Investment timing,liquidity, and agency costs of debt

This paper examines the effect of debt and liquidity on corporate investment in a continuous-time framework. We show that stockholder–bondholder agency conflicts cause investment thresholds to be U-shaped in leverage and decreasing in liquidity. In the absence of tax effects, we derive the optimal level of liquid funds that eliminates agency costs by implementing the first-best investment policy for a given capital structure. In a second step we generalize the framework by introducing a tax advantage of debt, and we show that an interior solution for liquidity and capital structure optimally trades off tax benefits and agency costs of debt.     

Investment,agency conflicts,debt maturity,and loan guarantees by negotiation

We consider an irreversible investment, of which the sunk cost is financed by a finite-term debt after entering into an option-for-guarantee swap (OGS) with negotiation. The OGS is a three-party agreement among a lender (bank), an insurer, and a borrower (entrepreneur), where the bank lends at a given interest rate to the entrepreneur and if the borrower defaults on debt, the insurer must pay all the principal and remaining interests to the lender instead of the borrower. In return for the guarantee, the borrower must allocate a perpetual American call option to purchase a fraction (guarantee cost) of his equity at a given strike price. We find that the investment threshold decreases but the exercise threshold of the insurer’s option increases with the borrower’s bargaining power. Both the investment and exercise threshold increase with debt maturity, but there is a U-shaped relation between the guarantee cost and debt maturity. The borrower postpones investment once the funding gap or project risk increases. The swap may overcome the inefficiencies from asset substitution and debt overhang, strongly depending on the debt maturity and borrower’s bargaining power.     

R&D Investment timing,default and capital structure

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - This paper investigates the interaction between R&D investment timing, probability of default, and capital structure. In particular we are...     

Private monitoring,collusion, and the timing of information

When a principal's monitoring information is private (nonverifiable), the agent should be concerned that the principal could misrepresent the information to reduce the agent's wage or collect a monetary penalty. Restoring credibility may lead to an extreme waste of resources—the so‐called burning of money. A more realistic and efficient outcome is feasible when the private information arrives in time to rescale the agent's effort. Rescaling is more effective than pure monetary penalties because effort has different values to different parties whereas money is equally valuable to all parties. Furthermore, when rescaling is feasible, private monitoring is more efficient than public monitoring subject to collusion because nonmonetary penalties are ineffective to deter collusion.     

Investment timing under debt issuance constraint

This paper examines the optimal investment timing decision problem of a firm subject to a debt financing capacity constraint. We show that the investment thresholds have a U-shaped relation with the debt capacity constraint, in that they are increasing (decreasing) with the constraint for high (low) debt issuance capacity. Although the financing constraint distorts investment timing, it may encourage the constrained levered firm to overinvest compared with the non-constrained levered firm. Our result fits well with the related problems involving the internal financing constraint.     

Capital budgeting, information timing, and the value of abandonment options

This paper investigates how an abandonment option influences the optimal timing of information in a sequential adverse selection capital budgeting model. While the divisional manager has imperfect private pre-contract information, headquarters can time whether the manager obtains perfect project information before (timely information) or after (delayed information) the contract is signed. In the absence of the abandonment option, headquarters favors timely (delayed) information if the investment costs are high (low). The presence of the abandonment option favors delayed information because under the timely information regime the value of the abandonment option is zero, whereas under the delayed information regime the value of the option is positive.     

Dividend reductions,the timing of dividend payments and information content

Australian companies pay dividends semi-annually with smaller “interim” payments and larger “final” payments. Interim dividends are declared and paid within a less full information environment than final dividends. We analyze the interactions between the timing of dividends and their information content, controlling for share repurchase and tax effects. Dividend reductions that are not associated with share repurchases are statistically significantly related to future abnormal earnings and provide strong support for the information content of dividend reductions. The percentage of dividend reduction is stronger for interim than for final dividend reductions. The market reaction is negatively related to the reduction in imputation tax credit and reacts more aggressively and negatively to interim as compared to final dividend reductions.     

Investment timing and optimal capital structure under liquidity risk

Deterioration in debt market liquidity reduces debt values and affects firms' decisions. Considering such risk, we develop an investment timing model and obtain analytic solutions. We carry out a comprehensive analysis in optimal financing, default, and investment strategies, and stockholder–bondholder conflicts. Our model explains stylized facts and replicates empirical findings in credit spreads. We obtain six new insights for decision makers. We propose a ‘new trade-off theory’ for optimal capital structure, a new tax effect, and new explanations of ‘debt conservatism puzzle’ and ‘zero-leverage puzzle’. Failure in recognizing liquidity risk results in substantially over-leveraging, early bankruptcy or investment, overpriced options, and undervalued coupons and credit spreads. In addition, agency costs are surprisingly small for a high liquidity risk or a low project risk. Interestingly, the risk shifting incentive and debt overhang problem decrease with liquidity risk under moderate tax rates while they increase under high tax rates.     

The timing of information arrival and overnight returns

This paper examines the information assimilation of overnight returns after positive or negative news arriving during RHT (regular-hours-trading) or AHT (after-hour-trading). We first show that overnight returns are informative of earnings news arriving either during RHT or AHT, and the effects are strongest on the first day after the announcement. Our results then suggest that positive (negative) overnight returns after good (bad) earnings news arrival increase (decrease) CARs, with more pronounced effects for news released AHT. We further show that the market takes the timing of news release into account and reacts negatively to those released during AHT, causing significant under-performance in the subsequent CAR. Lastly, our finding of market underreaction to good news and overreaction to bad news when it is released during AHT suggest that it may be more appropriate for managers to release all news during RHT when market participants are at their trading desks.     

Analyst information production and the timing of annual earnings forecasts

We investigate whether the reputation-herding theory or the tradeoff theory explains variation in the timing of individual analysts’ forecasts. Using forecast accuracy improvements, forecast boldness, and the price impact of forecasts as measures of forecast quality, we find that in the information discovery phase that precedes an earnings announcement, earlier forecasts have higher quality than later forecasts. We also find a similar pattern in the information analysis phase that begins with the earnings announcement date. Our findings suggest that consistent with the herding theory, analysts who are more capable participate early in discovering and analyzing information, and therefore earlier forecasts in the information discovery and analysis phases are of higher quality than later forecasts in that phase.     

Investment in concealable information by biased experts

We study a persuasion game in which biased—possibly opposed—experts strategically acquire costly information that they can then conceal or reveal. We show that information acquisition decisions are strategic substitutes when experts have linear preferences over a decision maker's beliefs. The logic turns on how each expert expects the decision maker's posterior to be affected by the presence of other experts should he not acquire information that would turn out to be favorable. The decision maker may prefer to solicit advice from just one biased expert even when others—including those biased in the opposite direction (singular)—are available.     

Share reacquisitions,surplus cash,and agency problems

Share repurchases help alleviate agency costs of surplus cash by restricting management’s scope to waste corporate resources. But why do self-interested managers agree to disgorge surplus cash in the first place? This study examines the intervening effect of managerial monitoring and incentive alignment mechanisms on the decision to distribute excess cash through a share repurchase. Findings indicate that repurchases substitute for cash retention decisions that would otherwise prove costly for shareholders, and that better managerial incentive alignment and closer monitoring by external shareholders are important factors stimulating such payouts.     

Investment timing in presence of downside risk: a certainty equivalent characterization

We demonstrate that the value of a single threshold investment strategy under stochastic dynamics allowing both continuous fluctuations and instantaneous downward jumps has a certainty equivalent representation in terms of the value of this strategy under risk-adjusted deterministic dynamics, and that this risk adjustment can be made either to the discount rate or to the expected infinitesimal growth rate of the underlying. In this way our analysis characterizes a class of optimal timing problems of irreversible investments for which the solution of the stochastic problem coincides with the solutions of certain risk-adjusted deterministic optimal timing problems.     

Security analysis, agency costs, and UK firm characteristics

The paper examines the monitoring power of security analysts from the manager-shareholder conflict perspective. Our evidence supports the view that security analysis acts as a monitoring mechanism in reducing agency costs for smaller as opposed to larger firms. Moreover, we also find evidence that security analysis has a positive and significant impact on firm value only for smaller firms. These findings support the proposition that, as firms grow larger and more complex, the monitoring activity of security analysis becomes less effective. Our evidence also shows that the monitoring role of security analysts is not restricted to the US capital market environment.     

Real options,agency conflicts,and optimal capital structure

We examine the impact of a stockholder–bondholder conflict over the timing of the exercise of an investment option on firm value and corporate financial policy. We find that an equity-maximizing firm exercises the option too early relative to a value-maximizing strategy, and we show how this problem can be characterized as one of overinvestment in risky investment projects. Equityholders’ incentive to overinvest significantly decreases firm value and optimal leverage, and significantly increases the credit spread of risky debt. Numerical solutions illustrate how the agency cost of overinvestment and its effect on corporate financial policy vary with firm and project characteristics.     

The effect of information releases on the pricing and timing of equity issues

With time-varying adverse selection in the market for new equityissues, firms will prefer to issue equity when the market ismost informed about the quality of the firm. This implies thatequity issues tend to follow credible information releases.In addition, if the asymmetric in information increases overtime between information releases, the price drop at the announcementof an equity issue should increase in the time since the lastinformation release. Using earning releases as a proxy for informativeevents, we find evidence supporting these propositions.     

A new measure of the direction and timing of information flow between markets

This paper examines the direction and timing of the flow of information between CBOE call options and the underlying NYSE stocks using a new methodology that avoids potential biases that can be introduced by using fixed-length time intervals. For the stocks in the sample, stock quotes tend to lead option quotes, but the length of the lead, ranging from a few seconds to six minutes, is shorter than previously thought. Options also occasionally lead stocks, but there is no evidence that the option lead exceeds three minutes.     

Investment analysis and the adjustment of stock prices to common information

In this article we are concerned with the effect of the numberof investment analysts following a firm on the speed of adjustmentof the firm's stock price to new information that has commoneffects across firms. It is found that returns on portfoliosof firms that are followed by many analysts tend to lead thoseof firms that are followed by fewer analysts, even when thefirms are of approximately the same size. Many analyst firmsalso tend to respond more rapidly to market returns than dofew analyst firms, adjusting for firm size. This relation, however,is nonlinear, and the marginal effect of the number of analystson the speed of price adjustment increases with the number ofanalysts.     

A further interpretation of the relational agency of information systems: A research note

This paper proposes a reinterpretation of the agency of information system (IS) as relational. It explores how the agency of IS has been articulated in the extant stream of accounting information system (AIS) research and explains how a relational view of agency can enhance our understanding of IS in its organizational context. This reinterpretation highlights the limitation of viewing IS as technology (technocentric view) with predefined functionality and predictable effects. Attention is also shifted away from an anthropocentric conceptualization of IS; where the technology is seen as a tool and agency is attributed only to humans. We argue in the paper that both the technocentric and anthropocentric views of IS limit what can be learned about the agency of IS. Drawing on actor-network theory (ANT), this study conceptualizes IS as a relational network and proposes a relational view of the agency of IS. This relational view suggests that the social and material entities that make up IS have no absolute essence when viewed in isolation; rather, their collective force defines the agency of IS. The implications of the relational view of agency for AIS research are also highlighted.