公司治理结构对内部控制有效性的影响

本文以2006年12月31日以前在中国上市的1162个上市公司为样本,用实证方法研究公司治理结构对内部控制有效性的影响。研究发现:年终股东大会出席率与公司内部控制有效性显著正相关;国有控股公司在财务报告质量上显著优于其他公司;董事会实际规模和监事会规模与公司绩效显著正相关;董事长兼任总经理会显著降低财务报告质量;设立审计委员会与公司绩效显著正相关;管理层的诚信和道德价值观念与公司内部控制有效性显著正相关;管理者的风险偏好与内部控制有效性呈显著的 U 型关系;管理层对员工胜任能力的重视程度与公司经营绩效和对法律法规遵循显著正相关;董事会监事会两会会议频率和第一大股东的控制力对内部控制有效性没有显著影响。     

浅析企业集团内部资本市场有效性的影响因素

改革开放以来,我国经济快速的发展,各个企业在经营和管理上都得到了较大的提高,当前大型企业集团的发展受到了高度重视,因为它们是我国目前的经济实行改革的重点,所以对于企业集团内部的资源管理模式进行改善,提高企业集团内部资本市场的效率,可以帮助我国的经济稳定快速的发展.笔者将根据国内的资本市场环境结合一些案例研究我国资本市场的有效性和它的影响因素,以供企业参考.     

资本市场发展与货币政策有效性的研究

迄今为止,众多的论著在讨论货币政策效应问题时,仍然偏重于分析实体经济和信贷市场,而忽视了资本市场的发展对货币政策有效性的影响,在某种程度上,这是导致我国货币政策效率不充分的一个重要原因.     

对公司治理结构与资本市场关系的思考

公司治理结构与企业的绩效是密不可分的。由于我国国有企业的产权结构畸形问题始终没有彻底得到解决,导致公司治理结构存在很大缺陷。根据我国的实际情况,完善公司治理结构的路径是多方面的,其中之一就是要充分协调与资本市场的关系。     

我国企业集团内部资本市场的形成机制分析

我国企业集团内部资本市场存在三种形成机制:一是基于集团发展战略而形成;二是国有企业重组上市而形成;三是民营企业借壳上市而形成。基于集团发展战略而形成的企业集团内部资本市场承担了节约交易成本及弥补外部资本市场欠缺的功能。但国有企业改制上市和民营企业借壳上市所形成的集团内部资本市场则先天具有一定的机会主义特征。     

我国资本市场有效性分析

资本市场是长期资金借贷和证券交易的场所,是联系投资者和筹资者的纽带。资本市场的有效性有助于发挥资源的优化配置,给予投资者合理回报,促进资本市场健康有序发展。当下中国资本市场与西方发达国家相比还存在较大差距,文章从分析中国有效性不足出发,为资本市场改革提供相关政策建议。     

内部资本市场与外部资本市场比较分析

内部资本市场与外部资本市场都是企业集团资金筹集和投放的市场。企业集团的资本配置过程需要经过内、外部两个资本市场。目前大部分企业对内部资本市场与外部资本市场认识不够深入,对两个市场的功效产生错误的理解。因此,对内部资本市场和外部市场进行比较研究有很重要的意义,不仅仅使得企业了解内外部资本市场的区别更了解他们之间的关系,有利于企业合理安排筹资,促进发展。     

风险资本市场的治理结构研究

风险资本的运作过程一般分为两个相互联系的环节:一是风险资本家筹资组成以有限合伙制为典型形式的风险投资中介机构--风险投资基金;二是风险投资基金对风险企业进行投资.即风险资本运作过程中存在所谓双重的委托--代理关系.本文围绕投资者与风险资本家之间的合同关系、风险资本家与企业家之间的合同关系,以及风险资本市场信息披露制度就风险资本市场的治理结构创新进行研究.     

内部资本市场与外部资本市场比较分析

内部资本市场与外部资本市场都是企业集团资金筹集和投放的市场。企业集团的资本配置过程需要经过内、外部两个资本市场。目前大部分企业对内部资本市场与外部资本市场认识不够深入,对两个市场的功效产生错误的理解。因此,对内部资本市场和外部市场进行比较研究有很重要的意义,不仅仅使得企业了解内外部资本市场的区别更了解他们之间的关系,有利于企业合理安排筹资,促进发展。     

Internal Capital Markets and Capital Structure: Bank Versus Internal Debt

We argue that domestic business groups are able to actively optimise the internal/external debt mix across their subsidiaries. Novel to the literature, we use bi‐level data (i.e. data from both individual subsidiary financial statements and consolidated group level financial statements) to model the bank and internal debt concentration of non‐financial Belgian private business group affiliates. As a benchmark, we construct a size and industry matched sample of non‐group affiliated (stand‐alone) companies. We find support for a pecking order of internal debt over bank debt at the subsidiary level which leads to a substantially lower bank debt concentration for group affiliates as compared to stand‐alone companies. The internal debt concentration of a subsidiary is mainly driven by the characteristics of the group's internal capital market. The larger its available resources, the more intra‐group debt is used while bank debt financing at the subsidiary level decreases. However, as the group's overall debt level mounts, groups increasingly locate bank borrowing in subsidiaries with low costs of external financing (i.e. large subsidiaries with important collateral assets) to limit moral hazard and dissipative costs. Overall, our results are consistent with the existence of a complex group wide optimisation process of financing costs.     

A Multinational Perspective on Capital Structure Choice and Internal Capital Markets

This paper analyzes the capital structures of foreign affiliates and internal capital markets of multinational corporations. Ten percent higher local tax rates are associated with 2.8% higher debt/asset ratios, with internal borrowing being particularly sensitive to taxes. Multinational affiliates are financed with less external debt in countries with underdeveloped capital markets or weak creditor rights, reflecting significantly higher local borrowing costs. Instrumental variable analysis indicates that greater borrowing from parent companies substitutes for three‐quarters of reduced external borrowing induced by capital market conditions. Multinational firms appear to employ internal capital markets opportunistically to overcome imperfections in external capital markets.     

Market Structure,Internal Capital Markets,and the Boundaries of the Firm

We study how the creation of an internal capital market (ICM) can invite strategic responses in product markets that, in turn, shape firm boundaries. ICMs provide ex post resource flexibility, but come with ex ante commitment costs. Alternatively, stand‐alones possess commitment ability but lack flexibility. By creating flexibility, integration can sometimes deter a rival's entry, but commitment problems can also invite predatory capital raising. These forces drive different organizational equilibria depending on the integrator's relation to the product market. Hybrid organizational forms like strategic alliances can sometimes dominate integration by offering some of its benefits with fewer strategic costs.     

内部资本市场：组织载体、交易与租金

本文首先对内部资本市场存在于多元化企业集团的观点提出了质疑,认为多元化可以扩大内部资本市场的运作空间,但不是判断企业集团是否存在内部资本市场的必要条件；其次对内部资本市场交易按其特征进行分类,并对其与关联交易的区别进行了辨析；最后从组织租金视角研究内部资本市场的本质,界定了内部资本市场租金的内涵,提出内部资本市场的本质是租金的创造与分配。     

Managerial Incentives and Internal Capital Markets

Capital budgeting in multidivisional firms depends on the external assessment of the whole firm, as well as on headquarters' assessment of the divisions. While corporate headquarters may create value by directly monitoring divisions, the external assessment of the firm is a public good for division managers who, consequently, are tempted to free ride. As the number of divisions increases, the free‐rider problem is aggravated, and internal capital markets substitute for external capital markets in the provision of managerial incentives. The analysis relates the value of diversification to characteristics of the firm, the industry, and the capital market.     

Divisional Managers and Internal Capital Markets

Using hand‐collected data on divisional managers at S&P 500 firms, we study their role in internal capital budgeting. Divisional managers with social connections to the CEO receive more capital. Connections to the CEO outweigh measures of managers' formal influence, such as seniority and board membership, and affect both managerial appointments and capital allocations. The effect of connections on investment efficiency depends on the tradeoff between agency and information asymmetry. Under weak governance, connections reduce investment efficiency and firm value via favoritism. Under high information asymmetry, connections increase investment efficiency and firm value via information transfer.     

Capital Constraints,Asymmetric Information,and Internal Capital Markets in Banking: New Evidence

A growing literature investigates the role of internal capital markets in mitigating financial constraints faced by the subsidiaries of a conglomerate. Most studies have relied on indirect tests based on correlations between the cash flows and the investment of the subsidiaries. In contrast, we avoid the widespread criticisms of such specifications by providing direct tests that focus on the mechanisms through which internal reallocations of funds occur. We find that internal capital markets are used by multibank holding companies to mitigate capital constraints faced by individual bank subsidiaries. In addition, we show that internal capital management within a multibank holding company involves not only the movement of capital to those subsidiaries with a relatively greater need for capital but also the movement of assets (loans) from less well capitalized to better capitalized subsidiaries by means of loan sales and purchases among the subsidiaries. Furthermore, net loan sales are used to allow efficiency‐enhancing specialization among bank subsidiaries, insofar as those subsidiaries with the best loan origination opportunities are able to focus on loan originations even if they do not have sufficient capital to hold the loans. Our evidence is consistent with banks affiliated with holding companies more actively participating in loan sales and purchases because, by using their internal secondary loan market, they are able to avoid the “lemons” problem faced by stand‐alone banks.     

Cash Flow and Investment: Evidence from Internal Capital Markets

Using data from the 1986 oil price decrease, I examine the capital expenditures of nonoil subsidiaries of oil companies. I test the joint hypothesis that 1) a decrease in cash/collateral decreases investment, holding fixed the profitability of investment, and 2) the finance costs of different parts of the same corporation are interdependent. The results support this joint hypothesis: oil companies significantly reduced their nonoil investment compared to the median industry investment. The 1986 decline in investment was concentrated in nonoil units that were subsidized by the rest of the company in 1985.     

高管团队内部治理与企业资本结构调整——基于非CEO高管独立性的视角

本文以2001-2017年A股上市公司为研究样本,实证检验了高管团队内部治理对企业资本结构的影响。研究发现:当企业负债不足时,高管团队内部治理效应能够显著提高企业(尤其是非国有企业)的负债水平,降低企业实际资本结构与目标资本结构的偏离程度。这种高管团队内部治理效应在第一类委托代理问题比较严重以及非CEO高管监督动机较强的企业中更加显著。作用机制分析表明,高管团队内部治理效应能够通过降低第一类代理成本来降低企业资本结构与目标资本结构的偏离程度。本文的研究结论为改善我国上市公司治理提供了新的思路,对于优化企业融资结构、深化金融供给侧结构性改革具有一定的启示意义。     

The Bright Side of Internal Capital Markets

We examine capital expenditure decisions of discount firms in response to Wal-Mart's entry into their markets. Before Wal-Mart's entry, focused incumbents and discount divisions of diversified incumbents are similar in size, geographic dispersion, and firm debt levels. However, discount divisions of diversified firms are significantly more productive. After Wal-Mart's entry, diversified firms are quicker to either "exit" the discount business or "stay and fight." Also, their capital expenditures are more sensitive to the productivity of their discount business. Internal capital markets function well, as transfers are away from the worsening discount divisions. It appears diversified firms make better investment decisions.