Evidence on differences between recognition and disclosure: A comparison of inputs to estimate fair values of employee stock options

I investigate reliability differences across recognition and disclosure regimes to shed light on differing incentives and reporting of employee stock option (ESO) fair values. I compare ESO fair values based on firm-reported inputs with ESO fair values based on benchmark inputs, estimated following authoritative guidance. On average, I find opportunism increases with recognition as compared with disclosure, and that it is associated with incentives to manage earnings. Despite the increase in opportunism, I find that accuracy does not decline for recognizers, and that accuracy differs across voluntary and mandatory recognition.     

ESO compensation: The roles of default risk, employee sentiment, and insider information

This paper derives a pricing model for employee stock options (ESO) that includes default risk and considers employee sentiment. Using ESO data from 1992 to 2004, the study finds that the average executive's subjective value is about 55% of the Black-Scholes value. Only employees who over-estimate firm returns (or insiders who know that the firm is under-valued) by about 10% per annum will prefer ESOs over cash compensation. Our model also shows that work incentives offered by ESOs may be far lower than those implied by Black-Scholes but that ESOs may induce less risk-taking behavior, contrary to typical moral hazard arguments. Findings may impact relevant accounting regulations as well as compensation decisions.     

The Cost of Employee Stock Option Grants: An Empirical Analysis

This study presents empirical evidence on the ex post costs of employee stock option (ESO) grants to issuing firms and examines whether the Black–Scholes [1973] model provides reasonable estimates of these values. Because there are no market prices for ESOs, the traditional avenues for testing option–pricing models are unavailable. This research relies instead on techniques from the economic forecasting literature, viewing model values as forecasts of the options' payoff. The theoretically appropriate rate at which to discount ESO payoffs is derived under the maintained hypothesis that the Black–Scholes model is valid. This rate is used in estimating ex post ESO costs at the time of grant, which are then compared with Black–Scholes estimates using Theil's [1966] tests of forecast rationality. Based on a sample of 966 ESO grants over 1963–1984, the results suggest that the Black–Scholes model, adjusted for concavity in the time to exercise using the Hemmer, Matsunaga, and Shevlin [1994] procedure, appears to provide reasonable estimates of ex post ESO costs for the average ESO grant. However, there is significant variability in the amount of model error on an individual grant basis.     

Repricing and employee stock option valuation

A repricing occurs when the issuing firm resets the strike price of an employee stock option (ESO). ESO repricings occur most frequently following a significant decline in the underlying stock price. Typically, the strike price is reset to the new stock price. We develop a new model for valuing ESOs with a repricing feature. Our valuation model is developed within a utility-maximizing framework that accounts for potentially multiple repricings, employee risk aversion, employee non-option wealth, the non-tradeability of ESOs, and the early exercise feature of ESOs. Simulations suggest that these factors can significantly affect ESO value.     

关于经理人股票期权会计确认问题的研究

本文对经理人股票期权会计确认问题进行了较深入的研究。本文提出 ,按照现代企业理论 ,经理人股票期权的经济实质是企业经理人参与企业剩余索取权的分享 ,行权前的经理人成为企业的非股东所有者。因此 ,应将股票期权确认为企业的利润分配 ,而非美国现行的确认为费用之处理 ,以反映经理人股票期权的经济实质。这样 ,股票期权的会计处理将不影响利润表 ,从而也更有助于推动用公允价值法计量之 ,以更科学地反映其价值。为此 ,应革新现行的财务会计观念与模式 ,建立非股东所有者的新概念 ,使之适应企业经理人参与现代企业剩余索取权分享的现实。     

Dynamic Contracting with Intermediation: Operational,Governance, and Financial Engineering

Private equity funds intermediate investment and affect portfolio firm performance by actively engaging in operational, governance, and financial engineering. We study this type of intermediation in a dynamic agency model in which an active intermediary raises funds from outside investors and invests in a firm run by an agent. Optimal contracting addresses moral hazard at the intermediary and firm levels. The intermediary's incentives to affect firm performance are strongest after poor performance, while the agent's incentives are strongest after good performance. We also show how financial engineering, that is, financial contracting with outside investors, interacts with operational and governance engineering.     

Non-marketability and the value of employee stock options

We adapt the Benninga et al. (2005) framework to value employee stock options (ESOs). The model quantifies non-diversification effects, is computationally simple, and provides an endogenous explanation of ESO early-exercise. Using a proprietary dataset of ESO exercise events we measure the non-marketability ESO discount. We find that the ESO value on the grant date is approximately 45% of a similar plain vanilla Black–Scholes value. The model is aligned with empirical findings of ESOs, gives an exercise boundary of ESOs and can serve as an approximation to the fair value estimation of share-based employee and executive compensation. Using the model we give a numerical measure of non-diversification in an imperfect market.     

Analytic Pricing of Employee Stock Options

We introduce a model that captures the main properties thatcharacterize employee stock options (ESO). We discuss the likelihoodof early voluntary ESO exercise, and the obligation to exerciseimmediately if the employee leaves the firm, except if thishappens before options are vested, in which case the optionsare forfeited. We derive an analytic formula for the price ofthe ESO and in a case study compare it to alternative methods.     

Employee stock options pricing and the implication of restricted exercise price: evidence from Taiwan

Employee stock option (ESO) issuance in Taiwan is associated with some unique characteristics. We believe this to be the first paper to examine the impact of different pricing model options on the theoretical price of ESOs in Taiwan. A clear consensus in terms of the time point to expense the ESO issuance and the setting of a restricted exercise price lead us to believe that the reset pricing model represents the most pertinent model to price Taiwanese ESOs. Furthermore, the factors that determine the decision to impose a restricted exercise price are also discussed. With an outreach of 24 logistic regressions, the empirical results show that the ultimate control power, operational performance and volatility of a firm are important indicators regarding the probability of adding a restriction on the exercise price.     

A Model of Equity Based Compensation with Tax

In this paper, we develop a two‐stage continuous time model of employee stock option (ESO) valuation under different tax regimes. We show that tax rules can have significant effects on ESO exercise behavior. In addition, we find that incentive stock options (ISO) are the optimal form of compensation for all levels of employees in the UK. In the US, restricted stock plans are preferred, and tax breaks offered by incentive schemes are only beneficial to employees with high liquid wealth (or small option holdings relative to wealth) or low risk aversion. We also analyze 83b elections for restricted stock plans in the US and find that making an election is a sub‐optimal decision for both the employee and the firm.     

Do controlling shareholders' expropriation incentives imply a link between corporate governance and firm value? Theory and evidence

We develop and test a model that investigates how controlling shareholders' expropriation incentives affect firm values during crisis and subsequent recovery periods. Consistent with the prediction of our model, we find that, during the 1997 Asian financial crisis, Asian firms with weaker corporate governance experience a larger drop in their share values but, during the post-crisis recovery period, such firms experience a larger rebound in their share values. We also find consistent evidence for Latin American firms during the 2001 Argentine economic crisis. Our results support the view that controlling shareholders' expropriation incentives imply a link between corporate governance and firm value.     

Implicit incentives and reputational herding by hedge fund managers

Several theories of reputation suggest that managers' incentives affect their propensity to engage in herding behavior. This paper investigates these theories by tracking hedge fund managers' herding behavior over their careers. I first examine managerial incentives for herding, and show that more senior managers that deviate from the herd have a significantly higher probability of failure and do not experience higher fund inflows than their less-senior counterparts. These implicit incentives should encourage managers to herd more as their careers progress. I find strong support for this hypothesis: using a number of proxies for herding, I show that more experienced managers herd more than less-experienced managers. Finally, I examine performance differences between more and less-experienced managers, and find that while more experienced managers underperform less-experienced managers, this underperformance does not appear to be caused by differences in herding. Overall, these results are in direct contrast with studies of mutual fund managers, reflecting important difference in implicit incentives between the two industries.     

Firm incentives,institutional complexity and the quality of “harmonized” accounting numbers

In this paper, we investigate how firm reporting incentives and institutional factors affect accounting quality in firms from 26 countries. We exploit a unique multicountry setting where firms are required to comply with the same set of international reporting standards. We develop an approach of cross-country comparisons allowing for differences between firms within a country and we investigate the relative importance of country- versus firm-specific factors in explaining accounting quality. We find that financial reporting quality increases in the presence of strong monitoring mechanisms by means of ownership concentration, analyst scrutiny, effective auditing, external financing needs, and leverage. Instability of business operations, existence of losses, and lack of transparent disclosure negatively affect the quality of accounting information. At the country level, we observe better accounting quality for firms from regulatory environments with stronger institutions, higher levels of economic development, greater business sophistication, and more globalized markets. More importantly, we find that firm-specific incentives play a greater role in explaining accounting quality than countrywide factors. This evidence suggests that institutional factors shape the firm's specific incentives that influence reporting quality. Our findings support the view that the global adoption of a single set of accounting standards in isolation is not likely to lead to more comparable and transparent financial statements unless the institutional conditions and the firm-specific reporting incentives also change.     

How changes in market conditions affect screening activity,credit risk,and the lending behaviour of banks

The global financial crisis dramatically transformed the market conditions in the banking industry. We construct a theoretical model of spatial competition that considers the differential information between lenders and loan applicants to explore how changes in the market structure affect the lending behaviour of banks and their incentives to invest in screening and how this, in turn, affects the level of credit risk in the economy. Our findings reveal that enhanced competition reduces lending cost thus encouraging the entry of new customers in credit markets. Also, that the transportation cost that loan applicants are required to pay to reach the bank of their interest shrinks with respect to the degree of competition. We further lend support to the view that stiffer competition has an increasing impact on the level of credit risk. Notably, we find that competition strengthens the incentives of banks to engage in screening activity and that screening serves as a protection mechanism that can provide banks with a shield against bad loans. Overall, when market conditions are substantially distorted, this has a dilutive impact on the incentives mechanism of banks to screen their applicants. We provide empirical evidence which is consistent with the conceptual underpinnings of our theoretical model and the obtained findings.     

How Might Companies Value ESOs?

There has been a steady growth in the use of employee equity compensation plans, and in the use of executive stock options (ESOs) in particular, along with a rise in shareholder and public perceptions that the values of compensation plans are not always fully disclosed. The IFSA of Australia recently called for separate reporting in financial statements of numbers and values of ESOs. Companies, when negotiating employment contracts, frequently agree to compensate an executive if a share option plan is subsequently not approved by shareholders. These facts suggest that reporting the value of an ESO plan is a useful and important exercise. We outline a model for the valuation of ESOs typically issued by Australian listed companies and illustrate the application of the model with a case study.     

Market Structure, Capital Regulation and Bank Risk Taking

This paper discusses the effect of capital regulation on the risk taking behavior of commercial banks. We first theoretically show that capital regulation works differently in different market structures of banking sectors. In lowly concentrated markets, capital regulation is effective in mitigating risk taking behavior because banks’ franchise values are low and banks have incentives to pursue risky strategies in order to increase their franchise values. If franchise values are high, on the other hand, the effect of capital regulation on bank risk taking is ambiguous. We then test the model predictions on a cross-country sample including 421 commercial banks from 61 countries. We find that capital regulation is effective in mitigating risk taking only in markets with a low degree of concentration. The results remain robust after accounting for financial sector development, legal system efficiency, and for other country and bank-specific characteristics.     

The Limits of Organizational Theory and Incentives (Or, Why Corporate Success Is Not Just About Money)

Most economists begin their study of organizational behavior by taking for granted that incentive compensation influences behavior. Managers and employees are assumed to have "utility functions" that reflect a very basic set of "preferences"—preferences for things like money and leisure and job security. And, as clearly simplistic as it is, this "model" of human behavior has been shown to have considerable predictive power.
But it is equally clear that financial incentives and rewards are not all that matters in motivating people within large organizations. What economists have failed to recognize is the important subjective consequences for employees of acting in accord with well-designed incentives that have been "internalized"—viewed not just as leading to financial rewards and corporate success, but as "the right thing to do." In the language of economists, a well-designed incentive program can end up influencing not only people's behavior, but their underlying "preferences," or what non-economists like to call "values." And it is these preferences and values that are at the core of an organization's "culture."     

Household Level Economic Incentives, Unemployment Trap and Job Finding Probability

This paper considers the sensitivity of the household's disposable income with respect to the labour market states and the labour market transitions of unemployed workers. The paper analyses the following questions: (i) which are the determinants of starting wages? (ii) how many unemployed are in the unemployment trap? (iii) how do household level economic incentives affect the conditional probability of finding a job? The empirical analysis is based on individual panel data covering the years 1987–1993 in Finland, when the unemployment rate rose from about 4% to 18%. We have estimated the starting wage equation to calculate the effects of hypothetical re-employment on the household's disposable income and to evaluate the frequency of the unemployment trap. To analyse factors affecting the transition out of unemployment to employment in open labour market, we estimate unemployment duration using a semi-parametric proportional risk model. The paper shows that the impact of the economic incentives, measured by the hypothetical change in household disposable income, on employment is more important in the recession than in the boom.     

An IFRS 2 and FASB 123 (R) Compatible Model for the Valuation of Employee Stock Options

In this paper, we show how employee stock options can be valued under the new reporting standards IFRS 2 and FASB 123 (revised) for share-based payments. Both standards require companies to expense employee stock options at fair value. We propose a new valuation model, referred to as Enhanced American model, that complies with the new standards and produces fair values often lower than those generated by traditional models such as the Black–Scholes model or the adjusted Black–Scholes model. We also provide a sensitivity analysis of model input parameters and analyze the impact of the parameters on the fair value of the option. The valuation of employee stock options requires an accurate estimation of the exercise behavior. We show how the exercise behavior can be modeled in a binomial tree and demonstrate the relevance of the input parameters in the calibration of the model to an estimated expected life of the option. JEL Classification G13, G30     

Market competition,earnings management,and persistence in accounting profitability around the world

We examine how cross-country differences in product, capital, and labor market competition, as well as earnings management affect mean reversion in accounting return on assets. Using a sample of 48,465 unique firms from 49 countries, we find that accounting returns mean revert faster in countries where there is more product and capital market competition, as predicted by economic theory. Country differences in labor market competition and earnings management are also related to mean reversion in accounting returns—but the relation varies with firm performance. Country labor competition increases mean reversion when unexpected returns are positive but slows it when unexpected returns are negative. Accounting returns in countries with higher earnings management mean revert more slowly for profitable firms and more rapidly for loss firms. Thus earnings management incentives to slow or speed up mean reversion in accounting returns are accentuated in countries where there is a high propensity for earnings management. Overall, these findings suggest that country factors explain mean reversion in accounting returns and are therefore relevant for firm valuation.