Environmental Protection for Sale: Strategic Green Industrial Policy and Climate Finance

Industrial policy has long been criticized as subject to protectionist interests; accordingly, subsidies to domestic producers face disciplines under World Trade Organization agreements, without exceptions for environmental purposes. Now green industrial policy is gaining popularity as governments search for low-carbon solutions that also provide jobs at home. The strategic trade literature has largely ignored the issue of market failures related to green goods. I consider the market for a new environmental good (like low-carbon technology) whose downstream consumption provides external benefits (like reduced emissions). Governments may have some preference for supporting domestic production, such as by interest-group lobbying, introducing a political distortion in their objective function. I examine the national incentives and global rationales for offering production (upstream) and deployment (downstream) subsidies in producer countries, allowing that some of the downstream market may lie in nonregulating third-party countries. Restraints on upstream subsidies erode global welfare when environmental externalities are large enough relative to political distortions. Climate finance is an effective alternative if political distortions are large and governments do not undervalue carbon costs. Numerical simulations of the case of renewable energy indicate that a modest social cost of carbon can imply benefits from allowing upstream subsidies.     

ARMS EXPORT CONTROLS, SUBSIDIES AND THE WTO EXEMPTION

Owing to the World Trade Organization (WTO) exemption that allows governments to subsidize arms exports, the arms trade is one of the few remaining areas of trade where we observe export subsidies. This paper examines the effect of arms controls, in the form of licensing delays, on the incentives to subsidize arms exports and conversely the effect of the WTO arms trade exemption on the incentives to break arms control agreements. Our main result is that arms controls and free trade commitments re‐enforce each other. Licensing delays reduce the incentive to subsidise and free trade without subsidies reduces the benefits of a unilateral abrogation of arms controls. Transparency actually worsens the Nash inefficiencies at play in that incomplete information leads to lower subsidies and lower arms exports.     

Optimal incentives to reduce transboundary emissions: Theory and empirical illustration to sulphur emissions in Austria and (former) Czechoslovakia

The observation that only one out of 14 tons of sulphur compounds immissions in Austria originates from Austrian sources highlights the contribution of transboundary pollution (predominantly from Eastern Europe). Therefore, further abatement in Austria has only a marginal impact but is very costly given the already high Austrian abatement standards. Thus, scientists and politicians conclude that it is in the rich countries' (e.g., Austria, Germany and the Scandinavian countries) own interest to support environmental protection in the former centrally planned economies that are apparently less concerned about environmental harms and risks. However, the proposed policies lead to a crowding out of the recipient country's own abatement investments. In order to mitigate such strategic behaviour, which is possible due to asymmetric information, we apply the principal-agent theory to derive optimal incentives. These incentives are in stark contrast to actual policy proposals, in particular, no subsidy should be paid if the neighbouring and polluting country does not care sufficiently about environment. Indeed, the empirical application shows that only sufficient environmental concern in Czechoslovakia warrants subsidies from Austria.We acknowledge discussions with Markus Amann and Gary Brennand and in particular, the very constructive comments from three anonymous referees.     

Environmental policy instruments and imperfectly competitive international trade

Policy makers, industrialists and environmentalists express concern that the imposition of tough environmental policies in some countries displaces production, and hence pollution, to countries which impose less tough environmental policies. Yet empirical studies of such impacts suggest they are small. However, these findings are derived from models in which international trade is modelled as being perfectly competitive. In this paper I model trade as imperfectly competitive with scope for strategic behavior by producers, in this case investment in capital. I show that the choice of environmental policy instrument can have a marked impact on the incentives for producers to act strategically, with environmental standards significantly reducing the incentives for strategic overinvestment relative to environmental taxes or no environmental policy at all. Whether welfare is higher using standards or taxes depends on whether producing countries are also significant consumers of the polluting product, and on whether all producing governments act to reduce emissions or only some subset of governments. To assess the quantitative significance of these theoretical results I conduct policy simulations on a calibrated model of the world fertilizer industry. These simulations show that the impact of environmental policy on strategic behaviour can be large.     

Implementing Market Access

This paper examines ex post subsidies as a means of enforcing market share targets. Subsidies set after firms make their strategic decisions are shown to create powerful incentives for firms to raise prices. These effects are stronger when targets, and hence subsidies, are specified on a firm-specific rather than industry-wide basis. This occurs because firms perceive themselves as subject to more competition (i.e., more elastic demand) in the latter case.     

The Political Economy of State Government Subsidy Adoption: The Case of Ethanol

In this study, we examine the factors that determine the adoption of state economic development incentives in the ethanol industry. We compile data on the implementation dates for subsidies/tax credits for all states for the years 1984–2007, a period that covers the complete emergence of the biofuel industry in the United States and that was characterized by the passage of numerous state‐level subsidies and tax breaks aimed at increasing ethanol production. Using Cox proportional hazard regression analysis, we find that states are more likely to adopt ethanol subsidies when corn production is high, when corn prices are low and gasoline prices are high, when a state is affiliated with the National Corn Growers Association, when a check‐off is present, when a state has a high environmental score, and when state government is under the control of Democrats.     

Is Corporate Environmentalism Good for Domestic Welfare?

Many private firms voluntarily care about the environment and declare that their products and production processes are environmentally friendly. This paper shows that corporate environmentalism may reduce the effectiveness of government policies. A simple third‐market trade model with strategic environmental and trade policy is employed, in which an environmentally conscious domestic firm competes with a profit‐maximizing foreign firm. It is shown that even if emission taxes and export subsidies are both available, corporate environmentalism may reduce domestic welfare when pollution is transboundary. In the realistic situation where export subsidies are prohibited, welfare may fall even if pollution is local.     

Clean technology — Innovation and environmental regulation

The development and diffusion of clean technologies has an important role to play in preventing pollution. Government must address the issue of how firms can be given the necessary incentive to develop environmentally sound production techniques and products. This paper focus on how subsidies can — under certain restrictive conditions — stimulate innovation. Subsidization is usually assumed to involve unit subsidies for pollution reduction. Unit subsidies have little to do with the subsidy schemes in actual use. Our focus is on subsidy schemes specifically designed to promote the development of clean technologies through the use of grants/financial aid. Based on data from the development projects initiated through The Danish Clean Technology Programme we analyze how environmental innovations take place when the polluters, their suppliers and consultants are actively engaged in the development processes. The main merit of subsidy schemes like the Danish one is its direct focus on the innovation processes and the active incorporation of the network of firms surrounding the polluters. Our findings lead us to conclude that when it comes to subsidization, the role of government should be redefined. Government can act as a matchmaker by providing firms with informative incentives and necessary contacts for finding more efficient technological solutions to specific environmental problems.     

Strategic Environmental Policies in the Presence of Foreign Direct Investment

We analyze strategic environmental standards in the presence of foreign direct investment. A number of foreign firms located in a host country compete with a domestic firm in another country to export a homogeneous good to a third country. When the number of foreign firms is exogenous, the host country applies a stricter environmental regulation than the other producing country. However, under free entry and exit of foreign firms, the host country may apply a less severe standard under both non-cooperative and cooperative equilibrium. We also find that the nature market structure does not affect the equilibrium values of total pollution if export subsidies are also used.JEL Classification: F2, H2     

Foreign direct investment as a signal

This paper models oligopolistic competition among potential multinational firms in an environment of firm heterogeneity, incomplete information on costs, and strategic interactions. We show that foreign direct investment is more likely if it can serve as a signal of productivity in an environment of incomplete information as firms would like to avoid sending a low productivity signal. Our model shows that this effect is strong enough such that foreign direct investment can be an optimal foreign entry mode even if trade costs are zero.     

政府R&D补贴政策与企业创新决策间双向动态耦合与非线性关系*

本文以新常态下创新驱动的引擎产业——高技术产业为研究对象,通过面板向量自回归方法将政府的直接补贴、税收优惠与企业的资本、人员投入及创新收益同时纳入系统框架,研究政府R&D补贴政策与企业创新行为决策之间的双向动态耦合关系,然后基于动态面板门限回归研究企业创新收益与两类R&D补贴政策间可能存在的非线性关系,并以理论模型与经验研究相结合的方式分析直接补贴与税收优惠影响高技术企业创新的机理及作用效果。研究证实企业增加创新投入是提高创新收益的根本原因;R&D补贴对企业资本投入的“挤入作用”并不明显,但税收优惠能有效激励高技术企业在人员方面的投入;政府“低补贴、低优惠”的双低策略更有利于提高企业的创新收益。     

Competition in taxes and performance requirements for foreign direct investment

Tax incentives offered to attract firms engaged in foreign direct investment are often tied to performance requirements such as domestic content restrictions or adherence to environmental standards. The tax competition literature has repeatedly shown that competition between municipalities for mobile firms tends to drive taxes to low levels. One would expect a comparable result for burdensome performance requirements. Despite this, the evidence suggests that while taxes have indeed been driven down, performance requirements are as popular as ever. We explain this seeming conundrum by showing that in the presence of spillovers, binding performance requirements can act as a coordination device for firms. In equilibrium, municipalities choose performance requirements, which maximize joint surplus from investment. Competition between municipalities then transfers this surplus to firms via tax subsidies.     

The impact of “Mass Entrepreneurship and Innovation” policy on SMEs’ innovation: Using quasi-natural experiments

This study presents an in-depth investigation of the impact of “Mass Entrepreneurship and Innovation” (MEI) policy on small and medium-sized enterprises’ (SMEs’) innovation using the propensity score matching–difference-in-difference method. The MEI policy's R&D subsidies are found to generate a positive effect on SMEs’ innovation. Although R&D subsidies have no significant impact on SMEs’ strategic innovation, they can promote substantial innovation and establish a solid microfoundation for China's high-quality development. Compared with R&D subsidies, tax incentives in the MEI policy cannot encourage SMEs to innovate and may even have a negative impact on SMEs’ innovation.     

Standards and innovation: US public/private partnerships to support technology-based economic growth

This paper examines how strategic alliances to create and use standards affect economic growth and development. The explanation of the link from standards to economic growth and development is through the effects of standards on the incentives to perform industrial research and development (R&D). We examine product standards, metrology traceable to national and international standards, and regulatory standards to address negative externalities. The paper develops a theoretical explanation for the link from standards to growth, survey/interview-guides to gather information from industrial R&D experts about the explanation, and case-study evidence about the explanation. We discuss the standard-setting process and explain that it entails strategic alliances among firms and with government involvement. Case studies of R&D projects in firms and in a national laboratory support the belief that standards implemented via strategic alliances leverage economic growth and development.     

EXPORT SUBSIDIES VERSUS EXPORT QUOTAS WITH INCOMPLETELY INFORMED POLICY MAKERS*

This paper analyses export subsidies (price incentives) and export quotas (quantity controls) in the Brander‐Spencer (1985) model when policy makers have limited information on demand and cost structures. We examine necessary or sufficient information for policy makers to determine welfare‐enhancing policies. It is crucial that they know the elasticity value of the slope of the inverse demand curve and the market share. It is also shown that for policy makers, export quotas are superior to export subsidies under certain conditions.     

On the Endogenous Choice between Protection and Promotion

In a model of strategic interaction between firms in lobbying activity, I show that capitalists might prefer tariffs (protection) to production subsidies (promotion). This is due to the congestion problem arising from the government's convex welfare costs of providing subsidies as opposed to both the free-rider problem and the congestion problem acting in opposite directions in the case of tariffs. If an industry association exists, coordination can be achieved when lobbying for tariffs, but not in the case of production subsidies.     

财政补贴与税收优惠的创新激励效应研究——来自民营科技型企业规模与生命周期的诠释

在“大众创新万众创业”的时代背景下,激发微观主体创新活力具有重要战略意义。政府补贴是提升企业创新强度的一项重要政策工具,主要形式有财政补贴和税收优惠。选取2013-2017年在我国中小板上市的民营科技型企业为研究样本,采用固定效应模型,实证分析财政补贴和税收优惠对企业研发创新强度的影响效应,进一步考察企业规模特征对两种政府补贴工具效应的影响,并引入企业生命周期模型,考察政府补贴在民营科技型企业创新活动中的最佳投入阶段。研究结果表明：财政补贴对研发创新强度影响不显著,税收优惠能显著提升创新强度;企业规模在政府补贴与企业创新强度间存在显著调节作用,企业规模越大,政府补贴对企业创新强度的激励效应越弱。通过采用纳入企业生命周期因素的模型进行分析发现：政府补贴对成长期和成熟期民营科技型企业创新强度具有显著激励作用,对初创期和衰退期民营科技型企业创新强度影响不显著。     

On the welfare effects of competition for foreign direct investments

This paper investigates welfare effects of subsidy competition for the location of a multinational enterprise. One of the competing regions benefits more from the inward investment but, in the absence of incentives, the multinational's preferred location is the other, more advanced region. The paper shows that subsidies, by making the multinational switch location, may increase aggregate welfare. If the multinational exports in the absence of incentives, the welfare effects of subsidy competition may look very different. Allowing subsidies attracts the direct investment, which otherwise would not take place, in one of the two regions. Further, it intensifies competition in the market. The paper shows that the welfare increasing role of incentives may be amplified, but also that the competition effect, by hurting domestic firms, may cancel out any other positive role of incentives.     

Strategic Research Partnerships: A Managerial Perspective

Private sector incentives to participate in research partnerships can be grouped roughly into two categories: cost-economizing incentives and strategic incentives. This paper summarizes the argument in two streams of thought that are often identified with these two sides: the transaction-cost/incomplete contracts approach and the strategic management approach. The paper recounts business motives to engage in research partnerships in each and points out that differentiating between more traditional economic perspectives (transaction costs, incomplete contracts) and strategic management/organizational theory perspectives (strategic networks, resource-dependent view, dynamic capabilities, knowledge-based view, organizational learning, options approach) may not be as sharp as one might suppose at first. The complementary nature of these perspectives should be encouraging for theoreticians looking for a more integrated model of collaboration.     

Strategic Research Partnerships: A Managerial Perspective

Private sector incentives to participate in research partnerships can be grouped roughly into two categories: cost-economizing incentives and strategic incentives. This paper summarizes the argument in two streams of thought that are often identified with these two sides: the transaction-cost/incomplete contracts approach and the strategic management approach. The paper recounts business motives to engage in research partnerships in each and points out that differentiating between more traditional economic perspectives (transaction costs, incomplete contracts) and strategic management/organizational theory perspectives (strategic networks, resource-dependent view, dynamic capabilities, knowledge-based view, organizational learning, options approach) may not be as sharp as one might suppose at first. The complementary nature of these perspectives should be encouraging for theoreticians looking for a more integrated model of collaboration.