Do the French pension reforms increase re-employment of older unemployed workers?

ABSTRACT

The sustainability of Social Security financing has pushed authorities to reform their policy to increase the labour market participation of older workers. While most of the studies have focused on the consequences of pension reform on retirement decisions, we analyse the effects of two French pension reforms, which increased the period of contribution and the minimum retirement age, on transitions out of unemployment and into employment with a difference-in-differences approach. We find that both retirement reforms have positive effects on the re-employment of older unemployed workers. The pension reforms are also accompanied by an increase of the transitions into inactivity. The results suggest that the reforms have delivered significant effects by reducing the unemployment of older workers.     

OCCUPATIONAL PENSIONS, WAGES, AND JOB MOBILITY IN GERMANY

Pension‐covered workers in Germany are three times less likely to change jobs than workers not covered by an occupational pension scheme. This paper examines the effects of occupational pension coverage and pension portability loss on voluntary job changes using a sample selection model with endogenous switching. The model estimates, derived from western German panel data for 1985–1998, indicate that occupational pension coverage reduces worker mobility by imposing a capital loss on those leaving their job before retirement age. Moreover, pension‐covered workers receive a higher compensation, which discourages mobility. Making pensions portable increases mobility, but from a low initial level.     

Pension expectations,reforms and macroeconomic downturn in Italy. What can microdata tell us?

We use different years of the Bank of Italy’s Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) to explore how Italian workers’ expectations regarding their future level of pension benefits and retirement age changed from 2000 to 2014. Comparing expected and statutory values for future pension benefits and retirement ages, we find that knowledge of the pension system and its rules are not evenly distributed among workers. Some sections of the population, in particular, younger workers, women and the self-employed, are less precise in estimating their future pension benefits. As for retirement age, a large share of the working population still has not completely assimilated the implications of the linkage with the evolution of lifetime expectations at 65. Expectations in the final part of the period observed are dominated by increasing pessimism, which may be related to the macroeconomic crisis of the Italian economy and to the approval of a severe pension reform in 2011. Checking whether a household’s total wealth is consistent with lifetime consumption, we find that households where the head overestimates the future value of the pension benefit accumulate fewer resources than the remaining part of the population.     

Taxation of early retirement windows and delaying retirement: The French experience

This paper investigates the effect of the 2003 French pension reform on hiring, firing and employment rates among older workers. This reform increased the mandatory retirement age and simultaneously it set a tax levied on early retirement windows paid by firms to their older workers, to encourage them to leave their job early. We use a matching model with endogenous job destruction extended to account for a mandatory retirement age and we calibrate the model with data drawn from the French Labor Force Surveys for the years 2002 and 2003. We show that in the case of a high tax rate, delaying retirement raises job separation rates, which partially offsets its positive effect on job finding rates. Consequently, the combination of an increase in the retirement age and a taxation on early retirement windows may have negative effects on the employment rate among older workers.     

Retirement expectations, pension reforms, and their impact on private wealth accumulation

We estimate the effect of pension reforms on households' expectations of retirement outcomes and private wealth accumulation decisions exploiting a decade of intense Italian pension reforms as a source of exogenous variation in expected pension wealth. The Survey of Household Income and Wealth, a large random sample of the Italian population, elicits expectations of the age at which workers expect to retire and of the ratio of pension benefits to pre-retirement income between 1989 and 2002. We find that workers have revised expectations in the direction suggested by the reform and that there is substantial offset between private wealth and perceived pension wealth, particularly by workers that are better informed about their pension wealth.     

Age-specific entrepreneurship and PAYG: Public pensions in Germany

We present new empirical evidence on the distribution of earnings, income and wealth among entrepreneurs in Germany. We document that both earnings and income are more concentrated among entrepreneurs than among workers and describe a large-scale overlapping-generations model that replicates the age-earnings profiles of these two household types. As an application, we compute the equilibrium effects of a reform of the German pay-as-you-go pension system in which entrepreneurs must also contribute and receive a pension. We show that in the presence of mobility between workers and entrepreneurs, the expected lifetime utility of all newborn households unanimously declines due to the general equilibrium effects of lower aggregate savings, and welfare losses amount to approximately 0.7% of total consumption. In addition, the integration of self-employed workers into the social security system in Germany does not help to improve its fiscal sustainability, and only an increase in the retirement age to 70 years will help to finance pensions at the present level beyond the year 2050.     

Reinforcing the Link Between Contributions and Pensions: The Effect of the Population Aging

In this paper, we analyze a majority voting process on the earnings-related part of pension benefits in a Social Security system with flexible retirement. We show that the aging of the population may make it easier to implement one of the proposed reforms to achieve a delay in the average retirement age of workers, to reinforce the link between contributions and pensions.     

The Effect of Benefit Reductions on the Retirement Age: The Heterogeneous Response of Manual and Non‐Manual Workers

I estimate the effect of benefit reductions on the timing of retirement. The introduction of actuarial adjustments in the German public pension system serves as a source of exogenous variation to estimate discrete time transition rates into retirement for individuals of age 60–66. Responses to benefit reductions are elaborated separately for manual and non‐manual workers. On average, individuals postpone retirement by 13.2 months if pension benefits are reduced by 3.6 percent for each year of early retirement. This result is in line with the previous quasi‐experimental literature and suggests that people respond to the incentive of reducing the implicit tax on further periods of work. However, among men the response is about 50 percent lower for manual workers compared to non‐manual workers. Surprisingly, this does not necessarily indicate that retirement incomes of manual workers deteriorate. The explanation is that disability pensions are available at age 63—without benefit reductions.     

Market wages,reservation wages,and retirement decisions

The paper is an empirical cross-section study of the retirement decisions of American white men between the ages of 58 and 67, predicated on the theoretical notion that an individual retires when his reservation wage exceeds his market wage. Reservation wages are derived from an explicit utility function in which the most critical taste parameter is assumed to vary both systematically and randomly across individuals. Market wages are derived from a standard wage equation adjusted to the special circumstances of older workers. The two equations are estimated jointly by maximum likelihood, which takes into account the potential selectivity bias inherent in the model (low-wage individuals tend to retire and cease reporting their market wage). The model is reasonably successful in predicting retirement decisions, and casts serious doubt on previous claims that the social security system induces many workers to retire earlier than they otherwise would. The normal effects of aging (on both market and reservation wages) and the incentives set up by private pension plans are estimated to be major causes of retirement.     

CHANGING PENSION POLICY AND THE AGING OF AMERICA

The recently enacted Tax Reform Act of 1986 contains a number of pension policy provisions including faster vesting for private-sector, single-employer pension plans and imposing tax penalties on preretirement pension plan distributions that are not saved until retirement age. Since pensions are a long-term commitment, the impact of pension policy changes may not be fully realized for a number of years. For that reason, the effects of the Tax Reform Act's pension provisions are investigated using both short-run and long-run simulation models. Faster vesting would immediately entitle an additional 1.9 million pension plan participants to pension benefits at retirement. This increase would not, however, be translated directly into significant gains in pension recipiency for workers currently in their 50s. Nevertheless, by the time the baby boom generation retires, faster vesting and lump-sum penalties could provide more retirees with pensions and increase the standard of living of pension recipients.     

Pension profile preferences: the influence of trust and expected expenses

This paper studies the influence of people’s expectations about expenses during retirement and trust in pension funds on preferences for different pension arrangements. Although most workers prefer a flat-rate annuity, many workers want to deviate from it. The most popular option is a high/low, annuity-based profile, followed by a partial lump sum payment. Workers who expect declining expenses during retirement are more likely to opt for a high/low annuity-based pension and/or a lump sum payment at retirement. Furthermore, workers and pensioners who do not trust their pension fund are more likely to prefer a lump sum over annuity-based arrangements.     

The effects of recent Spanish pension reforms on sustainability and pension adequacy

The Spanish pension system has been recently reformed as a response to the demographic challenge and with the objective of ensuring the sustainability of the pension system in the long-term. The overall reforms include changes in the majority of the system parameters, a new indexation rule and a sustainability factor that links life expectancy and the first pension amount. The aim of this work is to analyse how these reforms affect two important features of a pension system: fiscal sustainability and adequacy. For this purpose, the real internal rate of return (IRR) of the lifetime contributions and benefits and the prospective gross theoretical replacement rate (TRR), both before and after the reforms, have been computed. The calculations are case-study based, for a few hypothetical workers who are sufficiently representative of the earnings and retirement patterns in Spain. The results show that the real IRR is 0.7 p.p. lower and the prospective gross TRR is 18 p.p. lower after the reform process for the base case of a man with an uninterrupted career of 40 years with average earnings and a retirement age of 65. In addition, pension reform process in Spain has different effects among the individuals depending on the gender, level of earnings, retirement age and career length.     

An increase in the retirement age in China: the regional economic effects

China’s pension system is in need of comprehensive reform. One measure on which we focus is to increase the retirement age. It is likely that a change in retirement age will have significantly different effects across China’s regions. Interregional disparities are already very substantial in China and it will be important to know how changes in pension arrangements will affect disparities. We consider four policies to increase the retirement age from 60 to 61. They differ according the use made of the extra revenue generated by the policy. All four policies increase welfare and reduce the interregional welfare gap.     

Labour-incentive reforms at preretirement age in Austria

Low participation rates of older workers in the labour market threaten the sustainability of the pension system in Austria. Given the current political debate on this issue, we try to shed light on employment and retirement behaviour of Austrian couples when income support is provided and pension benefits are reduced. Using a sample of married couples with both partners aged 50–65, we find that the proposed reform increases the labour supply of middle-income men whereas the effects on women are weaker. However, somehow surprisingly, we find that these reforms have an increasing effect on unemployment/inactivity probabilities which in turn is outweighed by a decreasing effect on the retirement probabilities in case of women. These findings emphasize the importance of a joint consideration of labour supply and retirement behaviour of married couples when introducing pension reforms and tax-benefit policies.     

延迟退休年龄与养老保险收支余额:作用机制及政策效应

文章通过连续时间养老金收支模型分析认为延迟退休年龄对养老保险计划收支余额的影响来自四个方面的效应,即缴费年限效应、领取年限效应、替代率效应和差异效应。改革的最终效果是上述四种效应共同作用的结果。短期看,前两种效应占据主导;长期看,后两种效应也具有显著影响。延迟退休年龄的政策效果和工资增长率、养老金增长率、改革速度以及未来参保人口结构有关。理论分析和实证检验结果表明,无论从改革过程还是从对养老保险计划收支余额的影响看,延迟退休年龄都是一个复杂而渐进的过程,延迟退休年龄必将减轻政府在养老保险方面负担的传统说法并不全面。     

Endogenous retirement and public pension system reform in Spain

Population aging has spurred developed countries around the world to reform their PAYG pension systems. In particular, delaying legal retirement ages and reducing the generosity of pension benefits have been widely implemented changes. This paper assesses the potential success of these policies in the case of the Spanish economy, and compares them with the results obtained by the (rather modest) reforms already implemented in 1997 and 2001. This evaluation is accomplished in a heterogeneous-agent dynamic general equilibrium model where individuals can adjust their retirement ages in response to changes to the pension rules. We check the ability of the model to reproduce the basic stylized facts of retirement behavior (particularly the pattern of early retirement induced by minimum pensions). The model is then used to explore the impact of pension reforms. We find that already implemented changes actually increase the implicit liabilities of the system. In contrast, delaying the legal retirement age and extending the averaging period in the pension formula to cover most of the individual's life-cycle can reduce the implicit liabilities substantially. These findings reveal the failure of the Spanish political system to distribute the costs of population aging more evenly across the generations.     

Life expectancy, human capital, social security and growth

We analyze the effects of changes in the mortality rate upon life expectancy, education, retirement age, human capital and growth in the presence of social security. We build a vintage growth, overlapping generations model in which individuals choose the length of education and the age of retirement, and where unfunded social security pensions depend on workers' past contributions. Social security has a positive effect on education, but pension benefits favor reductions in retirement age. The net effect is that starting from a benchmark case, higher life expectancies give rise to lower per capita GDP growth in the presence of social security as the share of the active population is reduced. In addition, higher social security contribution rates reduce the growth rate of per capita GDP.     

Social security and retirement incentives in Austria

This paper provides an overview of the interaction between social security and retirement behavior in Austria in the decades up to the on-going reform process. The key question is, how much of the retirement behavior can be attributed to incentive effects of the pension system. We describe the labor market and retirement behavior of the elderly in Austria, survey the key features of the public pension system and finally present the results of a series of simulations aimed at assessing the retirement incentives generated by the pension system. We compute levels and accrual rates of social security wealth and implicit tax rates on continued work according to the method portrayed in Gruber and Wise [Gruber J, Wise D (1999) Social security and retirement around the world. University of Chicago Press, Chicago London]. To some extent, the sharp drop in labor force participation among the elderly must be attributed to major disincentives of the Austrian pension system; the system turns out to provide significant incentives to retire early. Past reforms have reduced the disincentives. Our results, however, show the need to further reform the public pension scheme and to reorient it stronger towards the principle of actuarial fairness.     

Social Desirability of Earnings Tests

Abstract. In many countries, pension systems involve some form of earnings test; i.e. an individual's benefits are reduced if he has labor income. This paper examines whether or not such earnings tests emerge when pension system and income tax are optimally designed. We use a simple model with individuals differing both in productivity and in their health status. The working life of an individual has two 'endings': an official retirement age at which he starts drawing pension benefits (while possibly supplementing them with some labor income) and an effective age of retirement at which professional activity is completely given up. Weekly work time is endogenous, but constant in the period before official retirement and again constant (but possibly at a different level), after official retirement. Earnings tests mean that earnings are subject to a higher tax after official retirement than before. We show under which conditions earnings tests emerge both under a linear and under a non-linear tax scheme. In particular, we show that earnings tests will occur if heterogeneities in health or productivity are more significant after official retirement than before.     

Integration of unemployment insurance with retirement insurance

This paper analyzes a social insurance system that integrates unemployment insurance with a pension program, allowing workers to borrow against their future wage income to finance consumption during an unemployment episode and thus improving search incentives while reducing the risks arising from unemployment. This paper identifies the conditions under which integration improves welfare and the factors which determine the optimal degree of integration. We show that when the duration of unemployment is very short compared to the period of employment or retirement, the optimal system involves exclusive reliance on pension-funded self-insurance. This system imposes a negligible risk burden for workers while avoiding attenuating search incentives. We also argue that joint integration of several social insurance programs with a pension program through an individual account is desirable unless the risks are perfectly correlated with each other.