Japan's fiscal policy and fiscal reconstruction

This paper investigates the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy and the fiscal reconstruction movement in Japan. We first summarize Japan's fiscal policy in recent years and discuss advantages and disadvantages of government deficits. Next, we investigate the macroeconomic effects of Japanese fiscal policy and evaluate the plausibility of non-Keynesian effects. We also analyze the possibility of the crowding-in effect of fiscal policy and investigate the spillover effects of deregulation. Finally, we discuss political constraints in the fiscal reconstruction attempts and propose some measures for successful fiscal reforms in the near future.     

Decomposing local fiscal multipliers: Evidence from Japan

Recent studies on fiscal policy use cross-sectional data and estimate local fiscal multipliers along with spillovers. This paper estimates local fiscal multipliers with spillovers using Japanese prefectural data comparable with the national accounts. We estimate the local fiscal multiplier on output to be 1.7 at the regional level. We decompose the regional fiscal multiplier into the prefectural fiscal multiplier and the region-wide effect. Converting the latter component into the spillover, we find that the spillover is positive and small in size. We also decompose the regional fiscal multiplier on output into multipliers on the expenditure components. Our estimates suggest that there are crowding-in effects of government spending on consumption and investment. Moreover, we find that the regional fiscal multiplier on absorption exceeds 2.0 and that the spillover to absorption is considerable in contrast to the spillover to output.     

Optimal Exchange Intervention in an Inflation Targeting Regime: Some Cautionary Tales

Devaluations and fiscal retrenchments coming from developed countries are buffeting less developed countries. Many emerging market countries have adopted inflation targeting as “best practice,” but now they are being advised to enhance their inflation targeting regimes with foreign exchange intervention. Here we use a DSGE model to tell some cautionary tales about this advice. A Taylor rule guides interest rate setting, while foreign exchange interventions are used as a second tool of monetary policy. These interventions are effective in our model since domestic and key currency bonds are imperfect substitutes. We derive optimal (Ramsey) intervention policies in response to foreign devaluations and fiscal retrenchments, and find that they are rather complex. So, we compare the optimal responses to policies that simply smooth real or nominal exchange rate movements. Our results suggest that discretion may be the better part of valor: pure inflation targeting may come closer to the optimal policy than exchange rate smoothing. A secondary result may also be of some interest: foreign exchange interventions have a stronger impact on inflation and output in an inflation targeting regime than do sterilized interventions; the Taylor rule augments the effects of a given intervention.     

Stability and Growth Pact: issues and lessons from political economy

The paper analyses the EU fiscal rules from a political economy perspective and derives some policy lessons. Following a literature survey, the paper stresses the importance of appropriate incentives for rule compliance in an environment where national fiscal sovereignty precludes the option of centralised enforcement. In addition, the paper stresses the importance of clear and simple rules and in particular the 3% deficit limit in anchoring expectations of fiscal discipline and facilitating public and market monitoring of public finances. This, in turn, strengthens incentive for rule compliance. Moreover, the paper discusses the interests of the most important players in European fiscal rule formation and the importance of choosing the appropriate time for initiating a reform debate.Non-technical summary The EU fiscal framework as laid down in the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP, the Pact) aims to preserve fiscal sustainability while allowing room for automatic fiscal stabilisation. These two objectives are also at the heart of the ECB’s interest in the EU fiscal framework because their attainment facilitates monetary policy making in the short and long run.The paper analyses the EU fiscal rules from a political economy perspective and derives some policy lessons. The literature review of the first part reveals that fiscal rules can help solve deficit/debt biases and time inconsistency problems by constraining the behavior of policy makers. But rules can also mitigate biases if they facilitate financial market and public scrutiny of fiscal policies.Thereafter, the paper analyses the institutional environment in which EU fiscal rules are applied. It argues that EU rules reflect a “contract” amongst countries that retain sovereignty on fiscal policies. Enforcement, therefore, ultimately has to be undertaken by the contracting parties. Due to this constraint, the rules can also be characterised as “soft” law (with the 3% limit being nevertheless a much “harder” constraint than the other elements). But this does not necessarily imply that the rules are ineffective (or “dead”). Soft law reduces political transaction costs (by improving transparency and providing a forum for peer pressure). Moreover, if well-designed, such law can boost incentives towards making the rules “self-enforcing”. Evidence speaks in favour of this view: while EU fiscal rules were bent in a number of cases and compliance is undeniably of concern, major and rapid fiscal balance deteriorations have been largely prevented since the start of EMU.The paper also looks at potential trade-offs between “complex” rules where a “fine-tuned” economic rationale may boost acceptance of the rules versus simple and clear rules that allow easy monitoring. It is argued that clarity and simplicity of rules are important especially when formal enforcement is limited (“soft law”) and public monitoring becomes more important. By facilitating public and market monitoring of compliance, clear and simple rules are also more costly to breach.The benefits of “complexity”, and in particular the use of administrative discretion to fine tune the rules to country situations have limits, in particular when it comes to the excessive deficit procedure (EDP). It is argued that the 3% deficit limit and the time frame for correcting excessive deficits already provide some room to accommodate economic circumstances. The 3% limit must be clear, simple and strictly implemented to anchor expectations of fiscal discipline and to facilitate public and market monitoring. Further discretion and relaxation would conflict with this need. From this angle, other risks (e.g., efforts not materializing, structural reforms producing surprise costs etc) are hard to justify as a reason for extending deadlines to correct excessive deficits.The preventive arm of the Pact with its requirement of close-to-balance-or-in-surplus budgetary positions defines sound medium term budget positions and adjustment paths. This may be appropriately fine-tuned to address concerns about the Pact’s underlying economic rationale. For example, a symmetric application in good and bad times and less time inconsistency would be desirable.Finally, the timing of a debate on fiscal rules needs to be carefully chosen. In the EU context (and perhaps in other contexts as well), there seems to be much inherent pressure to make the rules more “complex”. Moreover, for the debate initiated in summer 2004, there was also no willingness by countries to give up sovereignty nor was there a sense of urgency to strengthen public finances via tighter rule implementation and enforcement. In such an environment, it is likely that changes to fiscal rules make them more complicated, discretionary and, thereby, potentially less enforceable.The views expressed are those of the author and not of the ECB. Comments by Vitor Gaspar, Mark Hallerberg, Steven Keuning, Jose Marin, Richard Morris, Gilles Noblet, Hedwig Ongena, Luca Onorante, Rolf Strauch, Juergen von Hagen, an anonymous referee and valuable assistance by Anna Foden are much appreciated.     

Stable and enforceable: a new fiscal framework for the Euro area

Since the great financial crash, the need for new fiscal rules to prevent unsustainable fiscal policies is universally recognised. In practice such rules, including those in the Stability and Growth Pact, have proved to be impossible to enforce. Thus, to avoid unsustainable fiscal policies reappearing, and to prevent monetary policy from being undermined by undisciplined governments, there is a need for a framework capable of imposing fiscal discipline. This paper considers an intertemporal assignment, where fiscal policy focuses on long-term objectives and monetary policy on short-term stabilisation. We argue for public sector debt targets as a practical way to achieve such a set up, and an excess debt protocol is constructed to give enforceable form to those targets. The ideas of “fiscal space” and optimal debt levels are used to provide a mechanism for identifying a stable region within which the debt targeting regime should operate. Making these factors explicit would both improve the credibility of planned fiscal policies and reduce risk premia on borrowing costs. We finally show how Europe’s competitiveness pact, and debt restructuring operations, can be used to maximise the available fiscal space.     

The role of macroeconomic policy in rebalancing growth

The aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2007–2009 has called the export-led growth model of many Asian economies into question. This paper describes the contribution that macroeconomic policy can make to promote a rebalancing of growth away from dependence on exports to developed economies to a more sustainable pattern of growth centered on domestic and regional demand. This represents a significant departure from the traditional uses of macroeconomic policy to stabilize the economic cycle and achieve stable and low inflation. The evidence suggests that macroeconomic policy can successfully contribute to growth rebalancing. Policy measures not only can affect aggregate demand directly, but can also affect it indirectly via their “microeconomic” impacts on private sector behavior such as the household savings rate. Although in the long-term fiscal policy should be balanced to maintain government debt stability and avoid crowding out of private investment, there may be substantial scope to expand monetary and fiscal policy in the medium-term to offset the deflationary effects of an appreciating currency during periods of current account reversal. Previous experience suggests that most of the needed stimulus can be provided by monetary policy, with only a supplementary role to be played by fiscal policy. Moreover, Asian economies with large current account surpluses tend to have sufficient fiscal space.     

Monetary theory and monetary policy a central banker's view

Summary In this article attention is paid to monetary theory, the relationship between the instruments of monetary policy and other important macro-economic policy instruments, and finally to the real possibilities of pursuing an effective monetary policy. The conclusion from the theoretical analysis is that the total money supply must be considered one of the most important macro-economic policy instruments. An excessive supply of money will sooner or later lead to inflation, to the debasement of money. Therefore the volume of money should be controlled. The use and effectiveness of monetary policy should always be seen in the context of other policy instruments, especially fiscal policy and, under circumstances, wage- and price policy. The possibilities to pursue an effective monetary policy are not unlimited. The effectiveness of such a policy can,e.g., be hampered by external factors. It is vital for a central bank to have the widest possible range of instruments at its disposal.     

Costs of separating budgetary policy from control of inflation: a neglected aspect of central bank independence

We investigate the importance of co-ordinating monetary andfiscal policy in a fully dynamic model. The monetary authorityseeks to control inflation while the fiscal authority has abudgetary target We investigate the resulting Nash equilibriumand the consequences of a period of learning which may ariseif each authority is not ex ante sure of the responses of theother. Both of these impact considerably on the outcome andindicate that there may be considerable costs to separatingmonetary and fiscal policy.     

The Performance of Simple Fiscal Policy Rules in Monetary Union

The paper analyses the stabilising potential of simple fiscal policy rules for a small open economy in monetary union in a 2-region DSGE model with nominal and real rigidities. We consider simple fiscal instrument rules for government purchases, transfers, and consumption, labour and capital taxes in analogy to interest rate rules in monetary policy. The paper finds a dichotomy in the welfare effects of fiscal policy for liquidity-constrained and intertemporal optimising households, i.e. policies enhancing the welfare of one group tend to reduce the welfare of the other one. The moderate average welfare gains from optimal policy contrast with potentially large welfare losses from non-optimal policy. Fiscal rules that respond to employment fluctuations may be preferred to fiscal rules responding to indicators of price competitiveness, because optimal policy corresponds more closely to the idea of countercyclical stabilisation in the former case. The simulations also emphasise the crucial impact of the budgetary closure rule on the welfare consequences of fiscal business-cycle stabilisation.     

The limits to discretionary fiscal stabilization policy

The use of discretionary fiscal policy as a counter-cyclicaltool has declined in popularity over the last 30 years. Thispaper examines the extent to which this decline is justifiedin terms of developments in macroeconomic theory over this period.Both a small calibrated model and a larger econometric modelsuggest that the intertemporal consumer will smooth away mostof the impact of temporary tax changes, even when additionaldiscounting and credit constraints are allowed for. However,this analysis suggests a more powerful role for other formsof fiscal policy, such as government objections to the use ofdiscretionary fiscal stabilization policy, and makes a tentativesuggestion as to how these might be overcome.     

中国财政赤字和国债政策的经济增长效应研究

本文通过构建一个VAR模型,选取财政赤字率和国债负债率为财政政策指标,来分析财政政策对经济增长和通货膨胀的影响。实证显示:财政赤字增加短期能够促进经济增长,但长期对经济增长无效,且不会引起通货膨胀;相反,负债率增加虽在短期内对经济增长影响不明显,但长期具有显著负影响,同时会导致通货紧缩。结论表明,国家应对金融危机的积极财政政策短期是有效刺激经济增长的,但是长期是无效的,尤其是通过大量发行国债弥补赤字扩大财政支出的政策,对经济增长有较大的负作用。因此,本文认为目前政府应该给市场更多自由,减少对市场的政策干预。     

Fiscal decentralization and local expenditure policy in China

Since the tax-sharing reform in 1994, the Chinese fiscal system has exhibited a marked vertical fiscal imbalance—a mismatch between expenditure and revenue assignments—at the local levels, which may cause the common-pool problem in local governments' behavior. Using a large fiscal dataset at the county level from 1997 to 2006, this paper studies the effects of fiscal decentralization on local expenditure policy and analyzes how the vertical fiscal imbalance shapes these effects. The estimation results show that expenditure decentralization increases government spending and leads to a fund allocation with a larger weight on capital construction and smaller weights on education and administration. In contrast, revenue decentralization has little influence on local government expenditures. We show that the differences in the effects of expenditure and revenue decentralization can be attributed to the distortionary effects caused by the vertical fiscal imbalance and, thus, offer support to the importance of the common-pool problem at the county level of China's fiscal system.     

The stability and growth pact, fiscal policy institutions and stabilization in Europe

Ever since its inception, the EMU has been subject to controversy. The fiscal policy rules embedded in the Maastricht Treaty, and clarified in the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), are probably the most contentious. The SGP has constantly been accused of being too rigid and of forcing procyclicality in fiscal policy. However, in an influential paper Galí and Perotti (2003) concluded that discretionary fiscal policy has actually become more countercyclical in EMU countries since the Maastricht Treaty. This paper argues that this conclusion stands up to several robustness tests using ex-post data, including the use of institutional variables, but not to the use of real-time data. Using ex-post data, there is some evidence pointing to a more countercyclical use of discretionary fiscal policy (or at least to less use of procyclical discretionary fiscal policy). However, the use of real-time data for the period 1999–2006 reveals that discretionary fiscal policy has been designed to be procyclical. Hence, the actual acyclical behaviour of discretionary fiscal policy in the period after 1999 seems to be simply the result of errors in forecasting the output gap, and not the result of a change in the intentions of policy-makers. As a result, there is no evidence to support the view that Maastricht rules have forced euro-area policy-makers to change their behaviour and design countercyclical discretionary fiscal policies.     

Fiscal Policy Effectiveness in Japan

The effectiveness of fiscal policy in Japan over the past decade has been a matter of great controversy. We investigate the effectiveness of Japanese fiscal policy over the 1976–1999 period using a structural VAR analysis of real GDP, tax revenues, and public expenditures. We find that expansionary fiscal policy, whether in the form of tax cuts or of public works spending, had significant stimulative effects. Using a new method of computing policy multipliers from structural VARs, we calculate that the multiplier on tax cuts is about 25% higher at a four-year horizon than that on public works spending, though both are well in excess of one. A historical decomposition reveals that Japanese fiscal policy was contractionary over much of the 1990s, and a significant proportion of the variation in growth can be attributed to fiscal policy shocks; accordingly, most of the run-up in public debt is attributable to declining tax revenues due to the recession. Examining savings behavior directly, we find limited evidence of Ricardian effects, insufficient to offset the short-term effects of discretionary fiscal policy. J. Japan. Int. Econ., December 2002, 16(4), pp. 536–558. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York, and Institute for International Economics, Washington, DC. © 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E62, E65, E21.     

Cooperative fiscal policy at the zero lower bound

This paper investigates the use of fiscal policy in response to a large negative aggregate demand shock which may push the global economy into a liquidity trap. Fiscal policy may be an effective tool to respond to a liquidity trap, but its international spillover effects may operate quite differently from its domestic effects. We derive the optimal cooperative fiscal response to a global liquidity trap in a two country world economy. Surprisingly, we find that the optimal fiscal spending response for a partner country to a negative aggregate demand shock in a source country may be negative. If fiscal policy can be chosen under policy commitment, the optimal response involves current fiscal expansion combined with future fiscal contraction, after the liquidity trap has ended.     

The Macroeconomic Role of Fiscal Policy

This article examines the new consensus that fiscal policy shouldhave no macroeconomic role in ‘flexible inflation targeting’regimes. There is little basis for this presumption. Fiscalpolicy remains important in setting the policy mix and in managingshocks and imbalances. The credibility of an inflation-targetingregime should be enhanced rather than reduced if fiscal policyplays its proper role. It is true, nevertheless, that the costsof focusing fiscal policy narrowly on public-sector concernsmay not be very great, most of the time. However, when interestrates cannot be used, the role of fiscal policy must be different.With interest rates at their lower bound of zero, there is noplausible alternative. For asymmetric shocks and adjustmentsin EMU, fiscal policy needs, ideally, to substitute for theinterest-rate policy reaction function of the consensus, butthe difficulties are very great. We suggest a policy focus onreal exchange rates as a way of resolving some of the dilemmas.There is a serious danger that orthodox views about fiscal policy,drawn from the consensus, will be inappropriately applied, especiallyin Europe. Footnotes ¹ E-mail addresses: christopher.allsopp{at}new.ox.ac.uk; david.vines{at}economics.oxford.ac.uk     

Fiscal Rules in a Monetary Union: A Short-Run Analysis

This article challenges the conventional result according to which an instrument-independent central bank able to strictly commit to price stability makes fiscal constraints unnecessary. We present a model of a monetary union with heterogeneous members where the inefficient policy mix resulting from the lack of coordination between the common monetary policy and national fiscal policies incites the governments to appoint excessively liberal delegates to the central bank's board. We characterize the fiscal restraints necessary to restore the central bank's ability to deliver the most desirable degree of price stability. It appears that even country-specific and state-contingent restraints may be counterproductive for some member states.     

Mix of Fiscal and Monetary Policy Rules and Inflation Dynamics in China

The present paper examines the role of the mix of fiscal and monetary policy rules in determining inflation dynamics using fiscal and monetary policy reaction functions and Markov‐switching vector autoregression methods based on quarterly data in the period 1992–2007. Our results show that fiscal and monetary policies in China can be adequately described using some simple rules, and that significant regime shifts took place around 1998. Fiscal policy tended to be active and countercyclical in the pre‐1998 period, then switched to be passive and more countercyclical, whereas monetary policy was characterized as passive and procyclical in the pre‐1998 period, and switched to be active and countercyclical afterwards. The mix of fiscal and monetary policy rules can explain inflation dynamics better than the monetary policy rule alone. Therefore, price stability requires not only appropriate monetary policy but also appropriate fiscal policy.     

Automatic Fiscal Stabilisers: What They Are and What They Do

The global financial and economic crisis has revived the debate in the academic literature and in policy circles about the size and effectiveness of automatic fiscal stabilisers. Especially in the euro area where monetary policy is centralised and discretionary fiscal policy making is constrained by the EU fiscal rules, knowing the size and the effectiveness of automatic stabilisers is crucial. While automatic stabilisers are a fairly established concept in the fiscal policy literature, there is still no consensus about their actual nature and their effectiveness. This paper shows that differences in opinion mirror a deeper disagreement over how the budget would look like without automatic stabilisers. This issue is addressed by defining two types of counterfactual budgets giving rise to two different interpretations about the nature of automatic stabilisation. Simulations with a structural model confirm that the degree of smoothing is conditional on how the counterfactual budget, i.e. the budget without automatic stabilisers, is defined.     

“撤县设区”如何影响财政收支?——基于激励视角的再研究

文章从激励差异视角重新考察"撤县设区"的财政收支效应。基于广东的区划改革和转移支付政策实践构造一个"准试验"样本，样本期内既有"撤县设区"案例，也涉及省财政对县区激励性转移支付政策的重大调整，因而能够区分二者对财政收支的影响。分析过程包括两步，首先，基于倾向得分匹配和双重差分（PSD-DID）方法，发现"撤县设区"降低了县区财政收支增速；其次，依据激励性转移支付政策变化构建三重差分（DIDID）考察"撤县设区"政策效应的产生机制，发现财政激励差异是导致"撤县设区"政策效应的原因。文章为检验"撤县设区"等行政区划调整如何影响当地发展提出一种识别机制，并发现激励落差是导致"撤县设区"影响财政收支的背后机制，而"撤县设区"本身的影响不显著。