江山靠谁守才不付东流?——控股家族非经济目标与经营权释出倾向实证研究

让子女接班还是将经营权释出给职业经理人,是代际传承时代背景下企业主的重要战略决策。文章基于委托代理理论,展示了家族/非家族高管在实现家族的非经济/经济目标上的各自优势,从控股家族非经济目标解释了企业CEO聘任决策,解构了能力与情感冲突的选择困境。根据全国工商联"中国非公有制经济健康状况评价"抽样调查数据发现,在家族成员与职业经理人都可兹聘任的情况下,那些更看重非经济目标的家族越不倾向于聘请职业经理人担任CEO作为企业下一代领导人。一代企业家的决策权力缺乏有效制衡将会强化非经济目标重要性与经营权释出之间的负效应;企业主与各级官员的频繁互动,加深社会联系巩固家族产权,有助于降低职业经理人的代理成本,显著地弱化非经济目标与经营权释出的负效用。文章的意义在于从控股家族所追求的目标解释为什么有的企业宁愿忍受企业绩效下降的经济后果仍然要雇佣家族成员担任CEO这个看似"非理性"现象。     

Market liquidity,private information,and the cost of capital: Market microstructure studies on family firms in Japan

We investigate cost of capital, information asymmetry, and market liquidity of listed family firms vs. non-family firms in Japan. First, we find that the cost of debt is lower and the cost of equity is higher for family firms than non-family firms, but the differences are not significant. The WACC of family firms becomes higher than that for non-family firms and the difference is significant probably because family firms in Japan use less leverage. Next, we find that the stocks of family firms are traded with higher information asymmetry than non-family firms. As for information asymmetry and illiquidity measures, we utilize the variables Adjusted PIN and Probability of Symmetric Order Flow Shocks (PSOS). Concomitantly we also estimate alternate conventional measures of market liquidity as a robustness check. Overall, the evidence on liquidity is somewhat mixed, while we find family firms show higher information asymmetry, which may affect cost of equity. As a final policy implication, we recommend family firms in Japan conduct more voluntary and timely disclosure, in particular, for the benefit of general stock investors, and may want to increase leverage to reduce the WACC.     

现金持有对家族企业市场竞争力的影响——基于CEO来源的视角

当前我国家族企业已陆续进入代际传承的重要阶段,企业CEO也出现了由一代、二代或外部经理人这三种不同来源的安排。不同来源的CEO从现金持有的交易动机、预防动机和代理动机出发,会选择不同的现金持有战略,从而影响企业的市场竞争力。文章以2010-2014年沪深两市A股上市家族企业为研究对象,研究现金持有水平与企业市场竞争力之间的一般关系,并根据家族企业的特殊性和差异性,推断家族企业现金持有是否同样具有竞争优势,还进一步研究家族企业不同CEO来源对现金持有竞争优势的影响。研究发现,家族企业的现金持有能够增强企业的市场竞争力,即家族企业存在现金持有的竞争优势。而且家族企业CEO的不同来源会对企业现金持有的竞争优势产生较大影响,具体说,家族创始人CEO由于维护社会情感财富和代际传承等原因,可能会损害企业现金持有的竞争优势,降低家族企业现金持有价值;家族二代CEO出于二次创业的动力,反而会加强企业现金持有的竞争优势;外部经理人担任CEO为了个人声誉和薪酬,也会显著加强企业现金持有的竞争优势。文章从家族企业这一特殊样本出发,丰富了家族企业现金持有竞争优势的研究,并从家族企业代际传承的视角,独特地研究了不同CEO来源对家族企业现金持有竞争优势的重要影响,同时也扩展了代际传承经济后果的研究。     

The innovation of family firms in China: New evidence from the China employer-employee survey

Drawing on China Employer-Employee Survey data collected in 2018, this study examines the effects of family ownership on firm innovation in China. Baseline regressions suggest that Chinese family firms have significantly lower R&D investment and number of patents than non-family firms, and the results are not sensitive to response quality, unobserved characteristics, and non-random assignment of family ownership. Furthermore, this gap can be effectively explained by the lower management quality of family firms. Heterogeneous analyses indicate that the low innovation of family firms appears only in more competitive environments. To improve innovation, we suggest that Chinese family firms should make increased efforts to upgrade their management.     

创业导向下女性高管对家族企业财务绩效的影响——来自性别属性与家族属性的双重效应

文章通过区分家族女性高管和非家族女性高管两类群体，实证检验了在家族企业创业成长的过程中，性别属性与家族属性带来的双重影响。研究结果表明，与独立型女性高管相比，与控制家族有血缘关系的亲缘型女性高管参与治理会对家族企业财务绩效产生更为积极的影响，且在内部创业导向下该积极作用更显著。独立型女性高管对财务绩效无直接显著作用，且在内部创业导向下，会削减家族企业的绩效，在外部创业导向下也没有体现出积极作用。本研究揭示了在以内部创业导向为主的家族企业中，家族经验、家族关系等家族属性可以一定程度上弥补女性角色在家族企业治理中的不足，为日益蓬勃的女性后代继任的家族企业创业成长给出了一定的有益指导。     

家族管理涉入如何影响并购战略行为——基于中国上市家族企业的实证研究

相比所有权涉入,家族成员参与企业经营管理将对战略行为产生更直接的影响。基于委托代理理论,文章对2010年-2018年中国上市家族企业的实证研究发现,家族高管参与对企业的并购倾向及横向并购行为具有促进作用,与纵向并购则表现为不显著的负向关系。组织冗余使家族高管参与与并购行为间的正向关系得到增强,而家族二代的进入则削弱了家族高管对企业并购的积极作用。进一步讨论家族权威在企业权力体系高度集中的情境,发现家族成员担任企业董事长及总经理与并购倾向的正向关系变得不显著,冗余资源的正向调节机制亦被抑制,但此时家族二代参与反而表现出正向的调节效应。结果表明跨代情境下家族管理涉入层面的多元化而衍生的不同委托代理问题将约束企业并购行为发生的边界,深化了家族企业谋求家业长青与顺应制度经济转型的讨论,为中国家族企业治理提供实践建议。     

家族承诺何以影响企业的风险承担?

企业创新创业活动具有很强的风险承担属性，创新创业研究离不开对风险承担的关注。本文考察家族承诺对家族企业风险承担的影响机制，基于2015年全国范围内非公有制企业调研，对877个家族企业样本的研究结果显示，家族承诺正向促进企业的风险承担，企业长期导向在家族承诺和企业风险承担的关系中起部分中介作用。通过引入企业长期导向，文章弥补了家族涉入到企业产出之间"缺失的一环"。与此同时本文验证了企业长期导向在中国家族企业情境下，并非有碍而是促进了家族企业风险承担。     

危机冲击与家族企业海外投资——来自中国香港上市公司的数据分析

社会情感财富理论提出后,许多学者在分析家族企业风险性决策时大多都是以社会情感财富这个单一的非经济目标作为决策依据,而忽略了经济目标在风险性决策模型中的重要性。文章针对这种单一决策目标的模型,基于企业经营的时间维度与目标类型构建了一个同时考虑到社会情感财富与经济目标的家族企业决策框架。基于2001-2016年中国香港本地制造业公司数据,文章重点考察了2003年发生的局部跨域SARS危机与2008年发生的全球金融危机对家族企业海外资产投资决策可能产生的影响,检验结果表明:与非家族企业相比,家族企业进行海外资产投资的动力往往更低。另外,不同的外部危机将对家族企业的海外资产投资产生显著的差异化影响。SARS危机冲击弱化了家族控制与海外投资的负向关系,即局部跨域危机来临时,家族企业为了持续发展将会加大其海外资产投资以获得潜在的风险性收益;全球性金融危机冲击则强化了家族控制与海外投资之间的负向关系,即全球性金融危机来临时,家族企业为了生存将会缩小其海外资产投资规模。文章的进一步研究还发现,虽然家族企业的海外投资对企业绩效具有负向影响,但局部跨域危机情境下的家族海外投资却显著改善了企业绩效,全球性金融危机冲击下的海外投资则更加恶化了企业绩效。     

创业与家族企业研究前沿与热点:基于BibExcel词频软件的文献计量分析

为了识别近十年国外创业与家族企业领域知识体系的演进发展趋势，文章基于近10年国外创业与家族企业核心期刊的关键词数据，利用BibExcel词频分析法列出了创业与家族企业领域常见的理论视角与话题，并通过趋势分析，推测未来几年该领域的研究方向。研究发现，创业与家族企业领域的理论视角具有明显的多样化特征，主流管理理论增长趋势放缓，而创业和家族企业特有的理论视角得到了更频繁的关注。话题关键词部分，创业研究呈现出了多极发展的趋势，家族企业研究则对传统的话题如传承、代际创业与家族性等保持着一如既往的热度，而战略领域的主流话题在创业与家族企业领域也富有旺盛的活力，中小企业的筹资、投资行为是上升最快的议题，而家族企业与新创企业的非经济作用，如企业社会责任等也受到了更多重视。     

The economics of the family firm

Abstract

The paper investigates how far the study of family firms constitutes a subject in its own right. It is argued that family ownership per se does not require the development of a special theory of family firms. It is suggested that the uniqueness of the family firm resides in the strength of the dynastic motive, which may strengthen trust between family members, but discourages the recruitment of non-family members and so inhibits the growth of the firm. The strength of the dynastic motive varies across family firms. The paper summarises two recent approaches to the economic theory of family firms which attempt to formalise these insights, and demonstrates the complementarities between them.     

家族性资源战略传承:从适应性到选择性组合创业——一个纵向案例研究

家族企业的跨代持续成长是其获取长效竞争优势的关键，以创业作为传承路径逐步获得认可，然而创业对家族企业传承的系统机制分析尚未形成。基于此，本研究从关注家族企业传承什么和如何传承转向创业对家族性资源战略传承以及对家族企业获得可持续发展的微观作用机制的研究。文章基于资源观视角，以兼具创业和传承特征的宁波夏厦齿轮有限公司为研究对象，采用单案例纵向研究，剖析在不同组合创业阶段家族性资源的代际传递和生成机制以及相关传承的策略性要素。研究发现：组合创业是家族性资源传承的有效途径，初次的适应性组合创业具有实验性质，是家族提供给继承者特有的试错和经验积累的过程，与后续的选择性组合创业形成一个创业深化体系；一代家族性资源为二代组合创业提供了得天独厚的资源，传承的策略性要素（家族信任、战略性教育和家族愿景认同）推动二代从适应性组合创业到选择性组合创业到一代+二代选择性组合创业的转化，促使二代家族性资源不断生成和内化并进一步驱动家族代际资源的融合和升华；最后文章构建了基于家族性资源传承的跨代组合创业理论模型。为家族企业传承和跨代持续成长提供启迪和借鉴，为后续创业行为研究和传承战略研究提供参考。     

西方家族企业由家族管理向职业化管理演进的经验与启示

本文致力于对西方家族企业由家族管理向职业化管理演进的历史进程进行考察,以期获得一些启示与借鉴,为人们了解家族与家族企业的关系、认识家族企业制度提供一个新的研究框架和思路。     

Parents’ Use of Subsidiaries to “Push Down” Earnings Management: Evidence from Italy

We find evidence consistent with Italian nonlisted subsidiaries engaging in accrual and real earnings management, so that their listed parents can meet or beat benchmarks. Thus, the parent firm drives the earnings management of the subsidiaries. We identify parents that are more likely to have managed earnings as the ones that avoid a small loss or meet or beat analyst forecast by a few cents. Cross‐sectional analysis reveals that Big 4 auditors mitigate accrual earnings management at the subsidiary level and that family‐owned firms use earnings management through nonlisted subsidiaries mainly to avoid reporting losses. Finally, we find that parent firms communicate earnings management strategies to their subsidiaries using board proximity. Our evidence shows that business groups manage earnings differently from single firms, pushing earnings management down to subsidiaries. It also supports the monitoring role of Big 4 auditors in a business group setting and contributes to understanding financial reporting decisions in family‐owned firms.     

高管层内薪酬差距、CEO内部继任机会与公司业绩研究——基于锦标赛理论的实证分析

利用2001—2007年A股上市公司的面板数据,研究了CEO内部继任可能性对高管层内薪酬差距及其激励作用的影响。结果显示,当CEO内部继任可能性较小时,公司为了提供足够的激励而倾向于扩大高管层内的薪酬差距,但这种扩大薪酬差距的行为并不一定会导致业绩提升。导致这一结果的原因在于薪酬差距的设定主要反映了CEO及股东们的观点,而业绩如何却在很大程度上依赖于非CEO高管人员对这一薪酬差距的反应。     

CEO与CFO股权激励的治理效应之比较:基于盈余管理的实证研究

在西方发达国家,CFO与CEO拥有相同的法律地位,负有监督CEO的责任,在公司治理结构中拥有重要的地位。本文从盈余管理角度研究我国CFO股权激励的公司治理效应,并比较CFO与CEO股权激励的公司治理效应,发现:尚未实施股权激励计划的公司,其CFO股权和期权占总薪酬比率与盈余管理呈负相关关系,而实施股权激励计划的公司,其CFO股权和期权占总薪酬比率与盈余管理的负相关关系显著变弱;尚未实施股权激励计划的公司,其CFO股权和期权占总薪酬比率对盈余管理抑制的程度显著小于CEO。这表明,正式实施股权激励会诱发盈余管理行为,其它类型的CFO持股则会抑制盈余管理行为,并且CFO股权激励的积极治理效应显著小于CEO。     

Maintaining a Reputation for Consistently Beating Earnings Expectations and the Slippery Slope to Earnings Manipulation

This paper investigates whether maintaining a reputation for consistently beating analysts' earnings expectations can motivate executives to move from “within GAAP” earnings management to “outside of GAAP” earnings manipulation. We analyze firms subject to SEC enforcement actions and find that these firms consistently beat analysts' quarterly earnings forecasts in the three years prior to the manipulation period and continue to do so by smaller “beats” during the manipulation period. We find that manipulating firms beat expectations around 86 percent of the time in the 12 quarters prior to the manipulation period (versus 75 percent for control firms) and that manipulation often ends with a miss in expectations. We document that executives of manipulating firms face strong stock market and CEO pressure to perform. Prior to the manipulation period, these firms have high analyst optimism, growing institutional interest, and high market valuations, along with powerful CEOs. Further, we find that maintaining a reputation for beating expectations is more important than CEO overconfidence and is incremental to CEO equity incentives for explaining manipulation. Our results suggest that pressure to maintain a reputation for beating analysts' expectations can encourage aggressive accounting and, ultimately, earnings manipulation.     

权力平等分配是否有利于家族代理效率提升——家族控制、内部股权集中度与代理效率研究

家族企业的两类代理问题是家族企业区别于其他类型企业的特色之一。文章以深市上市家族企业为研究对象,对家族控制权与代理效率之间的关系,以及股权在家族成员之间的配置中的调节作用进行了实证研究。结果表明,控制性家族对企业控制权的增强有助于提高代理效率。内部股权集中度对家族控制权与代理效率之间的关系起到了显著正向调节作用,这表明家族控制权在内部权力分配集中的阶段对代理效率的贡献更强;另一方面也说明家族内部权力分配的不平等性并不一定会损害家族企业的治理效率,对于家族控制权更高的企业,适度的权力集中分配会对家族企业的发展提供有效的支持。     

CEO Overconfidence and Stock Price Crash Risk

This study examines the association between chief executive officer (CEO) overconfidence and future stock price crash risk. Overconfident managers overestimate the returns to their investment projects and misperceive negative net present value (NPV) projects as value creating. They also tend to ignore or explain away privately observed negative feedback. As a result, negative NPV projects are kept for too long and their bad performance accumulates, which can lead to stock price crashes. Using a large sample of firms for the period 1993–2010, we find that firms with overconfident CEOs have higher stock price crash risk than firms with nonoverconfident CEOs. The impact of managerial overconfidence on crash risk is more pronounced when the CEO is more dominant in the top management team and when there are greater differences of opinion among investors. Finally, it appears that the effect of CEO overconfidence on crash risk is less pronounced for firms with more conservative accounting policies.     

股权的家族化、家族高管与家族企业业绩

文章利用2004-2015年中国A股家族控股上市公司的相关年度数据,从家族企业股权家族化视角出发,实证检验了股权家族化对家族企业业绩以及对企业是否聘任家族成员担任公司高管的经验影响关系。结果发现：（1）同等条件下,控股家族股权分配的家族化水平越高,其经营业绩表现越差;（2）家族成员担任CEO或董事长等关键高管会加剧股权家族化对家族企业业绩的负向影响关系;（3）同等条件下,公司股权的家族化更可能促使家族企业聘请家族成员担任CEO或董事长。此外,文章进一步分析发现,非核心家族成员参股企业会降低股权家族化与聘请家族成员担任公司CEO之间的正向影响关系。     

The Impact of Mandated Disclosure on Performance‐Based CEO Compensation*

Regulators argue that mandated compensation disclosure improves corporate governance by permitting shareholders to enjoin boards of directors to reward executives in ways that are consistent with shareholder value creation. We posit that mandated compensation disclosure, or the absence thereof, has a greater impact on the CEO compensation practices of widely held firms than of closely held firms. More specifically, we expect that, in the absence of mandated disclosure, CEO compensation is likely to be less performance‐contingent among widely held firms than among closely held firms. Moreover, we also expect that the advent of mandated disclosure leads widely held firms to increase the extent to which CEO compensation is performance‐contingent, much more so than closely held firms would. We use a unique data base resulting from the Ontario Securities Commission amendment of regulation 638 in October 1993. For the first time, this amendment required firms listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange to provide detailed executive compensation data similar to those required by the Securities and Exchange Commission, for the current year as well as retroactively for the previous two years. We find that, in the absence of mandated disclosure, CEO cash compensation in widely held firms is less performance‐contingent than in closely held firms. With the imposition of mandated disclosure, performance‐contingent cash compensation increases more in widely held firms than in closely held firms. Results with respect to stock option grants are mixed, with both closely held and widely held firms reacting to the advent of mandated disclosure.