Collective bargaining and regional wage differences in Spain: an empirical analysis

This article analyses the importance of labour market institutions and, in particular, collective wage bargaining in shaping regional wage differences in the Spanish labour market. Using microdata from the Spanish Structure of Earnings Survey, our results reveal that there are significant inter-regional wage differences for similarly skilled workers. These differences are present throughout the whole wage structure and can be explained by both competitive and non-competitive factors, such as insufficient competition in product markets. In this context, industry-level collective bargaining plays a major role in accounting for regional wage differences, a role that in the Spanish case is enhanced due to its unusual regional dimension.     

Distribution of wealth and incomplete markets: Theory and empirical evidence

This paper analyses the equilibrium distribution of wealth in an economy where firms’ productivities are subject to idiosyncratic shocks, returns on factors are determined in competitive markets, households have linear consumption functions and government imposes taxes on capital and labour incomes and equally redistributes the collected resources to households. The equilibrium distribution of wealth is explicitly calculated and its shape crucially depends on market incompleteness. With incomplete markets it follows a Paretian law in the top tail and the Pareto exponent depends on the saving rate, on the net return on capital, on the growth rate of population, and on portfolio diversification. The characteristics of the labour market crucially affects the bottom tail, but not the upper tail of the distribution of wealth in the case of completely decentralized labour market. The analysis also suggests a positive relationship between growth and wealth inequality. The theoretical predictions find a corroboration in the empirical evidence of United States in the period 1989-2004.     

Trade and unions: Does size matter?

Our empirical analysis builds upon the hypothesis that unions are detrimental to a firm's efficiency. Using a rich survey of German manufacturers, we investigate firm-level determinants on the probability of collective wage bargaining with particular focus on the impact of a firm's engagement in foreign markets. An interesting and very robust finding is that exporters are less likely to engage in union wage bargaining. This finding is in line with a pessimistic perception of unions. The negative effect of collective bargaining can be offset by efficiency gains for larger exporters, who can benefit from operation cost saving effects. Size does matter as larger firms export and may find bargaining with a single entity representing the workforce more convenient than bargaining with each worker individually. We are using firm level information on IT investment as instrument for the export dummy and successfully test for the validity of this instrument.     

Will Deregulating the Labor Market in Australia Improve the Employment COnditions of Women?

This article traces the development of policies designed to reduce gender workforce inequality in Australia. In contrast to earlier centralized and collective approaches, current strategy is founded on individualism and direct workplace bargaining. The location of reform is now the enterprise, with direct bargaining replacing collective standards. Current policy developments have seen gender subsumed under market imperfections and family responsibilities. These policies will remove many of the safeguards of minimum pay and conditions for women workers, especially those who are most vulnerable. When combined with the growth of "nonstandard" jobs the picture is bleak for many workers, especially the low paid. The onus for corrective action now rests with individual employees and workplace managers, with trade unions being marginalized. The authors suggest that a continuation of the current policy will wind back the clock on the employment conditions of women workers in Australia.     

Optimal tax progressivity in unionised labour markets: What are the driving forces?

In labour markets with collective wage bargaining higher progressivity of the labour income tax creates a trade-off. On the one hand, wages are lowered and unemployment decreases, on the other hand, the individual labour supply decision is distorted at the hours-of-work margin. The optimal level of tax progressivity within this trade-off is determined using a numerical general equilibrium model with imperfect competition on the goods market, collective wage bargaining and a labour-supply module calibrated to empirically plausible elasticity values. The model is calibrated to macroeconomic and institutional parameters of both the OECD average and a number of individual OECD countries. In most cases the optimal degree of tax progressivity is below the actual level. A decomposition approach shows that the optimal level is increased by high unemployment and by the general tax level.     

Coordination versus flexibility in wage formation: a focus on the nominal wage impact of productivity in Germany,Greece, Ireland,Portugal, Spain and the United States

Wage coordination between countries of the European Monetary Union (EMU) aims at aligning nominal wage growth with labour productivity growth at the national level. We analyse the developments in Germany, the EMU’s periphery countries Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain along with the United States over the period 1980 to 2010. Apart from the contribution of productivity to nominal wages, we take into account the contributions of prices, unemployment, replacement rates and taxes by means of an econometrically estimated nonlinear equation resulting from a wage bargaining model. We further study the downward rigidities of nominal wages. The findings show that in past times of low productivity, price inflation and reductions in unemployment still put significant upward pressure on nominal wage growth. The periphery countries are far from aligning nominal wage growth with productivity growth. German productivity is a major wage determinant, but surely not the only one. Within the context of a free bargaining process between employers and labour unions, policy-makers can effectively use the replacement rate to steer the nominal wages outcome.     

Shocks and rigidities as determinants of CEE labour markets’ performance

In this article, the impact of real wage, productivity, labour demand and supply shocks on eight Central and Eastern European (CEE) economies from 1996–2007 is analysed with a panel structural vector error correction model. A set of long‐run restrictions derived from the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model is used to identify structural shocks, and fluctuations in foreign demand are controlled for. We find that the propagation of shocks on CEE labour markets resembles that found for OECD countries. Labour demand shocks emerge as the main determinant of employment and unemployment variability in the short‐to‐medium run, but wage rigidities were equally important for observed labour market performance, especially in Poland, Czech Republic and Lithuania. We associate these rigidities with collective bargaining, minimum wage, active labour market policies and employment protection legislation.     

The Political Economy of Social Pacts in the EMU: Irish Liberal Market Corporatism in Crisis

The economic crisis is a collective action problem. In the absence of currency devaluations, eurozone governments are faced with the painful social process of wage devaluations. This paper examines the strategic choices facing the government and organised labour in how they respond to this problem. It will argue that the European Monetary Union contains an implicit neoclassical assumption that labour markets will automatically adjust to downward wage flexibility. This ignores the politics of collective bargaining. Labour relations systems are the most regulated of all markets. Based on this institutional embeddedness, the paper will outline a typology of political choices facing national governments: neoliberal market adjustment, national or sectoral concertation and euro-coordination. Institutional pre-conditions of collective bargaining mediate what strategy governments adopt. It will subsequently examine the case of Ireland that tried and failed to negotiate a national pact in 2009. Social partnership was a central institution of Ireland's political economy for 20 years but could not internalise the adjustment constraints of the current crisis. The voluntary and exclusive nature of Ireland's corporatist wage pacts weakened the power resources of labour and enabled the government to pursue a neoliberal strategy of adjustment. As an institution, it was dependent upon the political executive of the state.     

Macroeconomic outcomes,collective bargaining and intersectoral productivity differentials: a panel approach

Using a sample of 19 advanced countries from 1990 to 2014 and an Arellano–Bover/Blundell–Bond linear dynamic GMM estimator along with a bootstrap-based bias correction fixed effects estimator for dynamic panels, the paper examines the macroeconomic impact of collective bargaining structures in a context of varying intersectoral heterogeneity in productivity growth among the exposed and sheltered sectors of the economy. Results show a dampening impact of pattern and centralized bargaining structures on unemployment. However, strong domestic demand is a key precondition for such a favourable effect to materialize. Uncoordinated and centralized bargaining structures are the most efficient in terms of labour cost restraint while industry bargaining moderates labour cost growth as intersectoral productivity differentials widen.     

Unions and Gender Pay Equity in Academe: A Study of U.S. Institutions

This paper uses 1994-95 faculty salary data from over 1,100 four-year U.S. academic institutions, about one-fourth of them with collective bargaining agreements, to ask if faculty unions make a difference to gender pay equity. Average gender salary differences are negative at every rank and at every category of U.S. institution with or without collective bargaining agreement. Unions may improve gender salary differentials somewhat, particularly at the assistant professor level. There is no evidence that this gain will be lost at higher levels, and mixed evidence that further gains occur for women at the full professor level. The most pervasive and robust consequence of unions is to increase the positive impact that higher proportions of women at senior faculty ranks make on relative salaries at the assistant professor level. However, the influence of these higher-ranked women on gender salary inequalities at the associate and full levels is lower in union schools than nonunion schools. By reducing the flexibility of existing salary structures, collective bargaining apparently reduces the influence of senior women faculty on the salaries of current women faculty members while increasing their attention and influence at entry levels.     

Pitfalls in the modeling of labor market flows: a reappraisal

ABSTRACT

We discuss the relevance of the internationally adopted methodology for modelling labour market flows and comparing labour market flexibility. This is based on a two-state labour market model that neglects inactivity and uses aggregate stock data to derive transition rates. Traditionally, the results suggest that continental European labour markets are inflexible and unable to adjust quickly to aggregate demand or supply shocks compared with their Anglo-Saxon counterparts. This evidence has driven us to gain a better understanding of the relevance of such a modelling approach and critically discuss its main methodological hypothesis. We relax its assumptions by including inactivity and by using flow data for the period 2010–2017. We compare the results thus obtained with transition rates derived using a three-state labour market model for France, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom. These countries represent the institutional settings of continental Europe on the one hand and Anglo-Saxon nations on the other. The implied transition rates are much higher, even in continental Europe, when inactivity is considered, thus suggesting that conclusions derived using an incomplete representation of the labour market are misleading. Inactivity therefore plays a crucial role and its inclusion provides a more exhaustive picture of labour mobility.     

Minimum wages and the wage distribution in Estonia

Abstract: This article studies how changes in the statutory minimum wage have affected the wage distribution in Estonia, a post-transition country with little collective bargaining and relatively large wage inequality. The analyses show that the minimum wage has had substantial spillover effects on wages in the lower tail of the distribution; the effects are most pronounced up to the twentieth percentile and then decline markedly. The minimum wage has contributed to lower wage inequality and this has particularly benefitted low-wage segments of the labour market such as women and the elderly. Interestingly, the importance of the minimum wage for the wage distribution was smaller during the global financial crisis than before or after the crisis.     

Exports, unemployment, and the welfare state

Abstract .  The paper analyzes the labour market effects of globalization when foreign market entry is costly and risky. With flexible labour markets, a fall in foreign market entry cost tends to generate more income inequality, but not necessarily so, as more firms pay foreign entry cost. By contrast, when labour markets are inflexible in the short run, globalization tends to increase unemployment. In this situation, government unemployment benefits reduce the wages that exporting firms need to pay workers as risk compensation. Thus more firms within an industry and more industries enter the foreign market, which in turn tends to increase unemployment.     

Efficient bargaining versus right to manage: A stability analysis in a Cournot duopoly with trade unions

The present study considers a unionised (nonlinear) duopoly with two different labour market institutions, i.e. efficient bargaining (EB) and right to manage (RTM), to analyse product market stability under quantity competition with trade unions. We show that when the preference of unions towards wages is small, (i) the parametric stability region under RTM is higher than under EB, and (ii) a rise in the union power in the Nash bargaining played between firms and unions monotonically increases (resp. reduces) the parametric stability region under RTM (resp. EB). In contrast, when the preference of unions becomes larger, an increase in the union's bargaining power acts: (1) as an economic stabiliser when the union power is small; (2) as an economic de-stabiliser when the union power is high. In addition to established results with regard to equilibrium outcomes, our findings shed some light on the effects of how the labour market regulation affects out-of-equilibrium behaviours in a Cournot duopoly.     

Employment and Productivity Growth in Europe and North America: The Impact of Labor Market Institutions

In this paper, we examine long-run employment and productivity growth in the major economies of North America and Europe from 1960 to the early 1990s. We develop a model in which output growth is determined by the growth of aggregate demand, and the relative contributions of employment and productivity growth to the growth of output depend on country specific labor market institutions. We find that institutions that promote collective bargaining, employment security and social protection have roughly equal and opposite effects on employment growth (negative) and productivity growth (positive), giving rise to an inverse relationship between these variables. The welfare implications of this finding are that labor market deregulation could result in more work and greater inequality and insecurity for workers, without significantly increasing the rate of economic growth.     

UNION–FIRM BARGAINING AGENDA REVISITED: WHEN UNIONS HAVE DISTINCT PREFERENCES

In this paper we revisit the issue of the scope of bargaining between firms and unions by considering a more general union's utility function with distinct preferences and sequential negotiations. First, we compare exogenously given labour market institutions; i.e., right‐to‐manage (RTM) and sequential efficient bargaining (SEB). We show that the conventional wisdom, which states that firms always prefer RTM, no longer holds. In fact, when unions are adequately wage aggressive and have strong enough bargaining power, firms may prefer SEB negotiations; however, firms switch their preference to RTM when unions are very strong. Moreover, we show that a conflict of interest between the parties may emerge when unions are sufficiently employment oriented as well as sufficiently wage aggressive and not too strong or too weak in bargaining. Second, we analyse the endogenous choice of the bargaining agenda. We show that a rich plethora of equilibria may occur and new situations of conflict/agreement of interests between the bargaining parties arise in particular when unions are sufficiently wage‐aggressive.     

WESTERN FARM LABOR ISSUES

This paper examines three farm labor issues: (1) how mechanization affects the demand for farm labor; (2) how immigration reform affects the supply of farm workers; and (3) how 10 years of collective bargaining affect the farm labor market. The evidence suggests that mechanization, immigration reform, and collective bargaining have had or will have fewer effects on the farm labor market than is often assumed. However, the farm labor market is vulnerable to future shocks if it remains isolated from nonfarm labor markets.     

Labour market outliers: Lessons from Portugal and Spain

Spain has the highest unemployment rate (22.2%) of any European Union country, Portugal one of the lowest (7.3%). Superficially, these countries share many labour market features: the toughest job security rules in the OECD, an apparently similar architecture of wage bargaining, and comparable generosity of their unemployment insurance systems, at least since 1989. We address the puzzle by examining Portuguese and Spanish labour market institutions, in particular job security, unemployment benefits and the system of wage bargaining. We then conduct empirical analysis of Spanish and Portuguese unemployment outflows and wage distributions, using micro data. We find differences in unemployment benefits (non-existent in Portugal until 1985, and less generous nowadays), differences in wage flexibility (wage floors by category established by collective agreements are set at a lower relative level in Portugal), and, in practice, higher firing costs in Spain. A key explanation of the difference in Portuguese and Spanish unemployment rates is the wage adjustment process. Generous benefit levels may have been necessary for the path Spanish unions took, but this was not the sole explanation of different wage setting in Spain and Portugal.     

Structural change,specialization and regional labour market performance: evidence for the UK

While structural change and regional differences in the pattern of employment specialization are widely perceived to be significant factors in accounting for disparities in the labour market performance of regions in the United Kingdom, there have been relatively few recent attempts to gather detailed evidence on this issue. The current study aims to fill this gap by examining the effects of structural change and associated changes in the pattern of employment specialization on three key indicators of regional labour market performance: the rate of employment growth, the unemployment rate and the rate of nonemployment. The findings indicate that while industry structure has statistically significant effects on regional labour market performance, the quantitative significance of these effects is relatively small.     

Labour market segmentation and union wage gaps

Abstract

There has been a great deal of research regard the effects of unions on union – non-union wage gap. Most of the studies regarding the impact of unions on wages have assumed that apart from the division between union and non-union workers, the labour market is relatively homogeneous. A number of economists, however, have argued that the labour market is segmented, implying that there are distinct labour markets and that some workers employment opportunities are concentrated in “bad jobs” while other workers employment opportunities are concentrated in “good jobs” which are rationed.

This paper will explore whether the relative wage differential between union and non-union workers differs between the independent primary, subordinate primary and secondary labour markets. Labour market segments are defined using “job zones”. “Job zones” are distinct groups defined by the level of specific vocational preparation necessary for a particular occupation, allowing for the comparison of skill levels and training for each occupation. The data on “job zones” comes from the Occupational Information Network database (O?Net). We estimate separate equations for union and non-union workers in each segment using data from the Current Population Survey and calculate union non-union differentials for each labour market segment. The findings of this paper suggest that the greatest differentials are in secondary labour markets followed by differentials in the subordinate primary labour market and that the smallest wage differentials are in the independent primary labour market.