生产成本信息不对称条件下的供应链决策分析

文章认为在两种情形下制造商都会谎报其生产成本来增加自身收益,使得零售商收益受损,整个供应链绩效降低。而随着产品替代率的增加,制造商谎报程度将增加,而供应链绩效将进一步降低。     

部分信息下考虑返回策略的供应链协调研究

研究了仅知需求的上下界信息条件下,基于最小最大后悔准则的供应链收益共享契约和返回策略的协调问题。运用Stackelberg非合作博弈理论,分别构建了分散式、收益共享情形下、集中式供应链中零售商订货和供应链内部协调机制。研究发现,当需求的上下界信息发生大幅变动时,供应链系统的利润变化很小。相比分散式供应链情形,收益共享协调机制可以大幅提高零售商以及供应链系统的利润,小幅降低制造商的利润。进一步的分析发现,无论需求上下界信息如何变化,收益共享协调机制下供应链的整体利润大于集中式供应链下系统的利润。     

基于供应链绩效网上零售库存协同优化研究

基于电子商务和移动支付等智能销售系统,分析网上零售业库存管理的不确定性及盲目性影响供应链整体绩效的困境,提出了供应链库存多层级协同管理模式,并通过构建网上零售商及其供应链利润模型,定量研究库存多层级协同管理对网上零售商及供应链绩效的影响,为研究优化营商环境提供有力的理论支撑。     

基于需求与储量相关条件下的供应链协调研究

供应链模型由一个制造商和零售商组成,其中制造商向零售商供应商品,零售商面临客户的商品需求与储量相关。在该模型中,制造商欲通过批发价和储量成本补偿方式来协调分散式供应链并赢利,使供应链分散式时的系统总储量等于集中控制时的储量水平。假定商品需求是依赖储量的函数和一个储量成本补偿。在单个零售商情形下,制造商需要增大批发价及支付给零售商的储量成本补贴来协调整个渠道并盈利。当两个及多个零售商竞争时,假定市场需求依赖于总储量水平,零售商按照储量比例分割市场。     

零售商风险规避对制造商双渠道选择的影响

在随机的市场需求条件下,本文针对风险中性制造商为主导和风险规避零售商为随从的两级供应链,构建了单源渠道和双源渠道情形下供应链Stackelberg博弈模型,对比分析了不同情形下供应链均衡策略的变化。研究结果表明零售商的风险规避只能改变零售渠道的价格,而不会影响制造商批发价格和电子直销价格的制定;电子直销渠道市场份额会影响制造商和零售商决策的制定,减缓零售商的风险规避影响程度,品牌差异策略并不能完全协调渠道间的冲突。     

不同补贴对象下双渠道闭环供应链定价模型

基于双渠道销售/回收的三级闭环供应链,分别以制造商和消费者为补贴对象建立闭环供应链定价模型;求解并对比了不同补贴对象下产品直销价格,批发价格,零售价格,制造商回购价格,零售商和第三方回收商的产品回收价格;分析了政府在补贴制造商和消费者两种情形下补贴系数对定价的影响。研究表明:政府补贴制造商时,会提高闭环供应链回收渠道定价;政府补贴零售商或消费者时,会提高闭环供应链销售渠道定价。     

辽宁省装备制造业供应链治理结构与供应链绩效关系研究

以辽宁省装备制造业为研究对象,通过对供应链治理结构与供应链绩效之间关系的分析得出:关系型和合同型两种治理结构都能对供应链绩效产生正向影响,但随着供应链合作伙伴关系进一步推进,关系型治理对供应链绩效的贡献程度更高。辽宁省装备制造企业应该根据供应链的内部特点、外部环境等积极进行相应治理,来提高供应链响应速度、顾客满意度等,最终提高供应链绩效。此外,辽宁省装备制造业应该准确识别供应链柔性程度,根据其来选择不同类型治理结构,确保能够避免过分依赖合同治理或关系治理来降低供应链合作伙伴关系中效率低下或机会主义风险。     

专利再制造下的制造商与再制造商的竞争研究

本文研究了由一个制造商、一个零售商和一个第三方再制造商构成的闭环供应链系统模型中,制造商无法控制废弃品回收渠道和制造商能有效控制废弃品回收渠道两种情形下闭环供应链系统成员之间的博弈问题,通过专利费的变量刻画制造商对供应链回收渠道的垄断能力,结果表明在制造商能有效控制废弃品回收渠道的情形下,形成一种垄断竞争局面,对于制造商而言是乐观的,可是消费者的利益是受损失的,且社会福利水平(产品总需求量)以及供应链效率也是更低的。     

公平偏好下考虑政府补贴的低碳供应链定价决策

本文以制造商主导和零售商跟随的两级低碳供应链为模型,在政府补贴绿色产品的策略下,分别研究零售商和制造商的公平偏好对产品绿色度、最优定价及供应链利润的影响。研究发现：（1）不论供应链成员偏好与否,政府的补贴对供应链都是有利的,但补贴比例需控制在合理的范围内,以期供应链系统利润最大化。（2）研究制造商的批发价变化趋势时,需同时考虑政府补贴比例和偏好行为对其的影响。（3）供应链成员的偏好行为都会损害系统的利润,只有零售商的偏好行为会增加其自身的利润,特别是制造商的公平偏好行为是一种损人不利己的行为。     

VMI决策模型及其供应链绩效研究——基于买方主导和供应商主导两种供应链环境下的比较分析

本文对确定需求、无缺货的单一供应商对单一买方的供应链关系,分供应商主导和买方主导供应链两种情形建立了VMI模型,对比分析了VMI对供应链绩效的影响,找到了一些重要的临界条件,揭示了VMI在增进供应链协同性、降低成本、增加利润等方面的重要意义.并证明了两种供应链环境下,VMI使供应链库存相关成本获得降低的条件相同.而使供应链利润得到提升的条件是有区别的,从而进一步明确了VMI的应用价值和应用条件.     

风险喜好型零售商主导的双渠道定价策略研究

一个由生产商和零售商组成的供应链中决策的顺序为:零售商率先根据自己掌握的市场信息公布最大潜在订单数量,生产商根据最大订单数量来调整其批发价格和直销渠道价格,最后零售商才确定其最优订货数量。研究表明,在一个由风险喜好型的零售商和一个风险规避型的供应商组成的供应链中,零售商风险偏好系数超过某一特定值时,随着需求方差的增加,零售渠道最优定价会越来越高;而对于风险规避型供应商,则是随着需求方差和(或)供应商风险规避程度的增加,会选择较低的产品售价以期获得稳定的收入。     

品牌权益影响下的双渠道供应链定价决策及协调研究

针对一个制造商开通直销渠道销售产品与零售商的价格竞争问题,文章基于制造商与零售商共享品牌权益的视角,研究在制造商双渠道供应链结构中,价格和品牌权益同时作用下的双渠道供应链定价决策,分别分析在集中决策下和分散决策下,品牌权益对两种渠道价格和利润的影响。研究发现：在集中决策下,两种渠道的价格、利润与品牌权益成正相关;在分散决策下,当品牌权益超过一定临界值时,其对制造商直销渠道的价格和制造商总利润的影响大于零售商。鉴于品牌权益对供应链定价决策的重要影响,文章建立制造商和零售商之间的品牌权益成本共担机制,并通过数值仿真分析发现,当实施品牌权益成本共担机制时,制造商和零售商的销售价格和利润均是最优的。因此,零售商应加强与制造商的互动,共同创造高品牌权益的同时,也应共同分享高品牌权益。     

考虑零售商销售努力的双渠道供应链定价策略研究

随着电子商务市场的日益成熟,制造商建设线上直销渠道来适应新的商品销售环境成为趋势。制造商线上直销渠道的建立占领了部分原本属于线下零售渠道的市场份额,对线下零售渠道造成冲击。针对双渠道供应链中的竞争,将零售商销售努力行为考虑在内,通过构建博弈模型分别研究了在集中决策模式和分散决策模式下,制造商与零售商的定价策略。研究发现,在集中决策模式下,线下零售渠道与线上直销渠道之间的价格差异随着两个渠道潜在需求量之间差异的增大而增大,并且两个渠道的最优价格分别与其市场潜在需求成正比。在分散决策模式下,两个渠道的最优价格亦与潜在需求成正比,并且线下零售渠道的最优价格随零售商销售努力程度的增加而增加,线上直销渠道的最优价格随着零售商销售努力程度的增加而减少。     

Equilibrium in supply chain network with competition and service level between channels considering consumers' channel preferences

This paper considers a dual-channel supply chain network consisting of multiple competing manufacturers, multiple competing retailers and multiple demand markets. Each manufacturer produces and distributes his products via direct e-commerce channel along with traditional physical channel. The manufacturers also provide services for the consumers in both channels, while the retailers only offer offline services to the consumers. On this basis, a dual-channel supply chain network equilibrium model with pricing and service decisions are established based on variational inequality theory. Nash equilibrium solutions are obtained by modified projection and contraction method. Combined with numerical examples, we analyze the impact of three critical factors on the equilibrium states and profits. Some interesting managerial insights are derived. We find that the profits of the manufacturers decrease (increase) in the raw material conversion ratio under single channel case (dual-channel case), while the increase of the raw material conversion ratio always benefits the retailers and the whole dual-channel supply chain network; the service level in each channel is positively correlated with its transaction volume. There are significant inconsistencies among the best combinations of cross-channel price coefficients between two channels for the manufacturers, the retailers and the whole dual-channel supply chain network. The same equilibrium decision (service level, price) or profit may exhibit the opposite changing trend with respect to cross-channel price coefficients under two cases of active e-commerce transaction and inactive e-commerce transaction. When the introduction of e-commerce channel can bring more profits for the whole dual-channel supply chain network, the manufacturers should provide reasonable allocation schemes of profit increment for the retailers to satisfy their participation constraints.     

Shopping in the omnichannel supply chain under price competition and product return

In recent years, omnichannel retailing has created value for prospective consumers. The rise of omnichannel retailing has changed consumers' buying habits, and manufacturers are facing stiff competition from retailers. To reduce this competition effect, manufacturers and retailers often work together to reduce showroom display costs. Despite this practice, there is little understanding of how omnichannel retailing impacts supply chain (SC) profit under competitive conditions. We investigate the test-in-store-and-buy-online (TSBO) retailing strategy and its impact on SC profit and price competition between manufacturers. The retailer sells products of both manufacturers through its website but displays products of only one manufacturer in the showroom, which bears the displaying cost. The retailer adopts a return policy for the other manufacturer. Stackelberg game was used to examine how members of the chain interact, and Nash equilibrium was used to find optimal strategies for players under decentralized and integrated channels. The results show that the TSBO strategy in retailing benefits all supply chain players under the integrated channel. A further interesting finding is that omnichannel SC profits are highest when retailers adopt a return policy. When two manufacturers compete and adopt different sales models, the manufacturer who uses the TSBO retail model reaps the most profit. Several other managerial insights are drawn from sensitivity analyses.     

Pricing and coordination with consideration of piracy for digital goods in supply chains

Sales of digital goods via traditional channels are affected by those on digital channels, and thus a competitive relationship often exists. In addition, due to the ease of piracy, digital goods may suffer from a fall in demand, which intensifies competition. This study considers a single supplier who sells digital goods, which may be pirated, to customers through two independent and different retail channels, such as traditional and digital ones, which may compete with each other in terms of service and price. To consider the effects of piracy on demand, a Stackelberg game is utilized to determine the optimal gain-sharing ratio and the equilibrium prices for all channel members with an aim to maximize the profit of the entire supply chain. It is found that an increase in piracy would force retailers to compete in a smaller market, and thus lead to a decrease in profits for each channel member. Therefore, a retailer who has a greater market share and is capable of managing a lower piracy rate would gain more profits by setting a higher price.     

How does customer recognition affect service provision?

We examine how channel members’ ability to recognize repeat and new customers affects service provision, profits, and welfare. In decentralized channels, when only retailers can recognize customers, customer recognition increases service levels. However, in centralized channels or decentralized channels when both manufacturers and retailers can recognize customers, customer recognition reduces (increases) service levels if service investment persists (diminishes) sufficiently over time. Moreover, in centralized channels, customer recognition reduces firm profits and consumer surplus, whereas in decentralized channels, when manufacturers and retailers can recognize customers, customer recognition increases channel members’ profits but decreases consumer surplus.     

需求不确定对单周期产品的生产商—零售商供应链的影响

在单周期产品的生产商—零售商的供应链中,由于市场存在着激烈的竞争,市场需求的不确定性必然会对供应链双方的决策产生很大的影响。借助传统的报童模型,建立Stackberg博奕模型,考虑了一个供应商面对两个不同零售商时的情景,分别分析了当零售商决策依据是最大化期望利润和当两零售商的市场需求相关时,以及在零售商的决策依据是在给定利润水平时最大化其概率的情况下,市场需求不确定会对供应链双方产生怎样的影响。     

Supply Chain Networks and Electronic Commerce: A Theoretical Perspective

In this paper, we develop a framework for the formulation, analysis, and computation of solutions to supply chain network problems in the presence of electronic commerce. Specifically, we consider manufacturers who are involved in the production of a homogeneous product and can now sell and have delivered the product not only to retailers but also directly to consumers. In addition, the manufacturers can transact with the retailers electronically. We assume that both the manufacturers and the retailers seek to maximize their profits, whereas the consumers take both the prices charged by the retailers and the manufacturers, along with the associated transaction costs, in making their consumption decisions. We identify the network structure of the problem, derive the equilibrium conditions, and establish the finite-dimensional variational inequality formulation. We then utilize variational inequality theory to obtain qualitative properties of the equilibrium pattern. In addition, we propose a continuous time adjustment process for the study of the disequilibrium dynamics and establish that the set of stationary points of the resulting projected dynamical system coincides with the set of solutions of the variational inequality problem. Finally, we apply an algorithm for the determination of equilibrium prices and product shipments in several supply chain examples. This paper synthesizes Business-to-Consumer (B2C) and Business-to-Business (B2B) decision-making in a supply chain context within the same framework.     

Pricing Decisions in Dual-Channel Supply Chain Including Monopolistic Manufacturer and Duopolistic Retailers: A Game-Theoretic Approach

Emergence of the Internet as a new distribution channel has led to increasing attention by researchers to dual-channel supply chain in recent years. In this paper, pricing and ordering decisions are investigated on a dual-channel supply chain which consists of monopolistic manufacturer and duopolistic retailers. The market is assumed to be controlled by the manufacturer. Thus, the manufacturer becomes leader and the two retailers act as followers. Due to establishing this new structure, different game-theoretic models including Bertrand, Collusion, and Stackelberg are developed to analyze pricing strategies under the various interactions between the two retailers. Then, the equilibrium decisions are compared under the considered scenarios and valuable managerial insights are presented. We found that the various games do not have any effects on the manufacturer’s responses. The retail prices given by the Collusion game are higher than by the other games. In the Collusion model, demands in the retail channel are lower than in the other games. Moreover, the manufacturer and retailers receive respectively the lowest and the highest profits under the Collusion game.