A dominance solvable global game with strategic substitutes

Global games emerged as an approach to equilibrium selection. For a general setting with supermodular payoffs, unique selection of equilibrium has been obtained through iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies. For the case of global games with strategic substitutes, uniqueness of equilibrium has not been proved by iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies, making the equilibrium less appealing. In this work we provide a condition for dominance solvability in a simple three-player binary-action global game with strategic substitutes. This opens an unexplored research agenda on the study of global games with strategic substitutes.     

Convergence to competitive equilibria and elimination of no-trade (in a strategic market game with limit prices)

The strategic market games literature contains many results that predict Walrasian equilibria in the competitive limit. However, they usually come at the expense of ad hoc assumptions that rule out “pathological” no trade equilibria. This paper studies a strategic market game with limit prices. The set of Nash equilibrium allocations of this game converges to the set containing all competitive equilibria and no-trade, when players are replicated. Moreover, two rounds of iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies eliminate the no-trade equilibria. Hence, replication paired with two rounds of iterated dominance gives a clean prediction of competitive equilibrium.     

Risk aversion in RDEU

Various notions of risk aversion can be distinguished for the class of rank-dependent expected utility (RDEU) preferences. We discuss the relationships amongst five of these, and describe simple (testable) characterizations in terms of elementary probability transformations for all but the weakest notion. The paper also provides the first complete characterization of the RDEU orderings that are risk-averse in the sense of Jewitt [Jewitt, I., 1989. Choosing between risky prospects: the characterization of comparative static results and location independent risk. Management Science 35, 60–70]. We also extend Chew et al.’s [Chew, S.H., Karni, E., Safra, Z., 1987. Risk aversion in the theory of utility with rank-dependent probabilities. Journal of Economic Theory 42, 370–381] important characterization of strong risk aversion [Rothschild, M., Stiglitz, J.E., 1970. Increasing risk: I. A definition. Journal of Economic Theory 2, 225–243] by relaxing strict monotonicity and differentiability assumptions, and allowing for discontinuities in the probability transformation function. The important special case of maximin choice falls within this relaxed RDEU class. It is shown that any strongly risk-averse RDEU order is a convex combination of maximin and another RDEU order with concave utility and continuous, concave probability transformation. Our proof of the result on strong risk aversion is also simpler (as well as more general) than that of Chew et al. [Chew, S.H., Karni, E., Safra, Z., 1987. Risk aversion in the theory of utility with rank-dependent probabilities. Journal of Economic Theory 42, 370–381].     

Representation of the core of convex measure games via Kantorovich potentials

We establish a representation of the core of convex measure games by means of rearrangement ideas and the notion of Kantorovich potentials. Our representation was first proved by Marinacci and Montrucchio [Marinacci M., Montrucchio L., 2004. A characterization of the core of convex games through Gateaux derivatives, Journal of Economic Theory, in press] when the underlying measurable structure is that of a standard Borel space. The approach presented here is completely different and does not require this assumption.     

Generalized weak transfer continuity and the Nash equilibrium

This paper introduces the notion of generalized weak transfer continuity and establishes that a bounded, compact locally convex metric quasiconcave and generalized weak transfer continuous game has a Nash equilibrium. Our equilibrium existence result neither implies nor is implied by the existing results in the literature such as those in [Carmona, G., 2011. Understanding some recent existence results for discontinuous games. Economic Theory 48, 31–45], [Prokopovych, P., 2011. On equilibrium existence in payoff secure games. Economic Theory 48, 5–16], [Carmona, G., 2009. An existence result for discontinuous games. Journal of Economic Theory 144, 1333–1340], and [Reny, P.J., 1999. On the existence of pure and mixed strategy Nash equilibria in discontinuous games, Econometrica 67, 1029–1056].     

Robust games: theory and application to a Cournot duopoly model

In this paper, the robust game model proposed by Aghassi and Bertsimas (Math Program Ser B 107:231–273, 2006) for matrix games is extended to games with a broader class of payoff functions. This is a distribution-free model of incomplete information for finite games where players adopt a robust-optimization approach to contend with payoff uncertainty. They are called robust players and seek the maximum guaranteed payoff given the strategy of the others. Consistently with this decision criterion, a set of strategies is an equilibrium, robust-optimization equilibrium, if each player’s strategy is a best response to the other player’s strategies, under the worst-case scenarios. The aim of the paper is twofold. In the first part, we provide robust-optimization equilibrium’s existence result for a quite general class of games and we prove that it exists a suitable value \(\epsilon \) such that robust-optimization equilibria are a subset of \(\epsilon \)-Nash equilibria of the nominal version, i.e., without uncertainty, of the robust game. This provides a theoretical motivation for the robust approach, as it provides new insight and a rational agent motivation for \(\epsilon \)-Nash equilibrium. In the last part, we propose an application of the theory to a classical Cournot duopoly model which shows significant differences between the robust game and its nominal version.     

Testing for stochastic dominance using the weighted McFadden-type statistic

We demonstrate that when testing for stochastic dominance of order three and above, using a weighted version of the Kolmogorov–Smirnov-type statistic proposed by McFadden [1989. In: Fomby, T.B., Seo, T.K. (Eds.), Studies in the Economics of Uncertainty. Springer, New York, pp. 113–134] is necessary for obtaining a non-degenerate asymptotic distribution. Since the asymptotic distribution is complex, we discuss a bootstrap approximation for it in the context of a real application.     

A game-theoretic approach to the division of profits from economic land development

The present paper analyzes a very simple class of land-development games in which m developers individually seek to rent k contiguous land units from a set of n contiguous landowners. A notion of ‘admissible allocations’ is introduced to uniquely identify the set of ‘positive-profit participants’. Due to the contiguity of land, some land rents are seen to be positive even though the ‘bid rent’ for the land is zero.     

A necessary and sufficient condition for an NTU fuzzy game to have a non-empty fuzzy core

In 2004, Predtetchinski and Herings [A. Predtetchinski, P.J.J. Herings, “A necessary and sufficient condition for non-emptiness of the core of a non-transferable utility game”, Journal of Economic Theory 116 (2004) 84–92] provided a necessary and sufficient condition for non-emptiness of the core of a non-transferable utility game. In this paper, we extend this theorem to its counterpart in fuzzy games and give a necessary and sufficient condition for a non-transferable utility fuzzy game to have a non-empty fuzzy core. As a consequence, we derive a necessary and sufficient condition for non-emptiness of the fuzzy core of a TU fuzzy game.     

Exact finite sample properties of double k-class estimators in simultaneous equations

In our earlier paper [Srivastava, Agnihotri and Dwivedi (1980)] the dominance of double k-class over k-class with respect to exact mean squared error matrix criteria is established. It is observed that given a member of k-class, one can pick up a member of double k-class that will provide an improved estimator of the coefficients. This result prompted us to study the exact finite sample properties of the double k-class estimator. For this, we have considered a structural equation containing two endogenous variables and have investigated the properties of double k-class estimators of the coefficients of explanatory endogenous variables assuming characterizing scalars to be non-stochastic.     

A reexamination of the equity-premium puzzle: A robust non-parametric approach

Recent tests of stochastic dominance of several orders, proposed by Linton, Maasoumi and Whang [Linton, O., Maasoumi, E., & Whang, Y. (2005). Consistent testing for stochastic dominance under general sampling schemes. Review of Economic Studies, 72(3), 735–765], are applied to reexamine the equity-premium puzzle. An advantage of this non-parametric approach is that it provides a framework to assess whether the existence of a premium is due to particular cardinal choices of either the utility function or the underlying returns distribution, or both. The approach is applied to the original Mehra–Prescott data and more recent data that include daily yields on Treasury bonds and daily returns on the S&P500 and the NASDAQ indexes. The empirical results show little evidence of stochastic dominance among the assets investigated. This suggests that the observed equity premium represents compensation for bearing higher risk, taking into account higher-order moments such as skewness and kurtosis. There is some evidence of a reverse puzzle, whereby Treasury bonds stochastically dominate equities at the third order, a result which potentially reflects insufficient compensation to investors for bearing the negative skewness associated with the S&P500 index.     

Preference revelation games and strong cores of allocation problems with indivisibilities

This note considers the equilibrium outcomes of the preference revelation games in the general model of indivisible good allocation introduced by [Sönmez, T., 1999. Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores. Econometrica 67, 677–689]. We adopt the concepts of coalitional equilibria and cores which are both defined in terms of the weak deviation or blocking by a prescribed class of admissible coalitions. We prove that if the solution which induces preference revelation games is individually rational and Pareto optimal and the class of admissible coalitions is “monotonic,” then the set of coalitional equilibrium outcomes coincides with the core. And we point out that the preceding analysis in the context of marriage problems [Gale, D., Shapley, L., 1962. College admissions and the stability of marriage. American Mathematical Monthly 69, 9–15] is hardly extended to the general model.     

Uniqueness conditions for strongly point-rationalizable solutions to games with metrizable strategy sets

This paper introduces the iterative solution concept of strong point-rationalizability as a strengthening of standard point-rationalizability by stipulating that any two players have identical beliefs about the strategy choices of their common opponents. By adopting and generalizing the contraction-property approach of Moulin [Moulin, H., 1984. Dominance solvability and cournot stability. Mathematical Social Sciences 7, 83–102] and Bernheim [Bernheim, B.D., 1984. Rationalizable strategic behavior. Econometrica 52, 1007–1028] we derive sufficient conditions for the existence of unique strongly point-rationalizable strategies in strategic games with best response functions. These uniqueness results are derived under fairly general assumptions and are especially useful for complete and bounded, as well as finite strategy sets. For games with monotonic individual best response functions, equivalence between a unique strongly point-rationalizable and a unique point-rationalizable solution in the standard sense is established. Furthermore, the existence of unique fixed points is proven under conditions that generalize for bounded metric spaces an established fixed point theorem by Bonsall [Bonsall, F.F., 1962. Lectures on Some Fixed Point Theorems of Functional Analysis. Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, Bombay] and Smart [Smart, D.R., 1974. Fixed Point Theorems. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, London]. Possible extensions of our findings to games with multi-valued best response correspondences are discussed.     

The geometry of arbitrage and the existence of competitive equilibrium

We present the basic geometry of arbitrage, and use this basic geometry to shed new light on the relationships between various no-arbitrage conditions found in the literature. For example, under very mild conditions, we show that the no-arbitrage conditions of Hart [Journal of Economic Theory 9 (1974) 293] and Werner [Econometrica 55 (1987) 1403] are equivalent and imply the compactness of the set of utility possibilities. Moreover, we show that if agents’ sets of useless net trades are linearly independent, then the Hart–Werner conditions are equivalent to the stronger condition of no-unbounded-arbitrage due to Page [Journal of Economic theory 41 (1987) 392]—and, in turn, all are equivalent to compactness of the set of rational allocations. We also consider the problem of existence of equilibrium. We show, for example, that under a uniformity condition on preferences weaker than Werner’s uniformity condition, the Hart–Werner no-arbitrage conditions are sufficient for existence. With an additional condition of weak no-half-lines—a condition weaker than Werner’s no-half-lines condition—we show that the Hart–Werner conditions are both necessary and sufficient for existence.     

A note on portfolio selection and stochastic dominance

This note provides new and simpler conditions ensuring that, when one portfolio dominates another via stochastic dominance, a decision maker prefers the first one. The conditions are derived for the case of third-order stochastic dominance and for the general case of Nth-order stochastic dominance.     

A topological approach to Wilson’s impossibility theorem

We will present a topological approach to Wilson’s impossibility theorem [Wilson, R.B., 1972. Social choice theory without the Pareto principle. Journal of Economic Theory 5, 478–486] that there exists no non-null binary social choice rule which satisfies transitivity, independence of irrelevant alternatives, non-imposition and has no dictator nor inverse dictator. Our research is in line with the studies of topological approaches to discrete social choice problems initiated by [Baryshnikov, Y., 1993. Unifying impossibility theorems: a topological approach. Advances in Applied Mathematics 14, 404–415]. This paper extends the result about the Arrow impossibility theorem shown in [Tanaka, Y., 2006. A topological approach to the Arrow impossibility theorem when individual preferences are weak orders. Applied Mathematics and Computation 174, 961–981] to Wilson’s theorem.     

Ordinal proportional cost sharing

We consider cost sharing problems with variable demands of heterogeneous goods. We study the compatibility of two axioms imposed on cost sharing methods: ordinality and average cost pricing for homogeneous (ACPH) goods. We generalize the ordinal proportional method (OPM) for the two-agent case, Sprumont [Journal of Economic Theory 81 (1998) 126–162] to arbitrary number of agents.     

Unique induced preference representations

Machina [Machina, M.J., 1984. Temporal risk and the nature of induced preferences. Journal of Economic Theory 33, 199–231] considers an individual who has to choose from a set of alternative temporal uncertain prospects, and must take an action before the uncertainty is resolved, seeking to maximize the expected value of an (action determined) von Neumann-Morgenstern utility index. It is natural to ask if the set of underlying von Neumann-Morgenstern utility indices can be uniquely recovered solely on the basis of the thus induced (ordinal) preferences over temporal prospects. Machina’s conclusion is that “ordinal preferences alone will not suffice.” However, we show that it is possible to recover the action–utility set inducing the preferences uniquely if we restrict attention to action–utility sets for which no two actions induce the same preference relation on the space of temporal prospects, no action is redundant, and no action leads to a risk free outcome.