Economic and Monetary Union – Current Fiscal Disturbances and the Future

At the moment of its setting up the Economic and Monetary Union did not meet the criteria of the optimum currency area. Neither does it today. The crisis of public finance in the eurozone results from the abandonment public finance reforms, lack of consistency in enforcing the decision of the Stability and Growth Pact and, additionally, economic recession and financial crisis. Further functioning of the eurozone will depend on radical reforms of public finance and structural reforms enhancing efficiency of the market as an adjustment mechanism, and competitiveness of economies. The very establishment of the European Stabilization Mechanism and European Financial Stability cannot make up for the above mentioned necessary undertakings. It is important to change the socioeconomic model existing in the EU member countries.     

Fiscal Discipline as a Social Norm: The European Stability Pact

This paper reviews the arguments for and against the “Stability and Growth Pact.” We find the theoretical debate to be inconclusive, as both externality and credibility arguments can be used to yield opposite and plausible conclusions. Empirical evidence in favor of a Pact‐like rule is also scant. We therefore suggest the view that the Stability Pact is a public social norm, that countries obey in order to preserve reputation among the other members of the European Union. Using this extreme—but not implausible—hypothesis, we build a simple model similar in spirit to Akerlof's (1980) seminal work on social norms, and we show that reputation issues may cause the emergence of a stable but inferior equilibrium. Increased heterogenity generally has the effect of further reducing aggregate welfare; we conclude that the problems posed by the Pact/social norm are likely to increase following the enlargement, when a number of countries anxious to prove their “soundness” joined the club.     

On the impact of a tax shock in Portugal

In 1999, Cavaco Silva, the Portuguese Prime Minister from 1985 to 1995, proposed a comprehensive tax reform package, which is to this day the basic reference in the tax policy debate in Portugal. A tax shock would consist of 4pp cuts in the corporate income tax and in the firms social security contribution rates, and a 5pp reduction in the highest personal income tax rate. These cuts would be financed by combating tax evasion, curbing wasteful public expenditure and, if necessary, by increasing the VAT rate by up to 2pp. Using a dynamic general equilibrium model to evaluate the effects of this tax shock, we find that the long-term GDP gains would be between 0.72% and 2.91% while the effects on lifetime private welfare would range between -0.99% and 0.9%. The efficiency of this tax reform package depends critically on the way the tax cuts are financed to ensure deficit neutrality. Because investment is subject to adjustment costs, to alleviate the long-run trade-off between GDP and welfare, tax policy changes must induce a significant increase in net labor income.Received: July 2001, Accepted: March 2002, JEL Classification: C68, D58, E62, H21, H30Correspondence to: Alfredo M. PereiraA previous version of this paper was presented at the Society of Computational Economics and SPiE conferences. Thanks are due to Fernando Chau, Emanuel Santos, and two anonymous referees for very insightful comments and suggestions. The views in this article are of the authors alone and do not reflect the position of the Portuguese Ministry of Finance.     

The Economic Agenda: a View from the US

The paper surveys the agenda needed to restore noninflationary growth in industrial countries. The role of fiscal policy as short‐run stimulus both on the spending side and on the tax side is discussed. The author comments on trade, specifically the new trade round, and international finance. Long‐run fiscal imbalances due to aging are analyzed. The role of fiscal institutions such as the European Growth and Stability Pact, the Japanese bad‐loan problem, and structural problems are put into the perspective that advanced economies should nurture their reforms globally so as to provide successful examples of reforms and prove helpful trading partners.     

Towards a Political Economy of Zero Budgeting in Austria

The EMU sets new standards for public finance. In particular, the Stability and Growth Pact aims at a budget ``close-to-balance or in surplus'. Austria is lagging behind in this respect. First, this paper discusses the reasons for that. Then, two scenarios of budget consolidation are analyzed with the Wifo macroeconomic model. In the case of the crash-scenario, which balances the budget already in 2002, the pure Keynesian solution would result in a decline of real GDP of 1% after six years. The precautionary consolidation scenario (balanced budget in ten years) would result in a real GDP loss of only 1/2%. With supply-side effects (incentives for investment due to privatization and UMTS licences sales or credibility effects), real GDP declines only by 1/3% in both scenario. Taking a consolidated view of the tax reform 2000 and the budget consolidation, on balance, the overall effects are rather positive than negative.     

Patching up the Pact

The paper considers the implications for the EU accession candidates of Central and Eastern Europe of the fiscal‐financial constraints imposed by the Stability and Growth Pact and the Maastricht Treaty. Our findings apply also to those current EU members whose initial conditions (e.g., infrastructure and progress in state pension reform) or other structural characteristics (e.g., demographic structure, growth potential, Balassa‐Samuelson equilibrium real exchange rate appreciation) differ significantly from the EU average. We find the existing criteria to be seriously flawed and propose an alternative rule, the Permanent Balance Rule, based on a strong form of tax smoothing.     

The pace of fiscal consolidations,fiscal sustainability,and welfare: An overlapping generations approach

This study investigates expenditure- and tax-based consolidations under the rule of reductions in debt-to-GDP ratios to the target level and the effects of these consolidations on fiscal sustainability and welfare, using an overlapping generations model with exogenous growth settings. We derive (i) a threshold (ceiling) of public debt to ensure fiscal sustainability, (ii) sustainable paces of these consolidations, and (iii) the optimal pace of consolidations under both expenditure- and tax-based consolidations, examining whether these consolidations are effective in the sense that they are sustainable, increase welfare, and induce fairness of welfare distribution across generations (lower intergenerational conflicts over welfare). We find that the pace of tax-based consolidation required to ensure fiscal sustainability is higher than that required for expenditure-based consolidation. As for welfare, countries may differ in their choice of the type of consolidation, which depends on the size of outstanding debts relative to capital, the economy’s productivity, tax rate levels, and the extent of utility derived by individuals from public goods and services. More importantly, it may also depend on whether policymakers emphasize social welfare or fairness of welfare distribution between generations. By contrast, a common result from the viewpoints of both social welfare and fair distribution of welfare across generations is that fiscal consolidation cannot persist much longer than 30 years (one period in the model). This result will support the pace of consolidation in the EU: the Stability and Growth Pact.     

Welfare Effects of Different Public Expenditures and Taxes in the Netherlands

This paper explores the welfare effects of public consumption, income transfers and public investment financed through different types of taxes. One surprising result is that, contrary to public consumption goods, public capital goods do not necessarily become less attractive if distortionary taxes, rather than lump-sum taxes, are necessary to finance them. The numerical simulations reveal that the net welfare effects of public investments in the Netherlands are typically positive if financed through lump-sum taxes or distortionary taxes on labor. However, if a source-based capital tax is adopted to finance public investments, the overall welfare effect may be negative.     

On the Institutional Design of the European Monetary Union: Conservatism, Stability Pact and Economic Shocks

The aim of this paper is to design the optimal institutional arrangement for a monetary union. Using a two-country rational expectations model, the study analyses how the conservatism of the area-wide central bank and the penalty system for fiscal deviation (Stability and Growth Pact) should be designed with respect to different economic shocks. The optimal institutional arrangement is also dependent on who is the 'leader' of the policy game. When national governments move first, the independent area-wide central bank can exercise greater discipline over national fiscal policies, making the Stability Pact unnecessary.
(J.E.L.: E58, E63, F42).     

New constitutional “debt brakes” for Euroland? A question of institutional complementarity

Despite the EU Stability & Growth Pact and existing constitutional limits on public deficit/debt at the (sub)national level in many EU member countries, in the wake of the 2010 Greek bailout, many politicians and policy advisors have proposed new constitutional “debt brakes” to prevent future fiscal crises and bailouts. This paper puts a question mark behind this popular policy recommendation. Public choice scholars and other critical observers have repeatedly emphasised that constitutional deficit/debt limits are not per se credible commitments to run a sound fiscal policy in the future. To demonstrate this, design defects of such fiscal constraints are usually pointed out (no politically independent control, no sanctions, etc.). Going beyond this standard approach of credibility assessment, this paper argues for taking the issue of institutional complementarity seriously. To assess its credibility, one has to not only examine the design of a deficit/debt limit but also the institutional environment (tax/expenditure policy, capital market, etc.) in which such a constitutional commitment is embedded.     

Tax reform from the gradient projection viewpoint

This paper examines the problems of gradual tax reform. Desirable small moves of the tax system are determined using the principles of the well-known gradient projection algorithm. Three classical models of public finance are considered. For each of them a continuous time dynamic process is exhibited along which the social welfare function increases until convergence to local second best extrema. Although the selection of trajectories according to the gradient projection method has some arbitrariness, it leads to intuitively and economically appealing rules such as a tax reform analog of the classical optimal taxation result on production efficiency.     

Have the euro area and EU governance worked? Just the facts

We test whether the two key EU and euro area economic governance pillars, the Stability and Growth Pact and the Lisbon Strategy, have had any impact on macroeconomic outcomes. We test this proposition on a panel of 27, some of which are non-EU (control group) using a programme evaluation approach. The impact of the EU economic governance pillars is evaluated based on both the performance before and after their application as well as against the control group. We find strong and robust evidence that neither the Stability and Growth Pact nor the Lisbon Strategy have had a significant beneficial impact on fiscal and economic performance outcomes. We conclude that a profound reform of these pillars is needed to make them work in the next decade.     

省级财政收入竞争的成因分析

省级财政收入竞争是财政分权制度下的必然结果，其中不完善的分税制是省级财政收入竞争的制度基础；不科学的税收计划是省级财政收入竞争的促进因素；超税收的财政需求是省级财政收入竞争的现实基础；不规范的自由裁量权是省级财政收入竞争的重要原因。     

The macroeconomics of social pacts

In this paper we analyze macroeconomic interactions between trade unions, the central bank and the fiscal policymaker. We explicitly model unions’ concern for public expenditure, paving the way for an analysis of the potential gains from cooperation between the fiscal policymaker and the unions, i.e. the so-called corporatist or social pacts that have characterized economic policies in a number of European countries in the last few decades. We also highlight the profoundly different incentives generated by institutional arrangements such as the Maastricht criteria and the Stability and Growth Pact. The former has unambiguously induced more efficient outcomes; the latter is likely to backfire!     

Supply-Side Economics of Germany's Year 2000 Tax Reform: A Quantitative Assessment

Abstract. The paper provides an assessment of supply‐side economics following Germany's year 2000 tax reform. Investigated are a corporate tax cut, deteriorating depreciation allowances and imputation rules, and a private income tax cut. For this purpose, a neoclassical growth model is augmented by various fiscal policy parameters and endogenous corporate finance and calibrated with German data. The model is used to evaluate consequences of Germany's tax reform on production, firm finance and leverage, investment, consumption and welfare of a representative household.     

Capital and Consumption Tax Reforms in a Small Open Economy

The effects of a reform in capital and consumption taxes on private welfare and government tax revenue are examined for a small open, capital‐importing economy. A trade‐off between private welfare and tax revenue is encountered in maximizing social welfare. Nonetheless, lowering capital taxes and raising consumption taxes can increase both private welfare and tax revenue if the initial tax rates are not optimal. In addition, a tax reform by this fashion is a likely response to a rise in the foreign rate of return on capital.     

No Credit for Transition: European Institutions and German Unemployment

The Stability and Growth Pact, adopted by members of the European Union,imposes tight limits on government deficits. But since the collapse of Communism,Europe has been faced with the problems of economies in transition: and reunifiedGermany—the leading economy of the EU—combines a prosperous western stateand an eastern economy in the process of transition. In a model where unions play akey role in wage bargaining and transition imposes a substantial burden on thenational budget, we analyze the implications of balancing the budget for the path ofunemployment. Where high but temporary costs are financed by raising taxes onemployment to satisfy the Stability and Growth Pact, then the title is a misnomer:relative to a policy of `tax smoothing', the pact increases unemployment and slowsgrowth. In designing fiscal rules for Europe, the benefits of tax smoothing must beweighed in the balance along with the virtues of fiscal discipline.     

Growth and Welfare Maximization in Models of Public Finance and Endogenous Growth

This paper evaluates the trade‐off between growth and welfare maximization from two perspectives. First, it synthesizes and extends endogenous growth models with public finance to compare the growth‐ and welfare‐maximizing tax rates. Second, it examines the distinct model outcomes in terms of the growth rates and welfare levels. This comparison highlights the range of trade‐offs: the growth‐maximizing tax rate can lie above, below, or on the welfare‐maximizing equivalent. We find however that even relatively large differences in growth‐ and welfare‐maximizing tax rates translate into relatively small differences in growth rates, and, in some cases, welfare levels.     

The new stability and growth pact: A first assessment

The paper proposes a theoretical model of fiscal policy offering new insights on some of the key policy trade-offs involved in the recent reform of the Stability and Growth Pact. As suggested by the proponents of the reform, greater room for case-specific economic judgment in the implementation of the pact may improve welfare. In our model, these gains occur because the consolidation path implied by the implementation of the pact does not discourage high-quality measures. In practice, however, the difficulty to extract true policy intent from budget figures may hinder the qualitative assessment of fiscal policy. Hence, reforming a rules-based fiscal framework with a view to enhance its “economic rationale” would also require closer monitoring, a better grasp of the policies underlying the budget, and ultimately stricter enforcement. In that sense, recent reforms are at best unhelpful.     

Tax Reform with Useful Public Expenditures

We examine the effects of tax reform in an endogenous growth with two types of useful public expenditures. The optimal fiscal policy shifts the tax base to private consumption and generally requires a change in the size of government. If a tax reform holds the size of government fixed to satisfy a revenue‐neutrality constraint, then the reform will be suboptimal; theory alone cannot tell us if welfare will be improved. For some model calibrations, we find that a revenue‐neutral consumption tax reform can result in large welfare gains. For other quite plausible calibrations, the exact same reform can result in tiny or even negative welfare gains as the revenue‐neutrality constraint becomes more severely binding. Overall, our results highlight the uncertainty surrounding the potential welfare benefits of fundamental tax reform.