An institutional analysis of environmental management in the Korean mobile communications industry

Environmental sustainability in the mobile communications industry can affect corporations not only in the sector but also in other industries by providing solutions to cope with environmental issues. However, despite the significance of environmental sustainability in the industry, there has been a lack of academic attention. This study investigated the environmental issues in the mobile communications industry by adopting an integrated and holistic approach to corporate sustainable management. In addition, the environmental management of mobile network operators was analyzed using the framework of institutional theory. To investigate the environmental management of mobile network operators, we carried out a case study on three Korean mobile network operators including SK Telecom, KT, and LG Uplus. The results demonstrated that economic and environmental issues were mostly found in the mobile communications industry, and the mobile network operators have actively coped with these issues. Their environmental management was relatively active, and regulatory, mimetic and normative mechanisms were working simultaneously. This study provides some meaningful implications for practitioners and policymakers.     

Competitive dynamics in Polish telecommunications, 1990–2000: growth,regulation, and privatization of an infrastructural multi-network

This paper analyzes the relationship between governmental regulatory policies and competitive dynamics amongst private operators and the national monopolist, TP SA, in three network segments of the Polish telecommunications sector. Special attention is paid to the evolution of organizational strategies in a regulatory environment characterized by constant strategic indecision and reorientations of national policy makers. The paper finds that regulatory/competition coevolution has taken diverse forms in the three network subsegments, with asymmetric duopoly operating in the local fixed network, hidden competition at work in the long-distance fixed network, and oligopolistic technology-driven competition characterizing the high-growth cellular network. The conclusion reached is that Polish telecommunications to date has been stuck in a broad stage of pre-competitive market maneuverings by domestic and international capital, in preparation for privatization of the national operator and for full liberalization as part of EU integration.     

Artificial Intelligence Applications in Telecommunications and other network industries

Artificial intelligence applications in network industries have the potential to reduce network roll-out and operating costs, improve performance, enhance customer service, and support the development and introduction of new services. This paper identifies and analyzes the range of AI applications already in place and those expected to be in place in the near future. After analyzing the applications found in the literature, we have conducted interviews with senior executives responsible for AI in telecommunications, electricity, gas and water companies headquartered in North America and Europe, as well as with suppliers incorporating AI into their equipment. These interviews have provided information on which AI applications are actually being used in these network industries and which are expected to be implemented in the future. While some of these AI applications, like predictive maintenance, have already been implemented today by most operators, more complex applications, such as traffic management AIs for 5G, are being considered by only a few large operators. Finally, the paper explores the consequences of AI for regulation. At the least, regulators will need to understand AI in order to determine if AI applications raise regulatory concerns. At this point, however, as AI becomes increasingly integrated into network operations, regulatory issues are only beginning to emerge.     

Effective competition and ineffective mobile industry regulation in South Africa

The most striking feature of South Africa’s mobile market is the skewed allocation of spectrum and a seemingly endless sequence of failed attempts to hold an auction for it. A shortage of spectrum (or the inefficient assignment of it) is blamed, among other things, for South Africa’s relatively slow LTE 4G speeds. Through historical accident, the country has two mobile data networks in addition to the four licensed mobile operators. The response of operators has been to innovate using roaming and network sharing agreements; as we explore in this paper, these have become the de facto spectrum allocation process.This paper looks at how the de facto industry structure has been moulded by spectrum holdings and sharing arrangements and asks how spectrum management could be improved. We observe that, although the number of mobile operators has effectively been reduced to 3 (a number which would raise concern in some circles), there exist a variety of arrangements between those three and other spectrum and network operators. The smallest of the current three mobile operators is still not able to offer a nationwide mobile service without a roaming agreement but, at the same time, the two larger operators depend critically on spectrum and roaming agreements themselves, mainly with the two physical data network operators that function as wholesale providers.The Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA) was established as a consequence of a new constitution that was adopted in 1996 and it helped to create new institutional arrangements for the burgeoning mobile industry. The authority has nevertheless continued to be hampered, as we shall demonstrate, by political imperatives. This has been pointed out by other authors over the past twenty years and we add to this body of evidence by considering the spectrum auction planned (again) for 2021.The “2021” auction is in fact an iteration of the auction originally announced in May 2010 and then abandoned (Song, 2011). The same thing happened again in 2016 (Paelo & Robb, 2020). Late in 2020, the regulator again announced an auction, due to take place during 2021 but by the second quarter of the year, two of the four national operators had already obtained a court injunction to stop it. The process is intertwined with a political imperative to establish a public wireless open-access network, which we discuss in detail.We describe how the industry has navigated around policy and regulatory dysfunction and how competitive interaction among the South African operators has managed to prevail. Following Hausman & Taylor’s (2013) lead in their work on the United States, in this paper we provide a commentary on apparently perverse outcomes from significant regulatory, judicial and legislative actions (or, perhaps more accurately, inactions) governing the South African mobile telecommunications industry from the commencement of the current constitutional arrangements in 1996 to the present.     

工程公司管理信息系统的设计与应用

以某大型工程公司计算机管理信息系统的设计与应用为例，阐明了信息资源及项目管理信息系统在工程公司经营管理中的应用，该信息网提供了一个先进，开放，实用的计算机网络环境，实现了企业办公自动化，数据件共享及项目全方位的动态管理。     

Das Umlaufvermögen von Verteilnetzbetreibern

How much current assets are needed to operate a distribution system in Germany? The German “Energiewende” requires tremendous amounts of investment in the distribution network over the next years. The return of invested capital is regulated by § 7 Strom/GasNEV (German network tariff regulations). Current assets are principally included in the regulatory asset base in order to determine the regulatory equity yield rate. The regulatory authorities and distribution system operators have different point of views regarding the proper amount of current assets needed for operating a distribution network. This debate seems quite significant when considering that the average ratio of current assets to total assets is 25%. On the other hand, one could argue that distribution system operators do not need current assets at all. In order to address the issue of the proper amount of current assets for distribution system operators, business specific processes (such as the “EEG process”) should be examined. Furthermore, the provision of current assets causes costs of capital, which reduces the shareholder value and makes the acquisition of capital more challenging. This paper analyses such interrelations between current assets and shareholder value in regulated markets. Moreover, the current regulatory practice of cutting current assets in the regulatory asset base to a standardized amount does not seem appropriate. Rather there is a need for a multi-level and item-by-item based valuation scheme: Is the item required for the business? Is the amount limited to the efficient minimum? Is the amount comparable to other businesses? Concerning this matter, this paper examines proper instruments, such as the cash flow statement. In addition, this paper benchmarks the current (liquidity) ratio of distribution system operators and non-regulated companies. Based on this benchmark, the current assets of distribution system operators appear comparatively efficient. The results point out a need of action regarding current regulatory practice.     

Business ecosystem strategies of mobile network operators in the 3G era: The case of China Mobile

In order to define the mobile network operators' strategies of building value network in the 3G era, this paper applies the ecosystem principles to the mobile industry through a China Mobile case study. Based on an analytical framework of such principles, this paper reviews China Mobile's ecosystem, and identifies its success factors and problems. The results indicate that a complete ecosystem, where mobile network operators collaborate closely with value-added service providers, content/application providers, equipment and device manufacturers, and other involved organizations, can promote the development of mobile data services substantially. Therefore, mobile network operators should play a central role in the ecosystem by managing the entire value-chain and setting up proper value-sharing mechanisms. However, while doing so, problems may arise because of regulatory issues and information asymmetry. High-value common assets, a centralized management system, partner selection schemes and continuous innovations are important success factors.     

Wholesale broadband access to IPTV in an NGA environment: How to deal with it from a regulatory perspective?

Network operators are increasingly competing with triple play offers from cable providers for both broadcast customers and telecommunications customers. In recent years they have invested in IPTV platforms and launched their own IPTV services. This has brought a new question on the regulatory agenda: shall network operators be obliged to offer wholesale access to their IPTV platform? And if yes, should the new wholesale IPTV product be regulated in the same way as traditional wholesale access? Or should traditional regulation be modified? While the majority of countries have so far no regulatory rules in place, some national regulators have started to become active in this market segment.     

On the dual-stacking transition to IPv6: A forlorn hope?

The assumption that IPv6 will inevitably replace IPv4 as the dominant network layer protocol on the Internet is almost universal. A failure of IPv6 to diffuse is thought to have far-reaching and long-lasting economic and social consequences, yet there have been no prior analyses of the dual-stacking transition mechanism by which IPv6 diffusion is expected to be achieved in order to understand whether it is likely to succeed. Guided by economic theory, this paper presents such an analysis, and concludes that the dual-stacking transition strategy is unlikely to work, leaving the Internet with no workable means of achieving migration to IPv6. The paper concludes with a number of recommendations for regulatory and policy bodies, end-user organisations and network operators.     

A CDS approach to induce facilities-based competition over NGA networks

The current regulatory framework in the European NGA market provides the basic principles for the gradual migration from service-based competition over the legacy copper access networks to facilities-based competition over fiber-based Next Generation Access (NGA) networks. This paper initially reviews the related literature and shows that: (i) an unbundling policy that boosts entry by alternative operators promotes service-based competition but provides operators with disincentives to invest in network upgrade; (ii) there is no consensus about the optimal regulatory policy that promotes competition and encourages investments in NGA networks; and (iii) the reviewed research articles are not consistent with the current regulatory framework in the European NGA market in terms of both the evolution of the regulatory goals over time and the recommended regulatory settings. This paper aims to propose a novel approach in order to effectively meet the current regulatory goals using the recommended settings. It is shown that the proposed approach, which is based on the basic principles governing a Credit Default Swap (CDS), provides an effective migration path towards facilities-based competition over NGA networks.     

Network effects and preference heterogeneity in the case of mobile telecommunications markets

This paper demonstrates how revealed- and stated-preference analyses can be used for modeling network effects in the field of mobile telecommunications. The aim of this study was to verify if network effects may still play a role in the Polish mobile telecommunications market, measure their strength, identify their sources and variability across consumers by accounting for consumers' observable and unobservable preference heterogeneity, evaluate their monetary value to consumers, and finally, to verify if the marginal utility associated with network effects is constant. The analysis of consumers' revealed choices (currently used mobile telephone operator) allowed the identification of major differences between customer bases of incumbent and new entrant operators, and insight into the business strategies adopted in the presence of asymmetric regulation of mobile termination rates. The second part of the study—the analysis of the consumers' stated choices (made in carefully prepared and designed hypothetical choice situations, known as the choice experiments) made it possible to directly model consumers' utility functions and, in this way, investigate the nature of network effects in mobile telecommunications markets. From the results, the presence of strong network effects, which are related to the ratio of consumers' social network group using the same operator, and to the magnitude of on-net price discounts, is confirmed. These network effects can be disaggregated to pecuniary and non-pecuniary effects. Through the utilization of the random parameters multinomial logit model, consumers' observable and unobservable preference heterogeneity can be accounted for, which proved a scientifically revealing and potentially policy-relevant approach. The results might be of a particular interest to other researchers aiming at modeling consumers' preferences as well as to mobile telephone operators and regulatory authorities—it is shown that capacity for vigorous price competition between mobile operators is limited by non-price factors, which affect subscriber's choices, especially in the presence of asymmetric mobile termination rates.     

Analysis of spectrum auctions in India—An application of the opportunity cost approach to explain large variations in spectrum prices

The remarkable growth of mobile communication has reinforced the significance of the radio spectrum for mobile network operators. The availability of spectrum varies considerably between different countries due to national regulatory decisions. The focus in this paper is on India where operators have access to a limited amount of spectrum. This paper analyses the value of spectrum by estimating the opportunity cost, which is calculated by the savings that can be achieved by acquiring appropriate amount of spectrum rather than investing in additional base stations. The applied approach combines network deployment, user demand levels, cost, and capacity issues, which are integrated in the application in the opportunity cost approach for spectrum. The opportunity cost of spectrum is compared with prices paid at spectrum auctions. The analysis includes a discussion of drivers that determine the willingness to pay for spectrum. The results show that the opportunity cost of spectrum in relation to auction prices is lower than prices operators paid for 3G spectrum in the metro circles (service areas) while the value derived from the opportunity cost is higher than auction prices in the remaining circles.     

A fresh look at zero-rating

We provide an economic assessment of zero-rating offers in the context of mobile internet access services and draw six lessons: (1) Zero-rating can have several different characteristics that crucially affect their economic and welfare assessment. Thus, regulatory interventions must be based on a careful case-by-case analysis. (2) In the context of zero-rating offers, it is often crucial to evaluate the extent to which users are able to activate and deactivate a (throttled) zero-rated tariff option. If activation/deactivation is easy and instantaneous, a sound economic theory of harm for consumers will in many cases be hard to establish. (3) Similarly, if access to zero-rated partner programs is non-discriminatory and entails low barriers to entry, a sound theory of harm for content providers will usually not be given. (4) Zero-rating can be beneficial for consumers and (legal) content providers alike by contributing to a reduction of illegal content. Combined with throttling it can mitigate congestion problems. However, by requiring all content belonging to the same content category to be treated equally with respect to throttling, independent of whether a content provider opted for zero-rating or not, the existing regulation creates a negative externality on those content providers that do not wish to be zero-rated for some reason. (5) Particular attention should be paid to the impact of throttled zero-rating tariffs on the competition between mobile network operators (MNOs) and MVNOs. The latter may not be able to compete on equal footing with MNOs, because they benefit less from the traffic management aspects of zero-rating. (6) Competition among (infrastructure-based) ISPs provides a safeguard against severe rent extraction and, thus, an abuse of throttling and zero-rating as an exploitative device. Therefore, regulators should carefully account for the competitive environment and the existing tariff portfolio and options before deciding to intervene. Competition policy, rather than ex-ante regulation, may be more suitable for this task.     

Customer retention,loyalty, and satisfaction in the German mobile cellular telecommunications market

Customer retention (CR), loyalty (CL), and satisfaction (CS) are important (intermediate) goals for telecommunication network operators on their way to superior economic success in the liberalised German market. Therefore, drawing on a sample of 684 residential customers of digital cellular network operators in Germany this study tests hypotheses suggesting that CR, CL, and CS should be treated as differential constructs which are causally inter-linked. LISREL analyses support a two-staged model in which overall CS has a significant impact on CL which in turn influences a customer's intention to terminate/extend the contractual relationship with his mobile cellular network operator (=CR). Mobile service price and personal service benefit perceptions as well as (lack of) number portability between various cellular operators were identified as supply-related variables with the strongest effects on CR. Mobile network operators’ perceived customer care performance had no significant impact on CR. The findings suggest that an important lever for regulators to promote competition in cellular markets is the enforcement of efficient number portability procedures between mobile network operators.     

The momentum for network separation: A guide for regulators

Next Generation Access Networks (NGAs) are a challenge to regulators and operators insofar as they require large investments, there is a significant uncertainty about the ability to recover costs, and the choice of the appropriate regulatory regime is far from consensual. Regulatory authorities might want to seize the moment and reconsider mandatory vertical separation of telecommunication firms, without jeopardizing incentives to innovation and investment. This paper discusses the main elements of a possible test for the adequacy of network separation as a regulatory remedy. A sequential decision tree procedure with three questions is proposed: (1) “Is there significant market power in the provision of access under NGAs?”; (2) “Are there little vertical complementarities between services along the supply chain?”; and (3) “Is network separation a better regulatory tool than any other alternative?”. A positive answer to all the questions implies that the regulator should consider network separation as a regulatory remedy.     

Competition in UK mobile communications

Since mobile communications began in the United Kingdom in 1985, with the licensing of two cellular networks, the number of subscribers has grown to eight million. Much of this growth has occurred in the past five years, which have also seen the emergence of new competition in the form of two PCN operators. The aim of this paper is to trace the development of competition between network operators over the period from 1985. We first present technological and regulatory considerations that are used as a background to understand relevant features related to the structure of the industry and to the growth of subscribers. The central part of the paper reviews the four operators’ strategies, which are interpreted with the help of insights from economic theory.     

Roaming in the Mobile Internet

With the acquisition of UMTS licenses Mobile Operators (MOs), have often been obliged to deploy 3G network infrastructures covering at least a given percentage of users by a given date. This paper discusses the rationale for imposing these minimum coverage requirements by regulatory bodies. To that end, a model is built, which studies the incentives for MOs to compete for market share and over coverage within an unregulated environment where MOs are assumed to be free to enter sharing agreements and to negotiate a reciprocal roaming charge. Within this framework, it is first shown that MOs would deploy their infrastructure to guarantee the coverage of the entire territory (population), but they would avoid any network duplication in order to maximize rents from roaming revenues. It is then discussed whether a minimum coverage requirement is the best policy to reduce these excess rents, or whether alternative measures could be adopted which could serve other goals as well, such as the avoidance of network duplication.     

Zero-rating arrangements of mobile Internet access service providers – An analysis of main factors shaping the need for regulatory interventions

Zero-rating is the practice of providers of radio-based Internet access for moving telecommunication devices of excluding traffic generated by specific online applications from usage counted towards capped allowances or strictly metered tariffs of their end customers. Worldwide and particularly in the European Union (EU), current regulatory frameworks for zero-rating arrangements (ZRA) imply that regulators have to examine on a case-by-case basis whether they prohibit a concrete ZRA or impose restrictions. Such conditions are set because regulators believe that a ZRA runs counter to the interests of end customers or application providers or impedes effective competition between application and Internet service providers. Thus, it is necessary to clarify which case features ought to be inspected in such zero-rating assessments and which feature levels speak against or in favor of regulatory measures linked to ZRA. The present article identifies nine design features of ZRA, three characteristics of customer groups targeted by such offers and three background characteristics of the markets for Internet access services and applications which are of special importance in decisions concerning the need to regulate (to abstain from regulating) zero-rating practices of mobile network operators. The analysis shows that in many instances interests of end customers, application providers as well as of politicians seeking to promote the competitive dynamics on mobile Internet access service and application markets are best served if regulatory authorities tolerate ZRA and control for potential harmful effects after their market launch. Moreover, the study reveals that empirical research on customer reactions to ZRA is urgently required.     

Regulation and the promotion of investment in next generation networks—A European dilemma

The paper discusses the dilemmas facing European regulators (the European Commission and the national regulatory authorities) over the promotion of investment in Next Generation Access Networks (NGANs). Whereas the US has adopted a deregulatory approach and parts of Asia takes an approach linked to industrial policy considerations, the EU has largely left the process to operators working subject to a framework of regulation of access. While this may be enough to elicit investment where there is competition among networks, the incentives to invest are weaker where there is only one fixed network, as is the case in most of the territory of the EU. In reaching this view, the paper examines the prospects for competition from both wireless and municipal networks. It recommends that steps be taken fully to mobilise incentives to invest in NGANs where there is competition. Elsewhere, it may be necessary to consider a broader range of policies to create conditions for investment.