A comparison of buy‐side and sell‐side analysts

There is very little research on the topic of buy-side analyst performance, and that which does exist yields mixed results. We use a large sample from both the buy-side and the sell-side and report several new results. First, while the contemporaneous returns to portfolios based on sell-side recommendations are positive, the returns for buy-side analysts, proxied by changes in institutional holdings, are negative. Second, the buy-side analysts' underperformance is accentuated when they trade against sell-side analysts' recommendations. Third, abnormal returns positively relate to both the portfolio size and the portfolio turnover of buy-side analysts' institutions, suggesting that large institutions employ superior analysts and that superior analysts frequently change their recommendations. Abnormal returns are also positively related to buy-side portfolios with stocks that have higher analyst coverage, greater institutional holding, and lower earnings forecast dispersion. Fourth, there is substantial persistence in buy-side performance, but even the top decile performs poorly. These findings suggest that sell-side analysts still outperform buy-side analysts despite the severe conflicts of interest documented in the literature.     

Do investment banks listen to their own analysts?

To what extent conflicts of interest affect the investment value of sell-side analyst research is an ongoing debate. We approach this issue from a new direction by investigating how asset-management divisions of investment banks use stock recommendations issued by their own analysts. Based on holdings changes around initiations, upgrades, and downgrades from 1993 to 2003, we find that these bank-affiliated investors follow recommendations from sell-side analysts in general, increasing (decreasing) their relative holdings following positive (negative) recommendations. More importantly, these investors respond more strongly to recommendations issued by their own analysts than to those issued by analysts affiliated with other banks, especially for recommendations on small and low-analyst-coverage firms. Thus, we find that investment banks “eat their own cooking,” showing that these presumably sophisticated institutional investors view sell-side recommendations as having investment value, particularly when the recommendations come from their own analysts.     

The impact of sell-side analyst research coverage on an affiliated broker’s market share of trading volume

Using NASDAQ reported individual stock level trading volume, we find that analyst research coverage on a stock increases the level of an affiliated broker’s market share of trading volume in that stock by 0.8 percent, on average, which corresponds to an additional annual volume of about one million shares in an average stock. Optimistic recommendations increase the level of market share by an additional 0.3 percent, on average, which is consistent with the notion that analysts have an incentive to issue optimistic recommendations. Also, a broker’s market share of volume increases on average when an affiliated analyst changes his/her recommendation, and decreases with the length of time during which an analyst maintains the same recommendation on a stock. The latter findings suggest that sell-side institutions are rewarded for providing new information to the market and for ongoing research services.     

Analyst forecasts and European mutual fund trading

This paper addresses the questions whether European mutual fund managers rely on sell-side analyst information and whether this behavior impacts fund performance. Results show that mutual funds significantly increase (decrease) their holdings in stocks when any of the consensus forecast measures increases (decreases) within the quarter prior to the observation period. Furthermore, mutual fund managers primarily attribute high information value to consensus forecast revisions that contain positive information, that are based on a sufficiently high number of inputs, and with more unanimous inputs to the consensus. Finally, following sell-side research seems to be beneficial for mutual fund managers since our results show that stock trades that are in line with analyst forecast revisions significantly outperform trades that are contrary to analyst research.     

Chaebol-affiliated analysts: Conflicts of interest and market responses

Some Korean business groups, or chaebols, have a large stake in securities firms that issue analysts’ reports on their member companies. This structure is unique in that industrial companies and securities firms are affiliated and operate within the same group. We investigate the informational content of earnings forecasts, stock recommendations and target prices made by the chaebol-affiliated analysts, using data collected between 2000 and 2008. The chaebol analysts tend to make more optimistic earnings forecasts for the member companies. The mean EPS forecast error (5.36%) of the affiliated analysts for the same chaebol company are significantly larger than that (3.23%) of other chaebol and independent analysts. The chaebol analysts also assign better recommendations by almost one level and set target prices 2.5% higher to the member companies after controlling for company and analyst characteristics. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that chaebol analysts’ reports are biased by conflicts of interest. Stock market reactions do not differ in response to announcements of stock recommendations issued by affiliated vs. non-affiliated analysts. This suggests that capital markets do not recognize the conflicts of interest inherent in chaebol analysts’ reports.     

INVESTORS ADJUST EXPECTATIONS AROUND SELL-SIDE ANALYST REVISIONS IN IPO RECOMMENDATIONS

In this article I compare investor response to sell-side analyst recommendation revisions of initial public offering (IPO) firms in the first three years after issue with that of a benchmark control sample of firms that have been public longer. I test whether investors in IPO firms adjust their initially optimistic expectations as information about new issues is released and uncertainty is resolved. In support of my hypothesis that investors adjust expectations downward, I find abnormally negative returns around analyst revisions of IPO firm recommendations. Additionally, I find the effect of analyst revisions on long-run performance of IPO firms is economically significant.     

Do Corporate Governance Analysts Matter? Evidence from the Expansion of Governance Analyst Coverage

T his paper examines the economic consequences of the initiation of governance analyst coverage. Governance analysts process, enhance, and disseminate governance‐related information to capital market participants via, for example, governance reports and ratings. Using an exogenous shock in the United Kingdom, I find that an increase in governance analyst coverage results in increased governance quality, improved liquidity, increased financial analyst following, and improved investor breadth. These findings are consistent with governance analysts creating value for firms via monitoring, information dissemination/production, and investor recognition.     

Analyst following,staggered boards,and managerial entrenchment

We use agency theory to explore how analyst coverage is influenced by the managerial entrenchment associated with the staggered board. The evidence suggests that firms with staggered boards attract significantly larger analyst following. We also document that firms with staggered boards experience less information asymmetry. Staggered boards insulate managers from the discipline of the takeover market. Entrenched managers are well-protected by the staggered board and have fewer incentives to conceal information, resulting in less information asymmetry. The more transparent information environment facilitates the analyst’s job. As a consequence, more analysts are attracted to firms with staggered boards. We also document the beneficial role of analyst coverage in improving firm value. Our results confirm the notion that analysts, as information intermediaries, provide oversight over management and thus help alleviate agency conflicts. The positive effect of analyst coverage, however, is severely reduced when the firm has a staggered board in place.     

A new approach to predicting analyst forecast errors: Do investors overweight analyst forecasts?

I provide evidence that investors overweight analyst forecasts by demonstrating that prices do not fully reflect predictable components of analyst errors, which conflicts with conclusions in prior research. I highlight estimation bias in traditional approaches and develop a new approach that reduces this bias. I estimate characteristic forecasts that map current firm characteristics into forecasts of future earnings. Contrasting characteristic and analyst forecasts predicts analyst forecast errors and revisions. I find abnormal returns to strategies that sort firms by predicted forecast errors, consistent with investors overweighting analyst forecasts and predictable biases in analyst forecasts influencing the information content of prices.     

ANALYST BEHAVIOR SURROUNDING TENDER OFFER ANNOUNCEMENTS

We examine the usefulness and credibility of analyst recommendations by focusing on their behavior surrounding tender offer announcements. For our 1998–2001 sample, we find analysts did not identify takeover targets through their recommendations nor did they distinguish between wealth‐increasing and wealth‐decreasing tender offers. We find some evidence of conflicts of interest in analyst recommendations, but it is confined to the 1999–2000 dot‐com period. However, the long‐run performance following recommendations suggests that these conflicts have little ultimate cost to investors.     

Regulating securities analysts

We examine the effects of regulations designed to address the potential conflict of interest that arises when sell-side analyst research is not independent of investment banking. We focus on two types of regulation: (1) internal barriers between equity research and investment banking that restrict communication; and (2) disclosure requirements relating to analyst compensation. We find that information barriers can increase research effort and improve report quality by limiting an investment bank's ability to distort its analyst's incentives. However, this type of regulation can also reduce information production and lower the quality of reports if an investment bank benefits directly from research activity. Disclosure requirements, on the other hand, unambiguously lead to more informative prices and a higher report quality relative to either information barriers or no regulation.     

Behavioural Bias and Conflicts of Interest in Analyst Stock Recommendations

Abstract:  This paper tests whether sell-side analysts are prone to behavioural errors when making stock recommendations as well as the impact of investment banking relationships on their judgments. In particular, we analyse their report narratives for evidence of cognitive bias. We find first that new buy recommendations on average have no investment value whereas new sell recommendations do, and take time to be assimilated by the market. We also show that new buy recommendations are distinguished from new sells both by the level of analyst optimism and representativeness bias as well as with increased conflicts of interest. Successful new buy recommendations are characterised by lower prior returns, value stock status, smaller firms and weaker investment banking relationships. On the other hand, successful new sells do not differ from their unsuccessful counterparts in terms of these measures. As such, we provide evidence that analysts are prone both to behavioural bias as well as potential conflicts of interest in their new buy stock recommendation decisions. We also show that these two explanations of analyst behaviour are to a great extent independent of each other. Consequently, the recent attempts by regulators to address potential conflicts of interest in analyst behaviour may have only limited impact.     

Causal effect of analyst following on corporate social responsibility

I examine the influence of sell-side financial analysts on corporate social responsibility (CSR) and find that firms with greater analyst coverage tend to be less socially responsible. To establish causality, I employ a difference-in-differences (DiD) technique, using brokerage closures and mergers as exogenous shocks to analyst coverage, as well as an instrumental variables approach. Both identification strategies suggest that analyst coverage has a negative causal effect on CSR. Analyst coverage seems to influence CSR activities via analysts' influence on the value of managerial ownership and discretionary spending. My findings are consistent with the view that spending on CSR is a manifestation of an agency problem and that financial analysts curb such discretionary spending by disciplining managers.     

The incremental impact of analyst initiation of coverage

I compare the return surrounding a sell-side analyst's initiation of coverage to the return surrounding a recommendation by an analyst who already covers the stock. The market responds more positively to analysts' initiations than to other recommendations. The incremental price impact of an initiation is 1.02% greater than the reaction to a recommendation by an analyst who already covers the stock. I examine whether the hypothesis that analyst coverage increases liquidity explains this incremental return. I find that liquidity improves after initiations, but that one must extend the liquidity hypothesis in order to fully explain the incremental price impact. Liquidity gains subsequent to analyst initiation depend on the analyst's recommendation. The more positive the initial recommendation, the greater the subsequent liquidity improvement. I also find that the initiation abnormal return correlates with the subsequent improvements in liquidity. Corporations should encourage analyst coverage to capture this liquidity benefit.     

Information,sell-side research,and market making

The interaction between an investment bank's research and market making arms may have important implications for the trading of a firm's stock. We investigate the impact that research has on the liquidity provided by the bank's market maker. Utilizing a large sample of Nasdaq firms, we show that market makers whose banks also provide research coverage provide more liquidity and contribute more to price discovery than do market makers without such research coverage. Finally, we show that such “affiliated” market makers are less affected by uncertainty following earnings announcements. Our results provide new evidence on the sources of liquidity improvements for Nasdaq firms, and suggest that the information produced by banks in the sell-side research process is beneficial to their market makers.     

信息共享还是利益冲突?——基于买方单独调研与买卖双方联合调研的实证检验

基于买方(Buy Side)与卖方(Sell Side)存在的利益关系(交易佣金),本文考察了买方(基金)调研对于卖方证券分析行业信息精度的影响。结果发现,基金调研行为对卖方机构预测准确度的影响机制并不单一。一方面通过“信息共享”效应提高了券商的平均预测准确性;另一方面,两者之间存在明显的“利益冲突”效应,该作用降低了卖方分析师的预测公允性。此外,本文更具体地研究了两种效应的内在传递机制。从“信息共享”的角度发现基金调研吸引更多券商分析师对上市公司的关注,从而为证券分析行业带来“信息增量”;从“利益冲突”的角度,实证结果表明在中国的二级市场中佣金关系(交易佣金席位)更能代表中国市场买卖双方之间的利益关系,这种利益关系带来的“利益冲突”降低信息有效性。进一步,本文通过TF-IDF方法挖掘调研文本信息,分析了牛熊市、投资者情绪和调研报告文本情感色彩对调研信息质量的影响。     

Do analysts follow emerging economy firms with higher intangible assets? Empirical evidence from Egypt

This paper tests whether analyst coverage and effort are related to the level of intangible assets reported by Egyptian listed firms. Intangible assets represent increasingly important investments for many firms, but most of these assets are not capitalized under prevailing accounting standards. Analysts reduce the information asymmetry by examining both financial reports and other information. Many Egyptian firms today seek access to foreign capital. I hypothesize that the larger the potential intangible assets of firms the more analysts will cover these firms and pursue private information about these firms. Sample consists of 435 firm-year observations over the period 1999–2007, and intangible assets are measured using eight different firm- and industry-level proxies. Consistent with prior research, results suggest that coverage is significantly associated with firm R&D, industry advertising expenses, firm size, and trading volume. Results also suggest that analyst effort is a function of firm and industry-level R&D expenses and firm size.     

Tagging the triggers: an empirical analysis of information events prompting sell-side analyst reports

In order to fulfill their function as information intermediaries in capital markets, sell-side equity analysts regularly issue updated forecasts on the stocks they cover. Quite often, the publication of (revised) analysts’ reports is subject to certain trigger events such as the publication of annual figures or the announcement of an upcoming merger. In this exploratory study, we develop a two-step procedure to identify the core events that trigger the release of analysts’ reports on companies that constitute the Dow Jones EuroSTOXX50 index during the three-year period from 2004 to 2006. These can be grouped into Financial Disclosures, Corporate Management, Corporate Strategy, Business Activity, Operating Environment and Share. The results suggest that sell-side analysts attach great importance to non-financial information events when transforming their earnings estimates into valuation forecasts and stock recommendations. Additionally, we link the information events identified as reasons of issuance to the summary measures disclosed in the reports in order to investigate the relationship between the report trigger and associated analyst reaction. Our findings indicate that the forecasting activity of sell-side analysts is greatly influenced by forward-looking statements made by management, strategy-related news flow, and non-company-specific information relating to the covered firm’s operating environment.     

Under watchful eyes: Analyst site visits and firm earnings management

This paper investigates whether analyst site visits, where sell-side analysts visit corporate sites and interact with management, reduce earnings management by host firms. Taking advantage of the disclosure of analyst site visits by Chinese listed firms, we find that the intensity of analyst site visits is negatively associated with discretionary accruals, and this relation is robust to controlling for endogeneity. Furthermore, we find that site visits attended by star analysts and including factory tours are associated with lower levels of discretionary accruals than those without these features. We also report that the number and coverage of questions posed during site visits are negatively associated with discretionary accruals. Our results demonstrate that site visits by sell-side analysts perform a vital monitoring role and exert significant constraints on firms' opportunistic financial reporting.     

The bright side of analyst coverage on corporate innovation: Evidence from China

Using a sample of A-share listed companies in China from 2007 to 2019, we investigate the effect of analyst coverage on corporate innovation. We find that analyst coverage will promote corporate innovation, supporting the information hypothesis. We also discuss possible mechanisms of how analyst coverage increases innovation. The information and monitor effects are two plausible channels that allow analyst coverage to promote innovation. Heterogeneity analysis shows the positive relation is more pronounced in non-SOEs, in higher intellectual property protection regions. And considering the firms' life cycle, we find firms in the growth and maturity stage are more vulnerably affected by analysts. Further investigation reveals a positive relationship between analyst coverage and external innovation, and the increased innovation ultimately translates into the long-term value of firms. Our research enriches the impact of analyst coverage on innovation and provides new empirical evidence to improve the multi-level capital market.