The Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing under Proportional Transaction Costs in Finite Discrete Time

We prove a version of the Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing, which applies to Kabanov's modeling of foreign exchange markets under transaction costs. The financial market is described by a   d × d   matrix-valued stochastic process  (Π _t ) ^T _{t =0}  specifying the mutual bid and ask prices between d assets. We introduce the notion of "robust no arbitrage," which is a version of the no-arbitrage concept, robust with respect to small changes of the bid-ask spreads of  (Π _t ) ^T _{t =0}  . The main theorem states that the bid-ask process  (Π _t ) ^T _{t =0}  satisfies the robust no-arbitrage condition iff it admits a strictly consistent pricing system. This result extends the theorems of Harrison-Pliska and Kabanov-Stricker pertaining to the case of finite Ω, as well as the theorem of Dalang, Morton, and Willinger and Kabanov, Rásonyi, and Stricker, pertaining to the case of general Ω. An example of a  5 × 5  -dimensional process  (Π _t )² _{t =0}  shows that, in this theorem, the robust no-arbitrage condition cannot be replaced by the so-called strict no-arbitrage condition, thus answering negatively a question raised by Kabanov, Rásonyi, and Stricker.     

TAX BASIS AND NONLINEARITY IN CASH STREAM VALUATION

The value of a future cash stream is often taken to be its net present value with respect to some term structure. This means that a linear formula is used in which each future payment is discounted by a factor deemed appropriate for the date on which the payment will be made. In a money market with taxes and shorting costs, however, there is no theoretical support for the existence of a universal term structure for this purpose. What is worse, reliance on linear formulas can be seriously inaccurate relative to true worth and can lead to paradoxes of disequilibrium. A consistent no-arbitrage theory of valuation in such a market requires instead that taxed and untaxed investors be grouped in separate classes with different valuation operators. Such operators are linear to scale but nonlinear with respect to addition. Here it is established that although these valuation operators provide general bounds applicable across an entire class, individual investors within a tax class can have more special operators because of the influence of existing holdings. These customized valuation operators have the feature of not even being linear to scale. In consequence of this nonlinearity, investors from the same or different tax classes can undertake advantageous trades even when the market is in a no-arbitrage state, but such trade opportunities are limited. Some degree of activity in financial markets can thereby be understood without appeal to differences in utility functions or temporary disequilibrium due to random disturbances.     

Randomized Stopping Times and American Option Pricing with Transaction Costs

In a general discrete-time market model with proportional transaction costs, we derive new expectation representations of the range of arbitrage-free prices of an arbitrary American option. The upper bound of this range is called the upper hedging price, and is the smallest initial wealth needed to construct a self-financing portfolio whose value dominates the option payoff at all times. A surprising feature of our upper hedging price representation is that it requires the use of randomized stopping times (Baxter and Chacon 1977), just as ordinary stopping times are needed in the absence of transaction costs. We also represent the upper hedging price as the optimum value of a variety of optimization problems. Additionally, we show a two-player game where at Nash equilibrium the value to both players is the upper hedging price, and one of the players must in general choose a mixture of stopping times. We derive similar representations for the lower hedging price as well. Our results make use of strong duality in linear programming.     

An Asymptotic Analysis of an Optimal Hedging Model for Option Pricing with Transaction Costs

Davis, Panas, and Zariphopoulou (1993) and Hodges and Neuberger (1989) have presented a very appealing model for pricing European options in the presence of rehedging transaction costs. In their papers the 'maximization of utility' leads to a hedging strategy and an option value. The latter is different from the Black–Scholes fair value and is given by the solution of a three–dimensional free boundary problem. This problem is computationally very time–consuming. In this paper we analyze this problem in the realistic case of small transaction costs, applying simple ideas of asymptotic analysis. The problem is then reduced to an inhomogeneous diffusion equation in only two independent variables, the asset price and time. The advantages of this approach are to increase the speed at which the optimal hedging strategy is calculated and to add insight generally. Indeed, we find a very simple analytical expression for the hedging strategy involving the option's gamma.     

家族涉入、网络结构与家族企业的网络交易成本

文章利用浙江和重庆两地制造业家族企业的调查数据,实证检验了家族涉入对家族企业降低网络交易成本的影响及网络结构的中介效应,研究结果表明：（1）家族所有权、家族承诺对家族企业降低网络交易成本有显著的正向影响,领导企业的家族代数对家族企业降低网络交易成本有显著的负向影响;（2）网络中心度和密度在家族承诺与降低网络交易成本之间起部分中介作用。本文的研究结论对于提高我国家族企业网络组织效率具有一定的现实意义。     

Determinants of Merchandising Proposals by Vendors: Influence of the Recognition of Transaction Costs

ABSTRACT

This study discusses customized merchandising proposals in retailer-vendor relationships, based on transaction cost theory. The theoretical model suggests that trust relationships and the centralization of merchandising authority promote the activeness of customized merchandising proposals. The results from structural equation modeling analysis reveal that customized merchandising proposals by a vendor are actively executed when (a) a trust relationship between a retailer and a vendor becomes long term and stable and (b) the merchandising authority of a retailer's merchandising division becomes centralized.     

Arbitrage and Growth Rate for Riskless Investments in a Stationary Economy

A sequential investment is a vector of payments over time, ( a ₀, a ₁, ... , a_n ), where a payment is made to or by the investor according as a_i is positive or negative. Given a collection of such investments it may be possible to assemble a portfolio from which an investor can get "something for nothing," meaning that without investing any money of his own he can receive a positive return after some finite number of time periods. Cantor and Lipmann (1995) have given a simple necessary and sufficient condition for a set of investments to have this property. We present a short proof of this result. If arbitrage is not possible, our result leads to a simple derivation of the expression for the long–run growth rate of the set of investments in terms of its "internal rate of return."     

农户要素禀赋、交易费用与农户农地转出行为——基于江西省农户调查

在农地流转过程中,愈是具有从事非农要素禀赋的农户,转出农地的可能性愈大,转出的面积愈大。农地交易费用虽然对农户农地转出的可能性和流转面积有负向影响,但是它并没有构成农户农地转出行为的最主要影响因素。     

Bounds on Derivative Prices in an Intertemporal Setting with Proportional Transaction Costs and Multiple Securities

The observed discrepancies of derivative prices from their theoretical, arbitrage-free values are examined in the presence of transaction costs. Analytic upper and lower bounds on the reservation write and purchase prices, respectively, are obtained when an investor's preferences exhibit constant relative risk aversion between zero and one. The economy consists of multiple primary securities with stationary returns, a constant rate of interest, and any number of American or European derivatives with, possibly, path-dependent arbitrary payoffs.     

Dynamic Optimization of Long-Term Growth Rate for a Portfolio with Transaction Costs and Logarithmic Utility

We study the optimal investment policy for an investor who has available one bank account and n risky assets modeled by log-normal diffusions. The objective is to maximize the long-run average growth of wealth for a logarithmic utility function in the presence of proportional transaction costs. This problem is formulated as an ergodic singular stochastic control problem and interpreted as the limit of a discounted control problem for vanishing discount factor. The variational inequalities for the discounted control problem and the limiting ergodic problem are established in the viscosity sense. The ergodic variational inequality is solved by using a numerical algorithm based on policy iterations and multigrid methods. A numerical example is displayed for two risky assets.     

交易成本内部化与模块化组织边界变动

文章基于交易成本理论,对模块化变革引起的交易成本内部化及模块化组织边界变动问题进行了探讨。首先,识别并界定了模块化组织边界,认为模块化组织边界是指依据模块化组织基本架构和主导规则所建立起来的关系网络的界限范畴。其次,基于模块化"竞合机制",指出了模块化组织交易成本内部化趋势,集中体现为：信息提升强化了组织运行的不确定性、频繁更替成员企业促使了组织内部合作的交易化、规则化约束强化了资产专用性的锁定。进一步地,厘清了交易成本内部化而引起的模块化组织边界变动的实质,即组织会在交易契约与协作契约之间进行二次选择,直到最优契约组合模式的出现。最后,对模块化组织边界变动下的治理问题进行了探索性分析。     

Bond Market Structure in the Presence of Marked Point Processes

We investigate the term structure of zero coupon bonds when interest rates are driven by a general marked point process as well as by a Wiener process. Developing a theory that allows for measure–valued trading portfolios, we study existence and uniqueness of a martingale measure. We also study completeness and its relation to the uniqueness of a martingale measure. For the case of a finite jump spectrum we give a fairly general completeness result and for a Wiener–Poisson model we prove the existence of a time–independent set of basic bonds. We also give sufficient conditions for the existence of an affine term structure.     

Erin Anderson and the Path Breaking Work of TCE in New Areas of Business Research: Transaction Costs in Action

This review article synthesizes Erin Anderson's academic contribution, with an emphasis on two path breaking aspects of her work, namely the operationalization of TCA in different contexts and the refinement of the theory. We review the measures that she developed to reflect key TCE constructs, and identify five contexts in which Erin Anderson's application of TCE concepts broke new paths. These are employee or representative salesforces, choice of foreign entry mode, new market entry and innovation, countertrade, and ethics. We highlight a number of ways in which her research integrates other theories to transaction cost economics, thereby deepening our understanding of key issues involving make or buy decisions. Finally, we draw attention to directions for future research identified through her work.     

Competition In Mediation Services: Modeling the Role of Expertise,Satisfaction, and Switching Costs

This article analyzes competition among mediation service providers that match clients and vendors in a horizontally differentiated market. This is an issue that is important for decision support of mediators in determining pricing and service strategies. We present a simulation model to simultaneously represent search as well as the behaviors of clients, vendors, and multiple competing mediators. Among our findings: intermediaries find it optimal to offer registration fee incentives and derive revenues from transaction fees from successful matches; as switching costs increase, incumbent utilities increase and entrant utilities decrease; expertise, modeled as the ability of mediators to assess vendor attributes accurately, is a powerful competitive weapon for entrants to erode the incumbent intermediary's first mover advantage. On the other hand, client satisfaction is an instrument for an incumbent intermediary to deter entrance by competitors.