Lattice structure of knowledge and agreeing to disagree

This paper is a contribution to the study of the underlying mathematical structure of common-knowledge, which gives the well-known result of Aumann about the impossibility of ‘agreeing to disagree’. We present the Bayesian subjective probability model with player's belief: i.e. a triple (? %plane1D;4AF;, μ), in which i is a player. ? is a lattice in the field of sets of a state space Ω, %plane1D;4AF;, is a correspondence assigning to each state ω a filter %plane1D;4AF;(ω) in ?, and μ is a common-prior. For this model, we impose none of the important restrictions on the information structure in the Aumann-Bacharach model: axiom of knowledge K₁. axiom of transparency K₂ and axiom of wisdom K₃. We can extend both the disagreement theorem of Aumann and the agreement theorem of Geanacoplos and Polemarchakis under the assumption that each ? is an Artinian lattice.     

On the existence of walrasian equilibrium in large-square economies

An existence theorem for Walrasian equilibrium is demonstrated for an economy with a continuum of consumers and an infinite-dimensional commodity space, such as l₁ or c₀, having an ‘order-compatible’ basis.     

Robust trend inference with series variance estimator and testing-optimal smoothing parameter

The paper develops a novel testing procedure for hypotheses on deterministic trends in a multivariate trend stationary model. The trends are estimated by the OLS estimator and the long run variance (LRV) matrix is estimated by a series type estimator with carefully selected basis functions. Regardless of whether the number of basis functions K is fixed or grows with the sample size, the Wald statistic converges to a standard distribution. It is shown that critical values from the fixed-K asymptotics are second-order correct under the large-K asymptotics. A new practical approach is proposed to select K that addresses the central concern of hypothesis testing: the selected smoothing parameter is testing-optimal in that it minimizes the type II error while controlling for the type I error. Simulations indicate that the new test is as accurate in size as the nonstandard test of Vogelsang and Franses (2005) and as powerful as the corresponding Wald test based on the large-K asymptotics. The new test therefore combines the advantages of the nonstandard test and the standard Wald test while avoiding their main disadvantages (power loss and size distortion, respectively).     

Nonlinear generalization of the Frobenius theorem: A symmetric approach

A further generalization of the Samuelson-Solow's results for the Frobenius theorem is presented. We ask the existence of a semi-positive vector x with a non-negative scalar λ for an equation F(x;λ)=0, where F is a vector function from Rⁿ into itself with the parameter value λ. The nature of our extension as well as economic interpretation of our assumptions is also discussed in the paper.     

K-matrix-class estimators and the full-information maximum-likelihood estimator as a special case

This article presents a unified treatment of simultaneous system estimation. A general class of full-information estimators is proposed, called K-matrix-class (KMC). It is shown that the K-matrix-class includes both full-information maximum-likelihood and three-stage least- squares estimators as special cases and that the k-class can be regarded as a subclass of the K-matrix-class. Conditions under which KMC estimators are consistent (similar to those of the k-class estimators) are given. Furthermore, as a full information-generalization of the double k-class estimators, the double K-matrix-class estimators (DKMC) are proposed.     

The index theorem for a GEI economy when the degree of incompleteness is even

The purpose of this paper is to present a method to compute the index in an incomplete market economy. We show that generically in endowments and the asset structure the index theorem holds when the deficiency of markets, S−J, is even. The result is based on the indices of homotopies which have been presented for computation of an equilibrium in incomplete market economies.     

New unit root asymptotics in the presence of deterministic trends

Recent work by Phillips (Econometrica 66 (1998) 1299) has shown that stochastic trends can be validly represented in empirical regressions in terms of deterministic functions of time. These representations offer an alternative mechanism for modelling stochastic trends. It is shown here that the alternate representations affect the asymptotics of all commonly used unit root tests in the presence of trends. In particular, the critical values of unit root tests diverge when the number of deterministic regressors K→∞ as the sample size n→∞. When they are appropriately recentered and standardized, unit root limit distributions are shown to be normal as K→∞.     

Stochastic endogenous time preference

Preference for flexibility arises inherently in sequential decision making. However, a majority of the literature has limitations to capture a changing preference for flexibility across time in the sense that such an attitude is independent of past actions. This study incorporates the histories of past actions into an infinite-horizon extension of Dekel et al. (2001) and models a decision maker whose attitude toward flexibility evolves over time from the uncertainty of future time preference or discount factors. Moreover, we provide behavioral comparisons of the degree of patience across different histories and characterize the shift of subjective beliefs about discount factors in the sense of an increasing convex and concave stochastic order.     

On the product of gamma random variables

We give expressions for the distribution and density of a product of gamma or equivalently chi-square random variables. In particular, we give the distribution of the product of two independent gamma variables of mean k in terms of the Bessel functions K ₁, … , K _k .     

Universal Pareto dominance and welfare for plausible utility functions

We study Pareto efficiency in a setting that involves two kinds of uncertainty: Uncertainty over the possible outcomes is modeled using lotteries whereas uncertainty over the agents’ preferences over lotteries is modeled using sets of plausible utility functions. A lottery is universally Pareto undominated if there is no other lottery that Pareto dominates it for all plausible utility functions. We show that, under fairly general conditions, a lottery is universally Pareto undominated iff it is Pareto efficient for some vector of plausible utility functions, which in turn is equivalent to affine welfare maximization for this vector. In contrast to previous work on linear utility functions, we use the significantly more general framework of skew-symmetric bilinear (SSB) utility functions as introduced by Fishburn (1982). Our main theorem generalizes a theorem by Carroll (2010) and implies the ordinal efficiency welfare theorem. We discuss three natural classes of plausible utility functions, which lead to three notions of ordinal efficiency, including stochastic dominance efficiency, and conclude with a detailed investigation of the geometric and computational properties of these notions.     

The Thought of Work: A Review

The Thought of Work makes a vital contribution to industrial relations by offering a fresh examination of the many meanings of work and by clearly illustrating how those different meanings shape our thoughts and actions. The book also shows that work is fundamental to the human experience and highlights work’s complex and textured nature. The volume stops short of tying the different meanings together by means of an integrative framework. But even without such a framework, which can be constructed by integrating The Thought of Work with John R. Commons’s Industrial Goodwill, Budd makes it clear that work is a fully human activity—not merely an economic, psychological, or social endeavor. Accordingly, The Thought of Work deserves a wide audience.     

The use of R2 to determine the appropriate transformation of regression variables

It is proved that, under certain conditions, the ‘true’ model, from a set of alternative regression specifications involving different transformations of the same dependent variable, is the formulation for which population R² is highest. This theorem, which requires assumptions of normality, is proved through the use of Hermite polynomials. The paper contains an appendix listing the major properties of these polynomials.     

Continuous mean demand functions derived from non-convex preferences

In this paper we show that for a large subset of utility functions in the space of all C¹ utility functions and for all prices the mean demand of those consumers whose taste is represented by a given utility function in that subset is uniquely determined. This implies that for a large set of economies mean demand is a continuous function. Our analysis uses derivatives of first and of higher order. The result is essentially a consequence of the multijet transversality theorem.     

Best response dynamics with level-n expectations in two-stage games

This paper analyzes behavior in repeatedly played two-stage games, where players choose actions in both stages according to best replies using level-n expectations about the opponent׳s actions in both stages. Level-n expectations are recursively defined in a way that a player holding level-n expectations correctly predicts the action of an opponent holding level-(n−1) expectations. A general conceptual framework to study such dynamics for two-stage games is developed and it is shown that, contrary to results for single-stage games, the fixed points of the dynamics depend on the level of the expectations. In particular, for level-0 expectation, fixed points correspond to a Nash equilibrium of a simultaneous move version of the game, whereas (under certain conditions) fixed points converge towards the subgame perfect equilibrium of the two-stage game if the level of expectations goes to infinity. The approach is illustrated using a two-stage duopoly game, where firms in the first stage invest in activities reducing their marginal costs and in the second stage engage in Cournot competition. Conditions for local stability of the fixed points are derived for different levels of expectations and it is shown that level-2 expectations are sufficient to move the fixed-point of the dynamics to a close neighborhood of the subgame perfect equilibrium. Furthermore, it is demonstrated that although firms benefit from unilateral increases in the level of expectations, an increase of n by all firms reduces all profits.     

On the structure of the equilibrium manifold

An elementary proof is given of Y. Balasko's theorem that the equilibrium manifold is diffeomorphic to R^lm. Our proof includes the case (l,m)=(2,2), which the original proof does not cover.     

Some results on the existence of utility functions on path connected spaces

This paper concerns the existence of utility representations for preferences defined on a path connected space X. This includes any convex set. A classical result of Eilenberg (1941) proves the existence of utility representations when the consumption set is connected and separable. In an infinite dimensional space the above result may not be useful, because we lack, in general, the separability of the space. The non-separable spaces L^∞ and ca(K) are typical examples in mathematical economics. In this paper we show that a continuous preference relation ≽, on X has a continuous utility representation if and only if it is countably bounded, i.e., there is some countable subset F of X such that for all x in X there exist y and z in F with y≽x≽z. An easy corollary states that any continuous preference which has a best and a worst point has a continuous representation. We also obtain a convex continuous preference on a Banach lattice that has not a utility representation, because it is not countably bounded.     

The joint continuity of the expected payoff functions

Glicksberg [Glicksberg, I.L., 1952. A further generalization of the Kakutani fixed point theorem, with applications to Nash equilibrium points. In: Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society 3, pp. 170–174] generalized the Kakutani fixed point theorem to the setting of locally convex spaces and used it to prove that every k-person strategic game with action sets convex compact subsets of locally convex spaces and continuous payoff functions has a Nash equilibrium. He subsequently used this result to establish the following fundamental theorem of game theory: Every k-person strategic game with action sets metrizable compact topological spaces and continuous payoff functions has a mixed strategies equilibrium. However, in his proof of the latter result, Glicksberg did not show that the expected payoff functions were jointly continuous, something that was required for the existence of a mixed strategies equilibrium.     

Bootstrapping the Box–Pierce Q test: A robust test of uncorrelatedness

This paper describes a test of the null hypothesis that the first K autocorrelations of a covariance stationary time series are zero in the presence of statistical dependence. The test is based on the Box–Pierce Q statistic with bootstrap-based P-values. The bootstrap is implemented using a double blocks-of-blocks procedure with prewhitening. The finite sample performance of the bootstrap Q   test is investigated by simulation. In our experiments, the performance is satisfactory for samples of n=500$n=500$. At this sample size, the differences between the empirical and nominal rejection probabilities are essentially eliminated.