Trade credit use and competition in the value chain

Trade credit is a major source of finance in value chains in developed and emerging economies. Despite its ubiquitous use, this is one of the first empirical studies that analyzes why the use of trade credit varies along the value chain. We argue that competition faced by firms at different stages in the value chain and enforcement mechanisms that stimulate repayment jointly determine the use of trade credit. We distinguish two dimensions of competition, that is, rivalry and customer bargaining power. Competition may stimulate firms to provide trade credit to keep customers from switching to other suppliers. Yet, high contract enforcement costs relative to the value of the transactions, reduce the willingness to offer trade credit. We find empirical evidence showing that competition does not (strongly) influence the use of trade credit in the retail market, whereas it does in the markets for wholesalers and millers. We interpret these results as suggestive evidence that the retail, wholesale and milling market segments differ in terms of the enforcement costs involved in the provision of trade credit. Rivalry at the retail market segment makes switching easy for customers, even in case of default. As enforcement of repayment in this market segment is difficult and costly, trade credit appears to be a risky and less attractive marketing instrument for retailers. In contrast, in the wholesale and milling market segment, trade credit is widespread as stakeholders know each other, making informal mechanisms effective in supporting the enforcement of trade credit repayment.     

Screening by the Company You Keep: Joint Liability Lending and the Peer Selection Effect

We look at an economic environment where borrowers have some information about the nature of each other's projects that lenders do not. We show that joint-liability lending contracts, similar to those used by credit cooperatives and group-lending schemes, will induce endogenous peer selection in the formation of groups in a way that the instrument of joint liability can be used as a screening device to exploit this local information. This can improve welfare and repayment rates if standard screening instruments such as collateral are unavailable.     

论产出分布对团体贷款还款率的影响

关于团体贷款的现有研究对于还款率在时间上和空间上的差异还不能够给出有说服力的解释。通过构造一个产出信息不对称下的五人还款博弈模型 ,我们从产出在成员之间的分布的角度解释这种差异。我们的模型表明了产出在成员间的分布状况可以成为导致这种差异的重要力量 ,同时也加深了我们对团体贷款还款阶段各种影响因素的理解     

基于贷款偏好、企业规模和还贷行为的银企关系分析

中小企业融资难的一大原因是商业银行在选择授信对象时具有“授信给中小规模企业风险大”的贷款偏好．从而在信贷业务操作中表现出对中小企业的歧视。那么实际中小企业还贷履约行为如何？以商业银行和融资企业为对象,本文建立信贷交易博弈模型并实证检验融资企业的规模大小与其还贷履约行为的关系。结果表明：考虑到违约成本,相比较大规模企业的还贷履约情况,中小企业选择按时还贷履约的概率更大,还贷履约情况更好。     

论团体贷款对信贷市场低效率的可能改进

团体贷款以其骄人的还款率和在扶贫方面的突出表现吸引了众多经济学家和政策制定者的目光。但是 ,现有研究更多的是从不同角度来解释并不需要抵押或担保的团体贷款的还款率为何如此高 ,而忽视了团体贷款与个人贷款的效率的比较。对于“团体贷款的效率是否比个人贷款的效率更高 ?”和“团体贷款对信贷市场中的低效率问题有无改进以及是如何改进的 ?”等重要问题的回答构成了该研究领域中的核心内容。     

Repayment performance in group lending: Evidence from Jordan

Using data from a survey of 160 urban borrowing groups of the Microfund for Women in Jordan, we investigate the effect of screening, peer monitoring, group pressure, and social ties on borrowing groups' repayment behavior as an indirect test of different theoretical models. The dependent variable used captures the intensity of default measured by the total number of days of late repayment after each due date, allowing us to use count data models with cluster standard errors. As theory predicts, our empirical analysis suggests that peer monitoring, group pressure, and social ties reduce delinquency. The paper uncovers interesting evidence about the role of social ties and religion. Most notably, in an area where religion contributes to attitudes and beliefs of individuals, we find that religiosity improves repayment performance.     

商业信用融资对企业研发投入强度的影响

研发活动的高风险特征决定其必然受到融资约束。商业信用作为企业短期融资方式,是否影响研发投入？以我国2009-2016年创业板上市公司为样本,探讨商业信用融资对研发投入的影响及产权性质在其中的作用。实证研究发现：企业获得的商业信用越多,越不利于提高研发投入强度。商业信用带来的短期偿债压力会抑制企业研发投入;商业信用融资对民营企业研发投入强度的抑制作用更加明显。结论表明,商业信用融资对企业研发投入主要表现为偿债压力带来的风险效应,而不是融资支持,对民营企业的风险效应更为显著。在金融市场不完善情况下,短期融资难以支持企业长期投资,因而政府需要通过完善金融市场、缓解民营企业融资约束,降低短期负债偿债压力对企业研发活动带来的不利影响。     

Lending policies of informal, formal and semiformal lenders

This paper compares lending policies of formal, informal and semiformal lenders with respect to household lending in Vietnam. The analysis suggests that the probability of using formal or semiformal credit increases if borrowers provide collateral, a guarantor and/or borrow for business‐related activities. The probability of using informal credit increases for female borrowers. It also appears that the probability of using formal credit increases in household welfare up to a certain threshold, but at a decreasing rate. In addition, the paper discerns the determinants of probability of default across lender types. Default risk of formal credit appears to be strongly affected by formal loan contract terms, e.g., loan interest rate and form of loan repayment, whereas default risk on informal loans is significantly related to the presence of propinquity and other internal characteristics of the borrowing household. Overall, the study raises several important implications for the screening, monitoring and enforcement instruments that may be employed by different types of lenders.     

LES DÉTERMINANTS DE LA PERFORMANCE DE REMBOURSEMENT DES MICROCRÉDITS EN TUNISIE

Our work is part of the quest for sustainability of MFIs. To ensure sustainability, an MFI must be effective. It must, among others, face many risks and in particular the default risk. A question arises: what are the determinants of portfolio quality of MFIs? In other words, what are the determinants that influence delays in payment of MFIs? The interest of this research is twofold. The first is practical: knowing the importance of performance measures of microcredit as a precondition for the efficiency and financial performance of MFIs, this study identified determinants of the reimbursement rate in an MFI of Tunisia. It may even give an evidence for banks to intervene on the market of micro credit. The second is methodological: to find the determinants of reimbursement behaviour in MFIs, a binary logistic regression is used, while differing in explanatory variables between key variables and moderators’ ones, which was not met previously in the literature. The results showed that among the variables related to the characteristics of the loan, the loan amount and the borrower's experience with the MFI affect the rate of reimbursement. The credit increases the likelihood of default. Unlike, when borrower's experience with the MFI increases, the risk of default decreases. A relationship between the industry and the repayment rate has not been verified. For variables related to the characteristics of the borrower, age, educational level and marital status of the borrower appear to affect the relationship between the risk of default and the amount of credit. The effect of the credit amount on the default risk decreases as age and level of education increases. In addition, this effect is more important for married compared to the unmarried. For gender, we found that the effect of maturity on the risk of default is not the same for men or women borrowers. It seems that when the maturity increases, men provide reimbursement rates lower than women.     

基于VaR的银行资产投资优化分析

基于VaR银行资本优化模型分析表明:银行的资产风险回报与信贷投资的收益率、金融组合投资风险回报率以及拆借市场的隔夜拆借利率呈正相关关系.     

利率市场化能解决小微企业融资难问题吗*——基于行为金融学视角的分析

本文研究了银行信贷集中问题的成因,讨论了利率市场化背景下小微企业融资问题难的解决思路。本文首先以行为前景理论和心理账户理论为基础,考察授信者行为因素对银行授信决策的影响,以探讨小微企业融资困境形成和银行信贷集中问题产生的机制。然后本文讨论了分析信贷集中和小微企业融资问题所依赖的假设和变量,从收益和风险两个方面对商业银行信贷决策做出了研究。研究发现利率市场化改革可以有效缓解小微企业融资难和信贷资金集中于大中型企业的问题。     

Microfinance Beyond Group Lending

Microlending is growing in Eastern Europe, Russia and China as a flexible means of widening access to financial services, both to help alleviate poverty and to encourage private-sector activity. We describe mechanisms that allow these programmes to successfully penetrate new segments of credit markets. These features include direct monitoring, regular repayment schedules, and the use of non-refinancing threats. These mechanisms allow the programmes to generate high repayment rates from low-income borrowers without requiring collateral and without using group lending contracts that feature joint liability.     

Capital requirements and business cycles with credit market imperfections

The business cycle effects of bank capital regulatory regimes are examined in a New Keynesian model with credit market imperfections and a cost channel of monetary policy. Bank capital increases incentives for banks to monitor borrowers, thereby raising the repayment probability, and excess capital generates benefits in terms of reduced regulatory scrutiny. Basel I- and Basel II-type regulatory regimes are defined, and the model is calibrated for a middle-income country. Simulations of a supply shock show that, depending on the elasticity that relates the repayment probability to the bank capital–loan ratio, the Basel II regime may be less procyclical than a Basel I regime.     

Creating Creditworthiness through Reciprocal Trade

The paper investigates how barter can be used to finance imports and restore the creditworthiness of highly indebted countries when reputation as an enforcement mechanism for credit repayment does not work. The authors argue that payments in goods can be used to collateralize a trade credit and thus improve the creditor's incentives to pursue defaulting debtors. Furthermore, it is shown that barter is particularly advantageous if export revenues of the debtor country are stochastic, even in the absence of risk aversion. The predictions of the model are consistent with data on actual barter contracts.     

SOME NEW EVIDENCE ON COMPETITION IN PAYDAY LENDING MARKETS

A critical question in the policy debate about payday lending is whether other financial institutions can plausibly provide attractive and lower‐priced substitutes for standard payday loans. I present several new pieces of evidence addressing the question, focusing on whether credit unions, which are often held as the strongest potential competitors to payday lenders, do (or might) viably compete in the payday loan market. National payday loan offerings by credit unions show that very few credit unions currently offer payday loans. Credit union industry reports suggest that those credit unions offering such loans seem unwilling or unable to undercut substantially the prevailing prices set by payday lenders. Those industry reports also reveal that lower‐priced credit union loans generally ration riskier borrowers out of the market by imposing greater restrictions on approval and repayment; risk‐adjusted prices for credit union payday loans may not be lower at all. Survey evidence suggests that most current payday borrowers prefer higher‐priced but less restrictive standard payday loans to lower‐priced but more restrictive alternatives offered by credit unions. The combined demand‐ and supply‐side evidence suggests that one should not expect credit unions (or by extension banks) to offer lower‐priced, higher‐quality alternatives for consumers who currently use payday loans. (JEL G2, L0, L5)     

A finite-life private-information theory of unsecured consumer debt

We present a theory of unsecured consumer debt that does not rely on utility costs of default or on enforcement mechanisms that arise in repeated-interaction settings. The theory is based on private information about a person's type and on a person's incentive to signal his type to entities other than creditors. Specifically, debtors signal their low-risk status to insurers by avoiding default in credit markets. The signal is credible because in equilibrium people who repay are more likely to be the low-risk type and so receive better insurance terms. We explore two different mechanisms through which repayment behavior in the credit market can be positively correlated with low-risk status in the insurance market. Our theory is motivated in part by some facts regarding the role of credit scores in consumer credit and auto insurance markets.     

The suspension of borrowing: an implicit penalty for loan default under imperfect information

A credit seeker may be suspended from borrowing for a period of time due to a previous default. Such suspension is widely used in bank lending through credit check. Our work analyses the effects of suspension on the investment choice of borrowers under uncertainty and on the lending policy of banks facing asymmetric information. We show that suspension should be tightened at low loan rates, but loosened otherwise, to improve the repayment performance of borrowers. We also show that although credit rationing may not be completely removed due to imperfect information, the excess demand for credit or transitive waiting in the market can actually be attenuated by such efficient use of suspension. Our theoretical predictions are consistent with observed cyclical patterns of changes in lendingrates and suspension severity.     

Determinants of microcredit repayment in Portugal: analysis of borrowers,loans and business projects

Microcredit programs in Portugal represent a unique case for studying the microcredit repayment determinants in a developed country, as it experienced a financial hardship in 2008–2009, with economic and social consequences that led to unemployment crisis. This research examined the determinants of microcredit loan repayment based on a sample of 752 microcredit loans granted in Portugal by the National Association for the Right to Credit, adopting individual lending mechanisms and granting loans through partnerships with several credit institutions. This is the first study to ascertain the influence that a set of factors – grouped into three categories: borrowers’ individual characteristics; loan characteristics; and characteristics of business projects implemented by borrowers – has on the repayment ability of microcredit programs, in a developed country of the Eurozone. Moreover, this is the first study using an ordered logistic regression (OLR) in estimating the determinants of microcredit loan repayment. Similar to previous studies, married borrowers tend to repay loans faster as they tend to be more responsible than single borrowers. Nationality seems to be an issue as foreigners tends to default the repayment loans. Finally, those involved in manufacturing activities perform better than those involved in service activities in repaying their loans. This clearly indicates that in developed countries special attention needs to be provided to minority groups as well as market/supply conditions, which are not normally considered in less favored economic countries.     

微型金融机构信贷问题与对策研究

微型金融机构主要客户是财务不健全、缺少抵押与担保、信息严重不对称的小微企业与个人,如何有效管理信用风险、控制信贷审核成本是微型金融机构信贷业务亟待解决的问题。通过分析微型金融机构信贷业务面临的问题,利用贷款承诺与关系贷款理论,对微型金融机构信贷业务中存在的问题提出对策建议。