A re-examination of accruals quality following restatements

Empirical research from the first years following the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in the US suggests that firms improve accruals quality following restatements, but the materiality of restatements has declined since then. This decline may affect firms' responses to restatements, and hence we re-examine whether restatements are associated with subsequent improvements in accruals quality in a more recent sample. We compare the changes in accruals quality of firms restating between 2000 and 2014 with that of a control group. We do not find that firms improve accruals quality more than the control group following a restatement, even when we isolate the types of restatements considered to be most material. However, we do find that restatements followed by the most negative stock market reactions are associated with a relative increase in accruals quality, indicating that only restatements deemed very severe by investors lead to subsequent improvements in accruals quality. Our results suggest that firms' responses to restatements have changed concurrently with the trend of fewer and less material restatements in recent years.     

Corporate Investments: Learning from Restatements

This study analyzes the information conveyed by the restatements of financial reports. We argue that restatements contain news about the investment projects of the restating firms' competitors. This news causes competitors to revise their beliefs about the projects' value, and to modify their subsequent investment decisions. Accordingly, we hypothesize that changes in competitors' investments after restatement announcements are related to news in the restatements. Consistent with our prediction, we find that changes in competitors' investments following restatement announcements are significantly related to various proxies for news in the restatements, such as competitors' and restating firms' abnormal returns at the restatement announcements. We conclude that restatements convey information about the investment projects of restating firms' competitors.     

Do post-restatement firms care about financial credibility? Evidence from the pre- and post-SOX eras

This study examines whether negative-market-reaction firms in the year following restatement announcements adopt more conservative financial reporting to respond to their financial reporting credibility crisis, especially in the post-SOX era. Using Basu’s (1997) measure of conservatism, we find that negative-market-reaction firms in the year following restatement announcements report their financial statements more conservatively in the post-SOX era, as the market reaction following restatement announcements becomes more severe. We also find that as the negative market restatement reaction becomes more severe, negative-market-reaction firms using a Big N auditor in the year following financial restatements report their financial statements more conservatively in the post-SOX era.     

Financial Restatements, Cost of Debt and Information Spillover: Evidence From the Secondary Loan Market

Abstract:  In this paper, we investigate the effect of financial restatements on the debt market. Specifically, we focus on the secondary loan market, which has become one of the largest capital markets in the US, and ask the following: (1) whether financial restatements increase restating firm's cost of debt financing and (2) whether the information about restatements arrives at the secondary loan market earlier than at the stock market? Using 176 restatement data, we find significant negative abnormal loan returns and increased bid-ask spreads around restatement announcements. Furthermore, this negative loan market reaction is more pronounced when the restatement is initiated by either the SEC or auditors, and when the primary reason for restatement is related to revenue recognition issues. Additionally, we find restatement information arrives at the secondary loan market earlier than at the equity market, and that such private information quickly flows into the equity market. We also show that stock prices begin to decline approximately 30 days prior to the restatement announcements for firms with traded loans. However, we do not find such informational leakage for firms without traded loans. Collectively, the results of this paper suggest: (1) increased cost of debt financing after restatements and (2) superior informational efficiency of the secondary loan market to the stock market.     

The effect of restatements on analyst behavior

This paper examines how changes in the credibility of financial reporting affect analyst behavior. Using a sample of restatement firms experiencing a substantial change in credibility over 1997–2006, we document that restatements have a long‐lived effect on analyst behavior and that analysts differentiate between restatements caused by irregularities and those caused by errors. We find that while irregularity restatement firms exhibit a reduction in analyst coverage and forecast accuracy and an increase in forecast dispersion in the post‐restatement period, other restatement firms exhibit only an increase in forecast error. Finally, we find evidence to suggest that remedial actions reduce the effect of irregularity restatements on analyst behavior. Overall, these results are consistent with the notion that restatements affect analyst behavior in forming judgements regarding subsequent earnings announcements.     

The Timeliness of Restatement Disclosures and Financial Reporting Credibility

This study investigates whether prompt discovery and disclosure of earnings restatements is associated with greater post‐restatement financial reporting credibility. We measure the timeliness of restatement detection by the length of time between the end of the misstated period and the subsequent restatement announcement. We document that shorter detection periods are significantly associated with high‐quality corporate governance characteristics and executive and/or auditor turnover, but not with characteristics of restatements. We also find that firms with shorter detection periods exhibit a more moderate decline in the information content of earnings following restatement announcements relative to firms with longer detection periods, and that detection period length has an incremental effect on the information content of earnings relative to executive and/or auditor turnover alone. In addition, we find that restatement disclosures are more timely following the implementation of the SOX‐era reforms, and that only firms with shorter detection periods experience more moderate post‐restatement declines in the information content of earnings following the implementation of the SOX‐era reforms. The results from this study suggest that the timeliness of restatement detection and disclosure is associated with greater financial reporting credibility following restatements.     

The effects of accounting restatements on firm growth

Do restatements result in lower firm growth? One argument in support of this contention is that accounting restatements hurt contracting relations between the firm and outside parties such as a firm’s customers and suppliers, negatively impacting firm cash flows. The negative impact on cash flow reduces the level of internal cash holdings available for investment. Another argument is that restatements dampen firm growth by increasing the firm’s cost of external financing. We empirically evaluate these arguments by using the standard sales growth based financial planning model. In carrying out our analysis, we distinguish the effects of restatement on overall firm growth as well as its components of internally and externally financed growth. Our findings suggest that overall firm growth rates decline following a restatement. Furthermore, we find that accounting restatements have a greater adverse impact on externally financed growth rates. We also find that not all restatements yield identical effects: the impact of restatements is more pronounced for the subsample of firms identified to have undertaken the more egregious fraudulent reporting than the subsample of firms that reported restatements to correct previous accounting errors. We also find that firms with severe restatements, measured based on announcement period market reactions, have lower externally financed growth. Overall, our evidence highlights the adverse impact of restatement on firm growth, particularly through external financing.     

Restatement costs and reporting bias

Financial restatements are costly, but frequent, events and many firms restate several times. We explore why rational managers engage in misreporting despite the costly consequences. To guide our analysis, we build a parsimonious model of reporting bias and the cost of restating. In our model, the observed cost of a restatement conveys information about the true cost of biasing financial statements, which the manager incorporates into the optimal choice of bias. A restatement hence offers managers an opportunity to learn about the true cost of reporting bias, which allows them to update their biasing strategy if the observed cost differs from the expected. We test the model's predictions by analyzing how firms' accruals quality changes after observing the costs attached to restating, which we measure as the market loss following a restatement scaled by the restatement's net income effect. We find that future accruals quality is increasing in the cost of restating and the change in the cost of restating. Consistent with our stylized model, our results indicate that rational managers use the insights from prior restatements to improve their future bias strategy.     

Exploring the Causes of Accounting Restatements by Family Firms

Prior research shows that family firms have better earnings quality than non‐family firms in common‐law countries and highly developed markets. In contrast, we do not find a significant difference in the financial reporting quality between family and non‐family firms in the context of a civil‐law system and less developed market. We show that the financial reporting quality of family firms is conditioned on: (1) the divergence between the controlling shareholders’ voting rights and their cash flow rights, and (2) the firm's reputation for integrity, while these two conditions do not explain the restatement likelihood for non‐family firms. Moreover, when accounting irregularities are detected in the case of family firms, they are associated with more serious accounting restatements. Together, these results imply that the severity of the conflict between ultimate and minority shareholders, and a lack of integrity, explain the propensity for making financial restatements among family firms in a regime characterized as having weak investor protection and concentrated ownership structures.     

An investigation of SEC “Speech GAAP”

This study investigates the financial reporting regulation effects of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) staff comments made during the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) Annual Current SEC & Public Company Oversight Board (PCAOB) Developments Conference in Washington, D.C. (SEC Conference). At this conference, the SEC staff communicates its preferences about areas where it believes companies are misapplying GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles). We call this communication SEC Speech GAAP. One outcome of the SEC Conference may be that companies re-evaluate their previous financial reporting by restating their financial statements. We find, first, that firms with restatement issues similar to those covered at the SEC Conference experience a decrease in the association between earnings and future cash flows after the restatement. Second, we find little market reaction to the disclosure of restatements related to SEC Conference issues, but the disclosure of non-conference related restatement issues has a significantly negative affect on investors’ valuation decisions. Our findings suggest that SEC Speech GAAP is associated with financial statements that are less informative to investors and investors find the valuation consequences of restatements prompted by SEC Speech GAAP to be less important than the valuation consequences for restatements prompted for other reasons.     

The impact of accounting restatements on CFO turnover and bonus compensation: Does securities litigation matter?

This paper examines the association between accounting restatements, class-action securities litigation and chief financial officer (CFO) turnover and bonus compensation. We identify income-decreasing earnings restatements that were the result of aggressive accounting policies, and hypothesize that these restatements will result in higher CFO turnover rates, and lower bonus compensation, especially when the firm is the target of a restatement-related class-action securities lawsuit. Our results indicate that CFO turnover and bonus compensation are affected by restatements, but only when the restatement firm is the target of a class-action suit. When we expand the analyses to consider other types of executives (e.g., CEOs and COOs), we continue to find that turnover only occurs in the presence of a class-action suit. However, bonus compensation penalties to other types of executives are not limited to litigation-related restatements.     

The impact of accounting restatements on corporate innovation strategy

This study examines the effect of accounting restatements on corporate innovation strategy. Using a sample of restating firms and propensity-score-matched non-restating firms from 2000 to 2009, we find that, after restatements, restating firms experience a greater increase in exploratory innovation and a greater reduction in exploitative innovation compared to non-restating firms. These results suggest that restating firms are associated with an increased risk appetite as managers believe the upside potential may yield corporate improvement. The results also differ between fraudulent and non-fraudulent restatements, and among restatements of varying severity. The results of this study shed light on a previously unexplored consequence of accounting restatement and highlight its real impact on corporate business strategy.     

Material weakness disclosures and restatement announcements: The joint and order effects

We examine differences in stock price, option volatility, and litigation reactions to restatement announcements that are associated with a material weakness (MW) disclosure. Contrasted with restatements that are not associated with any MW disclosure, our analyses reveal that firms that announce both a restatement and an associated MW experience significantly more negative market returns, greater implied volatility, and higher likelihood of class action lawsuits. Separating the restatements into timely reporters, where the MW precedes the restatement, and non‐timely reporters, where the MW is concurrent with or follows the restatement, we find that timely reporters experience more negative returns at the time of the restatement, relative to non‐timely reporters, suggesting that investors perceive the early MW disclosure to signal more pervasive control‐related problems. Interestingly, we find that timely and non‐timely reporters are equally likely to be sued, consistent with the argument that wrongdoing (through either a timely or non‐timely MW disclosure) provides stronger grounds for establishing scienter. However, timely reporters appear to secure more favorable litigation outcomes: they face higher likelihood of lawsuit dismissals and pay much lower settlements, compared to non‐timely reporters. Overall, our evidence provides new insights into how market participants incorporate information about internal control weaknesses into their perceptions regarding the economic implications of financial restatements, and financial reporting quality.     

Accounting restatements and information risk

We examine the association between accounting restatements and the pricing of information risk. Using the Fama and French three-factor model augmented with discretionary and innate information risk factors, we find a significant increase in the factor loadings on the discretionary information risk factor for restatement firms after a restatement announcement. The increase in factor loadings results in an increase in the estimated cost of capital, which is cross-sectionally associated with the short-window price reaction to restatements. We study several potential determinants of the change in information risk pricing and find evidence consistent with the restatement initiator (auditor vs. firm management) and the number of times a firm restates affecting the change in the pricing of discretionary information risk. We also find an increase, of smaller magnitude, in the pricing of discretionary information risk for non-restatement firms in the same industries as the restatement firms, consistent with an information transfer effect.     

The Chinese experience: The impact of financial restatements on firm value and its implications on the investigatory practices of regulators

We examine the relationship between restatements of prior period financial results and firm value in China. This relationship is relevant to the millions of global investors who purchase Chinese equity securities because Chinese regulatory authorities must focus on the restatement events that, in their judgment, most warrant investigation. We recommend that they focus their attention on restatement announcements (and the firms that announce them) that possess the characteristics that most impact firm value.Prior studies of the American equity markets found evidence of a relationship between the nature of the restatement announcements and firm value, as well as evidence that core account adjustments and high-magnitude adjustments affect firm value more than noncore account adjustments and low-magnitude adjustments. However, based on a sample of Chinese listed firms that made corporate announcements that appeared in the Asian press between 2003 and 2011, we only find mixed evidence in the Chinese equity markets in support of the former relationship, and no evidence at all in support of the latter relationship.In other words, restatement announcements in China do not impact firm value to the same extent, and in the same manner, as restatement announcements in America. Chinese regulators must thus develop policies that are unique to the Chinese markets in order to effectively prioritize their oversight activities on firms that issue restatement announcements.What factors should be considered by Chinese regulators? We identify a collection of corporate governance variables, as well as a smaller collection of financial variables, that are significantly associated with decreases in firm value. We also develop a set of regression analyses that utilize these variables to explain a significant portion of the variability of firm value during the sample period. Interestingly, however, we find no evidence that the growth patterns of the firms are significantly associated with changes in firm value.Using this evidence, we recommend the development of a model of regulatory guidance that is customized for the unique characteristics of the Chinese equity markets. We believe that this model can help Chinese authorities focus their attention on specific restatement announcements that most impact firm value.     

Corporate misreporting and bank loan contracting

This paper is the first to study the effect of financial restatement on bank loan contracting. Compared with loans initiated before restatement, loans initiated after restatement have significantly higher spreads, shorter maturities, higher likelihood of being secured, and more covenant restrictions. The increase in loan spread is significantly larger for fraudulent restating firms than other restating firms. We also find that after restatement, the number of lenders per loan declines and firms pay higher upfront and annual fees. These results are consistent with banks using tighter loan contract terms to overcome risk and information problems arising from financial restatements.     

Information asymmetry and accounting restatement: NYSE-AMEX and NASDAQ evidence

We examine the impact of accounting restatement announcement on firms’ value and information asymmetry for both auction market (NYSE-AMEX) and dealer market (NASDAQ) using a public sample of restatement announcements from 1997 to 2005. In both markets, we document economically and significantly negative mean cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement dates. The restatements attributed to auditors are associated with more negative returns than those attributed to management and the SEC. However, there is no significant difference between market reactions arising from the core and non-core restatements. We also find a significant increase in volume, number of transactions, average order size, volatility, and various measures of spreads after the restatement announcement indicating that restatement announcements diminish company prospects and contribute to increased uncertainty and information asymmetry. Finally, we find that the information asymmetry in the NASDAQ market around the event date is less pronounced than in the NYSE-AMEX market.     

Board, audit committee and restatement-induced class action lawsuits

We examine the influence of monitoring provided by the board and audit committee on the probability of restatement-induced securities class action lawsuits using a sample of firms that have restated earnings in the period of 1997-2002. Logistic regression of the probability of restatement-induced class action lawsuits indicates a negative association between proportion of independent board members and the likelihood of restatement-induced class action lawsuits. We also find that when the market reacts more negatively to restatement announcements, shareholders are more likely to initiate a class action lawsuit. Finally, we document that restatement of revenues is positively associated with the likelihood of restatement-induced shareholder litigation. Our results are robust after controlling for the restatement initiator, restatements categorized as irregularities and Blue Ribbon Recommendations.     

财务重述与上市公司外部审计选择研究——来自中国A股市场的经验数据

本文以2001年至2009年的A股上市公司为样本,从市场角度研究财务重述与市场选择的关系。研究表明,业绩优秀的上市公司变更事务所和注册会计师会显著降低财务重述的概率,但业绩差的上市公司变更事务所和注册会计师会显著增加财务重述的概率;选择＂四大＂能显著降低财务重述的概率;但支付高的审计费用对财务重述的概率有显著影响,如果选择的＂非四大＂可以降低重述的概率,如果购买的是＂四大＂反会增加重述的概率。     

Financial literacy,financial development,and leverage of small firms

This study examines the relationship between financial literacy and the leverage of small firms, specifically of the legal forms, sole proprietorships, and partnerships. Using a cross-section of 73,302 firms in 22 countries, we find that the leverage of small firms is negatively associated with financial literacy. Further, we explore the role of financial development, bankruptcy and transaction costs, and information asymmetry, in moderating the relationship. We find that the negative relationship is less pronounced in countries with lower financial development, high bankruptcy and transaction costs, and high information asymmetry environments, respectively. We contribute to the understanding of small firms' leverage and the literature on financial literacy, SMEs, finance, and entrepreneurship. This study offers policy implications for economies that promote SMEs for entrepreneurship training and development.