ITC voting behavior on sunset reviews

This paper is the first attempt to analyze ITC Commissioner voting behavior on sunset reviews of antidumping cases. Sunset determinations entail greater complexity than initial antidumping investigations because ITC commissioners must account for the impact of dumping protection as well as competitive forces on industry conditions. Empirical findings indicate that ITC voting is based on both sunset regulation and nonstatutory factors. Results reveal apparent biases against Chinese competitors and poorer nations generally, and favorable treatment toward U.S. steel producers and high-wage industries. There is also evidence of preferential treatment of industries located in states of Senate oversight committee members. JEL no. F13     

An Econometric Analysis of U.S. Antidumping Sunset Review Decisions

This paper is the first comprehensive analysis of the U.S. antidumping sunset review process required under WTO commitments. The econometric models study determinants of decisions by three U.S. actors: the petitioning industry, the Department of Commerce (DOC), and the International Trade Commission (ITC). Domestic industries facing potential vigorous competition seem to use sunset reviews to maintain current high domestic profits. U.S. governmental institutions use criteria broadly consistent with their legal obligations. Exports involving Chinese firms may face negative bias in the ITC process. JEL no. F1, F13     

Friendly Fire? The Impact of US Antidumping Enforcement on US Exporters

While there has been considerable interest in recent years in the role of macroeconomic determinants of antidumping actions by the United States and other traditional users, on the one hand, and the determinants of the growing global usage of this trade policy instrument, on the other, there has to date been no systematic exploration of the motivations for the significant number of foreign antidumping cases filed against US exporters. Several observers have remarked that the growing number of foreign users of antidumping might threaten US exporters, but the determinants of these actions have not been examined. That is the purpose of this study. We find that these actions are in part explained by macroeconomic forces and as a response to US export superiority in particular sectors, however a significant role (and larger than found for global antidumping more generally) is played by retaliation for US trade policy actions. JEL no.  F13     

A note on the time inconsistency of strategic trade policy

In a simple three-stage model of an international Cournot duopoly, optimal strategic trade policy is shown to be time inconsistent. If the domestic government first announces a production subsidy, firms then irrevocably commit resources to R&D, and finally play their output game, there is an incentive for the government to revise its ex ante optimal policy once R&D decisions have been made. If private agents anticipate this revision and if the government does not have the power to commit itself to the ex ante optimal policy, a credibility constraint has to be imposed.     

日本农产品贸易政策及对中国的启示

文章在分析日本表产品贸易说状的基础上,从市场准入、国内支持和出口竞争三方面入手对日本农产品贸易政策进行分析和探讨,指出对我国农业保护及发展的启示。     

Trade policy and protection in the European Community

The European Community is the world's largest trading entity. As a result, trade policy in the EC has an important impact on the world economy. This paper evaluates the formulation of trade policy in the EC and assesses the key instruments, both by sector and by target. The relative importance of tariff and non-tariff barriers is emphasised as is the role of anti-dumping. Finally, the impact of the single market programme and the Uruguay Round are assessed. Both will have a crucial bearing on the evolution of policy.     

国际贸易摩擦发生的理论诠释

伴随着国际贸易的增长,各国之间的贸易摩擦比以往有了明显的增加,并出现了许多新的特点。无论何种摩擦形式,其基本的理论根源就在于国际贸易利益的存在及其各国对贸易利益最大化的追求。当一国为了追求本国的贸易利益最大化,采取"以邻为壑"的贸易保护政策措施,或者一国采取的措施有悖于国际贸易的趋势框架时,国际贸易的摩擦则不可避免。各国应尽可能减少国际贸易摩擦的发生,合理规避国际贸易摩擦的风险。     

Discussion on the Suitability of Strategic Trade Policy in China

One theory of strategic trade policies is about the profit shifts theory by ＂harming others to benefit oneself＇. This strategic trade policy is that one country takes its losses to other countries as in ＂using neighbor＇s field as a drain＂. This kind of trade policy may suffer the resistance and vindictiveness of other countries. Under these terms of effective large-scale production, the unperfected market structure and the transition stages of its economic system, China can＇t adopt this strategic trade policy blindly.     

Understanding Agreements on TRIPS and Subsidies in Tandem

We provide a theoretical framework to explain why governments seek stronger protection of IPRs and allow R&D subsidies through multilateral trade agreements such as the TRIPS Agreement and the Agreement on Subsidies. Our analysis indicates that it is globally optimal to disseminate knowledge without IPR protection and to subsidize inventive firms when issues of IPR protection and R&D subsidies are considered in tandem. R&D subsidies are a means of amending for damages to investors’ incentives by weak IPR protection. In addition, the TRIPS Agreement is understood as a victory of the interests of exporting countries over those of importing countries.

Industrial Concentration Reverses the Timing in a Trade Policy Game

Faced with an export subsidy by a foreign government, importing countries have to decide whether they should impose countervailing duties or not. Using a Cournot duopoly model, Collie (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 130: 191–209) shows that the subgame perfect equilibrium occurs when the importing country sets its production subsidy and tariff at stage one and the foreign government sets its export subsidy at stage two. That is, an importing country will choose to commit itself not to use countervailing duties. In this paper, we extend Collie's duopoly model to the case of a Cournot oligopoly and show that the country in which industry is less concentrated tends to emerge as the Stackelberg leader.     

我国频遭欧盟反倾销的原因及对策

近年来,我国与世界各大经济体不断产生贸易摩擦,而反倾销作为贸易保护的主要手段之一频繁地被采用。本文以欧盟为例,通过分析其频繁对我国进行反倾销的原因,提出了相应的应对对策;除此之外,也由我国频遭反倾销的现状对我国自身的贸易保护措施进行了探讨,旨在减小国际对华反倾销的对我国造成的负面影响,并增强我国的贸易保护力度,以促进我国经济更高速增长。     

浅析全面开放后外资银行对中国银企的影响

我国银行业对外资银行全面开放,这对我国银行和企业都产生了巨大影响。从两个方面分析外资银行全面开放对我国银行和企业的有利方面。对企业而言,外资银行业务拓展可以加强对国内企业的服务;对银行而言,竞争双方加剧,尽管如此,中外资银行的在竞争中也存在着合作和双赢。     

贸易逆差影响国内农产品市场和产业发展的作用机理及政策选择——以日本和澳大利亚为视角

加入世贸以来我国农产品贸易平衡由顺差变为逆差,进而成为常态并不断扩大,国内财富流失的负面效应日趋加剧。本文基于农产品贸易逆差对国内农产品市场结构和农产品产业结构的长期影响和潜在风险的研究,比较了日本和澳大利亚保护本国农产品贸易的政策措施,提出完善我国农产品国际贸易保护政策选择。     

窥探美国外贸政策的方向标——TPA授权析解

TPA是美国外贸法中一种独特的授权模式。该模式保障美国总统在贸易谈判中的可信度,确保国会在谈判前、中、后的核心地位;促使美国在历次重大贸易协定谈判中占据有利位置,维护了"府会"良好合作关系。本文旨在通过探讨TPA的法律机理与历史演进,分析其价值,管窥其未来发展趋向。     

利益集团影响下的中美知识产权贸易摩擦的诱发机制

文章首先分析了中美知识产权摩擦的现状,然后从利益集团的视角分析了知识产权保护政策的需求和供给的形成过程,并在此基础上剖析了中美之间两种不同类型的知识产权贸易摩擦的诱发机制。研究结论认为：中国和美国的产业利益集团从自身的经济利益出发形成了不同的知识产权保护需求,政府从政治捐赠和总福利水平效用最大化的角度出发形成了知识产权保护政策的供给,形成了制度层面和产品层面的知识产权贸易摩擦的诱发机制。