Information, speed vs. cost trade-offs, and order routing decisions in U.S. equity markets

Prior research indicates that both execution speed and cost are important to traders, but that these two dimensions of execution quality are negatively related across U.S. equity markets. In our paper, we examine how U.S. equity traders, who are (un)informed about future price changes, trade-off between speed and cost in their order-routing decisions. We find that informed traders are more likely to choose trading systems that allow them to trade-off lower cost for faster speed; whereas, uninformed traders are more likely to choose trading systems that allow them to sacrifice speed for lower costs. Our results indicate that traders have varying preferences for the different dimensions of execution quality based on their information levels. These differences subsequently influence order-routing decisions.     

Is faster or slower trading better? An examination of order type execution speed and costs

We examine order type execution speed and costs for US equity traders. Marketable orders that execute slower exhibit lower execution costs. Those who remove liquidity faster and pay higher trading costs transact in smaller size, spread trading across more venues, take more liquidity, and are better informed. Nonmarketable limit orders that execute slower exhibit greater adverse selection; and larger, uninformed traders who concentrate their trading in fewer venues submit them. Our findings suggest that slowing down the trading process, when faster options exist, can benefit certain market participants who seek to cross the bid–ask spread.     

The “make or take” decision in an electronic market: Evidence on the evolution of liquidity

This paper uses experimental asset markets to investigate the evolution of liquidity in an electronic limit order market. Our market setting includes salient features of electronic limit order markets, as well as informed traders and liquidity traders. We focus on the strategies of the traders and how these are affected by trader type, characteristics of the market, and characteristics of the asset. We find that informed traders use more limit orders than do liquidity traders. Our main result is that liquidity provision shifts as trading progresses, with informed traders increasingly providing liquidity in markets. The change in the behavior of the informed traders seems to be in response to the dynamic adjustment of prices to information; they take (provide) liquidity when the value of their information is high (low). Thus, a market-making role emerges endogenously in our electronic markets and is ultimately adopted by the traders who are least subject to adverse selection when placing limit orders.     

The Determinants of Execution Costs in Short‐Term Money Markets

Prior research attributes the observed negative relation between execution costs and trade size in opaque markets to two factors—information asymmetry and broker‐client relationships. We provide evidence that a trader's ex ante transaction price information and the relationship traders have with their brokers are both significant determinants of a trader's execution costs in an opaque market; however, traders who establish strong relationships with their brokers will achieve a greater reduction in execution costs than traders with ex ante transaction price information. We also find evidence that trade size has little explanatory power after controlling for a trader's ex ante transaction price information and broker‐client relationships.     

PIP Transactions,Price Improvement,Informed Trades and Order Execution Quality

This study focuses on innovations in order execution processes within the context of the Boston Option Exchange (BOX). More specifically, it examines the impact of the Price Improvement Process (PIP) on options quoted, effective and realised proportional spreads. We consider the PIP as a mechanism that allows the market maker to ‘internalise’ the transaction. We show that PIP transactions are associated with wider bid/ask proportional quoted spreads than non‐PIP transactions, in spite of the temporary narrowing of the effective proportional spread during PIP. We identify informed traders by focusing on the direction of trade. Using an original data set, we show that PIP transactions follow signals in the form of buy/sell orders by informed traders. We also show that PIP is a mechanism that allows the market maker to internalise a position in the same direction as that of the informed trader. We conclude that PIP does not improve the efficiency of the market but simply allows the market maker to benefit at the expense of uninformed traders.     

A dynamic limit order market with fast and slow traders

This paper considers the role of high-frequency trading in a dynamic limit order market. Fast traders? ability to revise their quotes quickly after news arrivals helps to reduce the inefficiency that is rooted in the risk of being picked off, which increases trade. However, their presence induces slow traders to strategically submit limit orders with a lower execution probability, thereby reducing trade. Because speed is a source of market power, it enables fast traders to extract rents from other market participants and triggers a costly arms race that reduces social welfare. The model generates a number of testable implications concerning the effects of high-frequency trading in limit order markets.     

Learning from others,reacting, and market quality

Traders pay attention to one another but are unable to perfectly deduce each others’ beliefs from transactions alone. This explains why markets are hard to beat and also why trading occurs at all. Even when traders react rationally to the actions of others, they cannot arrive easily at a common posterior assessment of value. We model a realistic market composed of traders who combine their own private information with rational learning about the information possessed by others. We compare phenomena in this market with an otherwise identical market populated by traders who receive the same private information but ignore other traders. Using simulation to engender greater realism, we find that learning usually reduces volatility, increases the accuracy of the market price as a forecast of value, reduces trading volume, and decreases the prevalence of bubbles. However, for some combinations of market conditions, learning can have the opposite effect. The marginal influences of eight different market conditions, ranging from information heterogeneity through resource diversity, are estimated. Prices, volatility, volume, and bubbles exhibit subtle and complex responses to market conditions.     

Hidden liquidity: An analysis of order exposure strategies in electronic stock markets

Many stock exchanges choose to reduce market transparency by allowing traders to hide some or all of their order size. We study the costs and benefits of order exposure and test hypotheses regarding hidden order usage using a sample of Euronext-Paris stocks, where hidden orders represent 44% of the sample order volume. Our results support the hypothesis that hidden orders are associated with a decreased probability of full execution and increased average time to completion, and fail to support the alternate hypothesis that order exposure causes defensive traders to withdraw from the market. However, exposing rather than hiding order size increases average execution costs. We assess the extent to which non-displayed size is truly hidden and document that the presence and magnitude of hidden orders can be predicted to a significant, but imperfect, degree based on observable order attributes, firm characteristics, and market conditions. Overall, the results indicate that the option to hide order size is valuable, in particular, to patient traders.     

Can Island Provide Liquidity and Price Discovery in the Dark?

On September 23, 2002, facing a regulatory mandate issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission, Island teminated the position of the Nasdaq 100 Index Tracking Stock (QQQ) on its book. While the market volume remained almost the same, Island's market share in the QQQ fell significantly. However, Island still dominates other trading centers in the price discovery process and volatility spillovers. The spreads on most trading centers became narrower after Island removed its quotes from the public view. The overall results suggest that the decrease in market transparency does not compromise market liquidity. Informed traders who provide price discovery in the QQQ are willing to sacrifice potential price improvements for the fast speed and reliable execution that Island offers, and are able to trade in the absence of displayed quotes.     

An examination of the relationship between the disposition effect and gender,age, the traded security,and bull–bear market conditions

We analyze how gender and age, internal characteristics of retail futures traders—one that remains fixed while the other changes over a lifetime—and the security being traded and bull–bear market conditions, two external factors, are related to the disposition effect by separately tracking their trade-by-trade transaction histories over a period of close to six years on the Taiwan Futures Exchange (TAIFEX). We show that women and mature traders, compared with their male and younger counterparts, exhibit a stronger disposition effect. The effect is also stronger among traders who trade financial-sector futures contracts than among those who trade electronic-sector futures contracts. We further demonstrate that a bear market sees a stronger disposition effect.     

Intraday time and order execution quality dimensions

We examine intraday execution quality patterns on Nasdaq stocks using proprietary order-level data from a US broker dealer. Orders submitted midday execute slower than orders submitted around the open and close. However, midday orders have lower execution costs. Our results indicate that execution speed and execution cost exhibit offsetting intraday time-dependent patterns and these patterns appear to be induced by variations in informed trading levels. While some traders concentrate their trading activity around the open and close, others prefer to trade midday. Traders have varying preferences for when to trade, and offsetting patterns exist between speed and cost. These factors highlight the complexity in defining an optimal trading time, which, among other things, is dependent on the dimensional preferences of individual traders.     

Order dynamics: Recent evidence from the NYSE

We examine investor order choices using evidence from a recent period when the NYSE trades in decimals and allows automatic executions. We analyze the decision to submit or cancel an order or to take no action. For submitted orders, we distinguish order type (market vs. limit), order side (buy vs. sell), execution method (auction vs. automatic), and pricing aggressiveness. We find that the NYSE exhibits positive serial correlation in order type on an order-by-order basis, which suggests that follow-on order strategies dominate adverse selection or liquidity considerations at a moment in time. Aggregated levels of order flow also exhibit positive serial correlation in order type, but appear to be non-stationary processes. Overall, changes in aggregated order flow have an order-type serial correlation that is close to zero at short aggregation intervals, but becomes increasingly negative at longer intervals. This implies a liquidity exhaustion–replenishment cycle. We find that small orders routed to the NYSE's floor auction process are sensitive to the quoted spread, but that small orders routed to the automatic execution system are not. Thus, in addition to foregoing price improvement, traders selecting the speed of automatic executions on the NYSE do so with little regard for the quoted cost of immediacy. As quoted depth increases, traders respond by competing on price via limit orders that undercut existing bid and ask prices. Limit orders are more likely and market sells are less likely late in the trading day. These results are helpful in understanding the order arrival process at the NYSE and have potential applications in academics and industry for optimizing order submission strategies.     

Why Do Traders Split Orders?

We examine factors that influence decisions by U.S. equity traders to execute a string of orders, in the same stock, in the same direction, around the same time. Order splitting is more likely to occur when traders submit larger‐size orders and when market depth and trading activity are lower. Order splitters demand liquidity more and pay higher trading costs, but their overall performance is better. When controlling for execution time, split orders are more informative than single orders. Our results suggest that order splitting arises from a variety of factors, including informational differences, order and trader characteristics, and market conditions.     

Volume, Volatility, Price, and Profit When All Traders Are Above Average

People are overconfident. Overconfidence affects financial markets. How depends on who in the market is overconfident and on how information is distributed. This paper examines markets in which price-taking traders, a strategic-trading insider, and risk-averse marketmakers are overconfident. Overconfidence increases expected trading volume, increases market depth, and decreases the expected utility of overconfident traders. Its effect on volatility and price quality depend on who is overconfident. Overconfident traders can cause markets to underreact to the information of rational traders. Markets also underreact to abstract, statistical, and highly relevant information, and they overreact to salient, anecdotal, and less relevant information.     

Dancing in the dark: post-trade anonymity,liquidity and informed trading

We analyze the impact of post-trade anonymity on liquidity and informed trading in an order driven stock market. The German stock market introduced the Central Counterparty (CCP) in March 2003 for German equities traded on its anonymous electronic trading platform Xetra leading to a major change in its existing transparency regime. Before the introduction trader IDs were revealed to the counterparties of a trade, with the introduction of the CCP even after the transaction the traders remain anonymous. Previous theoretical and empirical research documents that pre-trade anonymity results in increased liquidity, while results on post-trade anonymity are mixed. We find a significant increase in liquidity measured through a reduction of 25% in implicit transaction costs. We also document that the arrival rate of informed traders is reduced in the anonymous setting. Following recent findings of Bloomfield et al. (J Finan Econ 75:165–199, 2005) that informed traders take on the role of liquidity providers we interpret our findings as indication that informed traders change their behavior in providing liquidity more aggressively in an anonymous environment.     

Competition among Trading Venues: Information and Trading on Electronic Communications Networks

This paper explores the competition between two trading venues, Electronic Communication Networks (ECNs) and Nasdaq market makers. ECNs offer the advantages of anonymity and speed of execution, which attract informed traders. Thus, trades are more likely to occur on ECNs when information asymmetry is greater and when trading volume and stock‐return volatility are high. ECN trades have greater permanent price impacts and more private information is revealed through ECN trades than though market‐maker trades. However, ECN trades have higher ex ante trading costs because market makers can preference or internalize the less informed trades and offer them better executions.     

Information, Trading Demand, and Futures Price Volatility

We examine the relation between futures price volatility and trading demand by type of trader in the Standard & Poor's (S&P) 500-stock index futures market. We find that volatility covaries negatively with signed speculative demand shocks but is positively related to signed hedging demand shocks. No significant relation between volatility and demand shocks for small traders is found. Our results suggest that changes in positions of large hedgers destabilize the market, whereas changes in positions of large speculators stabilize volatility. Consistent with models with asymmetrically informed traders, we find that large speculators are likely to possess superior forecasting ability, large hedgers behave like positive feedback traders, and small traders are liquidity traders.     

Proprietary trading losses in banks: do banks invest sufficiently in control?

This paper analyzes management and control issues linked to the employment of traders who engage in proprietary trading activity for their employer (a bank). The bank can invest in control and monitoring of these traders, and the paper evaluates the profitability of such investments. We find that the investment in control is distorted due to interfering market microstructure effects. The bank is inclined to underinvest in control of its traders because traders who are not too closely monitored generate extra liquidity in the market. Bank supervision might be needed, therefore, to correct for such effects. We evaluate the effectiveness of the value-at-risk capital adequacy requirement proposed by the Bank for International Settlements, and find that this approach correctly targets the banks that are the most vulnerable, i.e. those that are the most at risk of underinvesting in its control and monitoring systems.      

Regulation NMS and Market Quality

We show that both the quoted and effective spreads increased, the quoted depth decreased, and the market quality index decreased after the implementation of Regulation National Market System (NMS) (Reg NMS). We also find an increase in the price impact of trades and the dispersion of the pricing error after Reg NMS. The order execution speed is slower, the order fill rate is lower, and the order cancellation rate is higher for most trades after Reg NMS. Hence, contrary to the Securities and Exchange Commission's belief, Reg NMS has proven to be detrimental to most traders. NASDAQ provided faster and more reliable executions than the NYSE/AMEX, and NASDAQ gained market shares from the NYSE/AMEX and other trading venues after Reg NMS.     

Consolidation, fragmentation, and the disclosure of trading information

It is commonly believed that fragmented security markets havea natural tendency to consolidate. This article examines thisbelief, focusing on the effect of disclosing trading informationto market participants. We show that large traders who placemultiple trades can benefit from the absence of trade disclosurein a fragmented market, as can dealers who face less price competitionthan in a unified market. Consequently, a fragmented marketneed not coalesce into a single market unless trade disclosureis mandatory. We also compare and contrast fragmented and consolidatedmarkets. Fragmentation results in higher price volatility andviolations of price efficiency.