristics of the physical product and the services offered, and the configuration of the manufacturing and distribution supply chain. The paper discusses how these drivers may lead to consistent configuration choices, and how choices are related.     

Integrated solutions from a service-centered perspective: Applicability and limitations in the capital goods industry

Although advanced services, or so called integrated solutions, have increasingly received attention in the literature, no coherent body of literature exists, and the relational dimensions and consequences of integrated solutions are not explored in detail. Based on the emerging literature, we develop a framework identifying four different categories of integrated solutions: rental, maintenance, operational and performance offerings. We also compare and contrast the service- and the goods-centered logics with the logic of integrated solutions, and thereby show how the reciprocal interdependencies increase between customers and suppliers. We explore these interdependencies further in three case studies of firms experimenting with integrated solutions, and identify dependencies related to process knowledge, process optimization, and process operations. The paper shows that rather than moving along a linear continuum from goods to services, firms developing integrated solutions need to balance elements of both goods- and service-logics, as well as manage the increased customer–supplier interdependencies that integrated solutions entail.     

Deregulation,governance structures,and efficiency: the U.S. electric utility sector

The business strategy literature offers apparently opposite views of the ability of vertical integration to cope with the uncertainty related to changing regulatory environments. In this paper, we analyze how the process of retail deregulation affects the comparative efficiency of governance structures, which range on a continuum from fully vertically integrated structures to market transactions. Based on the analysis of 177 U.S. electric utilities from 1998 to 2001, our results show that the process of retail deregulation has a negative impact on firms' productive efficiency, as measured using Data Envelopment Analysis. Furthermore, firms that are vertically integrated into electricity generation, or that rely on the market for the supply of their electricity, are more efficient than firms that adopt hybrid structures combining vertical integration and contracting. This research has important implications because it shows the coexistence of different types of governance structures that cope efficiently with regulatory uncertainty through different mechanisms. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Vertical integration and innovation

Innovation is a driving force for most industries, where it moreover affects many stages of the vertical chain. We study the impact of vertical integration on innovation in an industry where firms need to undertake risky R&D investments at both production and distribution stages. Vertical integration brings better coordination within the integrated firm, which boosts its investment incentive at both upstream and downstream levels. However, it is only mutually beneficial for firms to integrate when both upstream and downstream innovations are important. When innovation is irrelevant at one level, firms favor instead vertical separation. The analysis provides insights for the wave of mergers and R&D outsourcing observed in the pharmaceutical industry and other vertically related industries.     

STRATEGIC VERTICAL INTEGRATION WITHOUT FORECLOSURE*

We determine the endogenous degree of vertical integration in a model of successive oligopoly that captures both efficiency gains and strategic effects. Foreclosure effects are purposely left aside. The profitability of integration originates in the greater ability of integrated firms to adopt a specific type of technologies. We show that vertical merger waves can stop by themselves before integration is complete because of strategic substitutability in vertical integration. This is in contrast to the strategic complementarity result in McLaren [2000] that leads to either complete integration or complete separation.     

Antitrust and Vertical Integration in “New Economy” Industries with Application to Broadband Access

Whether the firms that supply Internet hardware and software should face restrictions on the use of their property is an important and controversial policy issue. Advocates of “net neutrality”—including President Obama and the current FCC majority—believe that owners of broadband distribution systems (hardware used to distribute Internet and video services) and producers of certain “must-have” video content should be subject to prophylactic regulation that transcends present-day antitrust law enforcement. In the economic terms that are used in debates on competition policy, the concern is with vertical integration that may give firms both the opportunity (through denial of access or price discrimination) and incentive (increased profit) to restrict competition. This paper’s central point is that virtually every production process in the economy is vertically integrated, and economics predicts changes in the extent of vertical integration—that is, changes in the boundaries of the firm—in response to changes in relative prices, technology, or institutions. Both vertical integration and changes in the extent of vertical integration are benign characteristics of efficient, dynamic, competitive markets. While there is no shortage of theoretical models in which vertical integration may be harmful, most such models have restrictive assumptions and ambiguous welfare predictions—even when market power is assumed to be present. Empirical evidence that vertical integration or vertical restraints are harmful is weak, compared to evidence that vertical integration is beneficial—again, even in cases where market power appears to be present. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that prophylactic regulation is not necessary, and may well reduce welfare. Sound policy is to wait for ex post evidence of harm to justify interventions in specific cases. Net neutrality, recently enacted by the FCC but subject to judicial review, is an unfortunate idea.     

Success and Failure in New Industrial Services

The critical role of innovation has long been recognized in physical goods; however, the development of innovative services has received much less attention. The research described here reports on an early major study of success and failure in new industrial services. Building on her integration of two literatures on new product innovation and services marketing, Ulrike de Brentani reports how companies measure new service performance and the factors which are associated with success. She reports that new industrial services share some important success factors with physical goods, such as the firm's market orientation, a formal service development process, project synergy and a truly superior new service offering. Yet she finds that firms must adjust their approach to the distinctive character of services, including customer perceptions of service quality, features that successfully differentiate services in competitive terms and cost reduction.     

纵向一体化的选择及其影响因素——基于能源行业的实证分析

文章研究中国能源行业的纵向一体化状况,以能源企业的纵向并购为例运用Logit模型分析了能源企业选择纵向一体化方式时考虑的因素。研究结果表明,策略效应和交易成本对能源企业采用纵向一体化的意愿影响较大,生产成本和不确定性的影响较小。     

Vertical integration and product differentiation

We study a new channel of downstream rent extraction through vertical integration: competition for integration. Innovative downstream firms create value and profit opportunities through product differentiation, which however affects an upstream monopolist’s incentive to vertically integrate. By playing the downstream firms against each other for integration, the upstream firm can extract even more than the additional profits generated by the downstream firms’ differentiation activities. To preempt rent extraction, the downstream firms may then reduce differentiation, which reduces social welfare. We show that this social cost of vertical integration is more likely to arise in innovative and competitive industries, and that the competition for integration channel of downstream rent extraction is robust to upstream competition.     

Vertical Structure and Patent Pools

It is well known that patent pools can enhance efficiency by eliminating the complements problem. This paper investigates how the presence of vertically integrated firms affects the economic impact of a patent pool. Without a patent pool, the presence of integrated firms may either increase or decrease the final product price as there are two countervailing effects – reduced double marginalization and raising rivals costs. However, when there is a patent pool, vertical integration always lowers the final product price. In conclusion, the economic efficiency arguments for patent pools are enhanced when some firms are vertically integrated.     

Are pricing policies an impediment to the success of customer solutions?

In an era of declining pricing power and increased global competition, customized solutions appear to be an effective way to build competitive advantages without the debilitating effects of price competition. Solutions involve provision of an integrated combination of goods and services that are designed to meet a business customer's specific needs. Premium prices and higher margins can be extracted by solution providers, who now have considerable incentives to design and market innovative solutions for their customers. We examine the applicability of various pricing frameworks and pricing practices in the context of two industries — business process outsourcing and power generation equipments. Our interviews suggest that firms predominantly use traditional pricing strategies; new strategies for solution pricing are only emerging; and, successful firms are currently using hybrid pricing models. We find that the solutions that we observed among practitioners are not what theory would suggest as true solutions but what would be described by theory as bundled products. We also find that solutions are in the eye of the beholder, i.e., if customers can de-bundle offerings, they are not true solutions. We extend our findings to academic theory and to the practice of developing and pricing solutions.     

Vertical integration and downstream collusion

We investigate the effect of a vertical merger on downstream firms’ ability to collude in a repeated game framework. We show that a vertical merger has two main effects. On the one hand, it increases the total collusive profits, increasing the stakes of collusion. On the other hand, it creates an asymmetry between the integrated firm and the unintegrated competitors. The integrated firm, accessing the input at marginal cost, faces higher profits in the deviation phase and in the non-cooperative equilibrium, which potentially harms collusion. As we show, the optimal collusive profit-sharing agreement takes care of the increased incentive to deviate of the integrated firm, while optimal punishment erases the difficulty related to the asymmetries in the non-cooperative state. As a result, vertical integration generally favors collusion.     

纵向一体化趋势和市场竞争力关系研究--以江苏制造业的实证为例

本文运用I—O(投入产出表)法中Davies—Morris指数法,旨在分析一个产业或企业内纵向一体化的趋势。论文实证检验了江苏省制造业的纵向一体化的状况,估计和分析了江苏制造业的16个产业和各产业前5名的80个企业的纵向一体化趋势,并与其他国家的状况进行比较。     

Asset specificity and vertical integration in franchising

This study empirically tests transaction cost hypotheses with the use of data on publicly-owned franchised firms. We employ measures of the proportion of company-owned outlets for the degree of integration and brand name capital for the degree of asset specificity. The results suggest that for the sampled firms the degree of asset specificity is positively related to the degree of vertical integration. Additionly, increases in the real interest rate and firm growth rates are found to be positively related with vertical integration, while increases in unanticipated growth and firm experience are negatively related with vertical integration.     

VERTICAL CONTRACTING WHEN COMPETITION FOR ORDERS PRECEDES PROCUREMENT*

This paper reverses the standard order between input supply negotiations and downstream competition and assumes that competition for orders takes place prior to procurement of inputs in a vertical chain. It is found that oligopolistically competitive outcomes will result despite the presence of an upstream monopolist. Here, vertical integration is a means by which the monopolist can leverage its market power downstream to the detriment of consumers. However, it does so, not by foreclosing on independent downstream firms, but by softening the competitive behaviour of its own integrated units.