Investment timing under debt issuance constraint

This paper examines the optimal investment timing decision problem of a firm subject to a debt financing capacity constraint. We show that the investment thresholds have a U-shaped relation with the debt capacity constraint, in that they are increasing (decreasing) with the constraint for high (low) debt issuance capacity. Although the financing constraint distorts investment timing, it may encourage the constrained levered firm to overinvest compared with the non-constrained levered firm. Our result fits well with the related problems involving the internal financing constraint.     

Brand perception,cash flow stability,and financial policy

This paper demonstrates that intangible assets play an important role in financial policy. Using a proprietary database of consumer brand evaluation, I show that positive consumer attitude toward a firm's products alleviates financial frictions and provides additional net debt capacity, as measured by higher leverage and lower cash holdings. Brand perception affects financial policy through reducing overall firm riskiness, as strong consumer evaluations translate into lower future cash flow volatility as well as higher credit ratings for potentially volatile firms. The impact of brand is stronger among small firms, contradicting a number of reverse causality and omitted variables explanations.     

Corporate cash holdings and CEO compensation incentives

We examine the effect of chief executive officer (CEO) compensation incentives on corporate cash holdings and the value of cash to better understand how compensation incentives designed to enhance the alignment of manager and shareholder interests could influence stockholder-bondholder conflicts. We find a positive relation between CEO risk-taking (vega) incentives and cash holdings, and we find a negative relation between vega and the value of cash to shareholders. The negative effect of vega on the value of cash is robust after controlling for corporate governance, is stronger in firms with high leverage, is reversed for unlevered firms, and is not present in financially constrained firms. We also find that the likelihood of liquidity covenants in new bank loans is increasing in CEO vega incentives. Our evidence primarily supports the costly contracting hypothesis, which asserts that bondholders anticipate greater risk-taking in high vega firms and, therefore, require greater liquidity.     

Corporate governance and the value of cash holdings

We investigate how corporate governance impacts firm value by comparing the value and use of cash holdings in poorly and well-governed firms. We show that governance has a substantial impact on value through its impact on cash: $1.00 of cash in a poorly governed firm is valued at only $0.42 to $0.88. Good governance approximately doubles this value. Furthermore, we show that firms with poor corporate governance dissipate cash quickly in ways that significantly reduce operating performance. This negative impact of large cash holdings on future operating performance is cancelled out if the firm is well governed.     

Trade credit,cash holdings,and financial deepening: Evidence from a transitional economy

This paper investigates the effect of financial deepening on the relationship between trade credit and cash holdings among Chinese listed firms. We first document an asymmetric effect of trade payables and receivables on cash holdings, in that firms hold an additional $0.71 of cash for every $1 of credit payable but use $1 of receivables as a substitute for only $0.15 of cash. We then find that firms in regions with higher levels of financial deepening hold less cash for payables while substituting more receivables for cash. A more highly developed financial sector helps firms to better use trade credit as a short-term financing instrument. Finally, we find that the ratio at which receivables are substituted for cash increased following the implementation of the new receivables pledge policy in 2007, which allowed firms to use receivables as security for loans. This policy event represents an exogenous shock that mitigates the endogeneity concern.     

Determinants of corporate cash policy: Insights from private firms

We provide one of the first large sample comparisons of cash policies in public and private U.S. firms. We first show that despite higher financing frictions, private firms hold, on average, about half as much cash as public firms do. By examining the drivers of cash policies for each group, we are able to attribute the difference to the much higher agency costs in public firms. By combining evidence from across public and private firms as well as within public firms across different qualities of governance, we are able to reconcile existing mixed evidence on the effects of agency problems on cash policies. Specifically, agency problems affect not only the target level of cash, but also how managers react to cash in excess of the target.     

The strategic use of corporate cash holdings in collective bargaining with labor unions

We provide evidence that firms in more unionized industries strategically hold less cash to gain bargaining advantages over labor unions and shelter corporate income from their demands. Specifically, we show that corporate cash holdings are negatively related with unionization. We also find that this relation is stronger for firms that are likely to place a higher value on gaining a bargaining advantage over unions and weaker for those firms in which lower cash holdings provide less credible evidence that a firm is unable to concede to union demands. Additionally, we show that for unionized firms increases in cash holdings raise the probability of a strike. Finally, we show that unionization decreases the market value of a dollar of cash holdings. Overall, our findings indicate that firms trade-off the benefits of corporate cash holdings with the costs resulting from a weaker bargaining position with labor.     

Determinants of corporate cash holdings: Evidence from spin-offs

We study the factors that influence the cash allocation decision around a spin-off, using variables suggested by the trade-off theory, and controlling for the possible endogeneity of leverage and cash ratios. Spin-offs provide an opportunity to examine the determinants of cash allocation at the margin at the time of creation of a new entity. Our results indicate that managers allocate higher cash ratios to smaller firms, and firms with high research and development expense ratio, low net working capital ratio, and low leverage. Thus, higher cash ratios are correlated with difficulty of raising external capital and reduced availability of cash from internal sources. In addition, managers also base the cash allocation on observable immediate growth opportunities instead of on long-term possible growth. An analysis of excess cash ratios, defined as the difference between the actual and predicted cash ratios, indicate that firms are, on average, allocated less cash than suggested by trade-off models, and this deviation in allocated cash from predicted levels is explained only by concurrent profitability of the firms (a pecking order theory implication).     

Cross-country analysis of secular cash trends

This study documents a pronounced secular upward trend in cash holdings which is almost systemic across seven industrialized countries over 1991-2008, with France exhibiting a modest rise and Japan a substantial decline. However, the driving forces underlying the cash pattern are not uniform across countries. While the evolution in firm characteristics necessitated elevated cash balances, the time-varying firm attributes explain the cash trend only in Canada, France, UK and the US. The agency motive plays a role in the rise in cash balances in Germany. Our analysis highlights that the functioning of the financial system is crucial to corporate cash policy as Australia’s cash pattern is driven by shallow private credit markets that curbed cash reserves earlier on and the decelerating cash trend in Japan is ascribed to financial reforms. While there is a degree of commonality in the determinants of cash policies, we find some divergence in cash practices.     

The impact of capital market imperfections on investment–cash flow sensitivity

We examine the investment–cash flow sensitivity of US manufacturing firms in relation to five factors associated with capital market imperfections – fund flows, institutional ownership, analyst following, bond ratings, and an index of antitakeover amendments. We find a steady decline in the estimated sensitivity over time. Furthermore, we find that investment–cash flow sensitivity decreases with increasing fund flows, institutional ownership, analyst following, antitakeover amendments and with the existence of a bond rating. The overall evidence suggests that investment–cash flow sensitivity decreases with factors that reduce capital market imperfections.     

Significant issuance date returns in seasoned equity offerings: An options-based resolution of a puzzle

The significant negative issuance day returns associated with seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) have been a puzzle. In this paper we provide two explanations for this empirical regularity. First, using an option-based argument, we contend that issuance day returns are negative because of SEO related declines in volatility that reduce the option value of equity. Our empirical examination of US SEOs between 1983 and 2003 strongly supports this contention. Second, we find that the negative issuance date return is also related to market liquidity around the issuance date. Our findings are robust to various sub-samples and the uncertainty resolution argument, and are not driven by SEO buy-sell order imbalances.     

Long-term debt and overinvestment agency problem

We investigate the role of long-term debt in influencing overinvestments by analyzing the pattern of abnormal investments around a new debt offering by unlevered firms. Before being levered when the disciplining role of debt is missing, firms retain excessive amounts of cash. The introduction of debt leads to a dramatic decline in cash ratios and the relation is stronger for firms classified as having poor investment opportunities. For the sub-sample of firms that overinvest in real assets, issuing debt leads to a reduction in abnormal capital expenditures. The decline in overinvestments is explained by debt service obligations that reduce discretionary funds under managerial control. Further, the reduction in overinvestments has a positive impact on equity value. These conclusions hold in other settings where there is a dramatic change in firms’ capital structures providing strong support for the hypothesis that debt reduces overinvestments.     

The influence of product market dynamics on a firm's cash holdings and hedging behavior

Prior work suggests that if a firm shares a larger proportion of its growth opportunities with rivals, an inability to fully invest in these opportunities leads to predatory behavior on the part of rivals and losses in market share. We examine whether firms manage this predation risk. We find inter- and intra-industry evidence that the extent of the interdependence of a firm's investment opportunities with rivals is positively associated with its use of derivatives and the size of its cash holdings. Moreover, an analysis of investment behavior provides evidence that if this interdependence is high, the management of predation risk provides strategic benefits. Our results indicate that predation risk is an important determinant of corporate financial policy choices and investment behavior.     

Share issuance and cross-sectional returns: International evidence

Share issuance predicts cross-sectional returns in a non-U.S. sample of stocks from 41 different countries. Issuance predictability has greater statistical significance than either size or momentum, and is similar to book-to-market. As in the U.S., the international issuance effect is robust across both small and large firms. Unlike the U.S., the effect is driven more by low returns after share creation rather than positive returns following share repurchases. Issuance return predictability is stronger in countries with greater issuance activity, greater stock market development, and stronger investor protection. The results suggest that the share issuance effect is related to the ease with which firms can issue and repurchase their shares.     

Does freezing a defined benefit pension plan affect firm risk?

This paper examines the impact of a defined benefit (DB) pension plan freeze on the sponsoring firm's risk and risk-taking activities. Using a sample of firms declaring a hard freeze on their DB plans between 2002 and 2007, we observe an increase in total risk (proxied by the standard deviation of EBITDA and asset beta), equity risk (standard deviation of returns), and credit risk following a DB-plan freeze. The increase in credit risk is reflected in a decline in credit ratings and an increase in bond yields for freezing firms. When we examine investment strategies, we observe a shift in investment from capital expenditures before the freeze to more-risky R&D projects after the freeze, and an increase in leverage. These strategies (increased focus on R&D and higher leverage) increase the operating and financial risk the firm faces. Overall, we observe an increase in risk-taking following DB plan freezes, consistent with theories that DB plans act as “inside debt” that aligns managers’ interests with bondholders’.     

Investment frictions and leverage dynamics

The paper examines the effect of investment frictions on leverage dynamics, using a model of a firm whose investment projects are (1) indivisible and lumpy, and (2) subject to time-to-build. Regressions on the model-simulated data demonstrate that investment frictions can provide alternative interpretations of the observed leverages shown in the empirical literature. Cross-sectional analysis of firms in the oil and gas extraction industries, as well as analysis across all industries, reveals the evidence that small firms have more volatile investments and longer time-to-build, which may explain the observed differences in leverage dynamics across small and large firms.     

Diversification and cash dynamics

Why do diversified firms hold significantly less cash than focused firms? We study this question using a dynamic model of corporate investment, saving, and diversification decisions. We find that investment dynamics are more important in explaining the cash differences than financing frictions. More efficient internal capital markets increase cash differences and are especially valuable when a firm diversifies or refocuses. Contrary to static models, more diverse conglomerates have lower cash differences. Endogenous selection (diversifying firms are larger and have better growth opportunities) accounts for 68% of the cash difference, and the diversification event itself reduces cash holdings by 32%.     

Accruals quality and corporate cash holdings

This Work Uses Panel Data For Firms Listed In The Spanish Stock Exchange Over The Period From 1995 To 2001 To Analyse The Effect Of Accounting Quality On Cash Holdings. The Results Show That Firms With Good Accruals Quality Hold Lower Cash Levels Than Firms With Poor Accruals Quality. This Finding Suggests That The Quality Of Accounting Information May Reduce The Negative Effects Of Information Asymmetries And Adverse Selection Costs, Allowing Firms To Reduce Their Level Of Corporate Cash Holdings. The Results Also Show That Cash Holdings Decrease When Firms Increase Their Use Of Bank Debt And In The Presence Of Cash Substitutes. In Contrast With This, Firms With Higher Cash Flow Hold Higher Levels Of Cash.     

Earnings quality and corporate cash holdings

Poor earnings quality exacerbates information asymmetry between internal and external stakeholders of a firm. Agency considerations then persuade investors to discount the value of corporate cash holdings out of concern about the inappropriate use of funds. In this study, we show that poor earnings quality has a negative impact on the value of corporate cash holdings and a positive impact on the level of cash reserves. We find that the negative effect of poor earnings quality either neutralizes or more than offsets the positive effect of excess cash on firm value. Our results are robust to several measures of earnings quality and model specifications.     

Controlling shareholders and market timing in share issuance

We examine market timing in the equity issuance of firms controlled by large shareholders using a hand-collected data set of controlling shareholders' ownership stakes in Chile between 1990 and 2009. When a firm issues shares, the controlling shareholder can either maintain or change his ownership stake depending on how many of the new shares he subscribes. Issuance predicts poor future returns and is preceded by high returns, but only when the controlling shareholder's stake is significantly reduced. Consistent with market timing, the results are stronger in the absence of institutional investors and in hot issuance markets.