我国公共服务民营化存在的问题及对策探究——基于A市水质危机事件案例

在公用事业民营化带来种种好处的同时也带来了诸多问题.本文以A市水质危机事件为例,分析现如今中国公共事业民营化改革过程中存在的主要问题,并在对以往国内外学者对公共事业民营化改革的研究进行综述,对我国公共事业民营化提出相应的对策探究.     

城市公用事业民营化的政策困境--以水务民营化为例

目前中国城市公用事业正在探索民营化改革,应该说民营化方向是正确的。但是,由于我国城市政府、民营企业等民营化有关各方关于城市公用事业民营化改革的理论上准备不足,操作上又无现成的、符合国情的模式可供模仿。因此在实际运作中出现了一系列矛盾和问题,使民营化有关各方陷入了两难境地,这也说明了城市公用事业民营化改革的艰巨性和复杂性。     

公用事业民营化后的政府管制

本文分析了公用事业与自然垄断产业的关系、公用事业民营化以后政府管制的理论基础以及竞争与管制的关系,并研究了公用事业民营化后几个具体的管制问题。     

中国国有企业民营化绩效研究

本文研究中国国有企业民营化是否有效的问题。我们通过对国企民营化进程的考察来对此问题作出经验解答。根据世界银行一份对中国五个城市、覆盖六个行业的近300家国有企业(SOEs)1996—2001年间的调查数据,我们发现:(1)绩效较好的国有企业优先被民营化;(2)总体上来说,中国的民营化是富有成效的,尤其是提高了销售收入,降低了企业的成本,并最终导致企业盈利能力和生产率的大幅提高;而且在获得这些收益的同时并没有带来大规模的失业问题;(3)由民营机构控股、彻底民营化的企业比那些仍然是国有控股、部分民营化的企业绩效表现更好。     

关于民营化的一些新思考

本文通过分析台湾省公营事业民营化的实施要点、推进组织、取得成果的初步评价、民营化进程中的阻碍和民营化后的管理等，得出若干观点：民营化在实践中难以多方共赢，在实践中应设计有限的目标和兼容的推进途径；民营化并不是解决公营事业低效率等所有问题的灵丹妙药，其实际效果尚待实证检验；民营化不等同于通常意义的私有化，包括所有制民营化和经营机制民营化两大类以及多种方式，形成了民营化谱系；民营化是经济体制的重大变迁，涉及到多方主体的利益再分配，阻力、挫折甚至是失败在所难免，应科学细致地做好论证和准备工作。     

浅议公共行政民营化中的法律保留

始于20世纪70年代英国撒切尔政府改革的民营化浪潮,取得了巨大的成功,随后民营化在世界范围内被广泛采用。在中国,民营化主要表现为关系着国计民生的公共事业的民营化。为了实现公共行政民营化的公益性,民营化需要在一定程度上接受现代行政法上法律保留原则的约束。因此,对法律保留原则的适用性进行探讨就成为研究公共行政民营化不可回避的一个问题。     

化解国有中小企业民营化改造问题的方略

对国有中小企业实施民营化改革是解决国有企业问题的根本途径。按照党的十五届四中全会精神,国有企业改革已全面铺开,并已进入攻坚阶段。对国有中小企业进行民营化改造,已摸索了许多成功的经验,但从目前情况看,还有许多问题需要进一步探讨。1、关于国有资产保值增值问题。一是有些地方、部门和企业对中小企业民营化改造在认识上存在偏差,错误地认为民营化改造就是将国有资产瓜分为私人所有。二是进行不规范的产权交易,将国有资产以低廉的价格出售给集体和个人。三是国有企业进行股份制改造中,国有资产不作股,以个人股参与国有资产分红。四是在租赁中,因     

大股东民营化与上市公司绩效

大股东民营化是否改善公司绩效,是一个深受关注的问题。本文在文献回顾和制度背景分析的基础上,对中国上市公司大股东民营化经济后果进行实证检验。单变量检验表明民营化公司的盈利能力和盈利质量显著提高,而控制权在国有股东之间转让的对比样本几乎无显著变化;但多变量回归结果表明,盈利能力和盈利质量的提高与民营化本身无显著关系,而是控制权转让后重大资产重组导致“盈余逆转”的结果。控制权转让后两年期的股票回报来看,民营化公司也未显著好于对比样本。     

中国公用事业民营化研究综述——基于障碍与突破的视角

公用事业民营化长期以来备受学术界、政府及广大民众的关注,是如今国内外研究的热点.近年来,随着中国公用事业民营化进程的加快,其对经济发展的促进作用日益显现.但是,中国公用事业民营化进程中还存在着诸多障碍和问题.我们要认识问题,找到对策,加快公用事业民营化进程,提高公用事业民营化质量,进一步发挥其对经济发展的促进作用.为此,国内外众多学者作了大量的研究,并取得了丰硕的成果.为了促进研究的进一步深入,现将中国相关研究成果综述如下.     

从包办经营到公共管理——公用事业的民营化与政府职能的转变

我国公用事业民营化要求政府转变职能 ,从过去的包办经营转变到民营化过程的组织管理和民营公用事业的监管上来。本文对公用事业民营化的必要性及其意义和政府对此进行管理的基本方式、主要职能与应注意的问题作了阐述。     

Mixed ownership in a mixed duopoly with differentiated products

We determine optimal privatization in a symmetric differentiated duopoly when the public firms do not bear the full cost of production and hence their objective functions differ from the government’s objective function. In the social optimum firms will generally have mixed ownership, and it will depend on the type of uncovered cost, the degree of substitutability of the two products and the output decision rule of the partially public firms. Different types of mixed duopoly emerge, ranging from both firms being partially privatized, to one being fully privatized. We also derive an optimal tax-subsidy scheme as a substitute for privatization.      

Optimal Environmental Tax and Level of Privatization in an International Duopoly

This paper explores the optimal environmental tax and level of privatization in an international duopolistic market. We show that when the government is able to control the environmental tax and the extent of privatization, the optimal environmental tax is lower than the standard Pigouvian level. We also show that the optimal level of privatization of state-owned enterprises is partial privatization. Further, the optimal level of privatization is inversely dependent on the cleanup cost of past environmental contamination.     

Privatization, water access and affordability: Evidence from Malaysian household expenditure data

The aim of this paper is to examine empirically the impact of privatization on water access and affordability in Malaysia using household expenditure data. The development of water sector in Malaysia in terms of coverage has been fairly uneven. Some states have privatized their water supply sector while others have not. The overall finding of this study is that the impact of privatization on access and affordability in the Malaysian water supply sector is ambiguous. Privatization does not seem to have improved access to treated water from network in Malaysia. A likely explanation of this is the role played by the government in the sector in terms of tariff regulation and universal service provision. Furthermore, privatization does not seem to have adversely affected affordability in the sector. In addition to political intervention in tariff regulation, this could be due to the government maintaining a significant stake in privatized water companies.     

China’s secondary privatization: new evidence on controlling shareholders tunnelling

This article utilizes the 2005 split-share structure reform (SSSR) in China as a natural experiment and conducts difference-in-differences (DID) tests to analyse corporate governance changes among Chinese SOEs compared to POEs. We show that tunnelling significantly reduced in both POEs and SOEs after the SSSR. More importantly, we find a significant and positive ‘privatization effect’ on SOEs’ tunnelling activities during the post-reform period suggesting the reductions of tunnelling were smaller among SOEs than POEs following the SSSR. In contrast, excess returns around the SSSR indicate that investors expected a negative ‘privatization effect’ on SOEs’ tunnelling. These findings suggest that the quality of corporate governance did not improve among SOEs as a result of the secondary privatization as the stock market expected without fundamental changes to firm ownership and control following the SSSR. The benefits of privatization accrue to the government controlling shareholders rather than minority investors.     

Privatization and contaminated site remediation in Central and Eastern Europe: Do environmental liability policies matter?

This paper examines the effects on site remediation decisions after state-owned firms have been privatized of providing environmental information to potential investors and undertaking site remediation planning prior to privatization. The literature suggests that to minimize distortions created by uncertain environmental problems, governments should invest in environmental information for potential investors, inventory problems and develop plans for remediation. One of the believed benefits is a higher probability of site remediation, because with uncertainty resolved potential conflicts after privatization are less likely. Few countries in Central Europe, which has experienced both environmental problems and privatization on enormous scales, have adopted this advice. Using firm-level data, empirical analysis is presented, which suggests providing only information to investors is insufficient to spur remediation. Inventorying site contamination and planning remediation prior to privatization is a much more effective measure. Combining provision of information with remediation planning is found to be the most powerful policy package for encouraging remediation.     

How does privatization work in China?

Bai, Chong-En, Lu, Jiangyong, and Tao, Zhigang—How does privatization work in China?Using a comprehensive panel data set of China’s state-owned enterprises, we investigate the impacts of privatization on social welfare and firm performance indicators. The privatization of China’s state-owned enterprises was found to have little impact on the change of firm employment, but it did lead to increasing sales and hence higher labor productivity. Meanwhile, there was a gain in firm profitability contributed to mostly by the reduction of managerial expenses to sales. The impact of privatization was sustainable in the long run, and was more pronounced when state ownership was reduced to minority position as opposed to majority position.     

Causes of privatization in China

We test five hypotheses regarding the causes of privatization in China by using firm‐level panel data collected in 11 cities in the period 1995–2001. We have found that privatization is positively linked with hardened firm budgets and the extent of market liberalization, but is constrained by excessive debts and worker redundancy. Firm efficiency and state‐owned enterprises’ financial liabilities imposed on local governments are not factors of influence. These findings match the broad flow of events in China and highlight the role of market building in bringing about efficient institutional changes.     

On the Neutrality of Profit Taxation in a Mixed Oligopoly

This paper investigates the neutrality of profit taxation in a mixed oligopoly where one (partially) public firm competes with private firms. We find that the neutrality of a profit tax is robust under a general cost and a general demand function as long as the degree of privatization is endogenously determined. This result is also true when product heterogeneity is considered under both Cournot and Bertrand competition. By contrast, if the degree of privatization is exogenously given, the profit tax neutrality holds only in the cases where the public firm is fully privatized or fully state-owned; otherwise, the neutrality breaks down.     

Political objectives and privatization decisions

In early Romanian privatization a group of firms was explicitly banned from privatization. We use this institutional feature to test which factors contributed to the selection of firms for long‐term state ownership, and find that politicians sheltered from privatization large and inefficient firms which paid low wages and had high overdue payments. These results are consistent with minimization of employment losses, even if efficiency enhancement of privatization had to be sacrificed. We conjecture that the unfavourable economic conditions bringing large employment losses motivated Romanian politicians to fear the possible negative employment effects of privatization.