Trade liberalization in environmental goods

Trade negotiations have started to pay attention to liberalization in environmental goods (EGs), whose production may require dirty intermediate goods. We construct a two-country trade model to explore the effects of trade liberalization in EGs on the local pollution, the global environment and welfare in the presence of such an environmental conundrum. We find that countries do not necessarily benefit from trade liberalization in EGs in the absence of an environmental policy. With the assistance of an upstream pollution tax, trade liberalization in EGs improves each country's welfare. This result holds independent of whether the upstream market is competitive or not, or whether we have upstream trade across countries. For asymmetric countries, trade liberalization in EGs improves the world welfare and the welfare for the country if it has a smaller demand for EGs; or experiences less damage from the production of dirty inputs; or values environment improvement more.     

Trade Liberalization and Environmental Taxation in Federal Systems

The literature on trade liberalization and environment has not yet considered federal structures. In this paper, we show how the design of environmental policy in a federal system has implications for the effects of trade reform. Trade liberalization leads to a decline in pollution taxes, regardless of whether pollution taxes are set at the federal (centralized) or local (decentralized) level, and it increases social welfare. The effect under a decentralized system is smaller than if these taxes are set by the federal government, and pollution emissions therefore decline in this case. Moreover, majority bias interacts with trade liberalization if federal taxes are used.     

Trade Liberalization and Welfare Inequality: A Demand‐Based Approach*

There is strong evidence suggesting that different income groups consume different bundles of goods. Hence, trade liberalization can affect welfare inequality via changes in the relative prices of goods consumed by different income groups (the price effect). In this paper, I develop a framework that enables us to explore the role of the price effect in determining welfare inequality. I find that trade liberalization does benefit some income classes more than others. In particular, I show that the relative welfare of the rich with respect to that of the poor has a hump shape as a function of trade costs.     

A Welfare Ranking of Multilateral Reductions in Real and Tariff Trade Barriers when Firms are Heterogenous

Trade liberalization comes about through reductions in various types of trade barriers. This paper introduces, apart from the customary real trade costs (i.e. iceberg and fixed export costs), two revenue generating trade barriers (i.e. an ad valorem tariff and a trade license) into a standard heterogeneous‐firms‐trade model with Pareto distributed productivities. We derive analytical welfare rankings of all four liberalization channels for an equal effect on two openness measures, for any trade cost level and while all four barriers are simultaneously present, i.e. for any initial equilibrium. We show that when openness is measured at retail prices, not border prices, the welfare rankings are sensitive to the degree of efficiency in revenue redistribution, e.g. the share of tariff revenues wasted on rent‐seeking activities. As a result, multilateral tariff reductions can switch from the least to the most preferred mode of liberalization. Among the other three barriers we establish a universal welfare ranking for any strictly positive level of revenue redistribution and for either measure of openness.     

On the static and dynamic costs of trade restrictions for small developing countries

We analyze the costs of trade restrictions for a small developing economy (LDC). Intermediate goods invented elsewhere are only introduced on the LDC market if it is profitable to do so. The LDC economy evolves to a balanced growth path in which income, welfare, and the share of available goods increase if trade restrictions fall. The adjustment path is asymmetric: an increase in trade restrictions leads to a slow-down of economic growth, while a decrease may lead to a rapid catch-up process. The dynamic costs of trade restrictions are in general substantially larger than the static costs.     

A North–South model of outsourcing and growth

In this paper, I formulate a simple North–South R&D‐based growth model where final goods firms in the North endogenously determine the range of international outsourcing of intermediate goods to the South. I show that a fall in the trade cost (through trade liberalization) of intermediate goods in the North: (i) reduces the wage of the North relative to that of the South; (ii) increases the outsourced variety of intermediate goods in the North; and (iii) stimulates Northern R&D activity and economic growth in both countries. By conducting welfare analysis, I also show that a decline in the trade cost of intermediate goods in the North improves welfare in the South more than in the North.     

Labor matching behavior and trade adjustment

This paper develops a model of costly trade and team production to examine the matching behavior of skilled workers in an open economy. Trade liberalization changes the supply of skilled production teams available for hire, even when firm production techniques remain fixed. As trade barriers fall, some workers choose to quit small firms in order to accept less skill intensive jobs at large firms that participate in foreign markets. Changes in worker matching behavior can explain several stylized features of firm-level adjustments to trade, with effects that are not limited to firms on the margin of exit or exporting. Trade is shown to rationalize the matching behavior of workers, leading to aggregate gains in productivity and lower prices. Openness benefits workers employed at exporting firms, however the likelihood of gaining from trade is not necessarily increasing in skill. Wages in the open economy are tied to both worker skill and job type.     

Interest Groups, Trade Liberalization, and Environmental Standards

In considering a country that imposes a minimum standard on an imported polluting good, which generates negative consumption externalities, we construct a common-agency model, in which a domestic environmental group and a foreign industrial lobby can influence the formation of the minimum standard by providing political contributions to the government. This paper investigates the effects of trade liberalization on the political equilibrium environmental standard, the pattern of trade, environmental disutility, and social welfare. We find that trade liberalization tightens the minimum standard, decreases imports of the polluting good, and reduces environmental disutilities. The importing country’s social welfare, however, does not necessarily increase with trade liberalization. The weaker the environmental group’s lobbying efficiency, or the stronger the foreign firm’s lobbying efficiency, the more likely it is that trade liberalization will enhance the importing country’s welfare.     

Trade Liberalization and Environmental Regulation on International Transportation

Incorporating pollution emissions from international transportation into a model of strategic trade and environmental policies, we investigate the effect of trade liberalization and environmental regulation on national welfare and the environment. Our model includes imperfectly competitive markets for international transportation and final products. We find that trade liberalization may reduce each country's welfare unless some level of environmental regulation on international transportation is in place. When international trade is liberalized initially, a mutual increase in the common emission tax rates may improve each country's welfare. However, when international trade is highly protected initially, imposing an emission tax may reduce welfare.     

The Effects of Trade Liberalization between Heterogeneous Countries on Endogenous Mergers

This paper examines the effects of trade liberalization on merger behavior. We endogenize merger choice among owners in an oligopolistic industry in asymmetric countries to analyze the consequences of trade cost reductions on competitiveness and welfare. In this context, the non‐cooperative game supports asymmetric market structures. We also find that trade liberalization is not necessarily pro‐competitive in countries with the competitive advantage, even if trade costs are completely abolished. Moreover, the tariff‐jumping explanation of international mergers does not necessarily apply. The welfare analysis shows that merger behavior can significantly alter any gains from liberalization. Countries should consider enforcing competition in regional agreements. Specifically, to avoid a reduction in domestic welfare following trade‐liberalizing reductions in trade costs, a high‐cost country's optimal policy may be to ban international mergers.     

Technology and the dynamics of comparative advantage

This paper explores how trade affects innovation in a two‐country, two‐good, two‐factor Heckscher–Ohlin model with heterogeneous firms. Trade openness induces an increase in process innovation in both industries. The increase is stronger in the comparative advantage industry. Trade openness boosts prospective entrants' profits in that industry, which leads to further increases in product innovation. Trade liberalization generates a different relative impact on innovation across industries, depending on trade costs. When they are high (low), it increases process innovation relatively more in the comparative advantage (disadvantage) industry, leading to TFP divergence (convergence) across industries.     

Trade creating free trade areas and the undermining of multilateralism

This paper indicates that the consequences of regional trade agreements for the world trade system may be deceiving—an arrangement's apparent virtue may constitute the source of its drawback. In a model where governments have political, as well as economic, motivations, I show that a free trade area induces its members to reduce protection against the non-members, and to do so sufficiently deeply to generate overall trade creation. Trade creation amplifies the excluded countries’ access to the integrating markets, but also reduces their extra gains from multilateral liberalization. Thus, trade creation can reverse the support of the excluded countries to liberalization on a multilateral basis. This is more likely to happen when governments outside the free trade area are more responsive to special interests.     

Vertical specialization in North–South trade: Industrial relocation,wage and welfare

This paper presents a North–South trade model with vertically linked industries and examines how declining costs of trade across stages of production encourage vertical specialization and affect wages and welfare. As trade costs fall below a threshold, the production of all final goods relocates to the South and vertical specialization emerges. In some industries, production of intermediate goods also relocates against comparative costs because of benefits of co‐location, and further declines in trade costs lead to reshoring. A country may temporarily lose from falling trade costs, but both countries can be better off after trade costs fall sufficiently.     

Adjustment in the process of trade liberalization: The U.S. and Mexico

Although many of the issues in North-American trade liberalization are reminiscent of those faced earlier by Europeans and by the United States and Canada, there are also some non-trivial differences. Divergences in economic structure are more pronounced. They affect the interplay of various sources of welfare gains and costs and are likely to make inter-industry and vertically integrated intra-industry trade more important Non-tariff barriers play a greater role in the present context and the welfare effects of preferntial elimination of quantitative restraints differ in important respect from those of tariffs. A free trade area, for example, which is clearly trade-diverting under tariff liberalization may be trade-creating under quantitative restrictions.     

Technology Diffusion through Trade with Heterogeneous Firms

I investigate the long‐run implications of trade and technology diffusion through trade, when firms are heterogeneous and trade is costly. This paper integrates firm heterogeneity and trade into a product innovation growth model from endogenous growth theory. I find that although exposure to trade increases average productivity, it has an ambiguous effect on economic growth and consumer welfare.     

Tax Competition and Economic Integration

This article examines the role of tax competition and economic integration in a core–periphery setting, where agglomeration forces are present. I present a New Economic Geography model, which accounts for firm entry/exit and international mobility of skilled labor employed in the public R&D sectors. In contrast to other literature on tax competition, I focus on its impact on labor migration and net earnings of skilled and unskilled labor. Economic integration is modeled as trade liberalization, an easing of factor mobility restrictions and technology diffusion. I find that tax competition favors skilled labor when trade costs are reduced. In contrast, unskilled labor benefits when factor mobility restrictions are eased and technology diffusion is enhanced.     

An Eaton–Kortum model of trade and growth

We combine a multi‐country, continuum‐good Ricardian model of Eaton and Kortum (2002) with a multi‐country AK model of Acemoglu and Ventura (2002) to examine how trade liberalization affects countries' growth rates and extensive margins of trade over time. Focusing on the three‐country case, we obtain three main results. First, a permanent fall in any trade cost raises the balanced growth rate. Second, trade liberalization increases the liberalizing countries' long‐run fractions of exported varieties to all destinations. Third, the long‐run effects of trade liberalization are different from its short‐run effects, which can reverse the welfare implications of the static Eaton–Kortum model.     

Quantifying the impact of services liberalization in a developing country

We compare goods versus services liberalization in terms of welfare, outputs, and factor prices in Tunisia using a CGE model with multiple products, services and trading partners. Restraints on services trade involve both cross-border supply (tariff-equivalent price wedges) and on foreign ownership (monopoly-rent distortions and inefficiency costs). Goods-trade liberalization yields a modest gain in aggregate welfare. Reducing service barriers generate relatively large welfare gains and low adjustment costs. Services liberalization increases economic activity in all sectors and raise the real returns to both capital and labor. The results point to the potential importance of deregulating services provision for economic development.     

Environmental Protection for Sale: Strategic Green Industrial Policy and Climate Finance

Industrial policy has long been criticized as subject to protectionist interests; accordingly, subsidies to domestic producers face disciplines under World Trade Organization agreements, without exceptions for environmental purposes. Now green industrial policy is gaining popularity as governments search for low-carbon solutions that also provide jobs at home. The strategic trade literature has largely ignored the issue of market failures related to green goods. I consider the market for a new environmental good (like low-carbon technology) whose downstream consumption provides external benefits (like reduced emissions). Governments may have some preference for supporting domestic production, such as by interest-group lobbying, introducing a political distortion in their objective function. I examine the national incentives and global rationales for offering production (upstream) and deployment (downstream) subsidies in producer countries, allowing that some of the downstream market may lie in nonregulating third-party countries. Restraints on upstream subsidies erode global welfare when environmental externalities are large enough relative to political distortions. Climate finance is an effective alternative if political distortions are large and governments do not undervalue carbon costs. Numerical simulations of the case of renewable energy indicate that a modest social cost of carbon can imply benefits from allowing upstream subsidies.     

Market entry and trade weighted import costs

Trade weighting is a common method of aggregating trade frictions. It will understate changes in these costs when there are non‐ad valorem trade costs and quality differences. Newly traded goods enter at higher trade costs than previously traded ones. Lower import costs shift trade to low‐quality goods with higher measured trade costs. These effects are quantitatively important. U.S. import costs fall more than twice as fast as trade weighted measures from 1974 to 2004 after the impact of shifting quality and newly traded goods is accounted for. Empirical estimates that use trade weighting will underestimate the welfare impact of trade costs.