Estimating the Strategic Value of Long-Term Forward Purchase Contracts Using Auction Models

We demonstrate how an auction model can be used in a traditional capital budgeting context to assign a value to the strategic advantage of long-term forward contracts. Research in the field of industrial organization has pointed to the danger of ex post opportunistic bargaining as a motivation for the use of forward contracts in natural resources and manufactured products, but no operational procedure exists for estimating the value secured by these contracts. Arbitrage methods for valuing forward contracts assume a competitive market in which the factors creating the bargaining problem and motivating the use of long-term contracts are not present. Use of the model is illustrated in the case of take-or-pay contracts for natural gas.     

Why derivatives on derivatives? The case of spread futures

Recently, calendar spread futures, futures contracts whose underlying asset is the difference of two futures contracts with different delivery dates, have been successfully introduced for a number of financial futures contracts traded on the Chicago Board of Trade. A spread futures contract is not an obvious financial innovation, as it is a derivative on a derivative security: a spread futures position can be replicated by taking positions in the two underlying futures contracts, both of which may already be quite liquid. This paper provides a motivation for this innovation, demonstrating how the introduction of spread futures can, by changing the relative trading patterns of hedgers and informed traders, affect equilibrium bid–ask spreads, improve hedger welfare, and potentially improve market-maker expected profits. These results are robust both to allowing serial correlation of asset price changes, and investor preference for skewness.     

Community Asset Valuations by Non‐profit Government Entities

This paper examines an implication of applying International Financial Reporting Standards to the government sector in Australia. We posit both a self‐interest and a transparency motivation for local governments effecting revaluations of both infrastructure assets and community land. The self‐interest motivation was expected to manifest as a relationship between the amount of revaluation and CEO (or management team) remuneration. The transparency motivation was expected to result in a relationship between revaluation and the extent of spending on these assets, measured as both the quantum of materials and contracts expense, and as the quantum of contracts awarded by the entity above the disclosure threshold. We also speculated that revaluations may be used to signal to state governments a need for additional funds through capital and/or operating grants. At conventional levels of significance, we find no support for these relationships, suggesting that agency motivations at the local government level are either more subtle or non‐existent. As local government authorities in our study follow a reporting framework and standardised accounting procedures prescribed by the state government (in compliance with applicable AASB/IFRS standards), financial and public accountabilities are also likely to be a driver for the valuation of local infrastructure assets at fair value, and this is not likely to be undermined by the opportunistic incentives we have considered.     

Corporate Financial Policy and the Theory of Financial Intermediation

This paper examines the optimal structure of financial contracts in an economy subject to two forms of moral hazard. Multiple information problems are shown to generate a role for multiple classes of financial claimants. We then show that economic efficiency is enhanced if the financial structure of the economy consists of both direct and intermediated financial contract markets. Consequently, our results demonstrate a motivation for the complementarity between capital markets and depository financial institutions.     

The impact of accounting rule and economic differences on the firm’s choice of cash and share-puts

While prior literature has sought to explain why firms issue put options on their own stock (Gibson et al., 2006), no one has focused on examining why some firms choose to structure put contracts in a way that provides them the ability to settle future put obligations with their own common equity rather than cash. FAS 150, which changed the reporting requirements, highlights that under the prior rules firms included share-settlement terms in their put contracts to avoid showing their open put position as a balance sheet obligation. However, some evidence suggests that the choice between including cash or share settlement terms may be economically driven by the potential impact that each settlement-type has on firm solvency and equity holdings. Our results support the economic-based motivation for put-type choice by showing that firms elect to include share-settlement terms in their put contracts to provide themselves payment flexibility in the event internally generated cash flows are not sufficient to meet future contractual put obligations. These results support the FASB’s announcement that it is reconsidering homogeneous liability classification of cash and share-settled puts in its re-examination of FAS 150.     

Contracts offered by bureaucrats

We examine the power of incentives in bureaucracies by studying contracts offered by a bureaucrat to her agent. The bureaucrat operates under a fixed budget, optimally chosen by a funding authority, and she can engage in policy drift, which we define as inversely related to her intrinsic motivation. Interaction between a fixed budget and policy drift results in low‐powered incentives. We discuss how the bureaucrat may benefit from stricter accountability as it leads to larger budgets. Low‐powered incentives remain even in an alternative centralized setting, where the funding authority contracts directly with the agent using the bureaucrat to monitor output.     

Underwriter Compensation Structure: Can It Really Bond Underwriters?

Underwriter compensation can be structured as all cash or a combination of cash and warrants. Using a sample of small initial public offerings (IPOs), we find that underwriter compensation contracts that include warrants in exchange for cash can serve as certification for IPO firms by substituting for reputation capital. When underwriters accept warrants when they could have received more cash compensation, the IPOs avoid the well documented long‐run underperformance. However, when underwriters receive warrants after maximizing cash compensation, the IPO experiences higher underpricing and poorer long‐run performance. The findings are consistent with a motivation by the underwriters to circumvent regulatory constraints.     

Dynamic Insurance Contracts and Adverse Selection

We take a dynamic perspective on insurance markets under adverse selection and study a dynamic version of the Rothschild and Stiglitz model. We investigate the nature of dynamic insurance contracts by considering both conditional and unconditional dynamic contracts. An unconditional dynamic contract has insurance companies offering contracts where the terms of the contract depend on time, but not on the occurrence of past accidents. Conditional dynamic contracts make the actual contract also depend on individual past performance (such as in car insurances). We show that dynamic insurance contracts yield a welfare improvement only if they are conditional on past performance. With conditional contracts, the first‐best can be approximated if the contract lasts long. Moreover, this is true for any fraction of low‐risk agents in the population.     

Risk aversion,prudence, and compensation

In a standard principal-agent setting, we use a comparative approach to study the incentives provided by different types of compensation contracts, and their valuation by managers with utility function u who are risk averse (u″<0) and prudent (u″′>0). We show that concave contracts tend to provide more incentives to risk averse managers, while convex contracts tend to be more valued by prudent managers. This is because concave contracts concentrate incentives where the marginal utility of risk averse managers is highest, while convex contracts protect against downside risk. Thus, managerial prudence can contribute to explain the prevalence of stock-options in executive compensation. However, convex contracts are not optimal when the principal is sufficiently prudent relative to the manager.     

Insurance Rating Games: Strikes,Spares, and Bags

Carefully designed classroom activities and games can be used to increase student engagement, motivation, and learning. This article describes two games that have been used with students of risk management and insurance to help highlight the intricacies of insurance pricing. These two games, bowling insurance and bags insurance, help students experience the challenging nature of premium determination in risk transfer contracts and also connect the various actions taken by insurers during the insurance transaction.     

Collaboration rules

Corporate leaders seeking to boost growth, learning, and innovation may find the answer in a surprising place: the Linux open-source software community. Linux is developed by an essentially volunteer, self-organizing community of thousands of programmers. Most leaders would sell their grandmothers for workforces that collaborate as efficiently, frictionlessly, and creatively as the self-styled Linux hackers. But Linux is software, and software is hardly a model for mainstream business. The authors have, nonetheless, found surprising parallels between the anarchistic, caffeinated, hirsute world of Linux hackers and the disciplined, tea-sipping, clean-cut world of Toyota engineering. Specifically, Toyota and Linux operate by rules that blend the self-organizing advantages of markets with the low transaction costs of hierarchies. In place of markets' cash and contracts and hierarchies' authority are rules about how individuals and groups work together (with rigorous discipline); how they communicate (widely and with granularity); and how leaders guide them toward a common goal (through example). Those rules, augmented by simple communication technologies and a lack of legal barriers to sharing information, create rich common knowledge, the ability to organize teams modularly, extraordinary motivation, and high levels of trust, which radically lowers transaction costs. Low transaction costs, in turn, make it profitable for organizations to perform more and smaller transactions--and so increase the pace and flexibility typical of high-performance organizations. Once the system achieves critical mass, it feeds on itself. The larger the system, the more broadly shared the knowledge, language, and work style. The greater individuals' reputational capital, the louder the applause and the stronger the motivation. The success of Linux is evidence of the power of that virtuous circle. Toyota's success is evidence that it is also powerful in conventional companies.     

Pay-performance sensitivity and firm size: Insights from the mutual fund industry

I examine the ex ante decision to make an agent's pay-performance sensitivity an inverse function of organization size. I focus on mutual funds and their decision to use compensation contracts that reduce the advisor's marginal compensation as the fund grows (a declining-rate contract) over the dominant contract type, where marginal compensation is unrelated to fund size (a single-rate contract). I find evidence consistent with the view that declining-rate contracts are a mechanism to keep marginal compensation in line with the advisor's declining marginal product. Specifically, I find that funds with greater exposure to diseconomies of scale are more likely to use a declining-rate contract and to specify a greater amount of compensation decline in their contracts. Consistent with optimal contracting, I find no evidence of a performance difference between funds with declining-rate contracts and funds with single-rate contracts.     

An Assessment of Competitive Tendering using Transaction Cost Analysis

Competitive tendering is the means by which most goods and services are produced by public bodies: therefore it is important to try to improve it. Transaction cost analysis, in particular the concepts of bounded rationality, asset specificity and opportunism, provided the framework for examining two competitively tendered contracts let by the Government Purchasing Agency (in Northern Ireland). The firms tendering for the contracts were surveyed and interviews were carried out with purchasing staff managing the tendering process. The authors found that the main areas for further improvement in competitive tendering are the availability of information on previous contracts and debriefing, providing a clearer specification of user needs and of quantities.     

Optimal job design in the presence of implicit contracts

We characterize the optimal job design in a multitasking environment when the firms use implicit contracts (i.e., bonus payments). Two natural forms of job design are compared: (i) individual assignment, where each agent is assigned to a particular job and (ii) team assignment, where a group of agents share responsibility for a job and are jointly accountable for its outcome. Team assignment mitigates the multitasking problem but may weaken the implicit contracts. The optimal job design follows a cutoff rule where only the firms with high reputation concerns opt for team assignment. However, the cutoff rule need not hold if the firm can combine implicit incentives with explicit pay‐per‐performance contracts.     

Identifying the influences of nominal and real rigidities in aggregate price-setting behavior

We formulate a generalized price-setting framework that incorporates staggered contracts of multiple durations and that enables us to directly identify the influences of nominal vs. real rigidities. We estimate this framework using macroeconomic data for Germany (1975-1998) and for the U.S. (1983-2003). In each case, we find that the data are well-characterized by nominal contracts with an average duration of about two to three quarters. We also find that new contracts exhibit very low sensitivity to marginal cost, corresponding to a relatively high degree of real rigidity. Finally, our results indicate that backward-looking price-setting behavior (such as indexation to lagged inflation) is not needed in explaining the aggregate data, at least in an environment with a stable monetary policy regime and a transparent and credible inflation objective.     

Information content and the contractual nature of hedging derivative incomes

In a sample of 87 banks representing 631 bank-years for the period 1996–2003, we examine whether information content of hedging derivative incomes is predicated on the contractual nature of the derivative. Of particular interest are the different abnormal trading volume reactions to incomes arising from executory contracts (i.e., cash flow and net investment hedges) and incomes arising from nonexecutory contracts (i.e., fair value hedges). We find a positive and significant relationship between two alternative measures of abnormal trading volume and incomes arising from cash flow and net investment hedges. The results are robust in an equity valuation framework. Our findings suggest that derivative incomes are informative, notably those incomes that are related to executory contracts. An implication for standard setters is that the complex rules for disaggregating incomes on hedging derivatives provide valuable information to the market.     

Currency risk hedging: Futures vs. forward

The objective of this paper is to address the issue of choosing between currency forward and currency futures contracts when hedging against currency risk within a stochastic interest rates environment. We compare between the hedging effectiveness of the two derivative assets both within a narrow sense (i.e., volatility minimization) and within a wide sense (i.e., risk-return trade-off). When judging hedging effectiveness in the narrow sense, forward and futures contracts give identical results even if they do not have identical prices. When judging hedging effectiveness in the wide sense, the choice between the two contracts is determined by the correlation between the domestic and the foreign term structures dynamics.     

Banks Increase Welfare

This paper examines the relative degrees of risk sharing provided by demand deposit contracts and equity contracts. It is shown that in a framework in which individuals have smooth preferences and there exists some type of aggregate uncertainty (interest rate risk), the allocations obtained with a financial intermediary allow in general for greater risk sharing than those achieved in an equity economy. However, the interest rate is essential in order to determine the superiority of demand deposit contracts over equity contracts. The results of the paper contradict the ones obtained by Jacklin [1987] and Hellwig [1994], where demand deposit and equity contracts are always equivalent risk sharing instruments.     

Accounting Earnings Processes,Inter-temporal Incentives and Their Implications for Valuation

Accounting measures such as levels and changes in residual earnings are widely used for performance evaluation and executive compensation (Healy, 1985). Quite often, these compensation contracts are of the linear form. In a multiperiod agency setting with hidden actions, where the agent's effort influences the random evolution of a general model of residual earnings, we show that linear compensation contracts based on weighted sum of the levels and changes of residual earnings are indeed optimal. We characterize the contract explicitly and show that the weights are determined by the earnings persistence parameter. Residual earnings are known to be important for valuation too (Ohlson, 1995; Easton and Harris, 1991). In our setting, we demonstrate that residual earnings are also sufficient for valuation. This implies that residual earnings can be used to align incentive goals with valuation objectives. In essence, our paper provides the theoretical underpinnings for linear contracts based on residual earnings and their implications for valuation.     

Financial covenants in the markets for public and private debt

The public debt contracts surveyed in Whittred and Zimmer (1986) and Stokes and Tay (1988) were issued between 1962 and 1985, and there has been significant macroeconomic, institutional and regulatory change since that time. We analyse a sample of 36 recently issued Australian public debt contracts and document a considerable change in the ‘package’ of financial covenants used in public debt contracts. The covenant package is now less restrictive and the types of covenants used are more heterogenous. We also survey a sample of 41 recent Australian private debt contracts. These contracts contain a greater number, variety and, collectively, more restrictive set of financial covenants than those public debt contracts we survey, supporting theory which suggests that covenant restrictive and renegotiation–flexible contracts are more suited to borrowers contracting with financial intermediaries in private debt markets. We also note differences in accounting rules associated with financial covenants used in these private debt contracts.