An empirical assessment of assortative matching in the labor market

In labor markets with worker and firm heterogeneity, the matching between firms and workers may be assortative, meaning that the most productive workers and firms team up. We investigate this with longitudinal population-wide matched employer–employee data from Portugal. Using panel data methods, we quantify a firm-specific productivity term for each firm, and we relate this to the skill distribution of workers in the firm. We find that there is positive assortative matching, in particular among long-lived firms. Using skill-specific estimates of an index of search frictions, we find that the results can only to a small extent be explained by heterogeneity of search frictions across worker skill groups.     

Preference revelation games and strong cores of allocation problems with indivisibilities

This note considers the equilibrium outcomes of the preference revelation games in the general model of indivisible good allocation introduced by [Sönmez, T., 1999. Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores. Econometrica 67, 677–689]. We adopt the concepts of coalitional equilibria and cores which are both defined in terms of the weak deviation or blocking by a prescribed class of admissible coalitions. We prove that if the solution which induces preference revelation games is individually rational and Pareto optimal and the class of admissible coalitions is “monotonic,” then the set of coalitional equilibrium outcomes coincides with the core. And we point out that the preceding analysis in the context of marriage problems [Gale, D., Shapley, L., 1962. College admissions and the stability of marriage. American Mathematical Monthly 69, 9–15] is hardly extended to the general model.     

MATCHING MODELS UNDER SCRUTINY: AN APPRAISAL OF THE SHIMER PUZZLE

Abstract Two papers have recently questioned the quantitative consistency of the search and matching model. Shimer has argued that a textbook matching model is unable to explain the cyclical variation of unemployment and vacancies in the US economy. Costain and Reiter have found the existence of a trade‐off in the model's performance: any attempt to change the calibrated values to improve the model's ability to predict the business cycle jeopardizes its predictions of the impact of unemployment benefits on unemployment. In surveying the literature originating in these findings, I distinguish three different avenues that have been followed to correct the model: change in wage formation, change in the calibration and changes in the model specification. The last approach seems to achieve the best results both from a business cycle and from a microeconomic viewpoint.     

Transitions from home to marriage of young Americans

The paper examines the impact of income on the transitions between home, living independently and first marriage of young Americans. A matching model is outlined, similar to that used in theories of job search, to explain the probability of marriage and living alone. A multiple‐state, multiple‐transition model which allows for correlated heterogeneity on the first and subsequent transitions is estimated. The results show that income has a strong and significant effect. The impact of unobserved heterogeneity is examined in detail. The impact of the young person's earnings on the transitions is explored through simulation. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Heterogeneous impacts in PROGRESA

We investigate impact heterogeneity using data from the experimental evaluation of the Mexican conditional cash transfer program PROGRESA. We build upon, and extend Heckman, Smith and Clements [Heckman, J., Smith, J., Clements, N., 1997. Making the most out of programme evaluations and social experiments: Accounting for heterogeneity in programme impacts. Review of Economic Studies 64, 487–535] and recent studies of quantile treatment effects and random coefficient models. We find strong evidence of systematic (i.e. subgroup) variation in impacts in PROGRESA and modest evidence of heterogeneous impacts conditional on the systematic impacts. Our paper concludes with a discussion of the policy relevance of our findings and of heterogeneous impacts more generally.     

Is training more frequent when the wage premium is smaller? Evidence from the European Community Household Panel

According to Becker [Becker, G., 1964, Human Capital, NBER, New York], when labour markets are perfectly competitive, general training is paid by the worker, who reaps all the benefits from the investment. Therefore, ceteris paribus, the greater the training wage premium, the greater the investment in general training. Using data from the European Community Household Panel, we compute a proxy of the training wage premium in clusters of homogeneous workers and find that smaller premia induce greater incidence of off-site training, which is likely to impart general skills. Our findings suggest that the Becker model provides insufficient guidance to understand empirical training patterns. Conversely, they are not inconsistent with theories of training in imperfectly competitive labour markets, in which firms may be willing to finance general training if the wage structure is compressed, that is, if the increase in productivity after training is greater than the increase in pay.     

On the equivalence of the Arrow impossibility theorem and the Brouwer fixed point theorem when individual preferences are weak orders

We will show that in the case where there are two individuals and three alternatives (or under the assumption of the free-triple property), and individual preferences are weak orders (which may include indifference relations), the Arrow impossibility theorem [Arrow, K.J., 1963. Social Choice and Individual Values, second ed. Yale University Press] that there exists no binary social choice rule which satisfies the conditions of transitivity, Pareto principle, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and non-existence of dictator is equivalent to the Brouwer fixed point theorem on a 2-dimensional ball (circle). Our study is an application of ideas by Chichilnisky [Chichilnisky, G., 1979. On fixed points and social choice paradoxes. Economics Letters 3, 347–351] to a discrete social choice problem, and also it is in line with the work by Baryshnikov [Baryshnikov, Y., 1993. Unifying impossibility theorems: a topological approach. Advances in Applied Mathematics 14, 404–415].     

Disentangling Treatment Effects of Active Labor Market Policies: The Role of Labor Force Status Sequences

This paper estimates treatment effects of two active labor market policies – a training program and a wage subsidy scheme – on participants' employment probabilities. The analysis is based on unique data from the 18th wave of the Polish Labor Force Survey containing detailed and extensive individual labor force status histories. We discuss two variants of an exact covariate matching procedure adapted to the specific nature of the data. Our study confirms and reinforces a point raised in recent research [Heckman, J.J., Smith, J.A. The Pre-programme Earnings Dip and the Determinants of Participation in a Social Programme: Implications for Simple Programme Evaluation Strategies. The Economic Journal 1999; 109; 313-348., Heckman, J.J., Smith, J.A. The Determinants of Participation in a Social Program: Evidence from a Prototypical Job Training Program. Journal of Labor Economics 2004; 22; 243-298.], that pre-treatment labor force status dynamics play a decisive role in determining program participation. We implement a conditional difference-in-differences estimator of treatment effects based on these individual trinomial sequences of pre-treatment labor market status. The estimator employs a “moving window” technique that nicely controls for changes in the macroeconomic environment over time. Our findings suggest that training raises individual employment probability, while wage subsidies display negative treatment effects for participants in the Polish case.     

Intergenerational Earnings Mobility Among Daughters and Sons: Evidence from Sweden and a Comparison with the United States

This article adopts Chadwick and Solon's (2002 ) model by using family earnings in the study of intergenerational earnings mobility with a highlight on the role of assortative mating. I analyze mean and quantile regression coefficients as well as transition matrices to investigate family earnings mobility between parents and daughters and parents and sons from Swedish register data. My findings indicate that Sweden has a higher degree of mobility compared to the United States, and that assortative mating also plays an important role as a channel through which income status is transmitted across generations in Sweden. However, the difference in intergenerational mobility patterns between the two countries does not, inherently, depend on factors that affect the marriage match. Swedish daughters and sons exhibit a rather similar scheme of intergenerational earnings transmission. Daughters tend to be slightly more mobile than sons, and the difference between their elasticity estimates is small but statistically significant. The quantile regression approach reveals that parents' family earnings are less important as an explanatory variable at the upper end of the children's earnings distribution than they are at the bottom, while transition matrices show substantial earnings persistence in the top earnings class.     

The return to schooling: Estimates from a sample of young Australian twins

This study uses a sample of young Australian twins to examine whether the findings reported in [Ashenfelter, Orley and Krueger, Alan, (1994). ‘Estimates of the Economic Return to Schooling from a New Sample of Twins’, American Economic Review, Vol. 84, No. 5, pp.1157–73] and [Miller, P.W., Mulvey, C and Martin, N., (1994). ‘What Do Twins Studies Tell Us About the Economic Returns to Education?: A Comparison of Australian and US Findings’, Western Australian Labour Market Research Centre Discussion Paper 94/4] are robust to choice of sample and dependent variable. The economic return to schooling in Australia is between 5 and 7 percent when account is taken of genetic and family effects using either fixed-effects models or the selection effects model of Ashenfelter and Krueger. Given the similarity of the findings in this and in related studies, it would appear that the models applied by [Ashenfelter, Orley and Krueger, Alan, (1994). ‘Estimates of the Economic Return to Schooling from a New Sample of Twins’, American Economic Review, Vol. 84, No. 5, pp.1157–73] are robust. Moreover, viewing the OLS and IV estimators as lower and upper bounds in the manner of [Black, Dan A., Berger, Mark C., and Scott, Frank C., (2000). ‘Bounding Parameter Estimates with Nonclassical Measurement Error’, Journal of the American Statistical Association, Vol. 95, No.451, pp.739–748], it is shown that the bounds on the return to schooling in Australia are much tighter than in [Ashenfelter, Orley and Krueger, Alan, (1994). ‘Estimates of the Economic Return to Schooling from a New Sample of Twins’, American Economic Review, Vol. 84, No. 5, pp. 1157–73], and the return is bounded at a much lower level than in the US.     

Inflation tax in the lab: a theoretical and experimental study of competitive search equilibrium with inflation

In this paper we measure the effect of the inflation tax on economic activity and welfare within a controlled setting. To do so, we develop a model of price posting and monetary exchange with inflation and finite populations. The model, which provides a game–theoretic foundation to Rocheteau and Wright (2005)׳s competitive search monetary equilibrium, is used to derive theoretical propositions regarding the effects of inflation in this environment, which we test with a laboratory experiment that closely implements the theoretical framework. We find that the inflation tax is harmful – with cash holdings, production and welfare all falling as inflation rises – and that its effect is relatively larger at low inflation rates than at higher rates. For instance, for inflation rates between 0% and 5%, welfare in the two markets we consider (2[seller]×2[buyer] and 3×2) falls by roughly 1 percent for each percentage–point rise in inflation, compared with 0.4 percent over the range from 5% to 30%. Our findings lead us to conclude that the impact of the inflation tax should not be underestimated, even under low inflation.     

Rumours and markets

The paper presents a simple model to study the effects of rumours on markets. Agents in our economy communicate with their local neighbours which gives rise to the possible spread of a rumour. As the rumour affects beliefs of the agents the evolution of the rumour has a direct impact on market outcomes. Our results show that if the rumour dies out long-run equilibrium prices correspond to pre-rumour values. However, if the rumour stays present it produces a price run-up for the good that is positively targeted by the rumour. Price run-ups related to rumours have been observed in empirical studies by Rose [Rose, A.M., 1951. Rumor in the stock market. Public Opinion Quarterly 15, 461–486], Pound and Zeckhauser [Pound, J., Zeckhauser, R., 1990. Clearly heard on the street: the effect of takeover rumors on stock prices. Journal of Business 63, 291–308] and Zivney et al. [Zivney, T., Bertin, W.J., Torabzadeh, K.M., 1996. Overreaction to take-over speculation. Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 36, 89–115]. The present model provides an analytical foundation for this finding.     

Career Tournaments

This paper studies a model of career concerns where (besides agents having different ability levels) principals are heterogeneous. Two types of heterogeneity are considered: principals can differ in their productivities, and in the visibility of the agents working for them. Productivity differences result in convex wage profiles and generate assortative matching between principals and agents. Visibility differences, on the other hand, affect the mobility and career prospects of agents, and can generate nonassortative matching. We characterize the equilibrium in this market, derive implications for the behavior of agents, and examine the incentives to invest in increasing productivity and visibility.     

An axiomatization of the inner core using appropriate reduced games

I adapt a reduction process introduced by Serrano and Volij [Serrano, R., Volij, O., 1998. Axiomatization of neoclassical concepts for Economies. Journal of Mathematical Economics 30, 87–108] so that the reduced games of convex-valued games are convex-valued. I use the corresponding consistency property and its converse to axiomatize the inner core for games that are convex-valued, non-level and smooth.     

Contract enforcement in the early transition of an unstable economy

How were contracts among firms enforced in the early phase of a transition economy when firms lacked experience with commercial contracts or legal procedures? What were their views of their new business environment? We interviewed a sample of Bulgarian firms, including private, state-owned and cooperative firms in 1994. Consistent with Williamson's [Williamson, O., 1994. Institutions of economic development and reform. In: Bruno, M., Pleskovic, B. (Eds.), Proceedings of the World Bank Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics, World Bank, Washington, DC, pp. 171–197] theories, complex contracts were quite limited, sometimes implying the breakdown of important markets, but we also found that even spot-market contracts had severe problems of bilateral dependency. Having been “burned” in previous transactions, firms were very cautious in dealing with new potential trading partners and tried to work closely with trustworthy counterparts. These results are consistent with Klein et al. [Klein, B., Crawford, R., Alchian, A., 1978. Vertical integration, appropriable rents, and the competitive contracting process. J. Law Econ. 21, 297–326] theory.     

Implementation in generalized matching problems

We search for (Nash) implementable solutions on a class of one-to-one matching problems which includes both the housing market (Shapley and Scarf, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1974, 1, 23–28) and marriage problems (Gale and Shapley, American Mathematical Monthly, 1962, 69, 9–15). We show that the core correspondence is implementable. We show, furthermore, that any solution that is Pareto efficient, individually rational, and implementable is a supersolution of the core correspondence. That is, the core correspondence is the minimal solution that is Pareto efficient, individually rational, and implementable. A corollary of independent interest in the context of the housing market is that the core correspondence is the only single-valued solution that is Pareto efficient, individually rational, and implementable.     

Gender earnings gap: the role of firm specific effects

The gender earnings differential is an intensely studied issue in labour economics. However, existing studies do not examine how the wage policies of firms affect gender earnings differentials. This paper uses employer–employee linked data to address this issue. The Juhn et al. [Juhn, C., Murphy K., Pierce, B., 1991. Accounting for the slowdown in black–white wage convergence, in M.H. Kosters, ed. Workers and Their Wages, AEI Press, 107–143] decomposition methodology is extended to incorporate the decomposition of firm fixed effects. It is found that, on average, firms' wage policies are associated with a significant narrowing of the gender earnings gaps. Further analysis indicates that firms which are more likely to have narrower gender earnings gaps are those subject to strong market competition, find it easy to identify labour productivity at the individual level, and with no enterprise level wage bargaining.     

Do fixed income mutual fund managers have managerial skills?

Motivated by Berk and Green [Berk, J., & Green, R. (2004). Mutual fund flows and performance in rational markets. Journal of Political Economy, 112, 1269–1295] and Chevalier and Ellison [Chevalier, J., & Ellison, G. (1999). Career concerns of mutual fund managers. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114, 389–432] who show theoretically that performance persistence may be short-lived, we complement Bollen and Busse [Bollen, N., & Busse, J. A. (2004). Short-term persistence in mutual fund performance. Review of Financial Studies, 18, 569–597] and examine performance persistence in high-quality corporate-bond mutual funds over short horizons. Empirically, we find supporting evidence of performance persistence over shorter horizons. Our empirical tests also suggest that the performance persistence we document may be at least partly due to managerial skills.     

Evaluating the effectiveness of Washington state repeated job search services on the employment rate of prime-age female welfare recipients

This paper uses an unbalanced panel dataset to evaluate how repeated job search services (JSS) and personal characteristics affect the employment rate of the prime-age female welfare recipients in the State of Washington. We propose a transition probability model to take into account issues of sample attrition, sample refreshment and duration dependence. We also generalize Honoré and Kyriazidou’s [Honoré, B.E., Kyriazidou, E., 2000. Panel data discrete choice models with lagged dependent variables. Econometrica 68 (4), 839–874] conditional maximum likelihood estimator to allow for the presence of individual-specific effects. A limited information test is suggested to test for selection issues in non-experimental data. The specification tests indicate that the (conditional on the set of the confounding variables considered) assumptions of no selection due to unobservables and/or no unobserved individual-specific effects are not violated. Our findings indicate that the first job search service does have positive and significant impacts on the employment rate. However, providing repeated JSS to the same client has no significant impact. Further, we find that there are significant experience-enhancing effects. These findings suggest that providing one job search services training to individuals may have a lasting impact on raising their employment rates.