Financing constraints, cash-flow risk, and corporate investment

Using an analytically tractable two-period model of a financially constrained firm, we derive an investment threshold that is U-shaped in cash holdings. We show analytically the relevant trade-offs leading to the U-shape: the firm balances financing costs for present and future investment, respectively. Our main argument is that financing costs today are more important than the risk of future financing costs. The empirically testable implications are that low-cash firms facing financing costs today are more reluctant to invest if they have less cash, or if their future cash flows are more risky. On the other hand, cash-rich firms facing no financing costs today invest in less favorable projects (i.e., forgo their real option to wait) if they have less cash, or if their future cash flows are more risky. The magnitude of these effects is amplified by the degree of market frictions that the firms are facing.     

Optimal investment with fixed financing costs

Models with a premium on external finance produce counterfactual predictions about liquidity management. We address this shortcoming by introducing a fixed cost of increasing external finance into an otherwise standard investment/financing problem. This additional financial friction is well-motivated by case studies and our analysis shows that it generates more realistic predictions about liquidity management: firms hold external finance and idle cash simultaneously, and may invest an additional dollar of cash flow in liquidity rather than repaying external funds or investing in productive capital. In addition to better fitting the stylized facts about the time-series and cross-sectional pattern of liquidity holding, these results may help shed light on the fragility of estimates of investment–cash flow sensitivities.     

The impact of assets-in-place on corporate financing and investment decisions

In a dynamic setting with asymmetric information we consider firms’ debt-equity choice and investment timing. We extend recent research by adding an abandonment option and assets-in-place and we show that these extensions make debt more attractive. This implies, e.g., that mature firms (with larger assets-in-place) mainly use debt financing, whereas young high-growth firms (without assets-in-place) frequently use equity financing and signal their type by early investment. Simulation analyses confirm this and our model is thus able to explain empirical patterns which contradict the static pecking order theory.     

Earnings management and firm valuation under asymmetric information

This paper seeks to provide an explanation for why corporate officers manage the disclosure of accounting information. We show that earnings management affects firm value when value-maximizing managers and investors are asymmetrically informed. In equilibrium, the strategic management of reported earnings influences investors' assessments of the market values of companies' shares.     

Costly external financing, investment timing, and investment–cash flow sensitivity

This paper examines the effects of costly external financing on the optimal timing of a firm's investment. By altering the optimal investment timing, costly financing affects current investment and the sensitivity of investment to internal cash flow. Importantly, the relation between the cost of external funds and investment–cash flow sensitivity is non-monotonic. Investment–cash flow sensitivity is decreasing in the cost of external financing when it is relatively low and is increasing in the financing cost when it is high. Empirical tests examining investment–cash flow sensitivities within groups of firms classified by proxies for their costs of external funds provide evidence consistent with the model. The model and the empirical results complement recent studies by Cleary, Povel and Raith [Cleary, S., Povel, P. and Raith, M., 2007. The U-shaped investment curve: theory and evidence, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 42, 1–39.] and Almeida and Campello [Almeida, H. and Campello, M., in press, Financial constraints, asset tangibility and corporate investment, Review of Financial Studies.] that show a non-monotonic relation between firms' investment and the availability of internal funds.     

Real investment and risk dynamics

We ask to what extent the negative relation between investment and average stock returns is driven by risk. We show that: (i) the average return spread between low and high asset growth and investment portfolios is largely accounted for by their spread in systematic risk, as measured by the loadings on the Chen, Roll, and Ross (1986) factors; (ii) as predicted by q-theory and real options models, systematic risk falls during large investment periods; (iii) the returns of factors formed on the investment-to-assets, asset growth, and investment growth all forecast aggregate economic activities. Our evidence suggests that risk plays an important role in explaining the investment-return relation.     

Domestic and International Equity REIT Joint Ventures: Structuring Corporate Options

We examine a sample of 185 Joint Ventures parented by publicly-traded Equity Real Estate Investment Trusts 1994–2001. These transactions are found to be motivated by a wide variety of corporate strategies. Shareholder returns for REIT parents are significantly positive, which is consistent with wealth effects previously reported for joint ventures formed by non-REIT real estate firms. In a subsample of joint ventures formed to structure partial dispositions of property, however, abnormal returns are significantly negative, which is consistent with the free cash flow theory of Jensen. REIT joint venture experience in Asia has been neutral for value, but may improve in the future if early ventures have created options for more efficient partnerships later.     

Real options under a double exponential jump-diffusion model with regime switching and partial information

We consider the irreversible investment in a project which generates a cash flow following a double exponential jump-diffusion process and its expected return is governed by a continuous-time two-state Markov chain. If the expected return is observable, we present explicit expressions for the pricing and timing of the option to invest. With partial information, i.e. if the expected return is unobservable, we provide an explicit project value and an integral-differential equation for the pricing and timing of the option. We provide a method to measure the information value, i.e. the difference between the option values under the two different cases. We present numerical solutions by finite difference methods. By numerical analysis, we find that: (i) the higher the jump intensity, the later the option to invest is exercised, but its effect on the option value is ambiguous; (ii) the option value increases with the belief in a boom economy; (iii) if investors are more uncertain about the economic environment, information is more valuable; (iv) the more likely the transition from boom to recession, the lower the value of the option; (v) the bigger the dispersion of the expected return, the higher the information value; (vi) a higher cash flow volatility induces a lower information value.     

Wall of cash: The investment-cash flow sensitivity when capital becomes abundant

In the mid 2000s the oil and gas industry was hit by what might be best described as a ‘wall of cash’ as oil prices successively reached new record levels and access to external financing improved greatly. In this article we investigate what this sudden abundance of liquidity implied for the investment-cash flow relationship, the interpretation of which continues to generate controversy in the literature. For financially constrained firms we find that the investment-cash flow sensitivity decreases in the abundance period (2005–2008), suggesting that the financing constraints became less binding in this period. For financially unconstrained firms the investment-cash flow sensitivity instead increases over time, suggesting that this relationship is driven by agency problems related to free cash flow. Our paper is the first in the investment-cash flow literature to bring evidence from a natural experiment in which there was an unexpected, exogenous, substantial, and persistent decrease in the cost of external financing.     

Optimal Timing of Real Estate Investment under an Asymmetric Duopoly

This paper examines the sub-game equilibrium strategies for a duopoly real option model consisting of two firms with asymmetric demand functions. The relative strength of the firms is found to have significant impact on the firms’ equilibrium strategies. Preemptive strategies are critical if difference in strength between the two competing firms is relatively small. Short bursts and recession induced overbuilding are two outcomes in the asymmetric duopoly model. The model, however, predicts that the two phenomena occur in earlier phases of market cycles, rather than in the state of depression. In a depressed market with high volatility, the leader and the follower will both choose the waiting strategies. Construction cascade is, therefore, not an expected phenomenon in a depressed market in the asymmetric duopoly framework. Please forward your comments to the second author at rststf@nus.edu.sg. Your comments are appreciated. The authors wish to thank Stephen Cauley, Walter Torous, an anonymous referee, and participants in the Singapore–Hong Kong Real Estate Research Symposium on 14–15 July 2005 for their constructive comments and suggestions.     

An empirical investigation of trading on asymmetric information and heterogeneous prior beliefs

The purpose of this study is to identify and analyze inter-temporal trading patterns attributable to informed trading. Recent theoretical models posit that heterogeneous prior beliefs provide a source of trading volume in addition to the commonly accepted trading motives of liquidity and asymmetric information. After separating informed from uninformed trading using the estimation procedure of Easley et al. [Journal of Finance 51 (1996) 1405], we test for the presence of trading on heterogeneous beliefs as opposed to asymmetric information. The empirical findings confirm the existence of trading on heterogeneous prior beliefs and generally support the inter-temporal patterns proposed by Wang [Journal of Financial Markets 1 (1998) 321].     

Investment-based financing constraints and debt renegotiation

We consider how equity holders’ bargaining power during financial distress influences the interactions between financing and investment decisions when the firm faces the upper limit of debt issuance. We obtain four results. First, weaker equity holders’ bargaining power is more likely that the firm is financially constrained. Second, the investment quantity is independent of equity holders’ bargaining power. Third, the constrained credit spreads are increasing with equity holders’ bargaining power, contrary to the unconstrained ones. Fourth, higher volatility and weaker equity holders’ bargaining power are likely that the firm prefers to issue debt with renegotiation, compared with debt without renegotiation.     

Real option pricing with mean-reverting investment and project value

In this work, we are concerned with valuing the option to invest in a project when the project value and the investment cost are both mean-reverting. Previous works on stochastic project and investment cost concentrate on geometric Brownian motions (GBMs) for driving the factors. However, when the project involved is linked to commodities, mean-reverting assumptions are more meaningful. Here, we introduce a model and prove that the optimal exercise strategy is not a function of the ratio of the project value to the investment V/I – contrary to the GBM case. We also demonstrate that the limiting trigger curve as maturity approaches traces out a nonlinear curve in (V, I) space and derive its explicit form. Finally, we numerically investigate the finite-horizon problem, using the Fourier space time-stepping algorithm of Jaimungal and Surkov [2009. Lev´y based cross-commodity models and derivative valuation. SIAM Journal of Financial Mathematics, to appear. http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=972837]. Numerically, the optimal exercise policies are found to be approximately linear in V/I; however, contrary to the GBM case they are not described by a curve of the form V*/I*=c(t). The option price behavior as well as the trigger curve behavior nicely generalize earlier one-factor model results.     

企业社会责任战略如何缓解融资约束--实现路径与经验证据

本文在文献回顾的基础之上结合企业实践,深入分析了企业社会责任战略与企业融资约束间的关系。文章提出承担社会责任可以改善企业相关利益者关系,社会责任信息披露可以降低了企业的信息不对称,通过这两条路径,企业社会责任战略降低了企业的融资约束,进而为企业创造价值。相关的理论分析得到了经验证据的支持,这为企业战略管理和融资实践提供了理论支持和经验参考。     

高管薪酬粘性、风险承担与企业投资效率——管理者权力与融资约束的调节作用

本文选取2010―2019年中国A股上市公司数据,实证分析了高管薪酬粘性对企业投资效率的影响及其作用机制。研究表明:(1)高管薪酬粘性对企业投资效率具有负向影响,会加剧企业过度投资,由此加大非效率投资及降低投资效率。(2)高管薪酬粘性对企业投资效率的负向影响仅对“奖优-低惩劣”薪酬契约有效。相对于非国有、高估值与制造业企业,高管薪酬粘性对国有、低估值与非制造业企业投资效率的负向影响更为显著。(3)管理者权力的提高会加剧高管薪酬粘性对企业投资效率的负向影响,加剧高管权力寻租引发的薪酬补偿效应,由此稀释薪酬奖惩对业绩变动的敏感度。融资约束程度的提高会减弱高管薪酬粘性对企业投资效率的负向影响,这种负向影响主要针对投资不足企业,对过度投资企业不显著。(4)风险承担在高管薪酬粘性与企业投资效率的关系中承担着中介作用,高管薪酬粘性通过影响企业风险承担来影响企业投资效率,“高管薪酬粘性-风险承担-企业投资效率”的传导渠道有效。     

The effect of asymmetric information on product market outcomes

We explore how asymmetric information in financial markets affects outcomes in product markets. Difference-in-difference tests around brokerage house merger/closure events (which increase asymmetric information through reductions in analyst coverage) indicate worse industry-adjusted sales growth for shocked firms than for their peers. Our results are consistent with Bolton and Scharfstein's (1990) tradeoff between investor agency concerns and predation risk. Further support is found in stronger treatment effects among firms with ex ante greater agency concerns, financing constraints, asymmetric information, and those operating in ex ante more competitive (fluid) product market spaces. Our results are concentrated in industries where we can clearly identify either net firm entry or exit.     

To Invest or not to Invest: A real options approach to FDIs and tax competition

Foreign investment decisions of firms are often characterized by investment irreversibility, uncertainty, and the ability to choose the optimal timing of foreign investments. We embed these characteristics into a real option theory framework to analyze international competition among countries to attract mobile investments when firms, after the investment is sunk, can shift profit to low tax countries by transfer pricing. We find that an increase in the uncertainty of profit income reduces the equilibrium tax rates, whilst lower investment costs or larger profits, counteracts the negative fiscal externality of tax competition leading to higher equilibrium tax rates. JEL Code H25     

Optimal investment and production decisions and the value of the firm

We explore the effects of uncertainty on a firm that can respond by modifying its investment or production schedule (or both simultaneously) to variations in output price. Investment may increase capacity and/or reduce costs. We consider a firm with finite resources.Our model uses option theory instead of the more traditional net present value framework. One of the early papers using this approach is Brennan and Schwartz (1985) in which an investment project to extract a finite natural resource is valued. In that paper, the value of the firm is a function of two state variables, the finite resource to be extracted (output to be produced in the future) and the commodity spot price. In order to maximize firm value, the manager can respond by modifying one control variable, the production level. In our model we handle instead three state variables (spot price, resources, accumulated investment) and two control variables (production rate and investment rate), and solve numerically.We obtain both the value and the optimal policy of a firm that has investment projects that increase capacity and/or reduce costs and illustrate optimal policies as resources and available investments decrease over the life of the firm. Firms may start by only investing, then invest and produce, to end only producing.We thank Scott Wo, the referee and the editor for their comments and suggestions. Cortázar and Lowener acknowledge the financial support from FONDECYT and FONDER.     

投资者情绪、经理激励契约与企业投资

本文基于中国上市公司经理激励契约安排的制度背景,把经理激励契约纳入投资者非理性分析框架,就投资者情绪与经理激励契约如何相互作用影响企业投资进行了理论分析,并进行了实证检验。结果发现,高管持股会诱发高管利用投机的股市进行过度投资,而与股价弱相关的货币薪酬没有这种作用,而且经理薪酬的这种作用因企业实际控制人性质不同而有所差异。本研究表明高管持股在企业投资决策中具有负面的公司治理效应。