Opportunity Cost Pass‐Through from Fossil Fuel Market Prices to Procurement Costs of the U.S. Power Producers

This paper investigates the transmission of fossil fuel commodity spot market price changes to procurement costs of U.S. power producers. We measure and compare the speed and magnitude with which spot prices predict procurement costs using restricted access fuel price data. Natural gas spot prices are quickly reflected in procurement costs. Coal spot prices offer very little predictive power to coal procurement costs. Although not causal, the empirical results also show differences across regulatory status. These findings may have implications for the electricity market deregulation literature that creates marginal cost curves as a competitive benchmark.     

Can a margin squeeze indicate the need for deregulation? The case of fixed network voice telephony markets

In the beginning of fixed network liberalisation in Europe in the late 1990s, the main concern of regulators was to lower retail call prices. This was done by introducing wholesale regulation and promoting service-based competition. Some years later, the concern of some regulators turned from too high retail call prices to too low call prices, which might ‘squeeze’ entrants out of the market. This paper looks at a simple model in which this development is explained by increasing competitive pressure from an ‘outside opportunity’, most notably mobile telephony and cable. It is concluded that a margin squeeze is not necessarily used by the incumbent as a device to drive competitors out of the market and to increase market power but can also result from increased inter-modal competition. If this is the case, it is argued that the appropriate response would be deregulation or – under particular circumstances – a switch from cost-oriented access prices to alternatives such as retail-minus or capacity-based interconnection.     

QUANTIFYING MARKET POWER IN THE GERMAN WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY MARKET USING A DYNAMIC MULTI‐REGIONAL DISPATCH MODEL*

This paper quantifies the degree of market power in the German wholesale electricity market. A dispatch model simulates competitive marginal costs. In addition to common input factors like plant capacities, fuel prices and load structures, the model also incorporates international power exchange and dynamic effects like start‐up costs and hydro storage plant dispatch. The simulated prices are subsequently used as a benchmark for observed electricity prices. The analysis reveals significant market power in the German electricity market, mainly exhibited during peak periods. Producer surplus is also increased significantly due to strategic behavior.     

Telecom reforms in the EU: Prices and consumers' satisfaction

The paper shows the impact of privatization and liberalization on consumers in the telecommunication sector for 15 EU countries. Policy reforms are summarized by the OECD regulatory indicators (REGREF) that consider the extent of privatization, vertical disintegration, and market entry. After controlling for other country variables, first, a test of the impact of ownership and regulatory changes on consumer prices is given. In the second step, the Eurobarometer data on consumers' satisfaction about quality and prices of the telecommunication service are considered. The analysis confirms the importance of market regulation in reducing prices but minimizes the role played by privatization per se. Overall, the findings offer only mixed evidence, and somehow contradict, the hypothesis that all the reforms work in a similar way across the EU countries.     

Regulation of international roaming in the European Union—Lessons learned

This paper analyzes the evolution of prices and competition in intra-EU international roaming markets. It addresses three main research questions: (i) to what extent have market forces by themselves brought competition to retail roaming markets? (ii) Has the evolution of market dynamics in wholesale roaming improved competition? (iii) Is wholesale regulation sufficient to lead to a reduction in retail roaming prices? Data show that there has been little price-based competition both at wholesale and retail levels, despite prices being well above costs and the significant margins allowed by regulation. Available data from the period preceding the entry into force of the first EU roaming regulation also point to the same conclusion. Lack of competitive pressure in retail roaming markets and inelastic demand give little incentives for retail roaming service providers to lower prices. Wholesale international roaming markets have complex competition dynamics. They are characterized by the reciprocity of wholesale roaming agreements and traffic internalization inside transnational groups. These circumstances limit price competition at the wholesale level. The traditional regulatory approach applied to electronic communication markets has been primarily focused on wholesale regulation. However, empirical evidence shows that even if wholesale charges are reduced, retail roaming markets continue to operate at very high retail margins (for example, more than 200% retail mark-up over wholesale charges for data roaming services and incoming calls). This proves that in international roaming markets wholesale charge reductions are not necessarily passed on to retail prices. It can thus be inferred that wholesale price regulation alone is in most cases not sufficient to ensure that benefits are passed through to end users.     

Group purchasing, nonlinear tariffs, and oligopoly

Loyalty discounts are nonlinear tariffs that condition rebates or marginal prices on meeting aggregate purchase or market share targets. These discounts are widespread, and are often the impetus for consumers to form buying groups, or group purchase organizations (GPOs). This paper models the competitive effects of the introduction of a GPO into a market within which the preferences of the GPO's members are horizontally differentiated. While nonlinear tariffs are an effective way for a monopolist to extract consumer surplus, when two suppliers compete using such schedules, the results are far more competitive in comparison to simple Bertrand–Nash competition with linear tariffs. This result holds when the product of each of the suppliers is attractive to a substantial portion of consumers. In our model, the nonlinear schedule puts all customers “in play” to a degree that contrasts sharply with the competition at the margin characteristic of constant per unit prices. Moreover, competing in nonlinear tariffs removes allocative inefficiency that can result from single price competition.     

The effect of air traffic delays on airline prices

A legislative change in takeoff and landing restrictions at LaGuardia Airport provides an opportunity to study the effect of an exogenous shock to product quality on prices in the airline industry. I test how the price response varies with the degree of competition in the market. I find that prices fall by $1.42 on average for each additional minute of flight delay, and that the price response is substantially larger in more competitive markets.     

Pricing Private Mortgage Insurance

Issues involved in an evaluation of the price of private mortgage insurance are discussed. Cost considerations are emphasized as long-run equilibrium competitive market prices equal long-run marginal and average cost. An empirical evaluation of current insurance premiums vis-a-vis competitive market norms requires more empirical information on the determinants of foreclosures, especially the links between micro and macro determinants. Option pricing models suggest other data comparisons that also may shed light on an evaluation of insurance premiums.     

Personalized pricing and advertising: Who are the winners?

This paper investigates who wins and who loses when firms depart from a mass advertising/uniform pricing strategy (benchmark model) to a targeted advertising/price discrimination one. Considering a duopoly market in which firms simultaneously compete in prices and advertising decisions, we examine the competitive and welfare effects of personalized pricing with targeted advertising by comparing equilibrium outcomes under customized advertising/ pricing decisions to the results arising under mass advertising and uniform pricing. We show that, when both firms compete in both market segments, all segment consumers are expected to pay higher average prices under the personalized advertising/pricing strategy. We also show that, in the context of our simultaneous game, targeted advertising with price discrimination might boost firms’ profits in comparison to the case of mass advertising and uniform prices. The overall welfare effects of the personalized strategy are ambiguous. However, even when the personalized strategy boosts overall welfare, consumers might all be worse-off. Thus the paper gives support to concerns that have been raised regarding the firms’ ability to adopt personalized strategies to boost profits at the expense of consumers.     

Market Power in International Commodity Trade: The Case of Coffee

This paper studies the impact of market power on international commodity prices. I use a standard oligopoly model and exploit historical variations in the structure of the international coffee bean market to assess the impact of a cartel treaty on coffee prices and its global welfare consequences. The results suggest that the International Coffee Agreement (ICA, 1965–89) raised its price by 75% above the Cournot‐competitive level, annually transferring approximately $12 billion from consumers to exporting countries, and its lapse in 1989 explains four‐fifths of the subsequent price decline, that is, the ‘coffee crisis.’     

Competition and the signaling role of prices

In a market where sellers are heterogeneous with respect to the quality of their good and are more informed than buyers, high quality sellers' chances to trade might depend on their ability to inform buyers about the quality of the goods they offer. We study how the strength of competition among sellers affects the ability of sellers of high quality goods to achieve communication by means of appropriate pricing decisions in the context of a market populated by a large number of strategic price-setting sellers and a large number of buyers. When competition among sellers is weak high quality sellers are able to use prices as a signaling device and this enables them to trade. By contrast, strong competition among sellers inhibits the role of prices as signals of high quality, and high quality sellers are driven out of the market.     

K?nnen sich erneuerbare Energien langfristig auf wettbewerblich organisierten Stromm?rkten finanzieren?

In this paper we address the issue of whether renewable energy sources can be integrated into power markets if the use of renewable energies is extended at the desired speed. Market integration means that renewable energy sources have to cover their full costs from revenues on competitive markets. In the first part of this paper, we evaluate the long-term revenues of intermittent renewable energy sources using a high resolution power market model. Considering the renewable targets of the German lead study of 2010, we show that due to the merit order effect, intermittent renewable energy sources, such as wind power and photovoltaic, cannot be financed through power markets alone, even if their full costs fall below those of conventional power plants. This is also true for scenarios with high CO₂-prices and increasing spot market prices. In the second part of this paper, we discuss whether in the long run additional instruments such as green certificates or capacity markets would allow for a more competitive financing of renewable energy sources. Center stage in the discussion is the question under which circumstances these instruments increase competitive pricing and decentralised market decisions.     

Entry,donor market size,and competitive conduct among nonprofit firms

This paper empirically characterizes competitive behavior among charitable nonprofits where prices and output are difficult to observe. Using a model tailored to donative nonprofits and an empirical methodology that exploits cross-sectional variation in market size and various measurable demographic and cost characteristics applicable for nonprofits, this paper estimates the threshold number of potential donors required for nonprofit economic viability in five major charitable sectors. We find that our sample markets generally reach competitive levels once five or more nonprofits in a given nonprofit sector are observed. The paper offers several possible interpretations of these findings and directions for future research.     

ASYMMETRIC MARKET SHARES,ADVERTISING AND PRICING: EQUILIBRIUM WITH AN INFORMATION GATEKEEPER*

We analyze how asymmetric market shares impact advertising and pricing decisions by firms that have loyal, non‐shopping customers and can advertise to shoppers through a ‘gatekeeper.’ In equilibrium, the firm with the smaller loyal market advertises more aggressively but prices less competitively than the firm with the larger loyal market. Our results differ significantly from earlier literature which assumes that shoppers observe all prices and finds that the firm with the smaller loyal market adopts a more competitive pricing strategy. The predictions of the model are consistent with advertising and pricing behavior observed on price comparison websites such as http://Shopper.com .     

Price asymmetries and the path dependence of market power: Evidence from the U.S. airline industry

This paper uncovers price asymmetries across oligopolistic and monopolistic markets that are seemingly identical in structure but different in competitive history. This is done by identifying “quiet life” markets that have not (yet) experienced a change in structure, and “non-quiet life” markets that have been disrupted by firm entry and/or exit. Using a long panel dataset from the U.S. airline industry, we find that quiet life duopolies price significantly higher than duopolies that come about by entry in monopoly, and that quiet life monopolies price significantly lower than monopolies that come about by exit in duopoly. We show that the path towards a particular market structure matters for the determination of prices and explore several mechanisms that likely explain the price asymmetries, including engagement in anticompetitive behaviour, adjustment behaviour to market structure changes, and the cost heterogeneity of competing firms.     

ENTRY AND COMPETITION IN LOCAL HOSPITAL MARKETS*

We extend the entry model developed by Bresnahan and Reiss to make use of quantity information, and apply it to data on the U.S. hospital industry. The Bresnahan and Reiss model infers changes in the toughness of competition from entry threshold ratios. Entry threshold ratios, however, identify the product of changes in the toughness of competition and changes in fixed costs. By using quantity data, we are able to identify separately changes in the toughness of competition from changes in fixed costs. This model is generally applicable to industries where there are good data on market structure and quantity, but not on prices, as for example in the quinquennial U.S. Economic Census. In the hospital markets we examine, entry leads to a quick convergence to competitive conduct. Entry reduces variable profits and increases quantity. Most of the effects of entry come from having a second and a third firm enter the market.     

Towards a differentiated modeling of origin effects in hedonic analysis: An application to auction prices of specialty coffee

Origin matters. This has been shown by numerous studies using either discrete choice or hedonic approaches to derive implicit prices for origin as a product attribute. In most of the hedonic studies, intercept dummies were introduced for specific regional origins and statistically significant coefficients of those variables were seen as an indication of either a superior or inferior reputation, compared to products from other origins. We argue that hedonic pricing models of this type may be too simple to detect the true origin effects if assessments of a product’s sensory quality are available and interact with prior beliefs about reputation. Based on a supply-and-demand framework to explain auction prices, a reduced-form hedonic pricing model is suggested that includes intercept- as well as slope-dummy effects of the regional origin. Because reputation and the objective product quality are particularly important for markets of differentiated, high-quality foods and beverages, we analyze electronic auction markets for specialty coffees. The findings for the Cup of Excellence data reveal that it is important to distinguish reputation, sensory quality, and their interaction as determinants of coffee auction prices, as well as varying origin impacts across market segments.     

ENDOGENOUS COSTS AND PRICE‐COST MARGINS: AN APPLICATION TO THE EUROPEAN AIRLINE INDUSTRY*

This paper allows for endogenous costs in the estimation of price cost margins. In particular, we estimate price‐cost margins when firms bargain over wages. We extent the standard two‐equation set‐up (demand and first‐order condition in the product market) to include a third equation, which is derived from bargaining over wages. In this way, price‐cost margins are determined by wages and vice versa. We implement the model using data for eight European airlines from 1976–1994, and show that the treatment of endogenous costs has important implications for the measurement of price‐cost margins and the assessment of market power. Our main result is that observed prices in Europe are virtually identical to monopoly prices, even though observed margins are consistent with Nash behavior. Apparently, costs had been inflated to the point that the European consumers were faced with a de facto monopoly prices.