Tax Competition and Revelation of Preferences for Public Expenditure

This paper considers a federal country composed of local jurisdictions that differ in their inhabitants' tastes for public goods, and which finance local public expenditure through a source-based tax on capital income. The taste for public goods is the private information of local governments. The central government seeks an optimal policy, in which grants to local governments are conditioned on local tax rates. The uninformed central government seeks both to allocate capital efficiently among jurisdictions, and to induce jurisdictions to provide an efficient mix of private and public consumption. It is shown that there persist at this constrained optimum both some misallocation of capital and some violation of the Samuelson rule for optimal public good provision in every jurisdiction.     

借鉴国际经验完善我国促进循环经济发展的税收政策

循环经济是可持续发展的新兴经济增长模式,为了促进循环经济的发展,西方各国纷纷采用不同税收手段,如荷兰、丹麦、瑞典等国纷纷开征名目众多的环境税;美国联邦和地方政府分别开征不同的环境税;日本也在各不同环节开征环境税,与此同时,各国纷纷采用包括加速折旧、税收减免、税收抵免等税收优惠政策鼓励循环经济的发展,不断"绿化"本国税制。在借鉴这些经验的基础上,我国应完善立法、改革现行税制,开征新的税种,促进循环经济的发展。     

Tax Policy Coordination, Vertical Externalities, and Optimal Taxation in a System of Hierarchical Governments

Tax policies of two levels of government (state and federal) with overlapping tax bases are considered. This overlap leads to “vertical” fiscal externalities are considered when several different commodities are in the tax base and the tax bases of the two levels of government may not be identical. When the governments share a tax base, the mix of combined taxes is optimal. With different tax bases, combined taxes are no longer optimal as federal tax rates are adjusted to reflect state public service levels. When grants are available, a welfare-maximizing mix of taxes and public services is obtained.     

The new view of the property tax A reformulation

The ‘new view’ of the property tax is reformulated within the context of a model with interjurisdictional competition, endogenous local public services, individuals who are segregated into homogeneous communities according to tastes for local public services, a simple form of land use zoning, and a political or constitutional constraint on the use of head taxes by local governments. Expressions for the ‘profits tax’ and ‘excise tax’ effects of the property tax are derived. The effects of a ‘consumption distortion’ away from government services due to local reluctance to tax mobile capital are also examined.     

论物业税与现行房地产税收的关系

目前房价居高不下,政府调控房地产市场的措施陆续出台,在众多调控措施中,备受关注的一项措施是开征物业税。在开征物业税的过程中,必然会涉及到如何处理物业税与现行房地产税收的关系。对此,专家学者从不同角度发表了各自的看法。本文认为,现行的房产税、城镇土地使用税、城市维护建设税、教育费附加应该并入物业税,耕地占用税应并入土地出让金,土地增值税应该取消或并入物业税,契税应继续保留。我国应该通过正确处理物业税与现行房地产税收的关系,健全房地产税收体系。     

税收努力对金融发展的影响研究

搜集2002—2021年31个省区市的非平衡面板数据，运用LASSO回归测度税收努力，构建非线性计量模型考察税收努力与金融发展的关系。结果发现：税收努力与金融发展存在显著的倒U形关系，而财政缺口对二者关系起负向调节作用，经内生性处理和一系列稳健性检验后仍成立。异质性检验发现，消费税、西部地区、低出口退税率地区的税收努力与金融发展存在明显的倒U形关系，增值税税收努力决定了总税收努力对金融发展的负面影响。因此，在未来推进金融发展的过程中，既要保持适度税收努力，稳定财政缺口，又要规范地方政府行为，合理界定政府与市场的边界，为地方金融发展创造良好环境，助力实体经济高质量发展。     

The Spatial Effects of Wage or Property Tax Differentials, and Local Government Choice between Tax Instruments

This paper considers the spatial effects (on wages, employment, and business capital as functions of location) of a localized differential in source-based wage tax rates or business property tax rates between (for example) a central city and the surrounding suburbs. A simple model is used in which business production uses only labor and capital inputs. Consumers have fixed residential locations but may commute to work. Wage and property tax differentials have effects that are similar in some ways but different in other ways. If given a choice, a local government would choose to set its business property tax rate equal to zero and use only a wage tax.     

The decision to ‘bid for business’: Municipal behavior in granting property tax abatements

We investigate the timing of local economic development incentive offers by estimating duration models of the time to adoption of the first manufacturing property tax abatement offered by a municipal government. The effects of municipal characteristics, incentive prevalence measures, and fiscal stress indicators on the duration of non-abatement regimes are investigated using data for 112 municipalities in metropolitan Detroit during 1974–1992. Median household income and the local property tax price of local public services are found to affect the hazard rates. Most importantly, there is evidence of positive duration dependence, or an emulation effect, with first-time abatement offers.     

State and local tax competition in a spatial model with sales taxes and residential property taxes

This paper presents a theoretical model with a uniformly populated line that is divided into local jurisdictions (and/or states). If one level of government imposes sales and residential property taxes, and if the spatial extent of each taxing jurisdiction is positive and finite, then (in Nash equilibrium) the sales tax rate is less than residential property tax rate, housing consumption is suboptimal, and the public good is underprovided in each jurisdiction. If a very large state (or country) is divided into local jurisdictions, and if both levels of government choose tax rates endogenously, then under some assumptions there is an efficient outcome.     

关于我国开征物业税问题的探讨

文章从我国物业税发展现状入手,分析了国内开征物业税道路上存在的阻碍,探讨了开征物业税对我国房地产市场、消费者、地方政府产生的影响,最后对开征物业税需要解决的问题进行了探讨。     

The Revenue Adequacy of Site Value Taxation in a Ricardian System of Economic Growth

A bstract . The federal administration has sought to reduce the growth of federal expenditures by shifting some government costs to state and local governments. An increased expenditure burden for the latter governments would require increased tax rates for existing types of taxes that have adverse impacts on economic incentives. Land taxes are considered as a source of revenue because of their efficiency aspects. Unfortunately this idea is all too often dismissed because of alleged revenue inadequacy. Thus an analysis is called for of the revenue adequacy of site value taxation in a Ricardian model of economic growth. The model allows analysis of revenue adequacy over time in an economic growth context that is suited for the long range tax-expenditure planning horizon with which local governments are faced. When revenue needs are primarily dependent upon the population size, and the fisc is initially operating at a deficit, for a land tax to permit attainment of balance, per capita rents must be increasing over time. Also when the economy's public service demand is primarily dependent upon income, deficits will not occur if rental share exceeds the share of income devoted to public output. Not all income goes to fiscal output, so rent eventually exceeds expenditures.     

房产税对企业投资行为的影响——来自上海和重庆的经验分析

本文以上海和重庆房产税试点改革为重点,在分析房产税改革对企业投资影响机理的基础上,基于2006~2016年度35个大中城市的面板数据,采用合成控制法实证分析房产税改革对企业投资的影响效应,结合排序法与双重差分法进行稳健性检验。结果发现,相比房产税改革试点前,地方企业投资出现不同程度的提升。这表明地方政府可注重研究本地企业投资现状,在中央的部署下,通过适度调整房产税政策来引导企业投资,使得投资结构与地区经济结构相适应,实现地区经济高质量持续发展。     

On the optimal design of disaster insurance in a federation

Recent experience with disasters and terrorist attacks in the US indicates that state and local governments rely on the federal sector for support after disasters occur. But these same governments invest in infrastructure designed to reduce vulnerability to natural and man-made hazards. We show that when the federal government is committed to full insurance against disasters, regions will have incentives to under-invest in ex-ante protective measures. We derive the structure of the optimal second-best insurance system when regional governments choose investment levels non-cooperatively and the central government cannot verify regional investment choices. For low probability disasters this will result in lower ex-post intergovernmental transfers (and hence less ex-post redistribution) and greater ex-ante investment. However, the second-best transfer scheme suffers from a time-inconsistency problem. Ex-post, the central government will be driven towards full insurance rather than the second-best grants, which results in a type of soft budget constraint problem. Sub-national governments will anticipate this and reduce their investment in protective infrastructure even further. The result is that the central government may be better off suffering the underinvestment that results with first-best transfers because investment is even lower under second-best transfers when the central government is unable to commit.     

Tax Competition between Unitary and Federal Countries

We analyse taxation of capital in a two-country model, where one country is unitary while the other one is federal, consisting of two identical regions. Both national and regional governments levy a tax on capital. The countries play a noncooperative game between them, with the government of the federal country acting as a Stackelberg leader with respect to its regional governments. We show under what circumstances, at equilibrium, the federal country sets its tax rate inefficiently low, while the unitary country sets it inefficiently high.We are deeply grateful to three anonymous referees for their comments, and especially to one of them for extremely helpful suggestions. We also wish to thank participants at ESEM 2004 for fruitful discussions     

Lobbying and tax competition in an oligopolistic industry: a reverse home-market effect

This paper studies tax competition between two asymmetrical countries for an oligopolistic industry with many firms. Each government sets its tax rate strategically to maximize the weighted sum of residents’ welfare and political contributions by owners of firms. It is shown that if the governments care deeply about contributions and trade costs are low, the small country attracts a more than proportionate share of firms by setting a lower tax rate. The well-known home-market effect, which states that countries with a larger market attract a more-than-proportionate share of firms, may be reversed as a result of tax competition by politically interested governments.     

地方政府政绩诉求、政府控制与国有企业税负

以我国2004—2012年A股非金融类地方国有上市公司为研究样本,在区分了省级政府与市级政府控制的基础上,实证检验了各级地方政府不同的政绩诉求对国有企业控制程度是否存在差异及该控制程度对国有企业税负的影响。研究发现：地方政府的政绩诉求（包括财政盈余、相对经济增长率、失业率等）显著影响地方政府对国有企业的控制程度,且省级政府更注重相对经济增长率及失业率,市级政府更关注财政盈余水平;三个政绩诉求中相对经济增长率对政府控制的影响最为显著;地方政府对国有企业的控制程度与企业税负显著正相关;与省级政府相比,市级政府控制的国有企业税负更重。这表明,增加地方国有企业税负是市级地方政府实现其政绩诉求的重要途径。     

Local tax interaction and endogenous spatial weights based on quality of life

This paper studied the role of municipal quality of life as a driver of strategic tax interactions among local governments. A number of studies point out the existence of strategic interactions using spatial econometric models in which the spatial weights are mostly based on non-economic criteria or basic economic variables such as per capita gross domestic product (GDP). We propose the more sophisticated well-being indicator of municipal quality of life as the driver for these interactions. To deal with the potential endogeneity, we rely on instrumental variable estimators. The empirical analysis focuses on the main local tax in Spain (property) and on municipalities with more than 50,000 inhabitants, and it confirms the relevance of differentials in quality of life for the understanding of tax choices.     

Tax competition in a fiscal union with decentralized leadership

This paper examines capital tax competition in the presence of an interstate transfer policy without federal commitment. Lack of commitment implies that local tax policy is chosen prior to federal transfers. The paper's main result is that ex-post federal policy neutralizes horizontal fiscal externalities, insulating tax policy from capital mobility. Federal policy, however, introduces a new source of inefficiency unrelated to tax competition. Specifically, ex-post transfer payments prove to be equivalent to an interstate revenue-sharing system which may render federal intervention in the presence of fiscal externalities welfare-deteriorating relative to tax competition.     

Vertical externalities in cigarette taxation: Do tax revenues go up in smoke?

In federal systems, where tax bases are joint property, the tax policy of one level of government affects the tax base of the other. This paper examines the interdependence of US federal and state cigarette tax rates. Our results suggest that states may reduce their cigarette tax rate by as much as 48 cents per dollar increase in the federal tax rate. Thus, a federal tax hike may reduce the amount of generated state tax revenues both directly (the overall tax rate rises and the state tax base declines), and indirectly (the state tax rate declines).     

Fiscal news and macroeconomic volatility

This paper analyzes the contribution of anticipated capital and labor tax shocks to business cycle volatility in an estimated New Keynesian business cycle model. While fiscal policy accounts for about 15% of output variance at business cycle frequencies, this mostly derives from anticipated government spending shocks. Tax shocks, both anticipated and unanticipated, contribute little to the fluctuations of real variables. However, anticipated capital tax shocks do explain a sizable part of inflation fluctuations, accounting for up to 12% of its variance. In line with earlier studies, news shocks in total account for about 50% of output variance. Further decomposing this news effect, we find permanent total factor productivity news shocks to be most important. When looking at the federal level instead of total government, the importance of anticipated tax and spending shocks significantly increases, suggesting that fiscal policy at the subnational level typically counteracts the effects of federal fiscal policy shocks.